CourtListener 10635295•People v. Sanchez CA2/7
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Filed 7/17/25 P. v. Sanchez CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
THE PEOPLE, B336180
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. VA156822)
v.
GERARDO SANCHEZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Roger Ito, Judge. Affirmed.
James Koester, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews, Supervising
Deputy Attorney General, Ryan M. Smith, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
Gerardo Sanchez appeals from the judgment after a jury
found him guilty on two counts of gross vehicular manslaughter
while intoxicated (Pen. Code, § 191.5, subd. (a))1 and related
charges. The trial court denied probation and sentenced Sanchez
to a prison term of eight years eight months.
Sanchez does not challenge his convictions; he raises two
sentencing issues. He argues that the trial court erred in
presuming he was ineligible for probation and that substantial
evidence did not support the jury’s finding the victims were
particularly vulnerable, a finding Sanchez claims the trial court
may have used to deny probation and impose consecutive
sentences on Sanchez’s convictions. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Sanchez Gets into an Accident While Driving
Intoxicated and Kills Two of His Passengers
In the early morning hours following Halloween night,
Whitter Police Department Officer Jim Azpilicueta saw a black
car traveling at approximately 100 miles per hour. Seconds later,
he heard a collision and drove toward the sound. Officer
Azpilicueta and another officer arrived at the scene of the
accident and saw the black car in the middle of the street, resting
on the driver’s side. When Officer Azpilicueta approached the
car, he found Sadya Molina conscious and hanging from the front
passenger seat by her seatbelt. Officer Azpilicueta cut the
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
seatbelt and got Molina out of the car through the moonroof.
Officer Azpilicueta then discovered James Espinosa inside the car
and lodged between the driver seat and the back seat on the
driver’s side. Officer Azpilicueta also found Mayra Zarate lying
inside the car and on the driver’s side door (because the car was
on its side). Espinosa and Zarate were neither moving nor
breathing and appeared dead.
Approximately 45 minutes later, another officer conducted
a collision investigation at the scene and found Sanchez on the
ground near the accident next to a parked car. Sanchez’s face
was painted green. Paramedics transported Sanchez and Molina
to the hospital. Molina suffered a fractured pelvis.
At the hospital Sanchez told a police detective that he was
in the front passenger seat and that Espinosa was driving the
car. A phlebotomist drew Sanchez’s blood, and a subsequent
analysis of the sample determined Sanchez had a blood alcohol
content of .12 percent at that time.
B. The Police Investigate the Accident, and the People
Charge Sanchez with Several Crimes
While collecting evidence inside the car, a traffic
investigator observed green smudge marks on the air bag that
had deployed from the driver’s side door. No one other than
Sanchez appeared to have been wearing green face paint or
makeup.
A traffic collision investigator analyzed the data recorder
from the car and determined the black car was traveling
133 miles per hour approximately two seconds before the
collision. The investigator concluded the car first hit the center
median curb, bounced off a median light pole, continued across
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opposite lanes of traffic, and hit a tree and parked cars on the
opposite side of the street. A medical examiner concluded
Espinosa and Zarate suffered rapid fatal blunt force injuries and
died almost instantaneously.
When the police returned Zarate’s cell phone to her family,
the family found a time-stamped video from the night of the
accident showing Zarate, Espinosa, and Sanchez drinking alcohol
at a party on Halloween night and wearing the same outfits they
were wearing when the accident occurred. The video also showed
Sanchez wearing green face paint.
The People charged Sanchez with two counts of gross
vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated (§ 191.5,
counts 1 and 2); driving under the influence of an alcoholic
beverage and proximately causing bodily injury (Veh. Code,
§ 23153, subd. (a), count 3); and driving with a blood alcohol level
of .08 percent or more and proximately causing bodily injury
(Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (b), count 4). The People further
alleged for counts 3 and 4 that Sanchez inflicted great bodily
injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)) and that, for all counts, the victims
were “particularly vulnerable,” within the meaning of California
Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(3).2
C. The Jury Convicts Sanchez
The jury found Sanchez guilty on all counts and found true
the allegations the victims were particularly vulnerable, within
the meaning of rule 4.421(a)(3). The jurors also found true the
allegations Sanchez inflicted great bodily injury upon Zarate and
Espinosa.
