CourtListener 10644734•People v. Ramirez CA6
Texte intégral
Filed 7/30/25 P. v. Ramirez CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE, H052103
(Monterey County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. 20CR007123)
v.
DAVID MERINO RAMIREZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
In 2024, a jury found David Merino Ramirez guilty of various crimes stemming
from a fatal accident he caused while driving under the influence of alcohol, including
second degree murder and gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated. The trial
court sentenced Ramirez to 15 years to life in prison.
On appeal, Ramirez contends that the trial court erroneously instructed the jury
regarding the necessary elements for implied malice murder by failing to modify the
requisite instruction to reflect the language referencing a “high degree of probability” of
death from People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981 (Reyes), issued prior to his trial.
Ramirez argues that the erroneous instructions constituted prejudicial error requiring
reversal.
For the reasons discussed below, we find no instructional error and affirm.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Procedural History
On March 19, 2021, the Monterey County District Attorney’s Office filed an
information charging Ramirez with the murder of Noe Ramirez Santillan (Pen. Code1,
§ 187, subd. (a); count 1); gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated (§ 191.5, subd.
(a); count 2); driving under the influence causing injury, with two or more prior
convictions for driving under the influence (Veh. Code, §§ 23153, subd. (a) &
23566, subd. (a); count 3); driving under the influence causing injury with a blood
alcohol level above 0.08 percent, with two or more prior convictions for driving under the
influence (Veh. Code, §§ 23153, subd. (b) & 23566, subd. (a); count 4); and a
misdemeanor count for driving when the privilege was suspended for a prior conviction
for driving under the influence (Veh. Code, § 14601.2, subd. (a); count 5.) The
information further alleged the following: (1) counts 1, 2, 3, and 4 were serious felonies
within the meaning of sections 667.5, subdivision (c) and 1192.7, subdivision (c); (2) in
the commission of counts 3 and 4, Ramirez personally inflicted great bodily injury on the
victim (§ 12022.2, subd. (a)); and (3) as to count 4, Ramirez’s blood alcohol level was
0.15 percent or higher (Veh. Code, § 23578).
On February 14, 2024, following a five-day trial, the jury found Ramirez guilty of
murder (count 1), gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated (count 2), and
misdemeanor driving when the privilege was suspended for a prior conviction for driving
under the influence (count 5).2
1
Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
At the conclusion of evidence, the trial court instructed the jury that the charges
in counts 3 and 4 were lesser included offenses to the gross vehicular manslaughter
charge in count 2, and verdicts for these counts were only required if the jury did not find
Ramirez guilty on count 2.
2
On April 11, 2024, the trial court sentenced Ramirez to the following: (1) 15 years
to life in prison for second degree murder (count 1); (2) the middle term of six years for
gross vehicular manslaughter (count 2), which was stayed pursuant to section 654; and
(3) a concurrent term of 180 days in jail for misdemeanor driving when the privilege was
suspended due to a prior conviction for driving under the influence (count 5). The court
also granted the People’s motion to dismiss counts 3 and 4 in the interests of justice and
struck the associated enhancements with those counts.
Ramirez timely appealed.
B. Factual Background
1. Prosecution’s Case
a. August 21, 2020 car accident
On the night of August 21, 2020, witness J.C.3 was driving on a road near the
areas of Soledad and Greenfield in Monterey County when he observed parts of a vehicle
in the middle of the road. He then saw a crashed, upside-down vehicle, and stopped to
help. Upon approaching the vehicle, J.C. observed two occupants—a passenger and a
driver, who J.C. later identified as Ramirez. J.C. broke the window of the car, which
allowed Ramirez to get out of the car; however, J.C. saw that the passenger was “badly
pinned” and “crushed” to the car. After Ramirez exited the car, J.C. noted that he seemed
to appear drunk. Ramirez then made a phone call, and within ten minutes, a van came
driving down the same road towards the accident. The van struck the upside-down
vehicle without stopping, then came back and stopped. Ramirez then got into the
passenger seat of the van and attempted to leave but could not do so as police had already
arrived and closed off the road. After speaking with officers, J.C. confirmed that
Ramirez was the driver of the crashed vehicle, as Ramirez had initially denied he had
been driving.
3
We refer to the civilian witness in the proceedings by his initials only to protect
personal privacy interests pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 8.90 (b)(10).
