People v. Kennedy CA2/8

CourtListener 10643696Calctapp29 juil. 2025

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Filed 7/29/25 P. v. Kennedy CA2/8
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

THE PEOPLE, B339413

Plaintiff and Respondent, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA468310
v.

DARIUS KENNEDY,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Ray G. Jurado, Judge. Affirmed.
Gerald J. Miller, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne and Blake Armstrong,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
____________________
Darius Kennedy pleaded no contest to a violation of Penal
Code section 273.5, subdivision (a), inflicting injury on D.C., his
cohabitant and the mother of his son. At sentencing, the trial
court issued a ten year protective order in favor of D.C. and
Kennedy’s son. Kennedy requested a modification of the
protective order to remove his son. The trial court denied the
request. Because Kennedy has not provided an adequate record
to allow us to evaluate his claims on appeal, we affirm.
Kennedy lived with D.C. and their son. During a dispute,
Kennedy punched D.C. in the face. D.C. ran to the kitchen and
grabbed a frying pan and hit Kennedy on the forehead with
it. Kennedy then grabbed a frying pan and a knife and chased
D.C. as she tried to leave the home. Kennedy struck D.C. with
the pan several times all over her body and stabbed her with the
knife in the back of her head and arm. D.C. finally managed to
leave the home and fled. Kennedy chased her, but two men saw
and stopped him. D.C. had cuts to the back of her head, ear, and
eyebrow. She had blood in her eyes and “blacked out” shortly
after fleeing.
Police officers responded to the area and conducted a
search. Officers stopped Kennedy as he tried to drive away with
his son in the car. Officers discovered four prior reports for
cohabitant abuse, domestic battery, and criminal threats. A
protective order had previously been issued in favor of D.C., but
had expired a few years earlier. Officers found two handguns in
Kennedy’s home.
An information charged Kennedy with attempted willful,
deliberate and premeditated murder, assault with a deadly
weapon, and injuring a spouse, cohabitant, fiancé, boyfriend,
girlfriend, or child’s parent in violation of section 273.5,

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subdivision (a) as to D.C., and cruelty to a child by endangering
health as to Kennedy’s son. The information alleged Kennedy
personally used a deadly weapon and personally inflicted great
bodily injury in all but the child cruelty charges.
Because D.C. was uncooperative and refused to testify, the
prosecutor offered a plea deal, which Kennedy accepted.
Kennedy pleaded no contest to the violation of section 273.5,
subdivision (a) and admitted the great bodily injury allegation.
In accordance with the parties’ deal, the court sentenced Kennedy
to three years in state prison. At the sentencing hearing, the
court stated that there was a ten year criminal protective order
in favor of D.C. and Kennedy’s son. The court asked if the
defense had any objection, and defense counsel said he did
not. The record reflects that the court served the protective order
on Kennedy in court during the sentencing hearing.
About two years later, Kennedy requested a modification of
the protective order to remove his son from the order. Kennedy
argued that because his son was not involved in the incident, it
was improper to include him in the order. D.C. appeared and
testified in support of the modification, telling the court she
would like Kennedy to be able to help with childcare. Kennedy’s
counsel clarified that they were not asking the order to be
modified as to D.C. The prosecutor argued that the severity of
the crime warranted keeping the protective order in place as did
Kennedy’s failure to take any domestic violence or other
rehabilitative classes. The prosecutor further cautioned against
accepting D.C.’s evaluation of her safety in regard to Kennedy
given her refusal to participate in the previous proceeding. The
trial court denied the modification.

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Kennedy appeals, arguing it is improper for the protective
order to cover his son since he was not a victim of the section
273.5 violation. He cites cases about protective orders issued
under the Welfare and Institutions Code to support his
argument.
Absent from the record is any indication of under what
authority the trial court issued the protective order. Kennedy
neglected to include a copy of the order. He argues this is
irrelevant, especially because the order was a standard court
form.
This argument is incorrect. The statutory basis on which
the trial court relied determines the bounds of the court’s
authority and the standards for our evaluation. The form
Kennedy references includes at least four statutory bases on
which the court can issue the order. (People v. Fuentes (2023) 87
Cal.App.5th 1286, 1297 [noting the multiple statutory bases
included on the Judicial Council protective order form].) Certain
of the statutes are generally held not to allow application of the
protective order to a person other than the direct victim. (See,
e.g., People v. Delarosarauda (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 205, 213
[finding a protective order under section 273.5 cannot be
extended to a child of the victim].) Others can sometimes extend
to a child of the victim under certain circumstances. (See, e.g.,
People v. Race (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 211, 219–220 [protective
order issued under section 136.2, subdivision (i)(1) properly
applied to a child where child was involved in domestic violence
incident even where child not included in charges].) Without a
copy of the order, we cannot properly evaluate Kennedy’s
claim. Kennedy has not met his burden to provide an adequate
record to allow us to evaluate his claim. (Barak v. Quisenberry

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Law Firm (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 654, 660 [issue must be
resolved against appellant where appellant fails to provide
adequate record].)
We likewise affirm under the presumption of correctness.
(Moreno v. City of King (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 17, 30 [we
presume an order is correct, indulge all presumptions in its favor
on matters on which the record is silent, and require error be
affirmatively shown].) Because the trial court issued the
protective order to both D.C. and Kennedy’s son, we assume the
court made the requisite factual findings to do so under the
applicable statute.

DISPOSITION
We affirm.

WILEY, J.

We concur:

STRATTON, P. J.

RUBIN, J.*

*Retired Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.

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