Smith v. Robinson CA5

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Filed 7/31/25 Smith v. Robinson CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

BUDINA SMITH,
F086108
Plaintiff and Appellant,
(Super. Ct. No. 17CV-00110)
v.

RICHARD ROBINSON, OPINION
Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Merced County. Brian L.
McCabe, Judge.
Dolan Law Firm, Christopher B. Dolan, Matthew D. Gramly; Sharon J. Arkin for
Plaintiff and Appellant.
McCormick, Barstow, Sheppard, Wayte & Carruth and Todd W. Baxter for
Defendant and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
The trial court granted, on the day of trial, a dispositive motion in limine brought
by the defendant in this medical malpractice action. The plaintiff appealed. We reverse
the judgment and remand the matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Complaint
On January 12, 2017, Budina Smith filed a complaint for damages against Richard
Robinson, M.D. in the Merced County Superior Court. The complaint alleged two causes
of action against Robinson: (1) medical negligence, and (2) general negligence/res ipsa
loquitur.
The complaint made the following general allegations. In January 2011, Robinson
“surgically implanted a 6.6 French subclavian chemo port catheter into [the left side of
Smith’s] chest in the course of providing medical care to her.” The procedure was
performed at University Surgery Center. On April 9, 2012, Robinson “surgically
removed the 6.6 French subclavian chemo port and catheter from [Smith’s] chest in the
course of providing medical care to her.” This procedure was also conducted at
University Surgery Center.
The complaint further alleged: “In the course of performing the April 9, 2012
surgery, [Robinson] failed to remove the catheter fully intact and/or broke the catheter
during removal, and/or failed to fully inspect the catheter after removal to ensure that it
had been entirely removed from [Smith’s] chest intact and in its entirety.” “As a result, a
foreign object was left within [Smith’s] body (a broken section of the catheter) which
served no therapeutic purpose. [Smith] was discharged with the object in her body, and
was not informed of its presence.”
The complaint alleged that in December 2015, Smith experienced severe chest
pain. On December 21, 2015, Smith believed she was having a heart attack and sought
emergency treatment at Mercy Medical Center. A CT scan of Smith’s chest was
performed. It “revealed the presence of a curled and/or coiled section of catheter located
in her right pulmonary artery, where it had come to rest after passing through her heart.”
More specifically, the CT scan findings were: “There is a piece of a catheter, which is
coiled backwards upon itself, and both portions of this catheter are lodged within the

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main pulmonary artery extending into the right central pulmonary artery.” “This
diagnosis and condition was confirmed during a second CT scan which took place on
September 30, 2016.” More specifically, the subsequent CT scan report stated: “There is
a piece of a catheter which apparently has broken off and embolized into the main
pulmonary artery extending into the right central pulmonary artery.”
The complaint further alleged: “The foreign body [left in Smith’s body] directly
and proximately caused [her] substantial injury, pain, suffering, and attendant damages.”
Smith made multiple emergency room and hospital visits and underwent various scans
and imaging procedures. Removal of the catheter segment would entail additional
surgery, among other treatments.
As mentioned, the complaint asserted a medical negligence cause of action. With
regard to this claim, the complaint alleged: “[Robinson] owed [Smith] the obligation to
use the level of skill, knowledge, and care in diagnosis and treatment that other
reasonably careful practitioners would use in the same or similar circumstances. This
includes but is not limited to performing surgery in a professional and safe manner,
keeping track of all objects going into and out of [the] patient’s body, not leaving foreign
objects in the patient’s body, and timely detecting and correcting complications arising
from failures in the foregoing.” The complaint added: “[Robinson] breached the
standard of care by, inter alia, breaking the catheter during removal, leaving a foreign
object in [Smith’s] body in connection with the subject surgery, and failing to adequately
inspect the catheter upon removal from [Smith’s] chest to ensure that it had been
removed intact, complete and unbroken, causing injury to [Smith] in the surgery by
performing below the standard of care.” Finally, the complaint stated: “As a direct and
proximate result of the foregoing, [Smith] suffered severe injury and is entitled to
recover … damages in an amount according to proof at trial.”
The complaint also asserted a general negligence/res ipsa loquitur claim against
Robinson. In this regard, the complaint alleged: “[Robinson] breached the duty of care

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owed to [Smith] by, inter alia, leaving a foreign object in [Smith’s] body in connection
with the subject surgery, and by causing injury to [her] in the surgery by performing
below the standard of care.” The complaint added: “Further, [Smith] alleges that the
harm and injury sustained by [her] herein would not normally occur unless someone had
been negligent. At the time [Smith] was injured, [she] was under the care and control of
[Robinson].… [Smith] further alleges that she did nothing to contribute to … the acts or
omissions that caused her harm.” The complaint added that Robinson’s negligence
“constitutes a substantial factor in causing the harm suffered by [Smith].” The complaint
further noted: “As a direct and proximate result of the foregoing, [Smith] suffered severe
injury and is entitled to recover … damages in an amount according to proof at trial.”1
B. Deposition of Dr. Richard Robinson
In December 2019, Robinson was deposed in this matter. We will summarize his
deposition testimony. Robinson was a general surgeon; by October 2019, he was no
longer practicing. Robinson implanted a “port-a-cath” device in Smith’s chest. A port-a-
cath device consists of two parts: a port part and a catheter part. Robinson was asked:
“Have you ever reviewed any films of Budina Smith as to the issue of a port or catheter?”
Robinson responded: “The first X-ray I reviewed concerning the port and catheter
placement was [immediately] after its implantation in January of 2011.” Robinson
continued: “After this case was filed, I reviewed a chest X-ray that had been done from
an emergency room here in town, which I believe is the first time that there appeared to
be a fragment of the catheter still inside Mrs. Smith.”
Robinson confirmed he implanted the port-a-cath in Smith’s subclavian vein on
the left side of her chest; the subclavian vein is a large vein underneath the collar bone.
As for the catheter’s end point, he stated: “The catheter ideally is going to sit in the

1 The complaint also contained claims against the manufacturer of the subclavian
chemo port device. However, those claims were resolved and are not at issue in this
appeal.

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superior vena cava essentially just above the heart where its tip is infusing whatever
solution is passed though the reservoir directly into the right side of the heart.”
Robinson described the primary benefits of the port-o-cath device: “The device
allows access to the central venous system, a very large vein [i.e., the superior vena
cava], which therefore allows those solutions to be introduced at a faster rate because the
dilution is very rapid and [any causticity of the solution] doesn’t damage the vein.”
Robinson added that the device also benefits patients in terms of “not having to have
procedures at the time of treatment for starting an IV, poking and poking.” He added:
“[W]hat in effect, happens, is that the port provides a fast, safe pathway to the superior
vena cava at the junction where it meets the heart.” In Smith’s case, she was referred for
a port-a-cath by her hematologist, as she needed iron infusions for chronic anemia.
Robinson addressed the process by which he implants a port-a-cath in a patient.
Although not entirely clear, the testimony indicated that at the very beginning of the
process, an incision is made under the collarbone (superior or upper incision), the
subclavian vein is accessed with a needle, and a dilator is placed therein to stretch the
blood vessel; a sheath and guidewire are also placed at that site, to be used later to guide
the catheter into the superior vena cava. Three to ten centimeters below the superior
incision, another incision is made on the side of the chest (inferior or lower incision), for
placement of a pocket to hold the port reservoir.
One end of the catheter is then attached to a “tunneler.” Starting from the lower
incision, the catheter is then tunneled or pushed through the chest tissue to, and out, the
upper incision. In other words, the two incisions or “open” areas are connected by the
catheter. Robinson noted that both ends of the catheter end up getting trimmed in the
process. After the catheter is tunneled from the lower incision to the upper incision,
Robinson initially trims its lower or proximal end, which is thereafter attached to the port
reservoir. The port reservoir is then placed in the pocket, implanted, and sutured into
place. The segment of catheter that is “coming through the skin” at the site of the upper

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incision is then “placed on [the outside of] the chest wall to get an idea of how much
more needs to be trimmed if any,” to ensure the upper or distal end can be placed in the
superior vena cava. The catheter has lines every five centimeters along its length for
measuring purposes. The length of catheter placed in the patient ranges from “probably
between ten and 20 to 25 centimeters.”
Robinson was asked, with regard to his preoperative discussion with Smith: “Did
you discuss the risk of positioning of the catheter as it relates to where the catheter would
pass between the clavicle and first rib, the concept of what’s known as pinch-off?”
Robinson responded, “No.” Robinson responded in the affirmative when asked whether
he was “familiar with pinch-off.” He described pinch-off: “Well, it’s where the catheter
passes through the subclavian vein but is essentially pinched by the rib and [clavicle] so
that it tends to be essentially kinked.” Robinson confirmed he was familiar with this
potential complication when he implanted the port-a-cath in Smith’s chest.
Robinson clarified that he inserts the catheter medially (i.e., closer to the sternum).
Robinson noted the collarbone or clavicle goes from the shoulder to the sternum at the
first rib. When Robinson stated he aims to insert the catheter medially, he meant he aims
to insert it towards the center of the body. He stated that over the years, he moved more
and more “medial” or more and more towards the center of the chest, in terms of the
point where he accessed the subclavian vein. He testified: “Over the years, on the left
side access, I have come more medial for … that initial needle under the collarbone [i.e.,
he inserts the needle closer to the sternum].” He added: “I used to go at about the
halfway point of the clavicle of the collarbone[,] where I would make the needle stick and
maybe two centimeters below the inferior or lower border of the collarbone. Now I go
about one-third of the distance between the medial tip of the collarbone and its distal end,
so I’m much closer [to the sternum].”
Robinson summed up his placement technique: “I would go approximately one-
third of the distance between – from that point at the middle of the chest outward toward

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the shoulder, so about one-third of that distance to the side, in this case the left side. I
would then go below the palpable lower border of the collarbone for about two to three
centimeters, and that’s the site I would use for the needle stick to access the subclavian
vein.” Robinson confirmed he followed this pattern with Smith. He added: “The reason
I do it that way is it works.”
Robinson described his typical post-operative process. After he finishes up with
implanting the port-a-cath, the patient is sent for an x-ray. Robinson reviews the x-ray.
Robinson testified: “What I’m looking for is the catheter placement to see that it’s in the
appropriate position. I’m looking to see if there’s any evidence from [the] X-ray of
complications from the procedure … say, fluid collecting inside the chest wall outside the
lung which might indicate bleeding.” With regard to catheter placement, the only thing
Robinson looks for is whether the distal tip of the catheter is within the superior vena
cava.
Robinson was then further questioned about pinch-off. Robinson agreed that
pinch-off would occur if the catheter was in a position where it could be pinched at the
junction of the clavicle and the first rib. When asked whether an X-ray would reveal the
existence of pinch-off, Robinson answered, “Unlikely.” Pinch-off results in compression
of the catheter “so that it’s more difficult to flush or to utilize[,] or it flows slower.” Less
often, pinch-off results in a segment of the catheter breaking open or breaking off.
Robinson generally does not observe pinch-off in the X-rays taken after the implantation
procedure. With regard to the possibility that Smith suffered pinch-off, Robinson stated:
“So she could have had a pinch-off when she was sitting up, and I could have missed it or
just not seen it [on the X-ray]. It’s certainly possible, but I don’t know.”
Robinson testified that he was adequately aware of the risks and benefits of the
port at the time he implanted it in Smith, both from the medical literature and the
instructions for use that accompanied the device. He had reviewed the instructions for
use that came with the device. He confirmed that the instructions for use accurately