3
b. Police Investigation
California Highway Patrol (CHP) Officer Fernando Sanchez testified that he was
the first officer to arrive on the scene of the accident shortly after 9:00 p.m. on August 21,
2020. Upon contacting Ramirez, Sanchez observed that he had red watery eyes and the
odor of alcohol on his breath. Sanchez also indicated that he communicated with
Ramirez in Spanish on the scene, and did not observe that Ramirez had any trouble
understanding him or speaking in Spanish.
CHP Officer Jordan Smith, who also responded to the scene, observed tire tracks
coming from the left side of the road and continuing through to a dirt embankment on the
side of the road. Smith concluded that the crash was most likely caused by the driver of
the vehicle making an unsafe turning movement at a high speed, which subsequently
resulted in the driver losing control. The event data recorder from the vehicle also
reflected that the car’s speed around the time of the collision was approximately 80 miles
per hour, and that the antilock braking system did not engage, suggesting that the brake
pedal had not been pressed during the crash.
Smith then spoke with Ramirez, who initially claimed that his brother Noe, the
passenger in the car, had been the person driving, but later admitted that he (Ramirez)
had been driving. Ramirez then indicated that he and Noe had been traveling northbound
at the posted speed limit when another vehicle approached them from the southbound
lane with its high beams activated. Noe then yanked the steering wheel, causing the car
to crash.
Ramirez also admitted to Smith that he had consumed six beers prior to driving.
Smith then conducted an investigation for driving under the influence, including a
preliminary alcohol screening test, which yielded a positive result for the presence of
alcohol. After arresting Ramirez, Smith then performed a standard breath alcohol test,
which yielded a blood alcohol level result of 0.17 percent. Forensic scientist John Adam
Lutz noted that at this level, which is more than double the legal limit, the level of
4
impairment to the person’s mental facilities, small muscles, and large muscles would be
significant, including but not limited to slurred speech, difficulty walking and
maintaining balance, slower reaction times, and an inability to multitask.
Noe was pronounced deceased at the scene of the accident while still pinned inside
the vehicle. Monterey County Detective Randal Dyck, who removed Noe’s body from
the vehicle, confirmed the cause of death as cervical spine fractures due to blunt force
trauma.
c. Watson advisements
In 2019, Ramirez pleaded no contest to two separate charges of driving under the
influence of alcohol that took place in 2015 and 2019. At the time of Ramirez’s plea, the
court advised him pursuant to People v. Watson (1981) 30 Cal.3d 290 (Watson) that
driving under the influence was dangerous to human life, and if someone was killed as a
result of Ramirez continuing to drive under the influence, he could be charged with
murder. Ramirez was assisted by both Trique4 and Spanish interpreters at his plea
hearing, and the relevant plea forms were in Spanish, which he completed and initialed
with the assistance of the Trique interpreter.
As part of his sentence for his two prior convictions, Ramirez enrolled in a DUI
treatment program administered by Sun Street Centers. Sun Street staff confirmed that as
part of the enrollment process, counselors reviewed enrollment forms with participants in
person and arranged for interpreters if needed to ensure participants understood the forms
being completed. These forms included a Watson advisement, and Sun Street staff
confirmed that Ramirez was given Watson advisements on two separate occasions on
December 26, 2019, and July 30, 2020.
4
Trique is a language spoken in certain areas of Oaxaca, Mexico, where Ramirez
was born and raised.
5
2. Defense Case
Ramirez, who testified in his own defense, indicated that he was born in Oaxaca,
Mexico, and grew up speaking Trique. He stated that even after he immigrated to the
United States, he still primarily spoke Trique and only learned a small amount of
Spanish, and therefore could not have a “fluid” conversation with someone in Spanish.
He further indicated that the staff at the Sun Street program only spoke to him in Spanish
when completing his forms, and he did not understand everything being said or what he
was signing.
Ramirez admitted that he was driving and under the influence of alcohol at the
time of the accident. He indicated that he met up with Noe in the evening and consumed
a total of ten beers to join Noe in celebrating his (Noe’s) daughter’s birthday. Ramirez
indicated that prior to the incident, he had maintained his sobriety and was attending
court-ordered classes.
