People v. Davis CA2/7

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Filed 7/31/25 P. v. Davis CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

THE PEOPLE, B337195

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA517644)
v.

LASHAWN DAVIS,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Alison S. Matsumoto, Judge. Affirmed.
Ashwini S. Mate, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne and Shezad H. Thakor,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

__________________________
A jury convicted Lashawn Davis of making a criminal
threat and assault with a deadly weapon. The trial court
sentenced Davis to the middle term of two years for making a
criminal threat, doubled to four years under the “Three Strikes”
law, and imposed and stayed the lower term of two years for the
assault. Davis contends the court improperly relied on several
circumstances in aggravation to impose the middle term. We
affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Relevant Evidence at Trial
1. Prosecution evidence
On September 3, 2023, Carlos C.1 was sitting at his vending
stand. Davis lived in a motor home across the street from
Carlos’s stand. Carlos was familiar with Davis because he
“would throw things around” and “break things around his motor
home.”
Carlos saw Davis cross the street and run toward his stand,
yelling “ ‘son of a bitch’ ” and “ ‘ motherfucker.’ ” Davis came
“very close” to Carlos and, while holding a hammer, said,
“ ‘Motherfucker, I want to kill you.’ ” Davis continued to threaten
Carlos and swung the hammer near Carlos’s head five or six
times.
Afraid that Davis would kill him, Carlos called 911 from his
cell phone. While Carlos was on the phone, Davis’s friend called

1 We refer to the victim by his first name and last initial
only. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.90(b)(4) [permitting us to
refer to “[v]ictims in criminal proceedings” by first name and last
initial to protect their privacy interests].)

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over to Davis and told him to leave Carlos alone. Davis crossed
the street and walked toward his friend. A video camera
captured the entire incident, and the People played the footage
for the jury.
Shortly after Carlos called 911, Officer Jesus Tapia with
the Los Angeles Police Department arrived. Carlos told Tapia
that someone “held a hammer toward[] him.” Carlos appeared
“frantic,” “scared,” and had “tears coming out of his eyes.”
Davis came back to Carlos’s stand while Tapia was
investigating and appeared very angry. Carlos identified Davis
as the person who assaulted him.
2. Defense evidence
Davis testified that on the morning of September 3, 2023,
he was fixing damage to his motor home using wood, nails, and a
hammer. When he finished the work, he walked over to Carlos.
He was mad at Carlos because he thought Carlos was responsible
for the damage to his motor home and was “doing voodoo” on him.
He was so angry that he forgot he was holding a hammer. With
the hammer “down by [his] waist,” Davis told Carlos, “I want my
money.” He denied threatening Carlos or swinging the hammer
toward him.
3. Rebuttal
Officer Tapia testified that when he spoke to Davis at the
scene, Davis did not “make any statements about asking [Carlos]
for money.” Rather, Davis told Tapia that he confronted Carlos
because of the damage to his motor home, “possible voodoo,” and
that “they might have put worms inside of him.” Davis’s
statements concerned Tapia because Davis “did . . . not seem to
be [of] sound . . . mind.” As a result, Tapia contacted the “mental
evaluation unit.”

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B. Verdict and Sentencing
The jury convicted Davis of making a criminal threat (Pen.
Code, § 422, subd. (a))2, and assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245,
subd. (a)(1)). Davis admitted he had two prior “strike”
convictions from 1989 within the meaning of the Three Strikes
law. (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d).) He also
admitted one circumstance in aggravation: that he served a prior
term in prison or county jail. (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 4.421(b)(3).)3
Before sentencing, Davis moved to dismiss his prior strike
convictions under People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996)
13 Cal.4th 497. He argued that he suffers from mental health
issues and “[a]t the time of his testimony [he was] sincere in his
belief of the voodoo and witchcraft.” He asked the court to strike
both of his prior strike convictions and stated, “If the court were
to strike both strikes . . . Davis would ask the court to impose the
sentence of [two] years calculated as follows, mid[dle] term [of
two] years for [making a criminal threat] and low term [of two]
years for [the assault] . . . to be served concurrently.”
The court granted Davis’s motion as to one of his prior
strikes. The court reasoned that Davis believed Carlos “was
somehow involved in vandalism of his R.V.,” “Davis had some
mental health issues that were in play,” and the two strikes from
1989 were remote.

2 Further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
3 Further rule references are to the California Rules of
Court.