2 Citations to rules are to the California Rules of Court.
4
D. The Trial Court Sentences Sanchez
For the sentencing hearing the trial court had the
probation report, the People’s sentencing memorandum,
Sanchez’s statement in mitigation and sentencing memorandum,
and other materials. Sanchez asked the court to grant him
probation or to sentence him to lower, and concurrent, terms on
his convictions. The People asked the court to impose the middle
term on count 1, one-third of the middle term on count 2, and
one-third of the middle term on count 3, all three terms to be
served consecutively, and to stay execution of the sentence on
count 4, as well as on the great bodily injury enhancements
under section 12022.7, subdivision (a).
The trial court denied Sanchez’s request for probation and
sentenced him to prison for eight years eight months. The court
imposed a term of six years for his conviction on count 1, a
consecutive term of two years for his conviction on count 2, and a
consecutive term of eight months for his conviction on count 3.
The court stayed execution of the sentence on count 4 and the
enhancements on counts 3 and 4. Sanchez timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in
Denying Sanchez Probation
The probation officer’s report and the People’s sentencing
memorandum stated Sanchez was presumptively ineligible for
probation under section 1203, subdivision (e)(3). That provision
states: “Except in unusual cases in which the interests of justice
would be best served if the person is granted probation, probation
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shall not be granted to . . . [a]ny person who willfully inflicted
great bodily injury or torture in the perpetration of the crime of
which that person has been convicted.” Sanchez’s sentencing
memorandum did not state whether Sanchez was presumptively
ineligible for probation under section 1203, subdivision (e), but
asserted Sanchez was “eligible for a grant of probation since this
is an unusual case where the interests of justice are best served
by a grant of probation.” Sanchez’s sentencing memorandum
suggested counsel believed the presumption applied, but argued
he had rebutted it.
Sanchez argues that the probation officer, the prosecutor,
and Sanchez’s trial counsel all erroneously assumed he was
presumptively ineligible for probation and that the trial court
applied that incorrect assumption in denying Sanchez probation.
The record does not support Sanchez’s argument.
“[I]n most circumstances the trial court has broad
discretion to choose probation when sentencing a criminal
offender.” (People v. Prudholme (2023) 14 Cal.5th 961, 965.) “We
consider a trial court’s sentencing decisions under an abuse of
discretion standard of review.” (People v. Moseley (2024)
105 Cal.App.5th 870, 874.) “[I]n light of the presumption on a
silent record that the trial court is aware of the applicable law,
including statutory discretion at sentencing, [the reviewing court]
cannot presume error where the record does not establish on its
face that the trial court misunderstood the scope of that
discretion.” (People v. Gutierrez (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 515,
527.)
The trial court did not state Sanchez was presumptively
ineligible for probation, nor did the court refer to section 1203 at
any point during the sentencing hearing. The court did not state
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it was evaluating whether Sanchez’s case was “unusual” or
whether the interests of justice would or would not be served by
granting Sanchez probation, which are what the court would
consider if it were applying the presumption against probation in
section 1203, subdivision (e). The trial court stated: “I have read
the letters . . . in support of Mr. Sanchez . . . asking for some
degree of leniency given Mr. Sanchez’s . . . lack of any kind of real
criminal history. . . . They’ve made it very, very clear to me . . .
that Mr. Sanchez was living, aside from this incident, an
upstanding life.” Yet, the court stated, Sanchez “was traveling at
such an extremely egregious level of speed that this court has a
great deal of difficulty conferring any kind of motive other than
. . . an extraordinarily callous behavior.” The court gave no
indication that, in denying probation, it was relying on or
applying a presumption, under section 1203, subdivision (e)(3), or
otherwise.
Sanchez relies on People v. Lewis (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th
837, where the court held the trial court in that case erred in
denying the defendant probation without finding the defendant
intended to inflict great bodily injury. (Id. at p. 854.) Sanchez’s
reliance on Lewis is misplaced. In Lewis the probation officer,
the prosecutor, and counsel for the defendant all agreed the
defendant was presumptively ineligible for probation under
section 1203, subdivision (e)(3). (Lewis, at p. 851.) The court in
Lewis stated: “It is clear the trial court also believed [the
defendant] was presumptively ineligible for probation” because
the trial court found the case was not “unusual,” within the
meaning of section 1203, subdivision (e)(3). (Lewis, at p. 851.) In
contrast, the trial court here made no such statement or finding.