After they drank, he began driving Noe’s car on the backroads, but stopped
briefly, at which point Noe took over and drove. When Noe, who was also drunk, was
unable to keep the car straight in a single lane, Ramirez offered to drive again. After
Ramirez took over, Noe began looking at his phone and tried to show Ramirez what
appeared to be either a video or photo, then grabbed Ramirez’s hand when another car
approached them with its high beams on. The steering wheel began to move back and
forth, and Ramirez then remembered pressing a pedal very hard before everything
suddenly went dark. When Ramirez woke up, he was hanging in his seatbelt from the
car, which was upside down, and Noe was asking him if he was all right. Ramirez
recalled someone breaking the car and helping him get out, but did not fully remember
his subsequent conversation with this person. While he believed he asked for help to get
Noe out, and called 911, he could not confirm that he did. Ramirez did not recall seeing
a van on the scene or getting inside the van.
6
II. DISCUSSION
Ramirez contends that his conviction should be reversed because the trial court did
not provide the jury with the proper instructions for second degree implied malice
murder. Specifically, Ramirez argues that the trial court should have modified
CALCRIM No. 520—the relevant jury instruction for second degree murder—to include
the Reyes definition of the phrase “dangerous to human life” to mean “a high degree of
probability that the act in question will result in death” in the context of implied malice,
particular since CALCRIM NO. 520 was modified in March 2024 to include this
definition. Ramirez therefore claims that because this definition was not included in the
prior version of CALCRIM No. 520 given to the jury, the jury failed to find that his act
was dangerous to human life.
A. Relevant Jury Instruction
At the conclusion of evidence, the trial court instructed the jury with the version of
CALCRIM No. 520 regarding first or second degree murder with malice aforethought, as
it existed as of February 2024, as follows:
“The defendant is charged in Count 1 with murder in violation of Penal Code
section 187. [¶] To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove
that: [¶] 1A. The defendant committed an act that caused the death of another person; and
[¶] 2. When the defendant acted, he had a state of mind called malice aforethought.
[¶] … [¶]
“There are two kinds of malice aforethought, express malice and implied malice.
Proof of either is sufficient to establish the state of mind required for murder.
“The defendant had express malice if he unlawfully intended to kill. [¶] The
defendant had implied malice if: [¶] 1. He intentionally committed the act; [¶] 2. The
natural and probable consequences of the act were dangerous to human life; [¶] 3. At the
time he acted, he knew his act was dangerous to human life; [¶] and 4. He deliberately
acted with conscious disregard for human life.
7
“Malice aforethought does not require hatred or ill will toward the victim. It is a
mental state that must be formed before the act that causes death is committed. It does not
require deliberation or the passage of any particular period of time. [¶] … [¶] An act
causes death if the death is the direct, natural, and probable consequence of the act and
the death would not have happened without the act. [¶] A natural and probable
consequence is one that a reasonable person would know is likely to happen if nothing
unusual intervenes. In deciding whether a consequence is natural and probable, consider
all of the circumstances established by the evidence. [¶] … [¶]
“If you decide that the defendant committed murder, it is murder of the second
degree, unless the People have proved beyond a reasonable doubt that it is murder of the
first degree as defined in CALCRIM No. 521.”
The record reflects that prior to instructing the jury, the court asked the parties if
they had any objection to CALCRIM No. 521, to which both counsel responded they did
not.
B. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
“We determine whether a jury instruction correctly states the law under the
independent or de novo standard of review.” (People v. Ramos (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th
1082, 1088.) When we review a purportedly erroneous instruction, we consider
“ ‘ “ ‘whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged
instruction in a way’ that violates the Constitution.” ’ ” (People v. Richardson (2008) 43
Cal.4th 959, 1028.) We consider the instructions as a whole and “ ‘assume that jurors are
intelligent persons and capable of understanding and correlating all jury instructions
which are given.’ ” (Ibid.)
If a trial court incorrectly instructs on an element of a charged offense such that
the error impermissibly shifted or lowered the burden of proof for that element, the
applicable standard of prejudice is the Chapman standard. (See Rose v. Clark (1986) 478
U.S. 570, 570–581.) Under the Chapman standard, a federal constitutional error requires
8
reversal unless the People show the error was “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”
(Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24.)
C. Analysis
1. Forfeiture
Ramirez claims that even though he did not raise an objection to CALCRIM No.
520 at trial, any such objection would have been futile as the new version of CALCRIM
No. 520 was only published after his trial. Further, Ramirez claims that the post-Reyes
modification of CALCRIM No. 520 affected his substantial rights by increasing the
prosecution’s burden of proof for implied malice murder, and he may therefore raise his
claim of error for the first time on appeal.