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explained the risks and benefits of the device and fairly and accurately addressed the
proper technique for implanting the device.
With regard to Smith’s recovery, Robinson noted: “I saw her three days after
surgery, on January 7th of 2011, and she was complaining of severe pain at the site of the
reservoir (i.e., the pocket).” He added: “I saw her again five days later on January 12th
of 2011, and at that point my note says she was still with pain and normal exam.” She
subsequently improved and did not require further follow-up.
Robinson was next questioned about the port-a-cath’s functioning, as reflected in
Smith’s hematologist’s records. At one point, an attempt was made to flush her port with
normal saline, but she complained of severe pain above the port, at the site where the
catheter is tunneled under the skin. At another point, her hematologist was unable to
obtain blood flow through the port. Robinson stated: “[This] would seem to indicate that
the catheter or reservoir or both are occluded.” He added it could also mean the catheter
was no longer in the subclavian vein. Robinson also heard from Smith that her
hematologist was not accessing the port for her treatment, from which he gathered the
apparatus was likely occluded. At some point Smith went for an ultrasound, which
confirmed that the device was occluded. Declotting was attempted but failed.
Meanwhile, Smith continued to complain of severe pain at the site above the port. At that
point, Smith’s hematologist referred her back to Robinson for removal of the port-a-cath
device. The removal surgery took place on April 9, 2012.
With respect to the removal surgery, Robinson stated: “The catheter has been
walled off essentially by the body, so there’s not going to be, on removal, leakage of
blood from the vein into the tissues, and what apparently happened to [Smith] was a
portion of the catheter can break off on removal, and that situation, in my experience, you
know it at the time.” Robinson continued: “I’ve had a couple actually at the surgery
center where it was obvious that there was a problem in removing the catheter or the
catheter was incomplete on removal and therefore chest X-ray was done following the

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removal and the patient was referred to have the [severed] catheter portion removed from
their heart. [¶] I’ve had occasion to do that, but on both of those occasions, there was
[an] indication at the time of removal that a problem existed.”
Robinson’s report regarding Smith’s port-a-cath removal surgery stated that the
catheter’s tip was “clean.” Robinson testified: “Generally, when I say the tip is clean,
what that means is I’ve inspected the tip of the catheter and it appears to be a cut end,
implying that it’s not been broken.” His report also noted that the catheter appeared to be
the appropriate length. Robinson was asked whether he recorded that observation
because going into the procedure, he was concerned the catheter might have been broken.
Robinson responded: “I always inspect the catheter and the reservoir once I remove it to
see if it’s an appropriate length. I mean, we don’t have a length measurement, but to see
if it’s appropriate and to check the ends of the catheter to see if it’s a clean cut rather than
a fracture.” Robinson was asked: “And you do that because you’re aware it that it can
fracture?” He answered, “Yes.”
Robinson continued: “The other indication that you may have a problem with the
catheter fracturing is difficulty in removal of the catheter itself once the reservoir has
been taken out of its pocket[,] pulling on that catheter to bring it back out of its sheath in
the vein. If there’s resistance and significant resistance, it then gives way, that alone,
even if the length is okay and the tip looks okay, is an indication that maybe part of that is
broken off during removal.” Robinson said that even when the catheter’s tip looks ok, it
was still possible that it had actually fractured, as catheters do not always break
irregularly.
Robinson confirmed that he did not measure the length of the catheter at the time
of implantation. After removal, he sent the device components to the pathology
department. The pathology department recorded that the chemo port removed from
Smith’s chest consisted of a “12.3 centimeter portion of plastic tubing.” Robinson was
asked: “So given that it wasn’t measured when it was implanted, you don’t know

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whether or not that 12.3 centimeter [portion] represents the entirety of the catheter that
you implanted in Mrs. Smith?” Robinson responded: “That’s correct.” Robinson also
confirmed that no x-rays or scans were done immediately following removal.
Finally, Robinson was asked: “Did you have any reason to disagree with the
conclusions related to [the] scan [done in December 2015 when Smith sought emergency
treatment,] that there was a piece of catheter which had apparently embolized into her
pulmonary artery?” Robinson replied: “I concur with the interpretation that this is in fact
a portion of the catheter of this chemo port that is now lodged in the wall of her
pulmonary artery.”
C. Dr. Robinson’s Motion for Summary Judgment
On February 6, 2020, Robinson filed a motion for summary judgment.
Robinson’s motion summarized the basic facts as follows:

“On or about January 4, 2011, [Smith] was referred to Dr. Robinson by her
primary treating physician for surgical implant of a chemo port catheter
into her chest to allow for intravenous iron infusions to treat her chronic
anemia. The procedure was completed without complication.

“On April 9, 2012 [Smith] was referred back to Dr. Robinson for removal
of the chemo port catheter. The procedure was completed without any
known complications.

“A December 21, 2015 CT scan of [Smith’s] chest revealed the presence of
a coiled segment of catheter located in her right pulmonary artery. A
second CT scan, performed on September 30, 2016, confirmed this
diagnosis.” (Capitalization omitted.)
In support of his motion, Robinson submitted a declaration from an expert witness,
Dr. James R. Macho. Robinson contended in his summary judgment motion:
“[C]ompetent expert testimony from James R. Macho, M.D., a general surgeon,
establishes that Dr. Robinson met the applicable standard of care while rendering
treatment to [Smith] on April 9, 2012 and that nothing Dr. Robinson did or did not do
caused or contributed to any of [Smith’s] claimed injuries.” Robinson argued in the

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motion: “[Smith’s] causes of action for medical negligence and general negligence/res
ipsa loquitur fail as a matter of law because Dr. Robinson did not breach the standard of
care or cause the alleged harm.” (Capitalization and italics omitted.)
The declaration of Dr. Macho (defendant’s expert witness) set forth a number of
“conclusions and opinions,” which were “expressed to a reasonable degree of medical
probability”:

“a) To address Ms. Smith’s need for intravenous iron infusions to treat
her chronic anemia, it was appropriate and within the standard of care for
Dr. Robinson to implant the chemo port catheter based on the
recommendation of Ms. Smith’s primary treating physician. In addition,
Dr. Robinson’s technical performance of the procedure was appropriate and
within the standard of care, as Dr. Robinson used the correct technique and
equipment. In addition, the operative note is sufficiently detailed in
describing the catheter’s placement. Importantly, the standard of care does
not require measuring the length of the catheter placed in the patient or
documenting the length in the patient’s chart.

“b) The decision to remove the chemo port catheter was made by
Ms. Smith’s primary treating physician due to the ultrasound findings that
the catheter was occluded. Dr. Robinson’s technical performance of the
procedure was appropriate and within the standard of care, as Dr. Robinson
used the correct technique and equipment. The operative note [was] also
sufficiently detailed in describing the procedure and the technique used.
Importantly, the standard of care does not require that a physician measure
the length of catheter that is removed. Furthermore, since the standard of
care does not require the length of the catheter to be measured at the time of
implant, knowledge of the specific length of the catheter at the time of
removal would not provide insight as to whether the entire length of
catheter had been removed.

“c) Dr. Robinson’s failure to appreciate or suspect that a segment of
catheter may have been retained was not a breach in the standard of care,
given the evidence in this case. First, Dr. Robinson testified the catheter
was easily removed. This is significant as difficulty removing a catheter
may raise concern that a segment could break off. Second, Dr. Robinson
testified that after removing the catheter, he observed it and noted the end
was smooth and did not appear to have been torn or fractured.
Dr. Robinson further testified that the length of the catheter was within a
range that did not cause him to suspect that it was not the full length that

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had been inserted. The foregoing observations are important, as they would
not have caused a reasonable physician to suspect that he/she had failed to
remove the entire catheter. In addition, it is not established that the section
of the catheter broke off at the time of removal. It is entirely possible that
the catheter may have fractured due to prolonged mechanical shearing
forces acting on the catheter over the time of implantation. This is more
common with catheters inserted via the infraclavicular approach. Finally,
the ultimate fact that a segment of catheter was retained in Ms. Smith is not,
in and of itself, a breach of the standard of care, as it is a recognized risk of
the procedure which can result even in the absence of any negligence or
breach of care. The reported rate of intravenous catheter fracture is
approximately 0.1%.

“d) The retained catheter was incidentally discovered on a chest CT on
December 21, 2015. In comparison to a chest x-ray from February 26,
2013, it was in the identical position, curled up at the exit of the pulmonary
artery. Accordingly, the imaging evidences that the catheter had remained
in the same location for almost three years. This is significant because
when a segment of catheter has been retained for a long period of time, the
body will typically contain or ‘incorporate’ it, and the catheter will not be
exposed within the lumen of the vessel. Based on the length of time the
catheter has remained stationary in Ms. Smith, it is my expert opinion, to a
reasonable degree of medical probability, that the segment of catheter has
been incorporated and epithelialized. From my review of Ms. Smith’s
medical records in this case, I note that this opinion is shared by her
treating physicians. Importantly, once a foreign object, such as a segment
of catheter, has been incorporated and epithelialized, it rarely poses any risk
of injury to the patient.

“e) Although initially there are potential complications of retained
catheters, such as necrosis, occlusion and perforation, none of these
complications have occurred during the 7 years that the catheter segment
has been present in this patient. If any of the forgoing complications were
going to arise, I would have expected them to occur in the weeks and
months following the event that resulted in the retained catheter.
Accordingly, since Ms. Smith has not experienced any complications in the
past 7 years, to a reasonable degree of medical probability, Ms. Smith will
not experience any complications due to the retained segment of catheter in
the future.

“f) Although Ms. Smith has expressed subjective complaints to her
medical providers that the retained segment of catheter occasionally causes
her pain, this complaint lacks physiological basis. Catheters and

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pacemakers are routinely implanted in the heart and vessels. They do not
cause pain because of the lack of pain receptors in those locations. Since
the segment of catheter is looped and incorporated in Ms. Smith’s
pulmonary artery, it is, therefore, physiologically impossible for Ms. Smith
to feel it or for it to cause her pain. Nevertheless, Ms. Smith’s medical
records reflect that she underwent an extensive workup due to her
complaints of chest pain and that her cardiac evaluation was stellar: she
had a normal echocardiogram, normal ejection fraction, and normal stress
test, which was actually quite surprising and reassuring, considering her
other health problems. Accordingly, all of the available evidence supports
the conclusion that the catheter is not adversely affecting her cardiac
function.

“g) The overwhelming evidence suggests that no harm was done to
Ms. Smith by this retained segment of catheter. It has become a benign
entity that does not require any intervention, and to a reasonable degree of
medical probability, does not pose any risk of injury to Ms. Smith’s heart,
great vessels or any other part of her body, in the future.”
D. Smith’s Opposition to Robinson’s Motion for Summary Judgment
On April 13, 2020, Smith filed an opposition to Robinson’s motion for summary
judgment. Smith’s opposition noted:

“In this case Plaintiff Budina Smith contends that Defendant was negligent
in his treatment of her and that he breached the standard of care in at least
five separate ways.