The record is silent regarding whether the trial court considered
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the presumption of ineligibility for probation under section 1203,
subdivision (e)(3). Therefore, we presume that the trial court did
not apply the presumption and that the court correctly applied
the law. (See People v. Moran (1970) 1 Cal.3d 755, 762; People v.
Gutierrez, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at p. 527; People v.
Mosley (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 489, 496.)
B. Substantial Evidence Did Not Support the Jury’s
Finding the Victims Were Particularly Vulnerable,
but Any Error in Relying on the Jury’s Finding Was
Harmless
Sanchez argues that substantial evidence did not support
the jury’s finding the victims were particularly vulnerable and
that the trial court relied on the vulnerable-victim finding in
denying probation and imposing consecutive terms. According to
Sanchez, “the court’s reliance upon that factor, as the only
aggravating factor noted in the probation report, likely had a
profound affect [sic] upon the trial court’s calculus of [Sanchez’s]
sentence, and including the court’s decision to deny probation and
to impose consecutive rather than concurrent sentences.”
It is unclear whether the trial court, in denying probation
or imposing consecutive terms, relied on the jury’s finding the
victims were particularly vulnerable. The probation report for
sentencing identified as the only aggravating circumstance that
the victims were particularly vulnerable. In their sentencing
memorandum the People argued Sanchez was presumptively
ineligible for probation, not because the jury found the victims
were particularly vulnerable, but because Sanchez inflicted great
bodily injury. The People also argued the case was not “unusual”
under section 1203, subdivision (e)(3). The People gave several
reasons the court should impose consecutive sentences, one of
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which was that the jury found the victims were particularly
vulnerable. The trial court, however, did not mention the jury’s
finding on that factor, either in denying probation or in imposing
consecutive terms. In any event, if the court (silently) relied on
the jury’s finding, any error in doing so was harmless.
1. The Victims Were Not Particularly Vulnerable
“Any circumstances in aggravation or mitigation, whether
or not the factors have been stipulated by the defendant or found
true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by a jury or the judge in a
court trial, may be considered in deciding whether to impose
consecutive rather than concurrent sentences.” (Rule 4.425(b).)
One such aggravating factor is that the “victim was particularly
vulnerable.” (Rule 4.421(a)(3).) “[P]articularly . . . means in a
special or unusual degree, to an extent greater than in other
cases. Vulnerability means defenseless, unguarded, unprotected,
accessible, assailable, one who is susceptible to the defendant’s
criminal act.” (People v. DeHoyos (2013) 57 Cal.4th 79, 154.)
Examples of a “particularly vulnerable” victim are: a petite,
mentally disabled woman sexually assaulted by a massage
therapist (People v. Sperling (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 1094, 1103);
a group of unarmed parents with children the defendant shot at
in a park (People v. Esquibel (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 539, 558);
a pregnant woman the defendant attacked to cause a miscarriage
(People v. Curry (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 766, 792); a 16-year-old
girl raped while unconscious (People v. Ramirez (2006)
143 Cal.App.4th 1512, 1531); an 81-year-old woman burglarized
at night (People v. Alvarado (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 178, 195);
a man shot multiple times in the head while sleeping (People v.
Loudermilk (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 996, 1007); and an
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“unsuspecting, unarmed, physically and mentally abused” woman
the defendant shot at “as [she] lay helpless” (People v. Nevill
(1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 198, 205).
All victims of intoxicated, reckless drivers are, in a sense,
vulnerable: They have no control over the vehicle or the driver’s
actions that put their lives at risk. That was true here. Sanchez
drove a high-performance vehicle over 100 miles per hour while
under the influence of alcohol, killing two people and seriously
injuring a third. Though the three victims were vulnerable, they
were not particularly vulnerable, within the meaning of rule
4.421(a)(3), in the circumstances of this case. “All victims of
drunk drivers are ‘vulnerable victims,’ but it is precisely because
they are all vulnerable that [such victims] cannot be considered
to be vulnerable ‘in a special or unusual degree, to an extent
greater than in other cases.’” (People v. Bloom (1983)
142 Cal.App.3d 310, 322; see People v. Piceno (1987)
195 Cal.App.3d 1353, 1358. [“regrettably, all victims of vehicular
manslaughter” are vulnerable, and the “element of vulnerability
is inherent in the very crime of vehicular manslaughter caused by
a driver under the influence of alcohol,” but “[p]recisely because
of their inherent vulnerability, drunk driving victims should not
be considered more vulnerable than victims in other cases”].)