The Attorney General argues that Ramirez has failed to demonstrate his
substantial rights were affected by the instructional error because Reyes did not raise or
alter the standard for implied malice, but simply articulated a standard from prior case
law such that there was no instructional error. In addition, the Attorney General notes
that Ramirez failed to ask for any additional or clarifying language defining the term
“dangerous to human life,” despite the fact that Reyes had been decided eight months
prior to his jury trial.
“The appellate court may . . . review any instruction given …, even though no
objection was made thereto in the lower court, if the substantial rights of the defendant
were affected thereby.” (§ 1259; People v. Thomas (2023) 14 Cal.5th 327, 382.) We
agree with Ramirez that the claimed error involves a substantial right, and therefore shall
consider the claim on its merits despite Ramirez’s failure to raise it below.
2. No Error in The Challenged Instruction
a. Implied Malice Murder
Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought. (§ 187,
subd. (a).) Malice “may be express or implied.” (§ 188, subd. (a).) “Malice is implied
when no considerable provocation appears, or when the circumstances attending the
9
killing show an abandoned and malignant heart.” (Id., subd. (a)(2).) “Implied-malice
murder has a physical component: an act whose natural consequences are dangerous to
life. And it has a mental component: defendant’s deliberate performance of the act with
conscious disregard for life, knowing the act endangers another’s life.” (In re Ferrell
(2023) 14 Cal.5th 593, 604.)
“[M]alice may be implied when a person drives a motor vehicle under the
influence of alcohol and kills someone.” (People v. Lagunas (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 996,
1005 (Lagunas); Watson, supra, 30 Cal.3d at pp. 300–301.) “Since Watson, appellate
courts have upheld numerous murder convictions in cases where defendants have
committed homicides while driving under the influence of alcohol. [Citations.] These
opinions have generally relied on some or all of the factors that were present in Watson:
‘(1) blood-alcohol level above the .08 percent legal limit; (2) a predrinking intent to
drive; (3) knowledge of the hazards of driving while intoxicated; and (4) highly
dangerous driving.’ [Citation.] However, ‘courts have recognized that there is no
particular formula for analysis of vehicular homicide cases, instead requiring a case-by-
case approach.’ ” (People v. Suazo (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 681, 692–693 (Suazo); accord
Lagunas, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 1005.)
As noted by both parties in their briefs, California courts have historically used
two different formulations for the definition of implied malice as follows: (1) “ ‘an act,
the natural consequences of which are dangerous to human life,’ and (2) “ ‘ “an act
[committed] with a high probability that it will result in death[.]” ’ ” (See People v. Nieto
Benitez (1992) 4 Cal.4th 91, 103–104, 110–111 (Nieto Benitez), quoting People v.
Phillips (1966) 64 Cal.2d 574, 587 (Phillips) and People v. Thomas (1953) 41 Cal.2d
470, 480 (Thomas).) However, the California Supreme Court has indicated on a number
of occasions that these two tests are equivalent and reflect the same standard. (See, e.g.,
Watson, supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 300; People v. Dellinger (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1212, 1219
[reaffirming the finding in Watson that the two standards for implied malice “articulated
10
one and the same standard”]; Nieto Benitez, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 104.) Years later, in
People v. Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139, 157 (Knoller), the California Supreme Court
noted that to the extent the two tests in Phillips and Thomas differed, courts should
instruct juries utilizing the language in Phillips. The Knoller court concluded that the
Phillips test more accurately described the subjective component of the test—namely,
whether the defendant acted with a conscious disregard to human life—and did not
require the defendant to be aware that his or her conduct carried a high probability of
causing death. (Knoller, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 157.)
In the 2023 case of Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th 981, the California Supreme Court
provided clarification on the meaning of the term “dangerous to human life.” The court
noted that “to suffice for implied malice murder, the defendant's act must not merely be
dangerous to life in some vague or speculative sense; it must ‘ “involve[] a high degree of
probability that it will result in death.” ’ [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 989.) As a result,
CALCRIM No. 520 was revised in March 2024 to incorporate the definition of
“dangerous to human life” into the elements required for a finding of implied malice as
follows: “The defendant had implied malice if: [¶] 1. (He/She) intentionally (committed
the act/ [or] failed to act); [¶] 2. The natural and probable consequences of the (act/[or]
failure to act) were dangerous to human life in that the (act/[or] failure to act) involved a
high degree of probability that it would result in death; [¶] 3. At the time (he/she)
(acted/[or] failed to act), (he/she) knew (his/her) (act/[or] failure to act) was dangerous to
human life; [¶] and 4. (he/she) deliberately (acted/[or] failed to act) with conscious
disregard for (human/[or] fetal) life.” (Italics added.)
b. Actus Reus
Ramirez argues that in Reyes, the California Supreme Court “squarely” addressed
the high probability of death language by clearly stating that the term “dangerous to life”
was the same as “a high degree of probability that the act in question will result in death.”
