People v. Wheeler CA2/6

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Filed 8/5/25 P. v. Wheeler CA2/6
Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B314403
(Super. Ct. No. 20F-06062)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (San Luis Obispo County)

v. OPINION ON TRANSFER
FROM SUPREME COURT
JOSHUA WHEELER,

Defendant and Appellant.

A jury found Joshua Wheeler guilty of four counts of
forcible rape (Pen. Code,1 § 261, subd. (a)(2)) and four counts of
forcible sexual penetration (§ 289, subd. (a)(1)(C)). As to each
count, the jury found the victim was a minor 14 years of age or
older. The trial court sentenced Wheeler to a total term of 76
years in state prison.
In our prior opinion, we concluded Wheeler is not entitled
to a new sentencing hearing under section 1170 as amended.

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code

unless otherwise stated.
(Stats. 2021, ch. 731, § 1.3.) We also concluded that Wheeler is
not entitled to a jury determination on imposing consecutive
sentences under section 667.6, subdivision (d). Our Supreme
Court ordered that we vacate our decision and reconsider the
cause in light of People v. Salazar (2023) 15 Cal.5th 416
(Salazar I), and People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730 (Lynch).
Having done so, we affirm again.
FACTS
Jane Doe is Wheeler’s stepdaughter. Wheeler is the
biological father of Doe’s five younger siblings. They all lived
together in Oceano.
Wheeler began touching Doe inappropriately when she was
13 or 14 years old. By the time she was 16 years old, he was
having intercourse with her weekly, then almost daily. It
happened in her bed at her home. Doe froze during intercourse.
She had seen Wheeler being violent with her mother. Doe said
her mother left the home multiple times. Her mother was in a
psychiatric hospital from September 2018 to November 2019.
Wheeler looked after the family while her mother was gone. Doe
eventually told a counselor at her high school and Wheeler was
arrested.
Sentencing
At sentencing Wheeler’s counsel argued for the low term:
no force or threat of force was used, Wheeler had no prior felony
offenses, and he was raised by a single mother.
The trial court found as aggravating factors that the victim
was particularly vulnerable; that Wheeler’s acts reflected a high
degree of callousness; and, as “an overwhelming factor,” that he
took advantage of a position of trust or confidence.

2
The trial court rejected Wheeler’s counsel’s argument that
Wheeler’s lack of a prior felony conviction was a mitigating
factor. The court found Wheeler’s criminal history to be
increasingly serious. The court acknowledged that Wheeler used
duress rather than overt violence, but it did not find that to be
mitigating under the circumstances.
The trial court sentenced Wheeler to the upper term of 11
years on each count for forcible rape (counts 1, 3, 4, and 5) and to
the middle term of eight years on each count of digital
penetration (counts 2, 6, 7, and 8). The court imposed
consecutive terms on all counts for a total term of 76 years.
DISCUSSION
I. Resentencing Not Necessary
Wheeler contends he is entitled to be resentenced under
section 1170, as amended by statute 2021, chapter 731, section
1.3.
Prior to its amendment, section 1170, subdivision (b) gave
the trial court discretion in imposing the upper term. Section
1170, subdivision (b) now provides in part:
“(1) When a judgment of imprisonment is to be imposed and
the statute specifies three possible terms, the court shall, in its
sound discretion, order imposition of a sentence not to exceed the
middle term, except as otherwise provided in paragraph (2).
“(2) The court may impose a sentence exceeding the middle
term only when there are circumstances in aggravation of the
crime that justify the imposition of a term of imprisonment
exceeding the middle term, and the facts underlying those
circumstances have been stipulated to by the defendant, or have
been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or
by the judge in a court trial. Except where evidence supporting

3
an aggravating circumstance is admissible to prove or defend
against the charged offense or enhancement at trial, or it is
otherwise authorized by law, upon request of a defendant, trial
on the circumstances in aggravation alleged in the indictment or
information shall be bifurcated from the trial of charges and
enhancements. The jury shall not be informed of the bifurcated
allegations until there has been a conviction of a felony offense.”
Here the trial court, not the jury, found the aggravating
factors. In Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at page 768, our Supreme
Court stated the violation of section 1170, subdivision (b)(2) is
prejudicial unless an appellate court can conclude beyond a
reasonable doubt that a jury would have found true all the
aggravating facts relied upon by the trial court to justify an
upper term sentence.
That is precisely what we concluded in our original opinion.
We stated:
“The evidence was essentially uncontradicted. As Doe’s
stepfather, Wheeler held a position of trust. Doe was particularly
vulnerable. She lived in the same house as Wheeler; her mother
was absent from the home for substantial periods of time; she
was afraid that Wheeler would molest her siblings; and she had
seen Wheeler being violent. Finally, Wheeler’s acts reflected a
high degree of callousness. He molested Doe in her own home,
often, and over a substantial period of time.
“There is no reasonable doubt that a jury would have found
all the aggravating factors on which the trial court relied beyond
a reasonable doubt. We need not remand for sentencing.”
Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th 730, provides no reason for us to
change our conclusion.

