In re R.L. CA4/3

CourtListener 10639675Calctapp23 juil. 2025

Texte intégral

Filed 7/23/25 In re R.L. CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

In re R.L., a Person Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.

ORANGE COUNTY SOCIAL
SERVICES AGENCY,
G065043
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. 24DP0424)
v.
OPINION
M.H.,

Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Daphne G. Sykes, Judge. Reversed.
Paul A. Swiller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Leon J. Page, County Counsel, Debbie Torrez and Chloe R.
Maksoudian, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
No appearance for the Minor.
* * *
In this juvenile dependency proceeding, Mother appeals from the
judgment of the court that, first, determined Minor was described by Welfare
and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b)(1), and thus fell within the
jurisdiction of the court; second, removed Minor from Mother’s custody; and
third, vested Father with full physical and legal custody of Minor, following
which the court terminated the proceeding. Mother contends there was no
substantial evidence to support a finding that the court had jurisdiction over
Minor. She also contends there was no substantial evidence to support a
removal of Minor from her custody. And finally, she contends the court
abused its discretion in vesting complete custody of Minor with Father. We
agree with Mother’s first contention: the court lacked jurisdiction because
there was no evidence that Minor had suffered serious physical harm, nor
was there evidence of a substantial risk that Minor would suffer serious
physical harm. Because the court should not have exercised jurisdiction in
the first place, we do not address Mother’s remaining contentions.
FACTS
At around 4:00 p.m. on March 27, 2024, Mother borrowed a car
belonging to her great grandparents. She said she obtained permission from
her great grandmother. She took Minor (approximately 3 years old) from
Hemet to Oceanside, where her car had previously been towed, to retrieve her
belongings from her car. After spending some time with Minor at the beach,
it was late, so she tried to rent a room from a motel, but realized she did not
have enough money. Instead, she got dinner and sat in the parking lot with
minor until, eventually, in the wee hours of the morning, she decided to drive
back to her great grandparents’ home.

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Her great grandfather became upset because Mother did not ask
him directly to borrow the car (the great grandmother suffered from
Alzheimer’s and often forgot things), nor did Mother check in with her
whereabouts, so he reported the vehicle stolen. At approximately 3:00 a.m.,
Mother was arrested on her way home for driving a stolen vehicle. Minor was
in the vehicle at the time. Minor was properly restrained in a car seat and
appeared well. Mother was cooperative with law enforcement and tried to
explain it was a misunderstanding and she had permission to use the car.
Nevertheless, she was arrested, and because Mother was taken into custody,
Minor was taken to Orangewood Children and Family Center (Orangewood).
At the time of her arrest, Mother did not have stable housing.
She would “couch surf” between her great grandparents in Hemet, various
hotels, and friends in San Diego. Mother denied any active mental health
diagnoses and denied any substance abuse problems. Mother’s criminal
history consisted of an incident in 2015 in which she assaulted another
person with a knife in an incident Mother described as mutual combat. The
victim was a girlfriend of one of Mother’s former partners.
After the arrest, the assigned social worker interviewed various
family members of Mother, all of whom stated that Mother was a good parent
and that they had no concerns in that regard, other than Mother’s unstable
housing. The maternal great grandmother confirmed that Mother stays with
them sometimes and that they do give her permission to use their vehicle for
errands. She further confirmed that on the day of the arrest, Mother did have
permission to use the vehicle, but not to “leave town.” None of the family
members had concerns about substance abuse.
One of Mother’s aunts reported that Mother sometimes exhibited
erratic behavior, which included becoming verbally aggressive when she is

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upset. However, other than the incident that led to Mother’s incarceration,
the aunt was not aware of any instances of physically aggressive behavior.
Another aunt had obtained a restraining order against Mother.
When interviewed, that aunt explained it was “due to the mother’s
unresolved anger management problem” and “due to [Mother’s] inability to
control her emotions and keep her hands to herself. She communicated the
mother and child were previously residing with her, but it became ‘toxic,’ and
the mother left the home with the child and did not allow [the aunt] to have
contact with [Minor.]”
Father similarly reported aggressive verbal behavior from
Mother at times, to the point where in one instance she threatened to kill
him. Father was living in Las Vegas at the time and working as a truck
driver. He had no relationship with Minor.
Staff at Orangewood reported that they had no concerns about
Minor’s well-being, noting that Minor was “active and developmentally age
appropriate.” Another staff member described Minor as “well behaved, smart,
confident, and very social.”
At the detention hearing on April 2, 2024, the court found there
was a substantial danger to the physical health of the child and ordered
Minor detained. Mother was given 20 hours of supervised visitation.
On April 6, 2024, Mother appeared for a scheduled visit.
However, she absconded with Minor and did not respond to attempts to
contact her. She was located later that day by police officers and was
arrested. Minor was returned to his caretaker. Subsequently, the court
reduced Mother’s visitation from 20 hours to eight hours per week.
Afterward, on April 15, 2024, the assigned social worker spoke
with Mother and recommended that Mother participate in anger

