People v. Fearence CA2/5

CourtListener 10636894Calctapp18 juil. 2025

Texte intégral

Filed 7/18/25 P. v. Fearence CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE, B339828

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. NA060375)
v.

JAQUES OMAR FEARENCE,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Debra A. Cole, Judge. Affirmed.
California Appellate Project and Richard B. Lennon, under
appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
In July 2004, a jury convicted defendant Jaques Omar
Fearence of the first degree murder of Kiejuan Clay (count 1;
Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a))1 and possession of cocaine for sale
(count 2; Health & Saf. Code, § 11351.5). The trial court
instructed the jury that in order to find the defendant guilty of
first degree murder, it must find that “the killing was preceded
and accompanied by a clear, deliberate intent on the part of the
defendant to kill . . . .” The court did not instruct the jury on
felony murder, the natural and probable consequences doctrine,
or aiding and abetting generally. The jury found true the
allegations that defendant personally and intentionally
discharged a firearm inflicting great bodily injury or death
(§ 12022.53, subd. (d)), defendant personally and intentionally
discharged a firearm (id., subd. (c)), and defendant personally
used a firearm (id., subd. (b)). In returning its verdict, the jury
specifically found that defendant, “while engaged in the
commission of the crime, personally and intentionally discharged
a firearm, a handgun, which proximately caused great bodily
injury or death to KIEJUAN CLAY.” The trial court sentenced
defendant to a term of 51 years 4 months to life. We affirmed the
conviction. (People v. Fearance [sic] (Oct. 26, 2005, B178108)
[nonpub. opn.].)
On April 19, 2023, the trial court ruled on defendant’s
petition for writ of habeas corpus by resentencing defendant to a
new sentence of 50 years to life for count 1, and 2 years for count
2, which the court stayed pursuant to section 654.

1 Further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless
otherwise indicated.

2
On or about April 8, 2024, defendant filed a petition for
resentencing pursuant to section 1172.6. On July 12, 2024, the
trial court denied the petition in a minute order, finding that
defendant had filed the same petition “on at least three previous
occasions and [had been] denied each time.” The court further
indicated that “[defendant] has been advised numerous times in
the denials to his previous petitions on this exact same issue that
he is not entitled to resentencing under [s]ection 1172.6. The
statute is not applicable to this defendant and cannot provide
him any relief.” Defendant now appeals from that order.
On April 29, 2025, defendant’s appointed appellate counsel
filed an opening brief in which he did not identify any arguable
issues and requested that we follow the procedures outlined in
People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216.
On April 29, 2025, we notified defendant that appointed
appellate counsel had filed a brief that raised no issues and
defendant had 30 days within which to submit a supplemental
brief or letter stating any grounds for an appeal, or contentions,
or arguments that he wished this court to consider.
On May 9, 2025, defendant filed a supplemental brief.
Defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying his
petition without appointing counsel or issuing an order to show
cause. We reject this argument. The doctrine of issue preclusion
bars relitigation of the section 1172.6 petition here. (See People
v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 451–452.) Further, because the
jury was not instructed on felony murder or the natural and
probable consequences doctrine, defendant could not meet his
prima facie burden to demonstrate that he was eligible for relief
under section 1172.6. (People v. Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at
p. 233; People v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 52.)

3
DISPOSITION
The order denying the section 1172.6 petition is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

KIM (D.), J.

We concur:

BAKER, Acting P. J.

MOOR, J.

4

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