4
II. Personal Background Factors Moot
Wheeler contends the amendment to section 1170,
subdivision (b)(6) requires the trial court to consider factors in his
personal background that support imposition of the lower term.
The amended portion of section 1170, subdivision (b)(6)
provides in part: “[U]nless the court finds that the aggravating
circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances that
imposition of the lower term would be contrary to the interests of
justice, the court shall order imposition of the lower term if any of
the following was a contributing factor in the commission of the
offense: [¶] (A) The person has experienced psychological,
physical, or childhood trauma, including, but not limited to,
abuse, neglect, exploitation, or sexual violence.”
Wheeler relies on his statement to the court at sentencing
that he was raised by a single mother, so he did not have anyone
to model being a father.
In rejecting Wheeler’s argument, we stated:
“Being raised by a single mother does not come close to
‘psychological, physical, or childhood trauma’ within the meaning
of section of 1170. Many children are raised by single mothers,
and they grow up to be moral and law-abiding adults who would
not even think about sexually violating a child. There is simply
no link between being raised by a single mother and the
propensity to molest children.
“Wheeler contends the matter should be remanded so that
he could produce any evidence of trauma. He makes no offer of
proof that he has any such evidence. If any such evidence
existed, Wheeler would have produced it. Even before the
amendment to section 1170, the trial court could consider any
circumstances in mitigation that reasonably related to the

5
defendant or the crime. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.423(c).) A
history of childhood trauma is powerful mitigation evidence. (In
re Lucas (2004) 33 Cal.4th 682, 729.)
“In any event, a remand is not required where the record
clearly indicates that the trial court would have reached the same
conclusion even if it had been aware that it had such discretion.
(People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1391.) Here,
Wheeler, a mature adult, frequently sexually violated a child over
a substantial period of time. The court cited three aggravating
factors and no mitigating factors. This is simply not a low-term
case, even if Wheeler could produce evidence of trauma.”
Salazar I, supra, 15 Cal.5th 416, does not require a
different result. In Salazar I, a jury found the defendant guilty of
false imprisonment by violence and infliction of corporal injury on
a person with whom he had a dating relationship. The trial court
imposed the middle term. While his appeal was pending,
subdivision (b)(6) was added to section 1170. The defendant
demanded resentencing to the lower term. We declined to
remand for resentencing.
Under People v. Gutierrez, supra, 58 Cal.4th 1354, the
majority concluded that the record clearly indicated the trial
court would have reached the same decision if it had been aware
that it had discretion. (People v. Salazar (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th
453, 464) (Salazar II). Our Supreme Court disagreed with the
majority’s conclusion. The court pointed out that the defendant
was diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder and had a history of
paranoia, including hospitalization, since he was 10 years old.
The court stated that the parties and the trial court all
acknowledged that the defendant’s “criminality appeared to be
primarily bound up with his drug addiction and mental health

6
issues, and possibly the effects of losing his parents several years
before the current offenses.” (Id. at p. 427.) Our Supreme Court
also noted that under the former law the trial court had the
discretion to impose any term, but did not impose the upper term.
The court determined that the record did not clearly indicate the
sentencing court would have exercised its discretion to impose
the same middle term. (Id. at pp. 427-428.)
Here none of the factors exist that caused our Supreme
Court to remand in Salazar I. In sentencing Wheeler, the trial
court found three aggravating factors and no mitigating factors.
The court chose the high term. Wheeler presented no evidence of
a mental illness. He was simply motivated by lust for a 14-year-
old girl. Salazar I presents no reason for us to change our
conclusion.
III. Wheeler Suffered No Prejudice
under Section 667.6, Subdivision (d)(1)
Wheeler contends the imposition of consecutive sentences
violated his Sixth Amendment right to have a jury determine the
factual findings that led to an increased sentence.
Section 667.6, subdivision (d)(1) provides in part: “A full,
separate, and consecutive term shall be imposed for each
violation of an offense specified in subdivision (e) if the crimes
involve . . . the same victim on separate occasions.” Section
667.6, subdivision (e)(1) lists rape in violation of section 261,
subdivision (a)(2); and section 667.6, subdivision (e)(8) lists
sexual penetration in violation of section 289, subdivision (a).
Wheeler cites Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466,
490 (Apprendi), for the proposition that any fact that increases
the penalty for a crime is an element that must be submitted to
the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt. Apprendi

7
involved a state statute that provided for a sentence
enhancement if a trial judge found that a defendant committed a
crime for the purpose of intimidating a person or group on the
basis of race.
Our Supreme Court rejected Wheeler’s argument in People
v. Catarino (2023) 14 Cal.5th 748. Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. 466,
does not apply to a determination to impose consecutive
sentences. (Ibid.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

GILBERT, P. J.
We concur:

YEGAN, J.

BALTODANO, J.

8
Jesse J. Marino, Judge

Superior Court County of San Luis Obispo

______________________________

Arielle Bases, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Analee J. Brodie,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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