Ramirez argues that because this clarifying language was not contained in the version of
11
CALCRIM No. 520 given to the jury in his case, the jury was “free to define for himself
or herself what constituted danger to human life.” Ramirez therefore argues that jurors
could have concluded a small or moderate probability of causing death was sufficient to
meet this definition, which does not meet the burden of proof articulated under Reyes and
therefore mandates reversal.
We disagree with this contention. As the Attorney General notes, the Reyes
decision did not involve a jury instruction issue. Instead, Reyes concerned the sufficiency
of evidence for the trial court’s denial of a petition for resentencing under section 1172.6.
(Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 984.) Accordingly, the California Supreme Court’s
discussion of the elements of implied malice were related to its conclusion that the
defendant’s conduct of traveling into rival gang territory was insufficient to give rise to a
high probability that death would result. (Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 989.) However,
the court provided no indication that its ruling therein abrogated or called into question its
prior decisions in Nieto Benitez, Dellinger, or Knoller finding that the “high probability”
and “natural consequences” standards of implied malice are the same, and that it would
be proper to instruct the jury solely using the latter.
Further, we find no indication in the court’s decision that its finding regarding the
sufficiency of the evidence denying a section 1172.6 resentencing petition amounted to a
holding or mandate that trial courts must include the additional language regarding a high
probability of causing death when instructing on implied malice murder. Indeed, the
decision would strongly suggest otherwise based on the court’s language approving its
prior conclusion in Knoller that “under the objective component of implied malice,
“ ‘ “dangerous to life” ’ ” means the same thing as a “ ‘high degree of probability that’ ”
the act in question “ ‘will result in death.’ ” (Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 989,
citing Knoller, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 152.)
Additionally, the Reyes decision does not reflect that the Supreme Court criticized
or suggested any modifications to CALCRIM No. 520. In its sole reference to the
12
instruction, the court merely stated that CALCRIM No. 520 “alone . . . does not
encompass the elements of aiding and abetting implied malice murder as set out in
[People v. Powell [(2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 689].” (Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 991,
italics added.) In any event, “ ‘jury instructions, whether published or not, are not
themselves the law, and are not authority to establish legal propositions or precedent.
They should not be cited as authority for legal principles.’ ” (People v. Jo (2017) 15
Cal.App.5th 1128, 1157, fn. 7; People v. Morales (2001) 25 Cal.4th 34, 48, fn. 7.)
In summary, because we conclude that Reyes does not address or support
Ramirez’s claim for instructional error, we will not depart from the binding precedent
from the holdings cited above finding no distinction between the standards for “high
probability” and “natural consequences.” Accordingly, we find no error in the actus reus
element of the implied malice instruction given by the trial court at Ramirez’s trial.
c. Mens Rea
“For malice to be implied, a defendant must be subjectively aware that their acts
or omissions endangered the life of” the victim. (People v. Collins (2025) 17 Cal.5th
293, 321 (Collins).) In the version of CALCRIM No. 520 given to the jury in Ramirez’s
trial, the trial court instructed the jury that the mental component of implied malice
murder required proof beyond a reasonable doubt that “[a]t the time [the defendant]
acted, he knew his act was dangerous to human life.”
Ramirez acknowledges that the post-Reyes revisions to CALCRIM No. 520 did
not modify the requirements for the subjective component of implied malice. However,
he suggests that we “opine” on whether this element should be modified to include
language stating that “dangerous to human life” means an awareness that the act involved
a high probability that it would result in death. He argues that without such a
modification, there is a “disconnect” between the mental state and act required for
implied malice murder that could result in a jury finding the mental state satisfied simply
from some awareness that an act is dangerous to human life—even if that danger is only
13
slight. He therefore argues that the mens rea element would remain one “in name only”
if the same clarifying language about being “dangerous to human life” is not added to
CALCRIM No. 520.5
The California Supreme Court has repeatedly distinguished between the two
components of implied malice murder by emphasizing that the actus reus element is an
objective standard, while mens rea is a subjective one. (See Knoller, supra, 41 Cal.4th at
p. 157; see also Collins, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 322, citing Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p.