“1. Defendant failed to follow the manufacturer’s instructions relative to
the specific catheter insertion point when implanting her chest port catheter
on January 4, 2011, resulting in catheter ‘pinch off’ or severing;

“2. Defendant failed to follow the manufacturer’s instructions by not
measuring the length of the catheter he implanted into Plaintiff’s chest after
trimming both ends of the catheter on January 4, 2011[,] meaning that upon
removal there was no way for him to know whether the entire catheter had
been removed;

“3. Defendant failed to heed the manufacturer instructions in
March 2012 regarding Plaintiff’s symptoms of a non-functioning chest port
catheter and chest pain indicating that part of the catheter had been severed
and remained inside Plaintiff’s body;

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“4. Defendant failed to take an x-ray image of Plaintiff’s chest on
April [9], 2012 immediately following the removal of the chest port
catheter to ensure that the entire catheter had been removed, despite having
x-ray equipment readily available; and

“5. By leaving a section of the catheter inside her body, where it
traveled through her heart, coiled up, and became lodged in her right
pulmonary artery, where it remains to this day, like a ticking time bomb
inside Plaintiff’s chest.”
Smith’s opposition further stated: “Defendant admitted during his deposition in
December 2019 that the section of catheter lodged in Plaintiff’s right pulmonary artery is
indeed part of the chest port catheter he had previously implanted in Plaintiff’s chest.
Defendant also [effectively] admitted during his deposition that he deviated significantly
from the Instructions for Use from the catheter’s manufacturer during implantation,
instructions that were designed specifically to prevent the same kind of ‘pinch-off’
fracture as happened in this case. Defendant did exactly the opposite of what those
Instructions for Use provided for and the catheter was indeed ‘pinched off’ and severed
as a direct and proximate result of Dr. Robinson’s negligent failure to adhere to those
instructions.”
Smith’s opposition continued: “This ‘pinched off’ section of catheter broke free
and traveled down Plaintiff’s subclavian vein in her chest, into and through her heart, and
came to rest, coiled up in her right pulmonary artery where it remains lodged today. This
circumstance is visible on multiple x-ray films taken since December 2015[,] when it was
first discovered after Plaintiff presented to an Emergency Room with chest pains.”
Smith’s opposition noted: “Defendant’s failure to adhere to the Instructions for
Use from the manufacturer during implantation is what caused the catheter to fracture
and sever in the first place. [However,] neither Defendant’s motion nor the declaration of
Defendant’s expert address the issue of causation in this case.”
Smith’s opposition contended: “Prior to filing his Motion for Summary Judgment,
neither Defendant nor his counsel realized that the procedure Defendant performed on

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Plaintiff in implanting the catheter port directly contradicted the instructions provided.
Those instructions were designed specifically to prevent catheter pinch off, or severing.
This isn’t even addressed in Defendant’s motion. For that reason alone, as a matter of
law, Defendant’s motion has to be denied.”
Smith’s opposition concluded: “Because a section of the catheter remains lodged
inside Plaintiff’s chest, Plaintiff does not believe she even needs expert witness testimony
in this case but retained an expert anyway in an abundance of caution[.]”
In support of her motion, Smith submitted a declaration from Dr. Gary Hoffman, a
Cedars Sinai surgeon and Smith’s expert witness regarding the standard of care, breach
thereof, and causation. Hoffman had “extensive experience as it relates to the surgical
implantation and explantation of chest port catheters.”
Hoffman declared:

“[I]t is my opinion that Dr. Robinson’s actions fell below the standard of
care, at a minimum, during the implantation of Plaintiff’s chest port
catheter on January 4, 2011, when he failed to measure the length of
catheter he implanted into Plaintiff’s subclavian vein after he trimmed both
ends of the catheter tube. Failing to measure the length of the catheter tube
at the time of implantation and failure to document the length of catheter
tubing implanted made it impossible for anyone, including Dr. Robinson, to
accurately determine whether the complete catheter tube had been removed
during the explantation surgery on April 9, 2012, other than by visual
means which in this case proved to be incorrect. [The Instructions for Use
for the relevant device], within the section entitled ‘Implantation
Preparation,’ reads as follows, ‘Complete the patient implant record,
including the length of catheter implanted, product number and lot
number.’ [Citation.] Dr. Robinson did not follow this instruction.
Exhibit 3 to the deposition of Dr. Robinson is that part of his operative
report which contains a sticker provided by the manufacturer for the
purpose of recording this information. The sticker is designed to be
adhered to the operative record. On the sticker appears the lot number and
the product number, but no record of the length of the catheter implanted.
[Citation.] In this respect I disagree with the opinion of Dr. Robinson’s
expert witness Dr. James R. Macho.

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“In fact, on April 9, 2012[,] Dr. Robinson did not remove the entire length
of catheter tubing he had previously implanted in Plaintiff’s chest. Because
he did not measure the catheter tubing at implantation, there is no way he
could have known if he had removed it in its entirety during explantation.
He left a section of that catheter tubing inside of Plaintiff (which he readily
acknowledged during his deposition testimony) where it traveled down her
superior vena cava, through her heart, eventually coming to rest in her right
pulmonary artery. The stark reality of this case is that if Dr. Robinson had
measured the length of catheter he implanted in Plaintiff’s chest at the time
he implanted it, this case never would have been filed because
Dr. Robinson would have subsequently known at explantation that he had
not removed the entire length of catheter tubing. He then very likely would
have proceeded accordingly based on that information and removed the
section of tubing remaining in Plaintiff’s right pulmonary artery.

“It is my further opinion that it falls below the standard of care virtually any
time a surgeon leaves part of a medical device inside a patient’s body
following a surgical procedure intended to remove the entire medical
device, as Dr. Robinson did in this case. In this respect I also disagree with
the opinion of Dr. Robinson’s expert witness Dr. James Macho.

“The Instructions for Use relative to the … chest port catheter that
Dr. Robinson implanted, and then subsequently removed from Plaintiff’s
superior vena cava, which instructions Dr. Robinson testified at his
deposition he was familiar with and had read and believed to be accurate,
speak conclusively to a specific location along the subclavian vein where
the catheter should be inserted. These catheters are extremely flexible,
some might say flimsy, and can kink or break. This is why the Instructions
for Use indicate that insertion into the subclavian vein should be made
laterally (closer to the shoulder along the collar bone), rather than medially
(closer to the sternum along the collar bone). The Instructions for Use
provide this direction specifically to prevent catheter fracture, or severing
of the catheter due to compression between the collar bone and the first rib
at the top of the rib cage. Dr. Robinson did not adhere to this instruction
when implanting Plaintiff’s chest port catheter on January 4, 2011 and it is
more likely than not that this was the cause of the catheter fracture in this
case, causing the catheter to sever into two pieces while still inside
Plaintiff’s chest. Significantly, neither Dr. Robinson’s Motion for
Summary Judgment nor Dr, Macho’s declaration address this issue of
inserting the catheter medially versus laterally or whether the catheter
placement in this case was the cause of the catheter fracture that occurred.

16.
“I further disagree with Dr. Robinson’s expert witness[,] Dr Macho[,] when
he essentially describes a section of catheter tubing coiled up and lodged
inside Plaintiff’s right pulmonary artery as a benign ‘no harm, no foul’
situation that caused Plaintiff no injury. I also disagree with Dr. Macho
when he states that the section of catheter has likely been ‘incorporated’
into Plaintiff’s pulmonary artery. The implication is that if something has
become ‘incorporated’ into an artery wall then it has become immovable
and its position is permanently fixed. A section of catheter such as the one
at issue in this case may simply be too big to become incorporated into an
artery wall. It’s just highly improbable that this length could incorporate
into the wall of the pulmonary artery and be covered by benign scar tissue,
which would prevent a pulmonary embolism. The implication of this is
that the section of catheter tubing is NOT therefore immovable and its
position is NOT permanently fixed. This circumstance, by definition,
means that this may not be an entirely harmless situation.

“I offer no opinion as to what Plaintiff should do, whether she should leave
the section of catheter where it is and hope for the best, or whether she
should explore having the section of catheter surgically removed. But it is
certainly a possibility that the section of catheter could become dislodged
and migrate distally with potentially grave consequences. If she were to
explore surgical removal of the section of catheter she has two likely
options of accomplishing that: a sternotomy or cardiac catherization. A
sternotomy involves opening or splitting the sternum similar to an open
heart surgical procedure, resulting in significant post-operative pain, a long
recuperative period and leaving a lengthy and very noticeable vertical scar
along the patient’s torso and chest. A cardiac catherization procedure
involves threading a flexible catheter into a blood vessel in the patient’s
groin up the body to the pulmonary artery. One potential risk with this
procedure is tearing or perforating the wall of the patient’s pulmonary
artery, a potentially fatal consequence. Given these choices, it is fair to say
that no reasonable person would choose to live their life with a foreign
body lodged in or partially blocking their pulmonary artery, with the
potential of pulmonary thrombus, pulmonary scarring, and/or cardiac
dysfunction.”
D. Outcome of Robinson’s Summary Judgment Motion
On April 15, 2020—two days after Smith submitted her opposition to Robinson’s
motion for summary judgment along with Hoffman’s supporting declaration—Robinson
filed a short notice withdrawing his motion for summary judgment. Smith notes in her
opening brief that Robinson withdrew his summary judgment motion in light of Smith’s

17.
opposition and Hoffman’s supporting declaration. Smith further notes that Robinson did
not file any subsequent summary judgment motion ahead of the February 2023 trial date.
Robinson does not dispute these observations.
E. Deposition of Dr. Gary Hoffman
Smith’s expert witness, Dr. Gary Hoffman, was deposed on November 16, 2021.
Towards the beginning of his deposition, Hoffman was asked whether he wanted
to update or clarify anything he had stated in his prior declaration. Hoffman stated that,
at this point, the only way the piece of catheter residing in Smith’s right pulmonary artery
could be removed would be by an open procedure or sternotomy (the cardiac
catherization, using interventional radiology, discussed in his declaration was no longer a
feasible option). Furthermore, even an open procedure would entail “the risk of surgery
in general; bleeding, infection, death, cardiovascular [and] neurological sequelae.” Since
the pulmonary artery is a very thin-walled artery, taking the catheter fragment out would
expose Smith to “major risks,” such as “the risk of bleeding or of losing part of her lung
because you have to clamp and cut the artery itself[.]” On the other hand, by leaving the
catheter in the pulmonary artery, Smith ran “the risk of pulmonary hypertension, [and] a
less likely [outcome] that it would dislodge and move further.” Hoffman emphasized
Smith was between a rock and a hard place. He would advise her to “consider just living
with it.” Hoffman pointed out: “And of course then she’s going to have to live with the
psychological aspects of living with it and what’s going to happen down the road. But
that’s another risk. But that’s manageable.” (Italics added.)
Hoffman was asked what the primary risks were in terms of future consequences,
should Smith continue to live with the catheter inside her. Hoffman stated: “The risks
can go all the way from no risk, and we don’t know we’re looking down the road, to
developing pulmonary hypertension and cardiac failure as a result of that, inability to live
a life that has any physical aspect to it because there – there are four grades of pulmonary
hypertension, the worst being you can’t even move because you have such severe cardiac

18.
dysfunction from the pulmonary hypertension, the least being pulmonary hypertension
with no symptoms. So there’s a scale of 1 to 4. We don’t know where she’ll be 10 years
from now when her body is 10 years older.” Hoffman added: “But she’s got a risk factor
already. She essentially has a catheter there, which is a risk factor for pulmonary
hypertension, but we don’t know what the status is of the pulmonary artery. These things
can be two centimeters wide. They can be a centimeter in diameter. And when you have
scar and a catheter there, we don’t know that the whole lumen is not about to occlude. So
we just don’t know.” As for the risk that the catheter piece would migrate, Hoffman
observed: “[T]his thing has lodged as far as it’s going to go, and I don’t think it’ll travel
downstream.”
Hoffman was asked: “Can you say to a reasonable degree of medical probability
that her risk of contracting pulmonary hypertension is increased with the presence of the
catheter there than it would be if the catheter wasn’t there.” Hoffman answered:
“Absolutely, yes.” Hoffman continued: “What I’m telling you is we can tell you
pulmonary hypertension 1, 2, 3, or 4, the catheter is a risk. We may not know why. It’s
obvious it’s flapping around and creates problems. But the part about – even if it’s
epithelialized, it’s more toward the size of the lumen – lumen means opening – the size of
the lumen through which her blood is flowing. And just having an obstruct[ion]—
remember, this catheter went in, and it doubled back on itself. And if that whole thing
starts to scar in, she may already have pulmonary hypertension. [¶] And pulmonary
hypertension Stage 1 is you have no knowledge that you have it basically. [¶] Stage 2,
you start to feel it a little bit tired on – on exertion. It goes all the way up to Stage 4. [¶]
We don’t know if she doesn’t – she may already have pulmonary hypertension.”
Hoffman said that the uncertainty “is something [Smith] is going to have to live
with.” As to the likelihood of Smith getting pulmonary hypertension in the future,
Hoffman noted that he could not “speak to causation because it hasn’t happened yet.”
Hoffman confirmed that, with respect to the likelihood of Smith developing pulmonary

