CourtListener 10645544•People v. Alas CA2/2
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Filed 7/31/25 P. v. Alas CA2/2
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE, B337592
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. KA130332)
v.
WILFREDO SIMEON ALAS,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Rogelio Delgado, Judge. Reversed and remanded
for resentencing.
Edward H. Schulman, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Wyatt E. Bloomfield and Lindsay Boyd,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
__________________________
After a jury found Wilfredo Simeon Alas guilty of two sex
crimes, the trial court sentenced him on the rape count to the
midterm of six years. As to the sexual battery count, it sentenced
him to one-third the midterm, or one year, and ordered that it be
served consecutively, for a total of seven years. Because we
conclude the trial court misunderstood the scope of its sentencing
discretion and did not make necessary findings, we reverse and
remand for full resentencing. We reject the argument in the
alternative that Alas was entitled to have findings as to
consecutive sentencing determined by a jury beyond a reasonable
doubt.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A jury found Alas guilty of two felonies, one count of rape
by use of alcohol (Pen. Code1, § 261, subd. (a)(3); count 1), and a
second count of sexual battery by restraint (§ 243.4, subd. (a);
count 2). Two aggravating sentencing factors were specially
alleged as to each count: that the offenses indicated “planning,
sophistication, and professionalism,” and that Alas’s prior
convictions are “numerous or of increasing seriousness.” (Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(8) & (b)(2).) After Alas elected to
proceed by way of a bench trial as to these allegations, the trial
court found both factors true beyond a reasonable doubt.
At the sentencing hearing, Alas’s counsel confirmed he was
seeking the low term under section 1170, arguing that Alas had
experienced “psychological physical or childhood trauma” under
section 1170, subdivision (b)(6)(A). The prosecution sought “a full,
separate, and consecutive term” under section 667.6,
subdivision (c) (section 667.6(c)).
1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code.
2
The trial court initially indicated it would sentence Alas as
follows: count 1 as the base term, with the midterm of six years2
to be served in state prison, and count 2 with the midterm of
three years in state prison, but stayed pursuant to section 654.
The prosecutor immediately interjected that the two counts
were for different conduct: count 2 was not based on the same
conduct as the rape, but rather the sucking of the victim’s breast.
After some colloquy, the trial court requested the prosecution
provide authority for its argument that even though the verdict
form did not specifically detail the conduct on which count 2 was
based, closing argument to the jury would suffice to allow count 2
to be sentenced as different conduct.
After a short recess, the trial court stated: “It was brought
to the court’s attention by the People that [Alas], count 2,
243.4(a) must be sentenced consecutively to count 1. People
provided the court the case of the People v. Melhado,
60 Cal.App.4th, 1529, that deals with the proposition that
although the court did not give unanimity instructions, People
can argue certain set of facts to prove that element or to prove
that then happened separately from the underlying offense. . . .
[¶] . . .[¶] . . . In this case People have corrected the court and
perhaps the court should have unanimity. But the People did
comply with the law as presently presented under Melhado. The
People are correct.”
Alas’s counsel objected that “the People did not present this
to the jury,” and the prosecutor responded that the transcript of
2 The crime of rape is punishable by a determinate sentence
of three, six, or eight years (§ 264, subd. (a)), and the sentence for
sexual battery by restraint is two, three, or four years (§ 243.4,
subd. (a)).
3
the trial and in closing argument to the jury, “it was clearly
stated that count [2] was clearly relying upon the sexual battery
as it occurred when he sucked her breast,” as distinct from the
rape.
The trial court then changed the sentence on count 2 to
“the mid-term of three years, one-third the mid-term of that is
one year, and that will be consecutively for a total of seven years”
to be served in state prison.