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management, random drug testing, SCRAM, parenting classes, individual
counseling, and a mental health assessment. Mother expressed a willingness
to participate in all services.
In another interview the following month, Mother acknowledged
“she made an impulsive emotional decision when she absconded with the
child during a supervised visit. The mother communicated she made the
situation much worse by fleeing with the child and reported being remorseful.
The mother explained she contacted the caregiver . . . and apologized to her
for absconding with the child and for being disrespectful to her.”
On April 19, 2024, Minor was placed with his paternal
grandmother.
On May 16, 2024, the court authorized funding for substance
abuse testing for Mother. Importantly, the court did not order Mother to start
drug testing, and thus it was voluntary at that point. SSA submitted a
referral for Mother to do random drug testing, but Mother failed to appear at
all of her tests from late May through early July 2024.
In July 2024, a case manager at Project Kinship confirmed that
mother had been given housing through its program. As part of that program,
Mother was required to engage in drug testing. Although the case manager
did not specifically know the results of that testing, he said he would have
been notified if there had been any positive results (and apparently had
received no such notifications).
In August 2024, Mother was present for some substance abuse
testing. On two occasions, she tested negative. On two occasions, she tested
positive for alcohol. And on two occasions she was a no-show.
The jurisdictional hearing was completed on September 18, 2024.
The court found an interlineated petition to be true and exercised jurisdiction

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under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b)(1)
(substantial risk of serious physical harm). Reflecting on Mother taking the
great grandparents’ vehicle and later absconding with Minor, the court
commented, “There’s erratic behavior. There’s a lapse of judgment. There’s a
violation of the court order . . . .” “And the fact that this child might have
looked okay and did not have physical harm yet does not mean that there’s
not a significant, that it has not been demonstrated that there is a risk of this
child – a substantial risk, I find. And so, therefore, I am going to otherwise
sustain this petition.”
The disposition hearing was set for October 2024. Around that
time, SSA released minor to Father, who, though he did not have a
significant relationship with Minor prior to the dependency proceeding, had
been visiting regularly. The court continued the matter for 60 days to assess
how Father did.
At the time, Mother was living at Project Kinship, where she was
undergoing random drug testing. The house manager reported that all of
Mother’s tests were clean. Mother had ceased showing up for testing through
SSA.
Around November 2024, Mother ceased communicating with
SSA. She was in Las Vegas at the time and was continuing to visit with
Minor with no significant concerns noted by Father.
Neither parent personally appeared at the disposition hearing on
December 20, 2024. Father had authorized his counsel to appear on his
behalf. Mother’s counsel, however, had been unable to get a hold of her.
At the disposition hearing, the court removed custody of Minor
from Mother and vested full legal and physical custody of Minor with Father.

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At that point, the court ordered the dependency proceeding terminated.
Mother appealed.
DISCUSSION
“A ‘juvenile court’ is a superior court exercising limited
jurisdiction arising under juvenile law. [Citation.] Dependency proceedings in
the juvenile court are special proceedings with their own set of rules,
governed, in general, by the Welfare and Institutions Code.” (In re Chantal S.
(1996) 13 Cal.4th 196, 200.)
Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 sets forth various
bases upon which a juvenile court can exercise its limited dependency
jurisdiction. Here, the court exercised its jurisdiction based on section 300,
subdivision (b)(1). That section provides, in relevant part, “A child who comes
within any of the following descriptions is within the jurisdiction of the
juvenile court which may adjudge that person to be a dependent child of the
court:” “(b)(1) The child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the
child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of any of the
following: [¶] (A) The failure or inability of the child’s parent or guardian to
adequately supervise or protect the child. [¶] (B) The willful or negligent
failure of the child’s parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the
child from the conduct of the custodian with whom the child has been left.
(C) The willful or negligent failure of the parent or guardian to provide the
child with adequate food, clothing, shelter, or medical treatment.
(D) The inability of the parent or guardian to provide regular care for the
child due to the parent’s or guardian’s mental illness, developmental
disability, or substance abuse.”

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The burden of proof is on the petitioner, Social Services Agency,
to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a juvenile is described
by a subdivision of section 300. (In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773.)
Broadly speaking, SSA defends the court’s exercise of jurisdiction
based on two incidents: the initial apprehension of Mother and Minor in the
great grandparents’ car, and Mother absconding. We conclude neither
incident, considered separately or together, justified exercising jurisdiction
under section 300.
Regarding the incident with the vehicle, no one in this proceeding
is suggesting that Mother actually stole her great grandparents’ car. As SSA
describes the situation, Mother “took a vehicle outside the bounds of her
arrangement with the maternal great-grandparents, with whom her and
[Minor] lived intermittently.” Essentially, she stayed out too late with the
car. SSA blames Mother for “plac[ing] [Minor] in a situation where he was
out, without a caregiver, at 3:00 in the morning and had to be taken into
protective custody by law enforcement.”
We have serious doubts about whether Mother could have
foreseen that her great grandfather would report the vehicle stolen. But even
if that is the case, there is no nexus between this incident and any physical
harm to Minor. Minor was appropriately secured in a car seat and appeared
well at the time of the arrest. Mother was cooperative with law enforcement
and thus did not create any particular risk of harm associated with the
arrest. Moreover, there is no reason to expect, even if Mother did get
arrested, that the arrest would somehow result in serious physical harm to
Minor. Law enforcement is well equipped to safely transport a minor to
appropriate care facilities, such as Orangewood. Nothing about this incident