19.
hypertension specifically, he could not state that it was a medical probability she would
develop this condition as a result of the retained, severed catheter. However, Hoffman
also stated that were Smith to get pulmonary hypertension, more probably than not it
would be on account of the severed catheter in her pulmonary artery.
Regarding the position of the catheter, Hoffman stated: “I don’t know how it bent
backwards on itself … My guess would be that it stopped where it did because it could
not go any further. And especially when it bent in half, it stopped … at a point closer to
the heart, meaning it obstructed an even bigger segment of the pulmonary artery. And I
believe it obstructed right at the take-off from the main pulmonary artery to the right
pulmonary artery. That’s a huge artery. That’s a big deal.” Hoffman continued: “And,
in fact, if I read the report, or the picture right, part of it may … actually be in the main
pulmonary artery. If that’s the case, it’s a setup for even more possibility of having a clot
because now you have a free end that can’t epithelialize kind of waving in the breeze
with blood flowing … by it. So it stopped because it couldn’t go any further, and it
stopped at a pretty significant spot.”
Hoffman was asked what the purpose was of the right pulmonary artery relative to
the right lung. Hoffman noted: “[T]he right branch of the – off of the main pulmonary
artery provides the blood flow that goes to that lung. There are other sources, but this is
the oxygenated blood that gets to the lung, and it’s right at the take-off of the right side.”
Hoffman further explained: “You want to reoxygenate the deoxygenated blood. And as
the vessels get smaller and smaller, they’re actually able to come in contact with the fresh
air that you breathe in, exchange oxygen across the capillaries, and then they go back out
to the pulmonary vein, and they get bigger and bigger and bigger. And you’re
significantly decreasing the blood flow [due to the presence of the severed catheter].”
Hoffman concluded: “I would bet you, if I had to guess, bet, her blood flow is decreased
to the right pulmonary artery. And I can answer that more probably than not [that is the
case].”

20.
Hoffman had implanted hundreds of port-a-cath devices and removed
approximately half of those implanted. Hoffman testified he had never had the
experience where a catheter fractured when he was removing it. He added: “I [also]
personally have not ever had [it] happen, where the removal of the catheter was
incomplete, no matter when the fracture occurred. I have not had that experience.”
Hoffman was asked, with respect to the insertion of the catheter by Robinson,
whether Robinson had performed in a way that a reasonable surgeon would not have.
Hoffman answered: “I think I can … just simply say that it was placed too medially and
as a result fractured. And the fracture was the result of the location and – location of the
placement of the catheter.” Hoffman continued: “I’m intimately involved in the teaching
at Cedars [Sinai] and we no longer place [catheters] the way Dr. Robinson did it. So I
would have a criticism that it was placed too medially. It works, and more often than not
you get away with it, but when you don’t you don’t, and that’s why we don’t do it that
way anymore.” It was not appropriate when Robinson implanted the catheter in Smith in
October 2011, to have placed it as medially as he did. Hoffman concluded: “I would not
have let Dr. Robinson place the catheter the way he did had he been under my teaching at
Cedars [Sinai]. Or anywhere actually. It doesn’t matter whether it’s Cedars or a small
hospital.”
When asked what the risk or danger to the patient is, that would make Robinson’s
method an unreasonable practice in 2011, Hoffman testified: “Well, just what we saw,
which is the catheter fractured because of the costoclavicular pressure on it. We don’t
know exactly when it fractured, but I suspect it fractured – prior to him removing the
catheter it had already fractured. And that’s why I wanted to be specific. I don’t have
any problem with the way he pulled it out. It was probably already fractured.” Hoffman
continued: “So back in 2011, had he and I been in the operating room with [Smith] … [I]
would have [had him take] a little marking pen and X’d the point and showed me where
he was going to put it and I’d say no, that’s too medial. And he might have said, well,

21.
why. And I would have said, go look at your anatomy, look at how these things are
affected … by where they’re being put in and draw me another point on the body,
because that’s where it’s got to go.” Port-a-caths are not inserted medially because of the
incidence of “pinch syndrome.” Hoffman opined, that given the catheter in this instance
was placed too medially, it was more probable than not it fractured on account of
costoclavicular pressure at the insertion site.
Hoffman was asked: “What else, if anything, regarding the insertion of the
catheter do you feel was below [the] standard of care besides that it was placed too
medially?” Hoffman answered: “Well, again, this gets into the standard of care. I
measure the length of what I put in. It’s part of the record. So I know when I take it out,
how much I’ve got. [¶] And now we’re heading toward the removal part and his thought
process then.”
Hoffman and Robinson’s counsel had the following exchange:

“Q. Right. And I know from your Declaration you indicated that you, on
the little thing that they give you that identifies the product, there’s a space
to identify the length, and then that would be documented in the record.

“A. Right. That’s correct.

“Q. That’s something you do in your practice?

“A. That’s – well, everybody I know who does these does that.

“Q. Well, that was going to be my question that – is it your experience that
universally surgeons will actually write on there the length of a catheter in
this type of situation?

“A. Whether it’s written there – it’ll be in my operative report. It may not
be there, but it’ll be in my op report for this very reason.

“Q. All right. And – and I don’t mean to quibble with you, but you are
chief of surgery at Cedars-Sinai and all, but you’re not the standard. So I
don’t want to blend things into what you do or what you would aspire to or
what is best practice or what you would teach. What I want to make sure
I’m focusing on is whether it’s your opinion that it was unreasonable, that

22.
is below the standard of care[,] for any general surgeon not to make that
recording somewhere in the record of the length?

“A. With respect to Cedars, had this type of case come up, it would have
been presented at a morbidity/mortality conference. It hasn’t come up in a
while. [¶] Yes, it’s not reasonable. And I guess we’re into the withdrawal
phase now. But how can you know what you took out when you don’t
know how long it was what you put in? So it’s a comparison. And I think
it’s below the standard of care, absolutely.

“... [T]here are … some standard maneuvers we use to estimate how long
we’re going to make that catheter before we put it in. I think he did
describe it. Put it on the chest wall, etcetera. And the last thing you do is
measure it and you say, I’m putting in, you know, 22 centimeters of
catheter.”
Hoffman next addressed the “withdrawal phase.” He said: “They pulled out
12.3 centimeters of catheter, okay. That’s 4.8 inches. 4.8 inches to anybody who’s put
these in knows that’s impossible to be the full length of a catheter. It’s not possible.
Therefore, his mouth should have gone dry and he should have thought, uh-oh, we have a
problem. We don’t have the full catheter.” Hoffman explained: “You combine that with
the fact they couldn’t inject, and when they inject it hurt her, the first thought he should
have had is, okay, it’s implanted. It’s still there. A chest x-ray would have confirmed
that or some type of other study. But that didn’t seem to happen in this case. [¶] But
there’s no way that anybody could have looked at 12.3 centimeters of catheter and said, I
got it all out. It’s not possible.”
Hoffman further noted: “And – and I’ll tell you one other reason why. When you
put the port in on the chest, it’s 12 centimeters probably just to get the port up to where it
goes in the vein. You’ve got another 12 – 10, 12 centimeters to get down to the heart
superior vena cava. So pulling out 12 centimeters barely even makes it into the vein. So
he couldn’t have removed the whole thing, and he should have known it back then.” Not
to have known this was “[a]bsolutely” below the standard of care. It was obvious that the
segment that was removed was too short to have been the entire, implanted catheter.

23.
Usually, “the length of catheter from the … port side … to where to where it enters the
vena cava [is] 11 inches, which is 25, 27 centimeters[.]” A reasonable surgeon would
have “run down to radiology really quickly, I’d call a cardiac surgeon really quickly and
say, we got this problem.” The patient should be told the same day. The patient would
have had options. “[S]omething could have been done.” In this case, “it wasn’t
discovered for several years later that it was still in there, so [Robinson] probably didn’t
know.”
Hoffman stated: “And as far as I understand, we’re here because there was an x-
ray taken which showed a foreign body three years later, and that’s why we’re here.”
(Italics added.) Hoffman said there were psychological repercussions but he was not
asked to look at that aspect of the case. Hoffman agreed that no one would voluntarily
want to have something in them that was not supposed to be there.
Hoffman summed things up: “I think the decision to put the catheter in was
correct. I think the decision to take it out was correct. I think there was a technical
mistake made during the insertion, which led to a fractured catheter. I think that the
potential for damage was compounded by not recognizing that not enough catheter was
removed. I don’t have a criticism with the fact that he stopped at that point. I have a
criticism with the fact that … [h]e didn’t recognize what had happened, so he didn’t seek
help or other advice.” Hoffman stated that when a catheter breaks, it could still have a
smooth end. “These things can fracture clean. And that doesn’t really tell you what you
need to [know].”
Hoffman agreed that “you can have catheters that fracture that don’t necessarily
involve any breach.” However, he added: “Dr. Robinson described the breach, so the
logical conclusion is that’s probably what caused the problem.”

24.
F. Defendant’s Motion in Limine No. 22 and Smith’s Opposition
On January 20, 2023, on the eve of trial,2 Robinson filed his motions in limine.
Robinson’s motion in limine No. 22 (motion in limine 22) is at issue on appeal. Motion
in limine 22 provided: “Defendant [Robinson] seeks an order from this court precluding
Plaintiff’s retained expert, Gary Hoffman, M.D., from offering any medical causation
opinions at trial, based on the fact that Dr. Hoffman testified at deposition that he could
not state any of his causation opinions to a reasonable degree of medical probability and,
in fact, ‘can’t speak to causation because it hasn’t yet.’ ” (Emphases omitted.)
Robinson’s motion in limine further stated:

“Medical malpractice, which has been alleged in Plaintiff’s
Complaint under the titles of ‘Medical Negligence’ and ‘General
Negligence/Res Ipsa Loquitur,’ is a species of negligence. In cases alleging
medical negligence, the plaintiff must not only establish and prove that the
defendant was negligent and that plaintiff was harmed, but must also prove
that the defendant’s alleged negligence was a substantial factor in causing
the plaintiff’s harm. (Mayes v. Bryan (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1075, 1093;
See also, CACI, No. 400.) Simply because a plaintiff may have been
injured or is claiming some type of injury, harm, or damage, does not, by
itself, mean that the named defendant was legally responsible for the harm.

“The law is well settled that in a personal injury action[,] causation
must be proven within a reasonable medical probability based [on]
competent expert testimony. Mere possibility alone is insufficient to
establish a prima facie case[.]” (Emphases omitted.)
Robinson’s motion in limine 22 concluded: “Dr. Hoffman’s testimony
unequivocally establishes his inability to provide any expert opinion on the issue of
causation. Dr. Hoffman should be precluded from offering any medical causation
opinions at trial, as in his own words: ‘I can’t speak to causation.’ ”3 (Emphasis
omitted.)