This timely appeal followed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This case arose out of events taking place at a Halloween
party at Alas’s home in 2021.3 F.R., aged 23 at the time of the
incident, arrived at the party along with her brother and some
friends. F.R. described Alas as being very “touchy” during the
party, pulling her toward him. F.R. consumed “a lot” of alcohol,
enough to “get [her] drunk.” At some point, F.R. threw up. Alas
eventually led her to his son’s bedroom to rest (his son was not at
the house). Once they got there, he kissed her on the lips, but she
did not kiss him back. She told him “no” multiple times. She
blacked out, and the next thing she recalled was feeling the
penetration of his penis inside her vagina while he was on top of
her. She felt pain and went numb. She blacked out again and
when she awoke, one of her friends was present. She told her
friend that Alas had raped her. At that point, her friends helped
her out of the house and into a truck. Alas denied that he had
done anything to her.
After F.R. reported the rape, a Los Angeles County Sheriff’s
Department detective had a recorded interview with Alas.
3 Our recitation of the facts is limited to those facts
necessary to decide this appeal.
4
Portions of the recording were played for the jury, including a
portion in which he stated he had sex with F.R. twice. At other
points in the same recording he denied he had had sex with her,
but he told the detective that “the whole night we’re kissing . . .
everybody saw that,” her mouth had been on his penis, and he
“sucked on her titties.”
Alas testified in his own defense. He denied he had ever
had sex with F.R. and claimed that after he dropped off F.R. in
his son’s room, he never went back into that room. He testified
they had kissed well before she went to the bedroom, the first
time being when he was walking into his room and F.R. was
waiting in line to go into the bathroom. He also testified they
kissed in the hallway. He maintained that when they kissed, it
had been consensual. He recalled later that night being accused
of “do[ing] something to her,” and in response to a comment by
F.R. about having a baby he said, “If it was my child I would take
care of it, but there is no way this is my child.” He also claimed to
have been drunk and not to have slept well when he was
interviewed by the detective.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
A defendant is “entitled to sentencing decisions made in the
exercise of the ‘informed discretion’ of the sentencing court.”
(People v. Belmontes (1983) 34 Cal.3d 335, 348, fn. 8 (Belmontes).)
“ ‘A court which is unaware of the scope of its discretionary
powers can no more exercise that “informed discretion” than one
whose sentence is or may have been based on misinformation
regarding a material part of a defendant’s record.’ ” (People v.
Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1391.)
5
The appropriate remedy when a trial court is not aware of
the full scope of its discretion is to remand for resentencing
unless the record clearly indicates that the trial court would have
reached the same conclusion even if it had been aware that it had
such discretion. (People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 771;
People v. Myers (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 699, 704.)
II. The Relevant Sentencing Schemes
Two separate sentencing schemes are potentially applicable
to this case and to the trial court’s decision to impose consecutive
sentences upon Alas. The traditional framework is provided by
sections 1170.1 and 654. “Under section 1170.1, which is part of
the determinate sentencing law, a court imposing two or more
felonies is required to impose an ‘aggregate term of imprisonment
for all these convictions,’ which is the sum of the ‘principal term,’
the ‘subordinate term[s],’ and any enhancements. . . . The
principal term ‘shall consist of the greatest term of imprisonment
imposed by the court for any of the crimes.’ . . . The subordinate
terms ‘shall consist of one-third of the middle term of
imprisonment prescribed for each other felony conviction for
which a consecutive term of imprisonment is imposed,’ plus one-
third of any applicable enhancements.” (People v. Catarino (2023)
14 Cal.5th 748, 752, citations omitted (Catarino).)
A significant limitation is placed on the trial court’s
discretion, however, by section 654, subdivision (a). That statute
provides that “[a]n act or omission that is punishable in different
ways by different provisions of law may be punished under either
of such provisions, but in no case shall the act or omission be
punished under more than one provision.” (Ibid.) That statute,
first enacted in 1872, limits the punishment for multiple
convictions based on the same conduct, but not the ability to
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obtain multiple convictions in the first place. (People v. Jones
(2012) 54 Cal.4th 350, 353 [proper procedure where there are
multiple convictions for the same act is to sentence the defendant
for each count and stay execution of sentence on those convictions
to which § 654 is applicable].) “ ‘Its protection has been extended
to cases in which there are several offenses committed during “a
course of conduct deemed to be indivisible in time.” ’ ” (People v.
Hicks (1993) 6 Cal.4th 784, 789; see also People v. Corpening
(2016) 2 Cal.5th 307, 311.)