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placed Minor at substantial risk of serious physical harm, and thus we
cannot infer from this incident that Mother is likely to do so in the future.
The other major incident in this case was Mother absconding
with Minor. Without minimizing the seriousness of her violation of the court’s
visitation order, this incident similarly suffers from a lack of any nexus to
serious physical harm. Although the record is bereft of details, Mother does
not appear to have done anything risky with Minor during the incident. She
simply did not show up to return Minor to his caretaker and then refused to
answer phone calls and texts. This provoked a law enforcement response, but,
again, there was no evidence that Mother tried to evade law enforcement or
was uncooperative when arrested. Nothing about this incident placed Minor
at substantial risk of serious physical harm, and thus we cannot infer from
this incident that she is likely to seriously harm Minor in the future.
Ultimately, even if we accept the trial court’s characterization
that these incidents reflected “poor judgment” and “erratic behavior,” there
simply was no nexus between that behavior and a substantial likelihood of
Minor suffering serious physical harm. As was the case in In re David M.,
“The record on appeal lacks any evidence of a specific, defined risk of
harm . . . . Certainly, it is possible to identify many possible harms that could
come to pass. But without more evidence than was presented in this case,
such harms are merely speculative.” (In re David M. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th
822, 830, abrogated on other grounds by In re R.T. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 622.)
Beyond these incidents, the only other evidence SSA points to is:
evidence that Mother had anger management issues; evidence of Mother
drinking alcohol; and evidence that she previously smoked marijuana.
There was no evidence that Mother’s anger management
problems, which were only vaguely referred to in the record, ever placed

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Minor at any risk of harm. The principal evidence of her anger management
issues was multiple reports that she could become verbally aggressive. There
was no evidence of Mother becoming verbally aggressive with Minor,
however, and, in any event, verbal aggression does not amount to serious
physical harm. The only evidence of physical aggression was Mother’s
conviction from nine years prior for assaulting an ex-boyfriend’s partner with
a knife. Aside from that being remote in time, Mother described it as mutual
combat, and there was otherwise no evidence in the record of the
circumstances of that incident. That incident is not sufficient to create a
substantial risk that Minor will suffer seriously physical harm in Mother’s
care.
The evidence of substance use consisted of two tests positive for
alcohol—in what amount—is unclear and an unfounded report from nine
years before that Mother smoked marijuana heavily. Both alcohol and
marijuana use is legal under California state law, and there was no evidence
that Mother’s use of these substances amounted to abuse of the substances,
nor evidence that Minor was placed at any risk of harm based on Mother’s
use. The only other circumstance SSA points to is Mother’s refusal to drug
test through SSA. But that testing was voluntary, and thus we cannot
assume that she was abusing substances merely because she declined to test.
That is particularly true in this case, where there was not even any
circumstantial evidence that Mother was abusing substances. None of the
people interviewed in this case, for example, had any concerns about her
abusing drugs or alcohol, and no one ever reported that she appeared
intoxicated.
SSA’s brief also consistently refers to Mother’s “unresolved
mental health” issues. However, the evidence on that topic was so weak that

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the trial court specifically commented that it did “not put any weight on any
alleged specific mental health diagnosis.”1
Whether considered in combination or separately, the evidence
simply did not show that Minor was at substantial risk of suffering serious
physical harm under Mother’s care. Quite to the contrary, everyone who was
interviewed in this case reported that Mother takes good care of Minor.
Everyone who encountered Minor noted that he was healthy, well adjusted,
and developmentally on track. As such, the juvenile dependency petition
should have been dismissed.

1 The only other incident SSA points to is a phone call that

Father recorded in which Mother is heard to be speaking with Minor and
casually using swear words, and Minor is similarly heard to casually use
swear words in response. While that may not be how we would recommend a
parent to speak to a young child, it does not create a substantial risk of
serious physical harm. In that same phone call, Mother recommends that
Father add a “cap” of bleach to Minor’s bathwater. While that is an unusual
suggestion, there was nothing in the record to indicate that a small amount of
bleach in a bath is likely to cause serious physical harm. In fact, both the
Mayo Clinic and the American Academy of Allergy Asthma & Immunology
recommend a small amount of bleach in a bath to treat certain skin
conditions. (See <https://www.aaaai.org/tools-for-the-public/conditions-
library/allergies/bleach-bath-recipe-for-skin-conditions> [as of July 2, 2025];
<https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/atopic-dermatitis-
eczema/expert-answers/eczema-bleach-bath/faq-20058413> [as of July 2,
2025].) We express no judgment on whether it was appropriate in Minor’s
case. We simply note that it would not obviously create a risk of harm, and
the evidence is otherwise insufficient to conclude it would. Additionally, the
trial court did not rely on this incident in finding a substantial risk of serious
physical harm.

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DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed.

SANCHEZ, ACTING P. J.

WE CONCUR:

GOODING, J.

SCOTT, J.

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