2 Trial was set to commence on February 14, 2023.

3 Smith’s opposition to Robinson’s motion in limine 22 is not in the record on
appeal.

25.
The trial court heard argument on Robinson’s motion in limine 22 on January 30,
2023. The court ordered the parties to provide supplemental briefing on motion in limine
22 and set a further hearing on that motion on February 7, 2023.
The parties filed the supplemental briefing requested by the court. In her briefing,
Smith argued, among other things, as follows: “Despite the fact that, as a direct result of
Defendant’s negligence, Plaintiff now has a section of catheter lodged in her right
pulmonary artery, Defendant is claiming that Plaintiff suffered no injury and cannot
establish that she suffered any injury because she cannot prove causation. There is no
doubt that the negligent actions of Defendant caused all of this, it is painfully clear even
to the most casual observer. The section of catheter left inside Plaintiff’s body by
Defendant as a direct result of his negligence is likely going to be there forever.”
Smith added in her briefing: “Dr. Robinson’s negligence, and the results of that
negligence, have sidelined Plaintiff to some degree and have truly impacted her life
significantly, through no fault of her own and has caused her tremendous stress, worry,
anxiety, etc. The section of catheter passed through Plaintiff’s heart. Removing it could
kill her. Leaving it where it is increases her risk for innumerable ailments and conditions
in the future.”
Finally, Smith stated in her briefing: “Defendant Dr. Robinson breached the
standard of care in any number of ways in this case. Each breach contributed to the end
result: a pinched off, severed section of the port-a-cath catheter tube is now coiled up on
itself and has embolized (lodged in and partially blocking) in the Plaintiff’s right
pulmonary artery. A surgeon [unintentionally] leaving a foreign object inside his patient
is obvious negligence. Because Plaintiff lives everyday with the knowledge that this
foreign object resides in a main artery and exists with the fear of the unknown that
accompanies its existence and the unknown of whether or not she will eventually have to
undergo surgery to have it removed, she is entitled to the maximum recovery under
California law for her general damages.”

26.
On February 7, 2023, the court held a hearing on the issue of causation in the
context of Smith’s medical malpractice claims. Both parties presented argument at the
hearing. Smith’s attorney clarified that the injury at issue was the presence of the
catheter segment currently lodged near her heart. He noted that Smith could testify to,
and was entitled to, emotional distress damages arising from the fact that Robinson’s
breach of the standard of care had caused a segment of the catheter to be pinched off and
left inside her body for the long haul. He emphasized that Smith was not claiming
damages based on any future injury requiring future medical treatment.
Smith’s attorney further noted: “If the Court is saying that [Dr. Hoffman] cannot
testify as to causation of the event, itself, the Court is wrong to do so, because in the
deposition of Dr. Hoffman, [he] stated that the medical negligence caused the catheter to
be broken off inside of her. So insofar as the [elements of] duty[,] breach[,] causation[,]
damages relating to the medical negligence, he certainly said the medical negligence
caused the catheter to be broken inside of her.”
As for Robinson’s counsel, he argued: “[S]ome medical person has to say that this
negligence that Dr. Robinson [allegedly] did, and not [the port-a-cath] manufacturer’s
negligence – but this negligence that Robinson did, which is disputed, but that that
negligence caused some harm to the Plaintiff. And nobody has said that.”
Robinson’s counsel compared Smith’s case to cases in which a plaintiff has no
current injury but a potential exists for a future injury to develop. In this vein,
Robinson’s counsel contended: “In those cases, like the needle prick where somebody
says, ‘Well, now I’m going to get AIDS,’ they don’t get to testify themselves as a
layperson, … even though they really may be afraid that they got AIDS from this one
needle prick. No. There has to be a link, a medical link, that says it’s probable that you
may suffer some damage from that. [¶] And that goes along with HIV/AIDS.” Counsel
added: “[These cases] also talk about fear of cancer [from some toxic exposure]. It talks
about these things where you can’t just get up on the stand and say, ‘Oh, I’m worried

27.
about this,’ without this causation link.” Counsel posited: “So what we are laying before
the Court is something that, as a matter of law, is a fatal flaw in their case that I think
they’ve even admitted.” Counsel went on: “And I think that justice requires not to waste
the time of calling in a jury, empaneling them, making an opening statement, whatever.
They can’t make an offer of proof to you that can get them by this fatal legal flaw of
causation.”
The trial court granted Robinson’s motion in limine 22, thereby excluding
Dr. Hoffman’s testimony as to any causation issues. The trial court also stated that it saw
“a red flag that could be dispositive.” At this juncture, Smith’s counsel asked: “So when
the Court is saying that [Dr. Hoffman] can’t give any testimony on medical causation, is
the Court saying that he can’t say that there was a breach of the standard of care which
caused the catheter to be left inside her body?”
Ruling from the bench, the court reiterated that it was precluding “Gary Hoffman,
M.D., from offering any medical causation opinions at trial based on his specific
testimony from his transcript, which said he cannot, with medical certainty, testify that
Dr. Robinson caused any harm or injury to Plaintiff.” Smith’s counsel noted the court
should consider the fact that “this is a res ipsa case,” where specific testimony as to
causation is not required. The court indicated it would entertain additional briefing as to
whether or not its ruling on Robinson’s motion in limine 22 disposed of the case
altogether. The court set a briefing schedule for a dispositive motion from the defense; a
hearing on the dispositive motion was set for February 14, 2023 (the day of trial).
In a subsequent minute order, the court adopted its prior tentative ruling granting
Robinson’s motion in limine 22 (the court’s underlying tentative ruling does not appear
to be in the record on appeal).
G. Defendant’s Dispositive Motion in Limine and Smith’s Opposition
On February 8, 2023, Robinson filed a “dispositive motion in limine following
granting of motion in limine precluding medical causation opinions; motion for nonsuit”

28.
(dispositive motion or dispositive motion in limine), with a February 14, 2023, hearing
date that coincided with the trial date. (Capitalization omitted.) Robinson argued in the
dispositive motion: “The Court has granted Defendant’s Motion in Limine No. 22, to
preclude Plaintiff’s expert Gary Hoffman, M.D., from offering any causation opinions at
trial. Dr. Hoffman is the only expert, retained or non-retained, designated by Plaintiff. As
a consequence, Plaintiff is unable to present any expert testimony on the requisite issue of
causation and so, cannot prevail on her claims of medical negligence and general
negligence/res ipsa loquitur. Therefore, Defendant now seeks a dispositive ruling of law,
such as a judgment of nonsuit as to Plaintiff’s Complaint and the two causes of action
stated therein, to avoid unnecessarily impaneling a jury and [to] conserve judicial
resources.” Robinson also argued that application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was
not factually warranted in this case.
Smith filed an opposition to Robinson’s dispositive motion in limine, in which she
challenged Robinson’s motion on procedural and substantive grounds. As to her
procedural arguments, Smith stated, among other things: “In a most unusual, and
unprecedented, manner, the Court, just days before trial, and after granting a motion in
limine concerning “Medical Causation” requested a dispositive briefing, in essence a
summary judgment motion, providing Plaintiff less than 48 hours to respond. Plaintiff has
two causes of action, Medical Negligence and Res Ipsa Loquitur. Sufficient evidence
exists for Plaintiff to survive this dispositive motion and have a jury decide her case based
on triable issues of material fact.” Smith added: “Defendant has presented, and the court
appears tempted by, a convoluted rhetorical shell game wherein the Defendants claim that,
based on the Court’s ruling on Motion in Limine 22, Plaintiff can’t introduce medical
expert testimony on ‘medical causation’ which this Court has stated is essential to prove
Plaintiff’s claims. What Defendant attempts to accomplish is to have the court review the
facts and law and decide there are not sufficient, admissible, disputed facts, to support
Plaintiff’s causes of action and Defendant is therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of

29.
law. This is the summary judgment standard.” Smith continued: “This motion/process is
defective and should be canceled, taken off calendar and/or denied.”
Smith also made several substantive arguments as to why Robinson’s dispositive
motion had no merit and should be denied. Smith argued that Robinson seized on
Hoffman’s testimony that he could not say, in terms of probabilities, whether the catheter
segment lodged near Smith’s heart would cause future medical issues (such as pulmonary
hypertension), and on the basis of this partial bit of Hoffman’s testimony, falsely claimed
that Hoffman did not testify to any harm suffered by Smith at all. Smith argued that,
contrary to Robinson’s twisted rendition Hoffman’s testimony, Hoffman clearly testified
that Robinson’s breach of the standard of care caused the severed catheter segment to be
left inside Smith’s pulmonary artery. Smith suggested that Robinson conveniently
obfuscated this testimony.
Smith also pointed out that in taking Hoffman’s deposition, Robinson’s attorney
directed his questions to future medical issues rather than the proximate cause of the
retained catheter segment and the implications of the retained catheter segment for
Smith’s mental well-being. She posited the court could therefore not preclude
(1) Hoffman from testifying about the causal nexus between Robinson’s breach of the
standard of care and retention of the severed catheter segment in her body, and (2) Smith
herself from testifying about her resulting emotional distress.
With regard to Robinson’s contention that Smith could not show that Robinson’s
breach of the standard of care caused her any harm, Smith emphasized that Robinson’s
briefs focused on “future injuries of [pulmonary] hypertension and the fragment going
‘downstream,’ ” but not “the issue of proximate causation of the catheter being left behind
in Ms. Smith’s right pulmonary artery as a result of Dr. Robinson’s negligence.” She
further stated (quoting from one of her earlier briefs): “‘Future potential injuries and past
mental and emotional distress are unrelated and independent of each other. Potential
injuries or complications in the future and Plaintiff’s mental and emotional distress

30.
already suffered are being improperly conflated.’ ” Smith posited: “Therefore
Dr. Hoffman should not be precluded from testifying about his opinions on the breach of
the standard of care causing the foreign body object, the broken catheter section … being
left behind.” She also noted, citing Godfrey v. Steinpress (1982) 128 Cal.App.3d 154, 186
(Godfrey) and Vines v. United States (2008 E.D. Cal.) 2008 WL 4470795 (Vines), that
“[e]xpert testimony is not required to establish emotional distress; lay opinion alone can
be sufficient.”4
Finally, Smith argued that Robinson’s dispositive motion should be denied
because the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applied. Citing Brown v. Poway Unified School
District (1993) 4 Cal.4th 820, 825 (Brown), she stated: “ ‘Res ipsa loquitur is a doctrine
affecting the burden of producing evidence applicable to certain kinds of accidents that
are so likely to have been caused by a defendant’s negligence that, in the Latin
equivalent, “the thing speaks for itself.” ’ ” She added, again quoting Brown at page 825
and citing Evidence Code section 646, subdivision (b): “ [‘]If applicable, the doctrine of

4 Smith submitted a declaration in support of her opposition to Robinson’s
dispositive motion in limine (effectively, an offer of proof as to her potential trial
testimony regarding her emotional distress damages). In the declaration, among other
things, Smith stated: “I have suffered significant stress with the knowledge that a piece
of plastic that is not supposed to be in my body is in my right pulmonary artery, that it
has passed through my heart. I don’t want some broken piece of catheter left in me. I
don’t want plastic in the main artery to my right lung. I want it out, but I am told that I
face significant risks, and even death, if I try and have it removed. I think about this
often and it causes me stress.” Smith continued: “I am upset and angry that the plastic
was left in me. It makes me feel like I don’t matter enough for a doctor to be careful and
not leave things that shouldn’t be left inside of me, and that I could die if I try to get it
removed. Why didn’t he realize that he left something inside of me? He put it in, why
didn’t he take all of it out? Smith added: “I am now not as trusting of doctors as I used
to be. I wonder sometimes if he knew and just left it behind thinking no one would ever
know. This leads me to question whether what doctors say to me is true or not. It causes
me to be afraid every time I have something done to me, or take a medicine, that I may
not be getting the straight information.”