Substantial evidence did not support the jury’s findings
Sanchez’s victims were particularly vulnerable.3 There was no
3 We review the sufficiency of the evidence “‘in the light most
favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses
substantial evidence—that is, evidence which is reasonable,
credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact
could find the [aggravating circumstance true] beyond a
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evidence Sanchez or anyone else coerced the victims or forced
them into the car. Indeed, Sanchez was driving Espinosa’s car,
which suggests Espinosa entrusted Sanchez with the keys and
gave him permission to drive his car. Moreover, victims who
have “at least some advance notice or warning of the imminent
risk posed . . . should be considered less vulnerable.” (People v.
Weaver (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1301, 1316, disapproved on
another ground in People v. Cook (2015) 60 Cal.4th 922, 939;
cf. People v. Nicolas (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 1165, 1182 [“a victim of
gross vehicular manslaughter who ‘has absolutely no advance
warning or ability to attempt to avoid’ a car that crashes into his
or her vehicle may be characterized as a ‘particularly vulnerable’
victim”].) The victims here had notice of the risk of getting into
the car with a drunk driver; video taken hours before the accident
showed Zarate, Espinosa, and Sanchez drinking together at a
party, indicating they knew Sanchez was intoxicated.
2. Any Error by the Trial Court in Relying on the
Vulnerable-victim Finding Was Harmless
Because substantial evidence did not support the jury’s
finding the victims were particularly vulnerable, any reliance by
the trial court on that finding in denying probation or imposing
consecutive sentences would have been error. Any such error,
however, was harmless.
reasonable doubt.’” (People v. Boyce (2014) 59 Cal.4th 672, 691;
see People v. Hicks (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 496, 512 [we review the
trial court’s findings on aggravating circumstances for
substantial evidence].)
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“‘In deciding whether to impose consecutive terms, the trial
court may consider aggravating and mitigating factors.’
[Citation.] However, ‘there is no requirement that, in order to
justify the imposition of consecutive terms, the court find that an
aggravating circumstance exists.’ [Citations.] Thus, the
sentencing court is not required to find that any aggravating
circumstances exist before imposing consecutive sentences . . . .”
(People v. Salazar (2023) 15 Cal.5th 416, 429-430.)
“‘In order to determine whether error by the trial court in
relying upon improper factors in aggravation [or in imposing
consecutive sentences] requires remanding for resentencing[,]
“the reviewing court must determine if ‘it is reasonably probable
that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have
been reached in the absence of the error.’”’” (People v. Sperling,
supra, 12 Cal.App.5th at p. 1104; accord, People v. Dorado (2024)
105 Cal.App.5th 717, 738; see People v. Avalos (1984) 37 Cal.3d
216, 233 [error in imposing consecutive sentences was harmless
where it was “not reasonably probable that a more favorable
sentence would have been imposed in the absence of the error”].)
In denying probation, the trial court stated: “I can tell you
there is no way that this court would consider this to be a
probationary case.” Among other factors the court cited for
denying probation and imposing consecutive sentences, the court
stated the crash Sanchez caused was extraordinarily violent and
“ended up killing two people [and] seriously injuring a third.”
The court acknowledged as mitigating factors Sanchez had no
criminal history, was well-educated, had a good employment
record, and submitted character references. But the court found
those factors were outweighed by Sanchez’s driving at such an
excessive speed, callous conduct, and attempt to place “the blame
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for this extraordinarily horrendous accident at others, including
the dead young woman who was just riding along in this vehicle.”
The trial court made it abundantly clear, without mentioning the
jury’s finding the victims were particularly vulnerable, the court
was not going to grant Sanchez probation or impose concurrent
terms. (See People v. Hartsfield (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 504, 510
[“The reasons for the imposition of a consecutive term are
manifest from the record.”].) Thus, even if the jury had not found
the victims were particularly vulnerable or the trial court had not
considered the jury’s finding (if it did), the court still would have
denied Sanchez probation and imposed consecutive terms. (See
People v. Champion (1995) 9 Cal.4th 879, 934 [error in imposing
consecutive sentences was harmless where it was “inconceivable
that the trial court would impose a different sentence if [the
reviewing court] were to remand for resentencing”].)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
SEGAL, J.
We concur:
MARTINEZ, P. J. STONE, J.
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