989.) For example, in Knoller, the trial court granted a new trial to a defendant who had
been convicted of second degree murder on an implied malice theory, and based its ruling
on a finding of insufficient evidence that the defendant subjectively knew “her conduct
involved a high probability of resulting in the death of another.” (Knoller, supra, 41
Cal.4th at p. 142, italics added.) The Supreme Court reversed this ruling as erroneous
because subjective knowledge of the high probability of death is not an element of
implied malice. (Id. at p. 157.) The court instead determined that “ ‘high probability of
death’ ” is part of the objective component of implied malice, not the subjective
component. (Ibid.)
As discussed above, the Supreme Court’s decision in Reyes did not overrule
Knoller. We therefore find no merit to Ramirez’s contention that the trial court erred in
instructing the jury on the subjective mens rea element of implied malice murder, as set
forth in CALCRIM No. 520, without including clarifying language regarding the term
“dangerous to human life.”
5
It is unclear whether Ramirez is simply arguing that CALCRIM No. 520 should
be modified in general, or is specifically claiming that the trial court erred in his case by
not including this clarifying language in its instructions to the jury regarding the required
mental state for implied malice murder. In any event, for the reasons discussed infra, we
find no instructional error.
14
3. Harmless Error
Even if we assume that the trial court erred in not modifying the previous version
of CALCRIM No. 520 in the manner suggested by Ramirez, we find such error was
harmless under the Chapman standard.
According to Ramirez’s own testimony at trial, he admitted that he had been
driving and consumed ten beers prior to driving. His blood alcohol level was 0.17
percent, which was more than twice the legal limit of 0.08 percent. Ramirez also testified
that the steering wheel had been moving back and forth, and that he could not remember
which pedal he pressed before everything “went black.” Further, investigation from the
scene of the accident and the event data recorder included: (1) the direction of the tire
tracks from the left side of the road through to the dirt embankment; (2) the car’s speed of
approximately 80 miles per hours around the time of the collision; and (3) the antilock
braking system not engaging. Such evidence provided overwhelming support for a jury
to conclude that the crash was caused by Ramirez—the driver—making an unsafe turning
movement at a high speed and losing control.
In addition, Ramirez had been convicted of two previous charges for driving under
the influence in 2015 and 2019. Prior to entering guilty pleas of these charges, the trial
court advised him, and Ramirez acknowledged, that driving under the influence was
dangerous to human life, and if someone was killed as a result of Ramirez continuing to
drive under the influence, he could be charged with murder. Ramirez also received the
same written advisement on a number of occasions, including while completing his plea
forms with the assistance of both Spanish and Trique interpreters, as well as during the
completion of his enrollment forms with the Sun Street Center staff in December 2019
and July 2020. Evidence of prior reckless and/or drunk driving tends to establish a
“defendant’s knowledge—gained in the course of the prior misconduct—of the natural
consequences, dangerous to life, of the reckless operation of a motor vehicle, and of his
15
persistence in that behavior, thus evidencing a conscious disregard for the lives of others
on the road.” (People v. Ortiz (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 104, 111–112.)
Moreover, Ramirez’s claim that he did not properly understand this advisement
because it was only given to him in Spanish, which was not his native language, or “via a
rather chaotic chain of simultaneous interpretation,” was not supported by the record and
evidence presented at trial. The record reflected that Ramirez was given the advisement
in Trique both verbally in court when he entered his plea, as well as twice in writing
when completing his plea forms; further, Ramirez did not present any credible evidence
that he misunderstood the Watson advisements he received in Trique.
Accordingly, after considering the jury instructions as a whole and the evidence
presented at trial, and given the presence of all the factors identified in Watson, we
conclude that any error in giving the challenged instruction was harmless because it is
evident beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have still found Ramirez guilty of
implied malice murder despite the purported error. (See Suazo, supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 692–693; Lagunas, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 1005.)
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
16
___________________________________
Wilson, J.
WE CONCUR:
__________________________________________
Danner, Acting P. J.
__________________________________________
Bromberg, J.
People v. Ramirez
H052103
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