31.
res ipsa loquitur establishes a presumption of negligence requiring the defendant to come
forward with evidence to disprove it.[’] ”
Smith continued, quoting Brown, supra, 4 Cal.4th at pages 825-826: “ ‘The
presumption that an accident was caused by the defendant’s lack of care arises only when
the evidence satisfies three conditions: (1) The accident must be of a kind that ordinarily
does not occur unless someone is negligent; (2) the accident must be caused by an agency
or instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant; and (3) the accident must
not have been due to any voluntary action or contributory fault of the plaintiff.’ ” She
posited: “Medical devices, or parts thereof [that are not intended to be retained inside the
body], do not typically get left inside of patients during surgery in the absence of
negligence on the part of the surgeon. Here, Defendant Dr. Robinson had complete
control over every aspect of both of Plaintiff’s two surgeries, implantation and
explantation. He was solely responsible for the specific chest port catheter that was used,
the anesthesia selected, the x-rays taken and not taken, and the surgical procedures
themselves.” Moreover, Smith herself was under sedation during the implantation
surgery and under general anesthesia during the explantation or removal surgery.
Smith argued, quoting Blackwell v. Hurst (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 939, 946: “ ‘The
jury should have been permitted to make a factual finding on the issue of [the
applicability of] the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. If the jury determined that, in fact, the
injury does not ordinarily occur absent negligence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur would
have resulted in an inference of negligence that [Robinson] may or may not have been
able to overcome. We cannot hold the error harmless.’ ” In short, Smith contended that
Robinson’s dispositive motion failed.
Robinson filed a reply to Smith’s opposition to his dispositive motion in limine.
Robinson argued that his dispositive motion should be granted because Smith had not
suffered any physical injury, the case cited by Smith, Vines, supra, 2008 WL 4470795,
was distinguishable on that basis, among others, and Smith’s lay testimony as to any

32.
emotional distress she suffered was insufficient to support her claim for damages.
Robinson contended:

“In stark contrast, there exists extensive legal authority from the cases
involving recovery of damages for emotional distress, i.e., the line of cases
addressing fear of cancer, HIV, or AIDS, which directly addresses whether
a plaintiff can recover for emotional address damages where no physical
injury exists. This is the precise issue before this Court. Those cases hold
that in the absence of a physical injury, a plaintiff may only recover
damages for emotional distress, i.e., emotional upset, if she establishes
through reliable medical or scientific opinion that it is more likely than not
that she will suffer the feared of injury as a result of the event, that is,
retention of a catheter fragment. (See Potter v. Firestone Tire and Rubber
Co. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 965, 997 [(Potter)]; see also CACI 1622.) As
discussed thoroughly in Defendant’s moving papers, the same standard
should be applied to the case at bar.” (Emphasis in original)
Concurrently with his reply to Smith’s opposition to his dispositive motion,
Robinson filed an objection to Smith’s declaration in support of her opposition. (See
footnote 4, ante.) Robinson objected to Smith’s declaration mainly on grounds of
relevancy and calling for an expert opinion.
The court held a hearing on Robinson’s dispositive motion. At the hearing, the
court addressed Smith’s attorney: “Potter[, supra, 6 Cal.4th 965,] is controlling on these
types of cases dealing with future anxiety, fear, et cetera. That’s why Potter, which was
an opinion … by the California Supreme Court, talks about the fear of cancer, fear of
AIDS, fear of those types of things. Isn’t that what your client is doing here? She is
fearful of what’s going to happen in the future because that portion of the catheter is left
in her?” (Italics added.)
Smith’s attorney responded:

“No, no, no. AIDS, HIV, cancer, all of those things are a special category
because of the special nature of this future that’s unpredictable and that
they might experience or experience emotional distress because of what
might happen in the future.

33.
“I have taken out the hypertension. I have taken out the migration. We’re
not having a fear of those things in the future, ergo [CACI No.] 1622 is
irrelevant because we’re not talking about these two things, my exposure to
cancer, my exposure to HIV, hypertension in our case, or migration [of the
retained catheter segment]. They’re out of the picture. It comes down to
now, does leaving a physical object inside her body, is there – at this point
you must accept the inference that it will indicate to a jury that she suffered
some sort of emotional distress damage. We’re looking at the cases in the
3,000 series [of CACI], noneconomic damages.

“She has already experienced some of this. This isn’t about just the future.
This happened years ago. She felt – and I could read them to you, but it’s
straight out of her declaration, your Honor. She has indicated that she has
felt stressed. She has felt fear that it might move. They can have an expert
say it’s not going to move. Then a jury can say that’s not reasonable.

“She has said she has stress with the knowledge of the plastic inside her
body. It’s not supposed to be there. It [has] gone through her heart. I don’t
want some broken piece of plastic inside of me. She has the right to say to
a jury I’m suffering some distress because this piece of plastic is left inside
of me.

“You don’t need an expert for that one. It says, I don’t want plastic in the
main artery to my right lung. I want it out, but I’m told that I’d face
significant risk, even death, if I try to have it removed. I’m upset and angry
that the plastic was left inside of me. It makes me feel like I don’t matter
enough for a doctor to be careful and not leave things that shouldn’t be left
inside of me. I’m not as trusting of doctors as I used to be. I am upset the
doctor is saying even if he did me wrong, it doesn’t matter. It makes me
feel upset and stressed that I have plastic in my main artery.

“I don’t need an expert for that. I have demonstrated to you that there is
testimony which if the court follows the standard, we get the inference of,
the jury is going to hear that and can believe it. I don’t need an expert. I
don’t need a[n] expert to say since this object was left in her body, she’s
been stressed, upset, angry. I don’t need an expert for that.

“This is no in the future she might get AIDS or she might get cancer. This
[has] already happened. She’s experienced these things. She’s
experiencing these things.

[¶] … [¶]

34.
“Undoubtedly it’s problematic that a piece of plastic was left inside her,
period. From that, damages flow which are how she felt and experienced
something today and how she feels about that for the rest of her life. Not
hypertension, not migration, not AIDS, not cancer, none of that.

“It is the general emotional distress damages that we provide in every other
case without an expert.” (Italics added.)
The court next asked Smith’s counsel: “[H]ow do you get around causation[?] In
a Reader’s Digest version world, that is the issue before the court.” Smith’s counsel
responded: “Question, did it cause the plastic to be left behind. That’s the causation
we’re talking about. Duty, breach, causation, caused the plastic to be left behind …
We’re looking at duty, breach, causation. The issue is something was left behind.”
Counsel added: “Was there a duty, yes. Was there a breach, that’s the standard of care
question which [Hoffman] said, I say yes. They’re saying no … Duty, breach, caused,
the thing to be left behind.” Counsel continued: “The court’s inquiry regarding experts
stops there. Then my client said, because this is inside of me, these are my damages.
That’s just the way it works in any case I do, medical malpractice, personal injury.”
Counsel emphasized: “We have got duty, breach, causation, at [best] as a
presumption, definitely as a triable issue of fact.” Counsel rejected Robinson’s
contention that “you have to have medical causation of everything,” including emotional
distress. Counsel observed: “If the court is going to say that it needs an expert [to show
emotional distress], then every PI case is going to need an expert to say, yeah, this caused
some pain … To a reasonable degree of medical certainty, they suffered some pain. I
mean, to me that’s an unfathomable change in how we do these cases.”
The trial court ruled from the bench. The court stated: “The court first notes that
the court has reviewed the declaration of Budina Smith filed February 9th, 2023[,] on this
particular motion. The central issue revolving around for the court is whether or not the
expert testimony was needed to meet the elements of causation setting up foundational
issues [and] spring-boarding into and permitting emotional damages.” The court found

35.
that expert testimony was necessary, under Potter, supra, 6 Cal.4th 965, 997, to establish
causation and damages and that Smith’s expert’s testimony was insufficient. The court
ruled: “[T]his court … therefore, determines the plaintiff’s declaration to be irrelevant
and sustains all of the objections.” The court further granted Robinson’s dispositive
motion.
H. Trial Court’s Order on Robinson’s Dispositive Motion
Following the hearing on Robinson’s dispositive motion, the trial court issued, the
same day, a minute order granting the motion and dismissing the case. The court’s order
stated: “Defendant’s dispositive Motion in Limine [was] filed at the direction of the
Court. The motion is a follow up to the Court’s Granting of the Defendant[’]s In Limine
No. 22, which precluded the Plaintiff’s expert, Gary Hoffman, M.D., from offering any
medical causation opinions at trial. The Defendant’s dispositive motion is GRANTED.”
The court’s order further provided:

“In Potter v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 965,
997, the California Supreme Court held: Damages for fear of cancer may
be recovered only if the plaintiff pleads and proves that (1) as a result of
Defendant’s negligent breach of a duty owed to the Plaintiff, the plaintiff is
exposed to a toxic substance which threatens cancer; and (2) the plaintiff’s
fear stems from a knowledge, corroborated by reliable medical or scientific
opinion, that it is more likely than not that the plaintiff will develop the
cancer in the future due to the toxic exposure. Plaintiff’s expert can testify
as he did during his expert deposition, to a reasonable degree of medical
probability that [her] risk of contracting pulmonary hypertension is
increased with the presence of the catheter (i.e. that the risk has increased
from x% to y%). Plaintiff’s expert cannot testify that it is more likely than
not that plaintiff will develop pulmonary hypertension (i.e. greater than
50%) because such opinion was not offered during his expert deposition.
Accordingly, [Potter] bars Plaintiff from offering evidence of emotional
distress arising from her fear that she will develop pulmonary hypertension
in the future.” (Italics added.)
The court concluded that Smith therefore had no case and granted Robinson’s
dispositive motion. In turn, the court vacated “today’s jur[y] trial date.”

36.
DISCUSSION
I. Trial Court Erred in Granting Robinson’s Dispositive Motion
A. Standard of Review
The parties agree that the applicable standard of review is the standard we apply in
reviewing a trial court’s grant of a motion for judgment of nonsuit following opening
statement.
“[W]hen the trial court utilizes the in limine process to dispose of a case or cause
of action for evidentiary reasons, we review the result as we would the grant of a motion
for nonsuit after opening statement, keeping in mind that the grant of such a motion is not
favored, that a key consideration is that the nonmoving party has had a full and fair
opportunity to state all the facts in its favor, and that all inferences and conflicts in the
evidence must be viewed most favorably to the nonmoving party.” (Amtower v. Photon
Dynamics, Inc. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1582, 1595.) “In contrast, on appeal from a
judgment following trial, appellate review favors the judgment.” (Id. at pp. 1594-1595.)
Where a trial court grants a motion in limine to exclude evidence already produced
in discovery, whereby the plaintiff’s causes of action fail as a matter of law, the court’s
order is the functional equivalent of a grant of nonsuit. (Edwards v. Centex Real Estate
Corp. (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 15, 27-28 (Edwards).) “A trial court may grant a nonsuit
only when, disregarding conflicting evidence, viewing the record in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff and indulging in every legitimate inference which may be drawn
from the evidence, it determines there is no substantial evidence to support a judgment in
the plaintiff’s favor.” (Id. at p. 28; Nally v. Grace Community Church (1988) 47 Cal.3d
278, 291 (Nally) [“A defendant is entitled to a nonsuit if the trial court determines that, as
a matter of law, the evidence presented by [the] plaintiff is insufficient to permit a jury to
find in his favor.”].)
The substantial evidence needed to defeat a nonsuit motion is “evidence that is
reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from which a reasonable trier of fact could have

