CourtListener 10648087•People v. Clayton CA4/1
Texte intégral
Filed 8/5/25 P. v. Clayton CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D085021
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. CVRI2403616)
JESSE EDWARD CLAYTON,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Riverside County,
Samuel Diaz, Jr., Judge. Reversed and remanded with instructions.
Mytili G. Bala, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General,
Collette C. Cavalier and Nora S. Weyl, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
Jesse Edward Clayton appeals an order denying his petition for a
certificate of rehabilitation and pardon under Penal Code section 4852.01.
Clayton argues—and the People agree—the trial court misconstrued
section 4852.01 by concluding Clayton was statutorily ineligible. He also
asserts the trial court committed a reversible error by failing to appoint
counsel as required by section 4852.08. Resolving this matter by
memorandum opinion (see generally People v. Garcia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th
847), we accept the People’s concession and reverse and remand with
instructions.
I.
According to his petition, in 2012, Clayton was convicted of knowingly
possessing child pornography (§ 311.11(a))1, having knowing contact with a
minor to commit a sexual offense (§ 288.3(a)), and attempting to use a minor
for obscene material (§§ 664, 311.4(c)). Clayton was released from prison in
2013 and discharged from parole in 2016.
In 2024, Clayton petitioned for a certificate of rehabilitation and
pardon. Clayton represented himself in the petition’s proceedings. The trial
court denied the petition after concluding Clayton was not eligible to petition
for relief under section 4852.01(b).
II.
A.
Clayton argues the trial court erred because he is eligible to petition for
relief under the plain language of section 4852.01(a). The People concede
error, and we agree.
The trial court’s denial turned on its interpretation of section 4852.01,
which is a question of law we review de novo. (People v. Failla (2006)
140 Cal.App.4th 1514, 1520.)
1 Though the appellate record is unclear whether Clayton was convicted
of section 311.11 or section 311.4, the outcome of this appeal is the same
regardless.
2
Under section 4852.01(a), “a person convicted of a felony may file a
petition for a certificate of rehabilitation and pardon.” But the statute
excludes certain individuals. Relevant here, subdivision (b) restricts
eligibility for those convicted of “a felony violation of any sex offense specified
in [s]ection 290 who [are] granted probation.” (Id., subd. (b), italics added.)
Clayton argues, and the People concede, he is eligible to petition for
relief under section 4852.01(a). Although he was convicted of a sex offense
felony under section 290, he was sentenced to prison, not probation. As a
result, any restrictions in subdivision (b) do not apply to him. (§ 4852.01(b).)
By the statute’s plain language, Clayton is thus eligible to petition for a
certificate of rehabilitation and pardon under subdivision (a). (§ 4852.01(a).)
Because we perceive no ambiguity in the statute, the plain meaning
governs. (Failla, 140 Cal.App.4th at p. 1520.) Consequently, we do not need
to turn to any other interpretive aids. (Id. at pp. 1520-1521.)
Given Clayton’s eligibility to petition for certification of rehabilitation
and pardon, the trial court erred in concluding otherwise. As this appeal
addresses only Clayton’s eligibility to petition, we express no opinion
regarding the outcome of the merits of his petition on remand.
B.
Clayton argues reversal is also required because the trial court failed to
appoint counsel as required under section 4852.08. Because we are reversing
on another ground, we do not need to reach this issue. On remand, however,
the trial court must ensure Clayton is afforded his statutory right to assigned
counsel. (See § 4852.08.)
III.
We reverse and remand the order denying Clayton’s petition for a
certificate of rehabilitation and pardon. On remand, the trial court shall
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consider Clayton’s petition on the merits and proceed under the directives of
section 4852.01 et seq., including the right to counsel under section 4852.08.
CASTILLO, J.
WE CONCUR:
O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.
RUBIN, J.
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