4
With respect to Davis’s sentence, the court found four
circumstances in aggravation: the crime involved a threat of
great bodily harm (rule 4.421(a)(1)), Davis was armed with a
weapon at the time of the commission of the crimes (rule
4.421(a)(2)), Davis’s prior convictions were of increasing
seriousness (rule 4.421(b)(2)), and Davis served a prior term in
prison or county jail (rule 4.421(b)(3)). The court also found two
circumstances in mitigation: Davis mistakenly believed that his
conduct was legal (rule 4.423(a)(7)), and Davis was suffering from
a mental condition that reduced culpability for the crime
(rule 4.423(b)(2)).
The court sentenced Davis to a total term of four years in
state prison, consisting of the middle term of two years for
making a criminal threat, doubled under the Three Strikes law
(§ 1170.12, subd. (c)(1)). The court also imposed the lower term of
two years for the assault but stayed the sentence under section
654.
Davis timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

Davis contends that the court improperly considered three
of the four circumstances in aggravation to impose the middle
term for his conviction of making a criminal threat. He
acknowledges his trial counsel failed to object to the court’s
reliance on the aggravating circumstances either before or at
sentencing. By failing to object, Davis forfeited his challenge on
appeal. (See People v. Tilley (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 772, 778
[“Generally, if a party does not object to the sentence in the trial
court,” that party “may not claim on appeal the trial court failed
to properly make or articulate its discretionary sentencing

5
choices.”]; accord, People v. Boyce (2014) 59 Cal.4th 672, 730-731;
see also People v. Sperling (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 1094, 1100-1102
(Sperling) [defendant forfeited objection to dual use of
aggravating factor for failure to object].) Even had Davis not
forfeited his contention of sentencing error, his argument fails on
the merits.4 Although the court improperly relied on two
aggravating circumstances, the court’s error was harmless.

A. Relevant Legal Principles
In cases subject to a determinate sentencing triad, the
middle term is the presumptive term, unless certain exceptions
exist. (§ 1170, subd. (b)(1) [“When . . . the statute specifies three
possible terms, the court shall, in its sound discretion, order
imposition of a sentence not to exceed the middle term, except as
otherwise provided in paragraph (2).”]; People v. Sarmiento-
Zuniga (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 1216, 1224.)5 “In imposing a

4 We exercise our discretion to consider the merits and thus
need not discuss Davis’s associated claim for ineffective
assistance of counsel. (See People v Lua (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th
1004, 1014.)
5 Subdivision (b)(2) of section 1170 provides that the trial
court may impose the upper term if there are circumstances in
aggravation that justify the upper term and the facts underlying
those circumstances have been stipulated to by the defendant or
have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt. (§ 1170, subd.
(b)(2).) In addition, section 1170, subdivision (b)(6), establishes a
rebuttable presumption that the lower term applies if any of
three specified circumstances was a contributing factor in the
commission of the offense, “unless the court finds that the
aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating
circumstances that imposition of the lower term would be

6
middle term sentence, all that section 1170 requires is that the
court apply the Judicial Council’s sentencing rules and that the
court state the facts and reasons for imposing the middle term on
the record at the time of sentencing.” (Sarmiento-Zuniga, at
pp. 1223-1224; see § 1170, subds. (a)(3), (b)(5), (c); rule 4.401 et
seq. [felony sentencing rules].) Relevant here, the Judicial
Council’s sentencing rules provide: “In selecting between the
middle and lower terms of imprisonment, the sentencing judge
may consider circumstances in aggravation or mitigation, and
any other factor reasonably related to the sentencing decision.
The court may consider factors in aggravation and mitigation,
whether or not the factors have been stipulated to by the
defendant or found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by a
jury or the judge in a court trial.” (Rule 4.420(d).)
Discretionary sentencing decisions, such as whether the
aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating
circumstances, are “reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” (People
v. Salazar (2023) 15 Cal.5th 416, 428, fn. 8; accord, People v.
Hilburn (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 189, 205 (Hilburn).) “That
‘discretion must be exercised in a manner that is not arbitrary
and capricious, that is consistent with the letter and spirit of the
law, and that is based upon an “individualized consideration of
the offense, the offender, and the public interest.” ’ [Citation.]
The court abuses ‘its discretion . . . if it relies upon circumstances
that are not relevant to the decision or that otherwise constitute
an improper basis for decision.’ ” (Hilburn, at p. 206.)

contrary to the interests of justice.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(6); see
People v. Sarmiento-Zuniga, 108 Cal.App.5th at p. 1225.) None of
these exceptions applies here.