Rule 4.424 of the California Rules of Court provides that
“[b]efore determining whether to impose either concurrent or
consecutive sentences . . . , the court must determine whether the
proscription in section 654 against multiple punishments for the
same act or omission requires a stay of execution of the sentence
imposed on some of the counts.” (Ibid.)
While sections 1170.1 and 654 provide the traditional
determinate sentencing framework for the potential imposition of
a consecutive sentence, another statute provides an alternative
sentencing framework for certain sex offenses, including those at
issue here. First, under section 667.6(c), “a full, separate, and
consecutive term may be imposed for each violation of an offense
specified in subdivision (e) if the crimes involve the same victim
on the same occasion.” (Ibid., italics added.) Second, under
section 667.6, subdivision (d), if the trial court finds that multiple
sex offenses carrying determinate terms involved separate
victims, or the same victim on separate occasions, “[a] full,
separate, and consecutive term shall be imposed for each
violation.” (§ 667.6, subd. (d)(1), italics added.) Only
section 667.6(c), involving a discretionary decision by the trial
7
court for crimes against the same victim on the same occasion, is
at issue here.
A trial court has discretion to choose between the
traditional sentencing framework described by sections 1170.1
and 654, or the alternative sentencing framework described by
section 667.6(c). (Belmontes, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 345.)
III. The Trial Court Misunderstood the Scope of Its
Discretion
Both parties agree that the trial court’s ruling did not
follow the law, but for different reasons. Alas argues that when
the trial court chose to impose sentencing under the framework of
section 1170.1, it failed to consider whether the offenses
constituted a continuing course of conduct, as is required under
section 654. According to Alas, the evidence supports his
argument that the conduct which led to the convictions for rape
and sexual battery were part of a continuous course of conduct,
subject to section 654’s proscription against separate
punishments. He requests that we either modify the judgment by
directing that the sentence on count 2 be stayed pursuant to
section 654, or at minimum, remand the matter with directions to
the trial court to “complete its 654 analysis” as to whether the
offenses on which Alas was convicted were a continuing course of
conduct precluding a consecutive sentence.
The People support remand for a different reason. They
agree the trial court did not clearly state whether Alas’s
convictions constituted an indivisible course of conduct. But they
also contend the trial court’s oral pronouncement of sentence was
“unclear,” and that the record demonstrates the trial court
misunderstood its discretion to choose between the two different
sentencing schemes. They ask us to remand to allow the trial
8
court to exercise its sentencing discretion because it is unclear
whether the trial court understood it could sentence Alas to a full
consecutive sentence under section 667.6(c).
Neither the trial court’s oral ruling nor the minute order
states which sentencing scheme the court selected; but both
parties agree the sentence in fact reflects the framework of
section 1170.1 (i.e., the court selected one-third the midterm for
count 2, to be served consecutively). However, it could also reflect
a decision by the trial court to impose a partial consecutive term
under section 667.6(c). (See People v. Reynolds (1984)
154 Cal.App.3d 796, 811 [trial court has discretion to impose
either full or partial consecutive terms under § 667.6(c)].)
During the argument and colloquy after the initial sentence
of a concurrent full midterm, the record shows additional
confusion. Specifically, the trial court stated at one point its belief
count 2 “must be sentenced consecutively to count 1.” (Italics
added.) And rather than discuss section 654 or the relevant
factual analysis as to whether the two counts were based on a
single act or a continuous course of conduct, as required by
applicable law, the court claimed the consecutive sentence was
required by the case cited by the prosecutor, People v. Melhado
(1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1529 (Melhado).
