CourtListener 10646335•People v. Gibson CA2/2
Texte intégral
Filed 8/1/25 P. v. Gibson CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE, B334296
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. BA016268)
CLARENCE ALBERT GIBSON,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Renee F. Korn, Judge. Affirmed.
Danalynn Pritz, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant
Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Idan Ivri and Roberta
L. Davis, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
Clarence Gibson appeals the denial of his petition for
resentencing under Penal Code1 section 1172.6 following an
evidentiary hearing. He argues there is insufficient evidence to
support the superior court’s finding that appellant was a major
participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life
during the course of a robbery. We disagree and affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. Robbery and shooting
On the evening of Friday, March 23, 1990, appellant was
drinking on a porch with Tyrone Randall (Randall) and several
others. Appellant expressed a need for money and proposed
“ ‘doing a jack,’ ” i.e., robbing someone. Randall responded,
“ ‘Let’s roll.’ ” Appellant and Randall each pulled a gun, and
Randall “opened the chambers” on his gun to confirm there were
bullets “and closed it back.” The two men left the group and
walked toward an intersection to find a victim, with several other
men in tow. A truck stopped, and appellant and Randall each
faced the driver’s side of the truck. Either appellant or Randall
shot the driver dead. The victim’s wallet was taken and the cash
in it distributed among appellant, Randall, and other men at the
scene.
2. Conviction and appeal
In 1991, a jury convicted appellant of robbery (§ 211) and
first degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a)) “during the commission of
the crime of Robbery,” and found true a personal firearm use
allegation (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)).
Appellant’s conviction was affirmed on direct appeal.
(People v. Randall (Dec. 27, 1993, B066355 [nonpub. opn.].)
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
3. 1172.6 petition, summary denial, and appeal
In 2018, appellant filed a petition for resentencing under
section 1172.6. After appointing counsel and entertaining briefs,
the superior court denied appellant’s petition, concluding he had
not made a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief.
Appellant appealed, and this court reversed and remanded
for the superior court to conduct an evidentiary hearing. (People
v. Gibson (Aug. 11, 2022, B312655 [nonpub. opn.].)
4. Denial after evidentiary hearing
On remand, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing at
which appellant testified that law enforcement conspired against
him and that the victim had not in fact been killed. The People
relied on the transcripts from the underlying trial. The superior
court found beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was either
the actual killer or an aider and abettor, and that he was also
guilty under a still valid theory of felony murder because he was
a major participant in the robbery who acted with reckless
indifference to human life.
DISCUSSION
Appellant argues that substantial evidence does not
support the superior court’s finding that he was a major
participant in the robbery who acted with reckless indifference to
human life. Because this issue is dispositive, we do not reach
appellant’s arguments regarding other theories of liability (actual
killer and direct aider and abettor).
1. Section 1172.6, generally
Under the ameliorative changes in the law effected by
Senate Bill No. 1437 (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015), malice must be
proved to convict a principal of murder, except under the
narrowed felony-murder rule set forth in section 189, subdivision
3
(e), and may not be imputed based solely on an individual’s
participation in a crime (§ 188, subd. (a)(3)), thereby eliminating
the natural and probable consequences doctrine as a basis for
convicting a defendant of murder (People v. Gentile (2020) 10
Cal.5th 830, 842–843, 847 (Gentile)). The amended felony-
murder law requires the People to prove specific facts relating to
the defendant’s individual culpability: The defendant was the
actual killer (§ 189, subd. (e)(1)); although not the actual killer,
the defendant assisted in the commission of the murder with the
intent to kill (§ 189, subd. (e)(2)); or the defendant was a major
participant in an underlying felony listed in section 189,
subdivision (a), and acted with reckless indifference to human
life, “as described in subdivision (d) of Section 190.2.” (§ 189,
subd. (e)(3); People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708 (Strong).)
Section 1172.6 permits an individual convicted of felony
murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine to petition the sentencing court to vacate the conviction
and be resentenced on any remaining counts if he or she could
not now be convicted of murder because of Senate Bill No. 1437’s
changes to the definitions of the crime. (Strong, supra, 13
Cal.5th at p. 708; People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957;
Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 843.)
If the petitioner makes the requisite prima facie showing
he or she falls within the provisions of section 1172.6 and is
entitled to relief, the court must issue an order to show cause and
hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether to vacate the
murder conviction and resentence the petitioner on any
remaining counts. (§ 1172.6, subds. (c) & (d).)