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When a trial court relies on both proper and improper
reasons for its discretionary sentencing decisions, it is state law
error only, reviewable under the “reasonably probable” standard
set out in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 (Watson).
(See People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 492 [“ ‘When a trial
court has given both proper and improper reasons for a sentence
choice, a reviewing court will set aside the sentence only if it is
reasonably probable that the trial court would have chosen a
lesser sentence had it known that some of its reasons were
improper.’ ”], cited with approval in People v. Lynch (2024)
16 Cal.5th 730, 760, fn. 14 and In re F.M. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 701,
715; see Sperling, supra, 12 Cal.App.5th at p. 1104 [“ ‘In order to
determine whether error by the trial court in relying upon
improper factors in aggravation . . . requires remanding for
resentencing[,] “the reviewing court must determine if ‘it is
reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing
party would have been reached in the absence of the error.’ ” ’ ”];
cf. Lynch, at p. 761 [when the trial court relies on improperly
proven aggravating facts to justify an upper term sentence, a
Sixth Amendment violation occurs and the stricter test under
Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 applies].)

B. The Court’s Reliance on Improper Aggravating
Circumstances To Impose the Middle Term Was Harmless
1. The court improperly relied on two aggravating
circumstances
Davis acknowledges the court properly relied on one
aggravating circumstance (his prior prison term) but contends
the court improperly relied on three others in imposing the
middle term, namely that (1) the crime involved a threat of great

8
bodily harm, (2) Davis’s prior convictions were of increasing
seriousness, and (3) Davis was armed with a weapon. The People
concede that the court improperly relied on the first two of these
three aggravating circumstances, and we accept the People’s
concession. We also agree with the People that the court properly
relied on the aggravating factor that Davis was armed with a
weapon.
First, the trial court improperly relied on the aggravating
circumstance that the offense involved a threat of great bodily
injury. “A fact that is an element of the crime on which
punishment is being imposed may not be used to impose a
particular term.” (Rule 4.420(h); see People v. Burbine (2003)
106 Cal.App.4th 1250, 1261 [“It is established that a
circumstance that is an element of the substantive offense cannot
be used as a factor in aggravation.”].) To prove a defendant is
guilty of making a criminal threat, the People must prove that
the defendant “willfully threaten[ed] to commit a crime which
will result in death or great bodily injury to another person.”
(§ 422, subd. (a).) Because an element of making a criminal
threat involves threatening “great bodily injury” (§ 422, subd.
(a)), it was improper for the court to rely on the fact that Davis
threatened great bodily harm (rule 4.420(a)(1)) to aggravate his
sentence for that offense. (See rule 4.420(h).)
Second, the trial court improperly relied on the aggravating
circumstance that Davis’s convictions are of increasing
seriousness (rule 4.421(b)(2)). A trial court may consider a
circumstance in aggravation to impose the middle term so long as
the circumstance is supported by “a sufficient factual basis.”
(Hilburn, supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 205.) Davis was convicted
of the following offenses, in chronological order: second-degree

9
robberies (Pen. Code, § 211) in 1989, possession of a controlled
substance for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11351) in 1993, and sale
of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11352, subd. (a))
in 1994.
The punishment for Davis’s prior offenses is greater (and
the same in one instance) than the punishment for his current
offenses. (Compare Pen. Code, § 213, subd. (a)(2) [imprisonment
for two, three, or five years for second degree robbery]; Health &
Saf. Code, §§ 11351 [imprisonment for two, three, or four years
for possession of a controlled substance for sale]; and Health &
Saf. Code, § 11352, subd. (a) [imprisonment for three, four, or five
years for sale of a controlled substance] with Pen. Code, § 245,
subd. (a)(1) [imprisonment for two, three, or four years for assault
with a deadly weapon] and Pen. Code, § 18 [imprisonment for 16
months, two years, or three years for making a criminal threat].)
Moreover, although Davis’s current offenses are statutorily
designated as “serious” felonies (§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(31), (38)), his
prior convictions for second degree robbery are both “serious” and
“violent” felonies (§§ 667.5, subd. (c)(9), 1192.7, subd. (c)(19)),
which are treated more harshly. (E.g., § 2933.1, subd. (c)
[defendants convicted of violent felonies can earn only 15 percent
of presentence credit].) In sum, there is insufficient evidence
supporting the finding that his convictions are of increasing
seriousness.
On the other hand, we disagree with Davis that it was
improper for the court to rely on the aggravating circumstance
that Davis was armed with a weapon (rule 4.421(a)(2)). Davis
contends the elements of making a criminal threat “require the
. . . fact that [Davis] was armed with a hammer,” in violation of
the rule against dual use of facts at sentencing. Specifically, he