However, Melhado is unrelated to the trial court’s
obligation to determine at sentencing whether the conduct for
which the defendant is convicted is part of a continuous course of
conduct.4 Here, the trial court appears to have concluded that
4 We understand the Melhado opinion was located and
provided to the trial court during a rushed, brief recess in the
proceedings, but it had no application to the sentencing issues at
hand. In Melhado, a verdict against the defendant was reversed
9
because the prosecution argued in closing argument to the jury
there was different conduct for the sexual battery charge than for
the rape charge, the court was required to find that the sentences
could not be concurrent. But it is up to the trial court to decide
whether the conduct either (1) was based on the same act or
omission, including the same course of conduct, if it chose the
section 1170.1 framework, or (2) involved the same victim and
occasion, if it chose the section 667.6(c) framework. And
importantly, neither framework (unlike § 667.6, subd. (d))
requires a consecutive sentence. Under both sections 1170.1 and
667.6(c), a consecutive sentence is discretionary. (Catarino,
supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 753.)
We thus agree with the parties that the trial court’s ruling
demonstrates it misunderstood the scope of its discretion because
it erroneously assumed the prosecutor’s argument to the jury
required it to impose a consecutive sentence. (People v.
Fredrickson (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 984, 988 [“ ‘the defendant
must “affirmatively demonstrate that the trial court
misunderstood its sentencing discretion” ’ ”].) The trial court had
and the case remanded for retrial where the prosecution did not
inform the jury which act among several it elected to rely on for a
particular charge, and the trial court failed to instruct the jury
that it had to unanimously agree the defendant committed the
same specific criminal act. (Melhado, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 1534–1535.) In fact, the Melhado court held it was insufficient
to rely on the implications of the prosecutor’s argument, where
the jury was neither “instructed on unanimity [n]or informed that
the prosecution had elected to seek conviction only for the 11 a.m.
event, so that a finding of guilt could only be returned if each
juror agreed that the crime was committed at that time.” (Id. at
p. 1536.)
10
to first decide whether to sentence within the framework of
sections 1170.1 and 654 on one hand or section 667.6(c) on the
other. Each framework has its own applicable body of law on how
to establish those critical issues. But in either case, the trial court
must make the findings that could potentially lead to a
consecutive sentence. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.425.)
IV. Erlinger Does Not Provide a Basis for This Court to
Deviate from the Ruling in Ice and Catarino
Alas argues in the alternative that his consecutive one-year
sentence on count 2 should be vacated and the matter remanded
for a jury determination as to whether his offenses were
committed during a single course of conduct beyond a reasonable
doubt. He argues that a recent decision by the United States
Supreme Court, Erlinger v. United States (2024) 602 U.S. 821
(Erlinger), calls into question other precedents, notably Oregon v.
Ice (2009) 555 U.S. 160 (Ice) and Catarino, raising the issue with
us to preserve it for subsequent review. We are not persuaded.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
protects the right of a criminal defendant to trial by jury, and
under the Fourteenth Amendment, this protection extends to
state criminal proceedings. (Catarino, supra, 14 Cal.5th at
p. 754.) Among the protections in the jury trial guarantee are the
rights to have every element of the crime found by a jury, beyond
a reasonable doubt. (Ibid.) In Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000)
530 U.S. 466, 478, the Supreme Court explained that the jury
trial protection also extends to factfinding in the context of
sentencing. Accordingly, “[o]ther than the fact of a prior
conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond
the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury,
and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Id. at p. 490.)
11
Both Ice and Catarino have flatly rejected the application of
Apprendi and its progeny to the area of consecutive sentencing.
As reasoned in Ice, the scope of the jury trial guarantee is rooted
in the historic jury function, whereas the decision whether to
impose a consecutive, in lieu of a concurrent, sentence, is a
sentencing function in which the jury has traditionally played no
part. (Ice, supra, 555 U.S. at p. 163.) The common law tradition
was to “entrust to judges’ unfettered discretion the decision
whether sentences for discrete offenses shall be served
consecutively or concurrently.” (Ibid.) Indeed, “historically, ‘a
judge’s imposition of consecutive, rather than concurrent,
sentences was the prevailing practice,’ and . . . state statutes
making concurrent sentencing the rule and consecutive
sentencing the exception represent ‘modern . . . statutory
protections meant to temper the harshness of the historical
practice.’ ” (Catarino, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 756.)