37.
made the requisite finding under the governing standard of proof.” (In re Jerry M. (1997)
59 Cal.App.4th 289, 298.) A mere scintilla of evidence or evidence that is bare
speculation or conjecture is not enough; rather, there must be some substance to the
evidence upon which a reasonable person could rely. (Nally, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 291.)
We review a judgment of nonsuit de novo, applying the same standards as the trial
court. (Nally, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 291; Edwards, supra, 53 Cal.App.4th at p. 28 [“We
are bound by the same rules as the trial court. Therefore, on this appeal we must view the
evidence most favorably to appellants, resolving all presumptions, inferences, and doubts
in their favor, and uphold the judgment for respondents only if it was required as a matter
of law.”].)
B. Smith’s Medical Negligence Claim (Physical Injury)
“Generally, ‘negligence’ is the failure to exercise the care a reasonable person
would exercise under the circumstances. [Citation.] Medical negligence is one type of
negligence, to which general negligence principles apply.” (Massey v. Mercy Medical
Center Redding (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 690, 694.) “The elements of a medical
malpractice claim are ‘ “ ‘(1) the duty of the professional to use such skill, prudence, and
diligence as other members of his profession commonly possess and exercise; (2) a
breach of that duty; (3) a proximate causal connection between the negligent conduct and
the resulting injury; and (4) actual loss or damage resulting from the professional’s
negligence.’ ” ’ ” (Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Medical Center (2008)
159 Cal.App.4th 463, 468, fn. 2 (Avivi).) “Both the standard of care and [a defendant’s]
breach must normally be established by expert testimony in a medical malpractice case.”
(Id. at p. 467.) In addition, “ ‘[c]ausation must be proven within a reasonable medical
probability based upon competent expert testimony.’ ” (Dumas v. Cooney (1991)
235 Cal.App.3d 1593, 1603; see also Sanchez v. Kern Emergency Medical
Transportation Corp. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 146, 153 (Sanchez) [“ ‘Whenever the
plaintiff claims negligence in the medical context, the plaintiff must present evidence

38.
from an expert that the defendant breached his or her duty to the plaintiff and that the
breach caused the injury to the plaintiff.’ ”].)
Here, there is no dispute as to the first element, namely that Robinson had a duty
to use due care in performing the implantation and explantation surgeries on Smith, his
patient. As to the second element, Hoffman testified in detail that Robinson breached the
duty of due care during both implantation and explantation. As to implantation, Hoffman
explained that Robinson breached the standard of care in inserting the catheter in the
subclavian vein in too medial of a position, thereby subjecting the catheter to
compression at the junction of the clavicle and the first rib at the top of the rib cage and
resulting in a part of it being pinched off and severed. Robinson’s medial placement of
the port-a-cath conflicted with the instructions that came with the port-a-cath; the
instructions warned against medial placement of the catheter. Next, Hoffman noted that
Robinson failed to measure and record the length of catheter that was implanted, which
failure was a clear breach of the standard of care. The device’s instructions also called
for measuring and recording the length of catheter that was implanted. Measuring and
recording the length of catheter implanted was necessary so that when the implanted
catheter was removed from the body, it could be measured to ensure the entirety of the
implanted catheter had been removed.
Hoffman testified that Robinson also breached the standard of care during the
explantation surgery. Robinson did not get an x-ray of Smith’s chest following the
removal of the device; an x-ray would have revealed the severed segment of catheter that
was left inside Smith’s chest, within a blood vessel near her heart. Hoffman further
indicated that Robinson should have appreciated that the length of catheter he removed
was simply too short to have been the entire, implanted catheter. Had Robinson timely
realized he had removed only a partial segment of the catheter, he could have taken
immediate steps to facilitate prompt extrication of the retained, severed catheter
fragment.

39.
Hoffman also testified that the aforementioned breaches of the standard of care
committed by Robinson resulted in harm to Smith. Hoffman noted the breaches led to
the severed segment of catheter being left in Smith’s body and remaining undetected for
several years, in the course of which time it passed through her heart and became lodged
at a “significant spot” close to her heart, that is, the juncture of the main pulmonary artery
and the right pulmonary artery, which area was now partially obstructed. Hoffman said
relevant imaging indicated part of the severed catheter appeared to be “in the main
pulmonary artery,” which was “a setup for even more possibility of having a clot because
now you have a free end that can’t epithelialize kind of waving in the breeze with blood
flowing … by it.”
Hoffman stated: “It’s obvious it’s flapping around and creates problems. But the
part about – even if it’s epithelialized, it’s more toward the size of the lumen – lumen
means opening – the size of the lumen through which her blood is flowing. And just
having an obstruct[ion]—remember, this catheter went in, and it doubled back on itself.”
Hoffman indicated that more probably than not, Smith’s blood flow to the right
pulmonary artery was significantly decreased on account of the presence of the severed
catheter segment at the spot where the right pulmonary artery branches off from the main
pulmonary artery. Hoffman noted that blood flow through the blood vessels in the lungs
is responsible for oxygenating the tissues of the lungs. His testimony supported an
inference that reduced blood flow to the right pulmonary artery was suboptimal, as it
would limit the oxygenation of the right lung.
Hoffman also stated that he would advise Smith to consider just living with the
severed catheter fragment in her pulmonary artery as attempting to remove it was
extremely risky and could result in bleeding to death. He described Smith’s situation as
being between a rock and a hard place. Hoffman pointed out: “And of course then she’s
going to have to live with the psychological aspects of living with it and what’s going to
happen down the road. But that’s another risk. But that’s manageable.” (Italics added.)

40.
In light of the problems associated with the presence of the severed catheter
segment, Hoffman explicitly stated in his declaration: “I further disagree with
Dr. Robinson’s expert witness[,] Dr Macho[,] when he essentially describes a section of
catheter tubing coiled up and lodged inside Plaintiff’s right pulmonary artery as a benign
‘no harm, no foul’ situation that caused Plaintiff no injury.” Hoffman’s declaration and
deposition testimony constituted substantial evidence for a jury to find that Smith was
harmed by the presence of the severed catheter segment in her pulmonary artery (i.e., that
the presence of the severed catheter—an unwanted foreign object— was an injury to
Smith). Indeed, Hoffman testified at deposition that no one would voluntarily want to
have a physical object lodged inside a critical blood vessel, when the object at issue was
not supposed to be there.
As for the causal nexus between Robinson’s breaches of the standard of care and
the harm or injury suffered by Smith, Hoffman expressly stated in his declaration that
Robinson’s breach of the standard of care in implanting the catheter medially in the
subclavian vein, in contravention of the device’s instructions for use, was “more likely
than not” the “cause of the catheter fracture in this case, causing the catheter to sever into
two pieces while still inside Plaintiff’s chest.” Hoffman also testified at deposition as
follows: “I think I can … just simply say that [the catheter] was placed too medially and
as a result fractured. And the fracture was the result of the location and – location of the
placement of the catheter.”
Hoffman’s declaration and deposition testimony constitute substantial evidence for
a jury to find to a reasonable medical probability, that Robinson’s breach was a
substantial factor in causing the harm suffered by Smith. (Sarti v. Salt Creek Ltd. (2008)
167 Cal.App.4th 1187, 1210 [“California law on causation is ‘substantial factor’ ”]; see
Dougherty v. Lee (1946) 74 Cal.App.2d 132, 136 [“ ‘It is not necessary in the trial of civil
cases that the circumstances shall establish the negligence of the defendant as the
proximate cause of injury with such absolute certainty as to exclude every other

41.
conclusion.’ ”]; see also Haning, et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Personal Injury (The Rutter
Group 2022) ¶ 2:2405 “Causation is a question of reasonable probability; ‘legal cause’
need not be proved with certainty, but mere possibility is insufficient to establish a prima
facie case. Thus, the issue is whether it is more likely than not that plaintiff’s injury was
a result of defendant’s act or omission.”].)
Finally, for purposes of this analysis, we note that Robinson’s briefing to the trial
court, and to this court as well, both mischaracterizes and fails to address the full scope of
Hoffman’s opinions on causation. For example, in his motion in limine 22, Robinson
argued: “Defendant [Robinson] seeks an order from this court precluding Plaintiff’s
retained expert, Gary Hoffman, M.D., from offering any medical causation opinions at
trial, based on the fact that Dr. Hoffman testified at deposition that he could not state any
of his causation opinions to a reasonable degree of medical probability and, in fact, ‘can’t
speak to causation because it hasn’t yet.’ ” (Emphases omitted.) Robinson further
argued: “In addition, Dr. Hoffman testified that he could not state … to a reasonable
degree of medical probability that Plaintiff will suffer any injury as a result of the
retained catheter fragment. [¶] … [¶] Therefore, Dr. Hoffman should be precluded from
offering any medical causation opinions at trial, as in his own words: ‘I can’t speak to
causation.’ ” (Underlining omitted.)
However, it is very clear from Hoffman’s deposition that Hoffman made these
statements strictly in the context of the probability of Smith developing pulmonary
hypertension over time or in the future. Hoffman did not, by any means, state that he had
no causation opinions whatsoever. Specifically, when Robinson’s counsel asked
Hoffman whether Hoffman had told him all his causation opinions, Hoffman clarified
that, at that point, he was merely addressing causation in the context of pulmonary
hypertension as a possible outcome of the retained catheter. Hoffman stated: “If she gets
pulmonary hypertension … most likely more probably than not it’s due to the retained
catheter. So I’m sort of answering it backwards because we don’t know what’s going to

42.
happen to her. I can’t speak to causation because [pulmonary hypertension] hasn’t
happened yet.” (Italics added.) At other times during his deposition, Hoffman certainly
expressed other causation opinions, as discussed above. Accordingly, we conclude the
trial court erred in granting Robinson’s motion in limine 22, to the extent the trial court’s
ruling encompassed all of Robinson’s causation opinions, rather than merely his
causation opinions regarding the likelihood that Smith would develop pulmonary
hypertension or regarding the likelihood that the catheter fragment would further migrate
within Smith’s body.
In sum, the evidence reflected in the record was sufficient for a jury to find the
elements of Smith’s claim of medical negligence. Furthermore, were Smith to establish
her claim of medical negligence at trial, she would be entitled to damages arising from
Robinson’s negligence, including emotional distress damages based on the fact that as a
result of Robinson’s negligence, an unwanted catheter fragment had passed through her
heart and was lodged in a critical blood vessel supplying oxygenated blood to her lungs.
(See Selden v. Dinner (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 166, 174 (Selden) [in negligence cases, a
plaintiff can recover emotional distress damages where he or she has suffered an injury
and emotional distress is a ‘parasitic’ item of damages]; Thing v. La Chusa (1989)
48 Cal.3d 644, 651 (Thing) [same]; see Thomas, et al., Cal. Civ. Prac. Torts § 11:1 (2025)
[“A plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages for physical pain and mental suffering
that [ac]company or otherwise result from physical injury.”].) “The range of mental or
emotional injury subsumed within the rubric ‘emotional distress’ and for which damages
are presently recoverable ‘includes fright, nervousness, grief, anxiety, worry,
mortification, shock, humiliation and indignity, as well as physical pain.’ ” (Thing,
supra, at pp. 648-649.)
Further, “[t]he law in this state is that the testimony of a single person, including
the plaintiff, may be sufficient to support an award of emotional distress damages.”
(Knutson v. Foster (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 1075, 1096; see Vines, supra, 2008 WL