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contends the following two elements—(1) the threat actually
caused the person threatened “to be in sustained fear for his or
her own safety,” and (2) the threatened person’s fear was
“reasonabl[e]” under the circumstances (§ 422, subd. (a); see
CALCRIM No. 1300)—required the fact that he was armed with
a weapon.
Davis mistakenly focuses on his personal actions in
committing the offense rather than what is inherent in
committing the offense. “A sentencing factor is only an element
of the offense . . . if the crime as defined by statute cannot be
accomplished without performance of the acts which constitute
such factor.” (People v. Burbine, supra, 106 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1262.) Making a criminal threat as defined in section 422 can
be accomplished without the defendant being armed with or
using a weapon. (See People v. Holmes, McClain and Newborn
(2022) 12 Cal.5th 719, 809-810 [“section 422 does not require an
immediate ability or even an actual intention, to carry out the
threat”]; cf. People v. Wilson (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 789, 814
[holding there was substantial evidence to support conviction for
making a criminal threat where defendant “said that he had
killed officers in the past, said he would ‘blast’ [the officer], and
simulated pulling a trigger with his fingers”]; People v. Gaut
(2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1425, 1430-1432 [same where defendant
repeatedly made threatening telephone calls to victim].) Thus,
the fact that Davis was armed with a weapon could be used as an
aggravating factor.
In short, we agree with Davis, in part, that the court erred
in relying on two of the four aggravating factors—that the crime
involved a threat of great bodily harm, and Davis’s prior
convictions were of increasing seriousness.

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2. The court’s error was harmless
Davis has not met his burden to show that, absent the
court’s error in relying on two out of four circumstances in
aggravation to impose the middle term, there was a reasonable
probability of a more favorable result. (See People v. Price, supra,
1 Cal.4th at p. 492.)
The court properly relied on two aggravating factors—that
Davis was armed with a weapon and had served a prior term in
jail or prison. Under rule 4.420, the court was not required to
rely on any aggravating factors when imposing the middle term.
(Rule 4.420(d) [“judge may consider circumstances in
aggravation” (italics added)].) Given the circumstances here, it is
not reasonably probable that the court would have imposed the
lower term had it known it could not rely on the two additional
aggravating factors as well. (Cf. Sperling, supra, 12 Cal.App.5th
at pp. 1104-1105 [even if court had stated improper reasons for
imposing consecutive sentences, the error would have been
harmless because there were multiple aggravating factors].)
First, although the court noted two mitigating factors—
Davis mistakenly believed that his conduct was legal
(rule 4.423(a)(7)) and was suffering from a mental condition that
reduced his culpability for the crime (rule 4.423(b)(2))—it had
already relied on both those factors to justify striking one of
Davis’s prior strikes. And these mitigating factors were not
“ ‘super mitigant[s]’ ” (People v. Morgan (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th
488, 515, review granted, Oct. 2, 2024, S286493, disapproved on
other grounds in People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069),6 as they

6 “A ‘super mitigant’ is a ‘mitigating factor enumerated in . . .
[section] 1170(b)(6) that, if established as a contributing factor to

12
would be for sentencing under section 1170, subdivision (b)(6)(B),
giving rise to a presumption that the court should impose the
lower term for a determinate sentence. Rather, they are among
the 25 ordinary mitigating factors relating to the crime and the
defendant that the court is supposed to consider (but which are
not entitled to any particular weight) in selecting between the
middle and lower terms. (Rules 4.420, 4.423.)
Second, the two improper aggravating circumstances are
factually related to the two proper ones. The court improperly
considered that Davis’s threat involved great bodily harm but
properly considered that Davis was armed with a weapon. Both
these circumstances speak to the way Davis’s actions increased
the risk of harm to Carlos. Similarly, the court improperly
considered that Davis’s prior convictions were of increasing
seriousness but properly considered that Davis had served a prior
term in prison. These circumstances both pertain to Davis’s
criminal history. Because of the factual similarities between the
improper and proper aggravating circumstances, we cannot say
that either of the improper aggravating circumstances was
determinative to the court’s sentencing decision.

the commission of the offense, limits the court to imposition of
the low term of imprisonment, unless the court finds the
aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating
circumstances so that imposition of the low term would be
contrary to the interests of justice’ or ‘a mitigating factor
enumerated in . . . [section] 1385(c)(2) that requires or weighs
greatly in favor of the court dismissing or striking any additional
punishment for conduct and status enhancements unless the
court finds there is a likelihood that dismissal would result in
physical injury or serious danger to others.’ ” (People v. Morgan,
supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 515, fn. 13, review granted.)

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Finally, the court had already exercised leniency by
striking one of Davis’s prior strike convictions.
Given these circumstances, we cannot conclude the court
would have sentenced Davis differently had it not considered the
two improper aggravating factors. Thus, the alleged error was
harmless.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

STONE, J.
We concur:

SEGAL, Acting P. J.

FEUER, J.

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