CourtListener 10648083•People v. Mourning CA2/6
Texte intégral
Filed 8/5/25 P. v. Mourning CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B343248
(Super. Ct. No. 24PT-00444)
Respondent, (San Luis Obispo County)
v.
JEFFEREY MOURNING,
Appellant.
Jefferey Mourning appeals from the trial court’s order
committing him to the California Department of State Hospitals
as an Offender with a Mental Health Disorder (OMHD) within
the meaning of the OMHD Act. (Pen. Code1, § 2960 et seq.) We
appointed counsel to represent appellant on appeal. After an
examination of the record, counsel filed an opening brief raising
no arguable issues and requested we follow the procedures set
1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code.
forth in Conservatorship of Ben C. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 529 (Ben C.)
and People v. Taylor (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 304 (Taylor).
Appellant was informed by appellate counsel and this court
of his right to file a supplemental brief containing any issues he
wishes this court to consider. He filed one supplemental brief
raising no issues of merit. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Appellant was arrested for throwing rocks at moving
vehicles on a San Diego highway. When arresting officers asked
why he was throwing rocks, he said the government was trying to
kill him, he had to defend himself, the government was tracking
him by putting “nanos” in his fingers, and the arresting officers
were “cyborgs.”
Appellant pled guilty to one count of maliciously and
willfully throwing rocks at occupied vehicles in violation of
Vehicle Code section 23110, subdivision (b). He was sentenced to
two years in prison. Prior to his release, the Board of Parole
Hearings (BPH) determined he met the requirements of section
2962 for initial commitment under the OMHD Act. He filed a
section 2966, subdivision (b) petition contesting that
determination, and subsequently waived his right to a jury trial
and his right to be present at trial. The court held a bench trial,
denied his petition, and ordered commitment for one year.
DISCUSSION
Because this appeal is from an OMHD commitment
proceeding rather than a first appeal as of right from a criminal
conviction, appellant is not entitled to our independent review of
the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.
(See Ben C., supra, 40 Cal.4th at pp. 537-539; Taylor, supra, 160
Cal.App.4th at pp. 307-308.) He is, however, entitled to appellate
consideration of any contentions raised in his supplemental brief.
(People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216, 232.)
2
In his supplemental brief, appellant contends he received
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel because his appellate
attorney did not consult with him before filing his opening brief.
To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a
defendant must show trial counsel’s performance was deficient
and resulted in prejudice. (People v. Mickel (2016) 2 Cal.5th 181,
198; Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668 [80 L.Ed.2d
674].) “Similar concepts have been used to measure the
performance of appellate counsel,” (In re Harris (1993) 5 Cal.4th
813, 833) but “[i]t is particularly difficult to prevail on an
appellate claim of ineffective assistance.” (People v. Mai (2013)
57 Cal.4th 986, 1009.) Neither appellant’s supplemental brief nor
the record demonstrates appellate counsel lacked a rational
tactical purpose for filing a brief with no arguable issues.
Counsel provided a reason for filing a no issue brief and nothing
in the record suggests his explanation was not satisfactory.
Appellant also claims his conviction does not fall under the
criteria of the OMHD Act and that forensic psychiatrists did
“everything they could possibly do to obstruct” his release
“including lying to the Superior Court” because of “impartiality,
bias, prejudice, and vindictiveness.”
To qualify as an OMHD, the prosecution must establish
beyond a reasonable doubt (People v. Harrison (2013) 57 Cal.4th
1211, 1219) that defendant has (1) a severe mental disorder, (2)
that is not in remission or cannot be kept in remission without
treatment, (3) which was a cause of or aggravating factor in the
commission of (4) a crime listed in the statute for which the
prisoner was incarcerated in a state prison, (5) the prisoner has
been in treatment for the disorder for at least 90 days within the
year prior to scheduled release on parole, and (6) by reason of the
disorder represents at the time of the BPH a substantial danger
of physical harm to others. (Id. at pp. 1229-1230.)
3
Here, the trial court found all six criteria were proven
beyond a reasonable doubt. A forensic psychologist testified
appellant has a severe mental disorder that is not in remission
and cannot be kept in remission without continued treatment,
was the cause of his commitment offense, and appellant remained
a substantial danger of harm to others. The parties stipulated
appellant had received 90 days of treatment. The trial court
found appellant’s commitment offense satisfied the requirements
of section 2962, subdivision (e)(2)(Q)2, he posed a risk of
substantial danger of physical harm to others, lacked insight into
his severe mental disorder, had a poor history of medication
compliance, and lacked a reasonably viable relapse and release
plan. Appellant’s contentions are meritless.
DISPOSITION
This appeal is dismissed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
CODY, J.
We concur:
YEGAN, Acting P. J. BALTODANO, J.
2 The commitment offense meets the criteria if it is a “crime
in which the perpetrator expressly or impliedly threatened
another with the use of force or violence likely to produce
substantial physical harm in a manner that a reasonable person
would believe and expect that the force or violence would be used.
For purposes of this subparagraph, substantial physical harm
does not require proof that the threatened act was likely to cause
great or serious bodily injury.” (§ 2962, subd. (e)(2)(Q).)
4
Rita Federman, Judge
Superior Court County of San Luis Obispo
______________________________
Christian C. Buckley, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Appellant.
No appearances for Respondent.
5
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