43.
4470795, *6 [“Expert testimony is not required to establish emotional distress; lay
opinion alone can be sufficient.”].) Testimony of an expert witness is required when the
subject matter “is sufficiently beyond common experience that the opinion of an expert
would assist the trier of fact.” (Evid. Code, § 801, subd. (a).) As reflected in Smith’s
declaration attached to her opposition to Robinson’s dispositive motion, the emotional
distress to which she would testify is not beyond the common experience of jurors.
Smith’s emotional distress damages arise, inter alia, from her feelings of shock, anxiety,
grief, and concern on account of Robinson’s negligence, the severed catheter fragment
lodged in her right pulmonary artery, and related ill effects. Smith could testify to these
points. Expert testimony was not required. (See Vines, supra, at *6 [“the issue of
whether the knowledge that … there is a foreign object in his back caused plaintiff’s
‘emotional upset’ does not necessarily require specialized knowledge”]; see also Godfrey,
supra, 128 Cal.App.3d at p. 186.) Accordingly, the trial court erred in sustaining
Robinson’s objection to Smith’s declaration on grounds of relevancy, lacks-foundation,
calls-for-speculation, and calls-for-expert-testimony.
C. Smith’s “Direct Victim” Negligence Claim (No Physical Injury)
To the extent Smith could show at trial that she suffered serious emotional distress
on account of Robinson’s breach of the standard of care, she would be entitled to recover
emotional distress damages even if she failed to establish that Robinson’s breach had
harmed her physically. (See Thomas, et al., Cal. Civ. Prac. Torts § 11:3, supra [“Where a
tortious act causes emotional distress without any concurrent physical injury, the plaintiff
may still recover emotional distress damages under a negligent infliction of emotional
distress claim.”].) “[A] cause of action to recover damages for negligently inflicted
emotional distress will lie … in cases where a duty arising from a preexisting relationship
is negligently breached.” (Burgess v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1064, 1073-1074
(Burgess) [a “direct victim” claim alleges emotional distress was suffered as a proximate
result of a defendant’s breach of a duty that is assumed by the defendant, or imposed on

44.
the defendant as a matter of law, or that arises out of the defendant’s preexisting
relationship with the plaintiff].)
In Burgess, the plaintiff mother sought to recover damages from her obstetrician
for the emotional distress she suffered when her infant son was severely injured in the
course of delivery. The court found the doctor’s duty to the mother included preventing
injury to the fetus she was carrying. In finding the mother could therefore recover for the
distress she suffered, the court stated: “[O]nce the scope of the duty of care assumed by
[the doctor] to [the mother] is understood, [the mother’s] claim for emotional distress
damages may simply be viewed as an ordinary professional malpractice claim, which
seeks as an element of damage compensation for her serious emotional distress. The
elements of a claim for professional negligence incorporate a specific standard of care
into the elements of a negligence claim.” (Burgess, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 1077, italics
added; Thomas, McGhee, Kahn, & La Scala, Cal. Civ. Prac. Torts § 11:3, supra
[“negligent infliction of emotional distress is not an independent tort, but the tort of
negligence to which the traditional elements of a negligence cause of action apply”].)
Burgess clarified that the doctor’s breach of the duty of care arising from the physician-
patient relationship between the doctor and the mother “is sufficient to satisfy the
elements of a claim for professional malpractice on [the mother’s] behalf.” (Burgess,
supra, at pp. 1078, 1079.)
Just as in Burgess, Smith’s relationship with Robinson was a physician-patient
relationship. The duty imposed on Robinson by virtue of this relationship was to treat her
within the standard of care in implanting and removing the port-a-cath. (See Selden,
supra, 17 Cal.App.4th at pp. 175-176.) Hoffman’s testimony was sufficient for a jury to
find that Robinson negligently breached the duty he owed to Smith on account of their
preexisting relationship, resulting in the severed catheter fragment going through her
heart and lodging in her right pulmonary artery. (See Burgess, supra, 2 Cal.4th at
p. 1079 [“Moreover, even if Burgess had failed to allege physical injuries, physical injury

45.
is not a prerequisite for recovering damages for serious emotional distress, especially
when, as here, there exists a ‘guarantee of genuineness in the circumstances of the case.’
[Citation.] Serious emotional distress itself satisfies the damage element of Burgess’s
cause of action.”].) Smith could therefore recover damages for ensuing serious emotional
distress. (See Burgess, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 1079 [under the direct victim theory, the
emotional distress must be “serious”]; CACI No. 1620.)
D. Potter v. Firestone is Inapplicable
Here, the trial court erroneously applied Potter v. Firestone so as to grant
Robinson’s dispositive motion. Potter v. Firestone held:

“To summarize, we hold with respect to negligent infliction of emotional
distress claims arising out of exposure to carcinogens and/or other toxic
substances: Unless an express exception to this general rule is recognized,
in the absence of a present physical injury or illness, damages for fear of
cancer may be recovered only if the plaintiff pleads and proves that (1) as a
result of the defendant’s negligent breach of a duty owed to the plaintiff,
the plaintiff is exposed to a toxic substance which threatens cancer; and
(2) the plaintiff’s fear stems from a knowledge, corroborated by reliable
medical or scientific opinion, that it is more likely than not that the plaintiff
will develop the cancer in the future due to the toxic exposure. Under this
rule, a plaintiff must do more than simply establish knowledge of a toxic
ingestion or exposure and a significant increased risk of cancer. The
plaintiff must further show that based upon reliable medical or scientific
opinion, the plaintiff harbors a serious fear that the toxic ingestion or
exposure was of such magnitude and proportion as to likely result in the
feared cancer.” (Potter, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 997, italics added.)
At the hearing on Robinson’s dispositive motion, Smith’s counsel made clear that
Smith was not seeking damages based simply on a fear that (1) she would develop
pulmonary hypertension in the future; or (2) the severed catheter fragment would migrate
further in her body in the future. Rather, Smith sought emotional distress damages
related to the fact that the severed catheter fragment had been lodged as an unwanted,
foreign, physical object in her right pulmonary artery for several years, such that, as

46.
discussed above, it had certain presently existing and ongoing deleterious effects,5 and/or
resulted in serious emotional distress based on a number of factors, in a situation where
Smith had a preexisting relationship with Robinson. Accordingly, Potter v. Firestone is
inapposite and the trial court’ reliance on its holding was error. We conclude the trial
court erroneously granted Robinson’s dispositive motion in limine.
D. Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur
Smith contends that the trial court erred in finding that the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitor did not apply and dismissing the case. We agree.
“ ‘Whenever the plaintiff claims negligence in the medical context, the plaintiff
must present evidence from an expert that the defendant breached his or her duty to the
plaintiff and that the breach caused the injury to the plaintiff.’ ” (Sanchez, supra,
8 Cal.App.5th at p. 153.)
“A narrow exception to this rule exists where ‘ “ ‘the conduct required by the
particular circumstances is within the common knowledge of the layman.’ [Citations.]” ’
[Citation.] This exception is, however, a limited one. It ... applies only when the plaintiff
can invoke the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur[,]” “i.e., when a layperson ‘is able to say as a
matter of common knowledge and observation that the consequences of professional
treatment were not such as ordinarily would have followed if due care had been

5 To the extent Smith establishes she suffered a physical injury, she would be
entitled to parasitic emotional distress damages, including those based on a reasonable
fear, if any, of contracting pulmonary hypertension in the future. (See Potter v.
Firestone, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 981 [“Where a plaintiff can demonstrate a physical
injury caused by the defendant’s negligence, anxiety specifically due to a reasonable fear
of a future harm attributable to the injury may also constitute a proper element of
damages.”], citing Jones v. United Railroads of San Francisco (1921) 54 Cal.App. 744
[affirming damages for emotional distress endured up to time of trial where plaintiff
reasonably feared permanent disability in the future as direct and proximate result from
physical injury received in accident].)

47.
exercised.’ ” (Scott v. Rayhrer (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1535, 1542-1543; Flowers v.
Torrance Memorial Hospital Medical Center (1994) 8 Cal.4th 992, 1001.)
Res ipsa loquitur is a doctrine affecting the burden of producing evidence
applicable to certain kinds of accidents that are so likely to have been caused by a
defendant’s negligence that, in the Latin equivalent, “ ‘the thing speaks for itself.’ ”
(Brown, supra, 4 Cal.4th 820, 825.) If applicable, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
establishes a presumption of negligence requiring the defendant to come forward with
evidence to disprove it. (Id. at p. 825; Evid. Code, § 646, subd. (b); see Baumgardner v.
Yusuf (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1381, 1389.)
“ ‘The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable where the accident is of such a
nature that it can be said, in the light of past experience, that it probably was the result of
negligence by someone and that the defendant is probably the one responsible.’ ”
(Howe v. Seven Forty Two Co., Inc. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1155, 1161.) “All of the
cases hold, in effect, that it must appear, either as a matter of common experience or from
evidence in the case, that the accident is of a type which probably would not happen
unless someone was negligent. In the absence of such a probability there would be no
basis for an inference of negligence which would serve to take the place of evidence of
some specific negligent act or omission.” (Zentz v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno
(1952) 39 Cal.2d 436, 442-443.)
For res ipsa loquitur to apply, three conditions must be met: (1) the accident must
be of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone’s negligence;
(2) it must be caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control of the
defendant; and (3) it must not have been caused by any voluntary action or contribution
on the part of the plaintiff. (Ybarra v. Spangard (1944) 25 Cal.2d 486, 489.) The issue
of whether a plaintiff has established these three conditions before being entitled to a
presumption of negligence is a question of fact for the jury. (Newing v. Cheatham (1975)
15 Cal.3d 351, 359; Danner v. Atkins (1956) 47 Cal.2d 327, 331.)

48.
Here, Robinson admitted that he implanted the port-a-cath, and that the piece of
catheter lodged in Smith’s pulmonary artery came from that port-a-cath. Furthermore,
Robinson’s own expert, Dr. Macho, declared that the reported rate of intravenous catheter
fracture is only 0.1%. This evidence suggests that the catheter fracture that occurred
here, resulting in the severed catheter fragment to be retained in Smith’s body, would
ordinarily not occur in the absence of somebody’s negligence.6
Second, since Robinson performed both the implantation and explantation
surgeries, it would appear that the agency or instrumentality was within his exclusive
control. Finally, since Smith was under sedation during the surgeries, she reasonably did
not do anything to cause a fragment of the catheter to pinch-off and remain in her body.
Under these circumstances, the question of the applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitor should properly have been submitted to the jury. (See CACI No. 518.)
Accordingly, the trial court erred in granting Robinson’s dispositive motion and
dismissing the case.

6 Indeed, Smith’s expert, Hoffman, stated in a declaration: “It is my further
opinion that it falls below the standard of care virtually any time a surgeon leaves part of
a medical device inside a patient’s body following a surgical procedure intended to
remove the entire medical device, as Dr. Robinson did in this case.” As for Dr. Macho’s
point that the reported rate of intravenous catheter fracture is only 0.1%, it is not clear
whether Dr. Macho means that the total reported rate of intravenous catheter fracture is
0.1% or whether he means that the reported rate of spontaneous intravenous fracture is
0.1%. In any event, Dr. Macho’s point suggests that in 99.9% of these cases, intravenous
catheter fracture either does not occur or does not occur absent someone’s negligence.
Given this evidence, a jury could reasonably conclude that catheter fracture does not
ordinarily occur in the absence of someone’s negligence.

49.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed.7 The matter is remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion. Smith shall recover her costs on appeal.

FAIN, J.*
WE CONCUR:

SNAUFFER, Acting P. J.

DE SANTOS, J.

7 In light of the disposition, we need not address Smith’s final contention that “the
trial court’s procedural process was inappropriate and deprived [her] of the opportunity to
present her claims to the jury.”
* Judge of the Fresno Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to
article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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