At the evidentiary hearing, “the burden of proof shall be on
the prosecution to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
4
petitioner is guilty of murder or attempted murder under
California law as amended by the changes to Section 188 or 189
made effective January 1, 2019.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) The
court may consider evidence “previously admitted at any prior
hearing or trial that is admissible under current law.” (Ibid.) If
the superior court applied the proper standard and burden of
proof, the denial of a petition after an evidentiary hearing is
reviewed for substantial evidence. (People v. Vargas (2022) 84
Cal.App.5th 943, 951; People v. Ramirez (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th
970, 985 (Ramirez).)
2. The Banks and Clark factors
The overlapping factors for assessing whether a defendant
was a major participant in an underlying serious felony and acted
with reckless indifference to human life for purposes of section
190.2, subdivision (d), and thus for section 189, subdivision (e)(3),
were identified in People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 (Banks)
and People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, and reiterated more
recently in In re Scoggins (2020) 9 Cal.5th 667 (Scoggins).
To determine whether a defendant was a major participant
in one of the specified felonies, the Banks court listed the
following factors: “What role did the defendant have in planning
the criminal enterprise that led to one or more deaths? What role
did the defendant have in supplying or using lethal weapons?
What awareness did the defendant have of particular dangers
posed by the nature of the crime, weapons used, or past
experience or conduct of the other participants? Was the
defendant present at the scene of the killing, in a position to
facilitate or prevent the actual murder, and did his or her own
actions or inaction play a particular role in the death? What did
5
the defendant do after lethal force was used?” (Banks, supra, 61
Cal.4th at p. 803, fn. omitted.)
As to whether a defendant acted with reckless indifference
to human life, the Supreme Court enumerated the following
nonexclusive factors: “Did the defendant use or know that a gun
would be used during the felony? How many weapons were
ultimately used? Was the defendant physically present at the
crime? Did he or she have the opportunity to restrain the crime
or aid the victim? What was the duration of the interaction
between the perpetrators of the felony and the victims? What
was the defendant’s knowledge of his or her confederate’s
propensity for violence or likelihood of using lethal force? What
efforts did the defendant make to minimize the risks of violence
during the felony?” (Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 677; accord,
Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 808.) “ ‘ “[N]o one of these
considerations is necessary, nor is any one of them necessarily
sufficient.” ’ ” (Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 677.) Courts must
view “the totality of the circumstances to determine whether [the
defendant] acted with reckless indifference to human life.” (Ibid.)
Courts have recognized youth as another factor bearing on
whether a defendant acted with reckless indifference to human
life. (E.g., People v. Keel (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 546, 558–559;
Ramirez, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at pp. 990–991; In re Moore
(2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 434, 454–455.)
3. Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s
finding that appellant was a major participant who acted
with reckless indifference to human life
Ample evidence shows that appellant was a major
participant in the robbery. He was the one who proposed it, and
he then armed himself before he and Randall went off in search
6
of a victim. He also saw Randall check his own gun to make sure
he had bullets in it. The men selected a victim together, and they
were both facing the driver’s side of the truck when one of them
shot the driver dead. The men then took the cash from the man’s
wallet and left his body behind to share the loot with their
comrades.
Substantial evidence also shows appellant acted with
reckless indifference to human life. Not only did appellant carry
a gun himself, but he was also aware that Randall was armed
and watched as Randall confirmed that his gun was loaded.
Appellant did nothing to minimize the risk of violence. Although
it is unclear how long the interaction lasted, appellant and
Randall’s decision to rob someone who was in the driver’s seat of
a truck increased the risk that shooting the victim would be
necessary, lest the victim step on the gas and drive away. (See
People v. Mitchell (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 575, 592.) That
appellant was present on the driver’s side when the shooting
occurred suggests he had an opportunity to restrain Randall from
shooting the driver (assuming appellant was not himself the
shooter). The totality of the circumstances show appellant was
willing to resort to killing the victim to carry out the robbery.
(See Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 676–677 [“Reckless
indifference ‘encompasses a willingness to kill (or to assist
another in killing) to achieve a distinct aim, even if the defendant
does not specifically desire that death as the outcome of his
actions’ ”].)2
2 Appellant’s opening brief contains no argument
concerning his youth at the time of the shooting, but we note that
the superior court properly considered this factor in reaching its
conclusion.
7
DISPOSITION
The order denying appellant’s petition for resentencing is
affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
LUI, P. J.
We concur:
CHAVEZ, J.
RICHARDSON, J.
8
Vous vous demandez comment ce texte s’applique à votre situation ?
Consultation gratuite, sans engagement
Décrivez votre situation. Notre équipe vous recontactera par e-mail pour votre consultation.
Poursuivez vos recherches dans ChatGPT ou Claude
Connectez Omnilex pour rechercher dans le corpus juridique depuis votre assistant IA.