Erlinger does not address the decision to impose a
consecutive sentence. Rather, it focuses on whether a particular
sentencing enhancement under the Armed Career Criminal Act
that required a court to decide if a defendant’s past offenses were
committed on separate occasions using a preponderance of the
evidence standard instead required a jury to make that finding
beyond a reasonable doubt. (Erlinger, supra, 602 U.S. at p. 825.)
Applying Apprendi and a subsequent case, the Supreme Court
found the Sixth Amendment demanded a jury’s determination of
facts to support that enhancement. (Erlinger, at pp. 834–835.) As
it did not address either consecutive sentencing or Ice, it does not
undermine that precedent; at least, not until a court higher than
this one says so. (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962)
57 Cal.2d 450, 455.)
12
Similarly, we authorized supplemental briefing on the
applicability of the California Supreme Court’s decision in People
v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069. After reviewing that case and
both parties’ supplemental briefs, we agree with the People that
Wiley does not extend the Sixth Amendment’s jury trial right to
factfinding relating to consecutive sentencing decisions. In Wiley,
the California Supreme Court held that the trial court violated
the defendant’s jury trial right by adjudicating facts relating to
his prior convictions and improperly relying on its conclusions to
choose to impose an upper term sentence. (Wiley, at p. 1076.) As
with Erlinger, Wiley does not mention consecutive sentencing,
Ice, or Catarino, and does not justify any departure from those
directly applicable authorities.
V. The Proper Remedy Is Remand
The proper remedy here is remand. First, although neither
party raised the issue, section 1170, subdivision (c) requires that
“[t]he court shall state the reasons for its sentence choice on the
record at the time of sentencing.” (Ibid.) This applies equally to
the choice whether to apply section 667.6(c) and to the choice to
impose a consecutive sentence. (Belmontes, supra, 34 Cal.3d at
p. 347; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.406(b)(4) & (5).) It is also
required should the trial court choose to impose a full consecutive
term under section 667.6(c). (See People v. Reynolds (1984)
154 Cal.App.3d 796, 811.) Here, the trial court did not articulate
which framework it had selected, nor whether the conduct alleged
here met the requirements for consecutive sentencing under
section 654 or section 667.6(c). Alas is entitled to understand the
basis for any consecutive sentence in his case.
We do not agree with Alas’s argument, emphasized in his
reply brief, that the proper remedy here is to set aside the trial
13
court’s consecutive sentencing order and direct it to stay the
sentence on count 2. Because the trial court misapplied the
sentencing rules for crimes subject to different sentencing
schemes, upon remand, the trial court has “the opportunity to
revise all of its discretionary sentencing choices.” (People v. Neely
(2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 787, 799–800.)
Upon remand, the trial court must first exercise its
discretion to select and clearly identify the sentencing framework
it adopts. (See People v. Lee (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 861, 875
[“Because we conclude the trial court misunderstood the scope of
its discretion in this regard, we remand to give the trial court the
opportunity to decide, in its discretion, whether to reduce any of
the convictions to misdemeanors.”].) Both parties can then argue
to the court what findings should be made in favor or against
imposition of a consecutive sentence. If the trial court adopts the
sections 1170.1 and 654 framework, it must determine if the two
crimes were part of an indivisible course of conduct. Finally, if
the trial court concludes it has the discretion to impose a
consecutive sentence under the sentencing framework it selected,
it must determine whether a consecutive sentence is appropriate
in this case.
We remand this matter for the trial court to consider in the
first instance which sentencing scheme to adopt and whether to
impose the sentences consecutively under applicable law. We
express no opinion on how the court should exercise that
discretion.
DISPOSITION
The sentence is vacated and the matter remanded to the
trial court with directions to exercise its discretion whether to
sentence pursuant to section 1170.1 or section 667.6(c), to make
14
further appropriate findings according to the chosen framework,
and to thereafter resentence Alas. The trial court is directed to
set forth a statement of reasons. (§ 1170, subd. (c); Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 4.406(b)(4) & (5).) The trial court is further directed to
forward certified copies of relevant documents to the Department
of Corrections and Rehabilitation. The judgment is affirmed in all
other respects.
RICHARDSON, J.
WE CONCUR:
ASHMANN-GERST, Acting P. J.
CHAVEZ, J.
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