CourtListener 10635228•People v. Avila CA4/3
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Filed 7/17/25 P. v. Avila CA4/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, G063675
v. (Super. Ct. No. 12NF3910)
PEDRO AVILA, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from a postjudgment of the Superior Court of Orange
County, Steven D. Bromberg, Judge. Reversed and remanded.
Avatar Legal, and Jason L. Jones, under appointment by the
Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Robin
Urbanski, Seth M. Friedman and Juliet W. Park, Deputy Attorneys General,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
* * *
In 2014, Pedro Avila pled guilty to various crimes, including
attempted murder. In 2023, he filed a petition for resentencing of his
attempted murder conviction, which the trial court denied at the prima facie
stage of review. The trial court concluded the record of conviction, including
the preliminary hearing transcript, established Avila was the sole
perpetrator as a matter of law. Avila appealed, arguing the record of
conviction did not conclusively establish he was statutorily ineligible for
resentencing relief. The Attorney General agrees with Avila. Following a de
novo review of the record of conviction, we conclude Avila has made a prima
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facie case for resentencing relief under Penal Code section 1172.6.
Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.
UNDERLYING CASE
On December 14, 2012, the Orange County District Attorney filed
a felony complaint against Avila, charging him with premeditated attempted
murder (count 1), shooting at an inhabited dwelling (count 2), assault with a
firearm (count 3), hit and run resulting in injury (count 4), unlawfully
carrying a loaded firearm in pubic as an active participant in a criminal
street gang (count 5), possession of a firearm by a felon (count 6), and gang-
related resisting officer (count 7).
1
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code, unless
stated otherwise.
2
As to counts 1 and 2, it was further alleged that Avila
intentionally and personally discharged a firearm during the commission and
attempted commission of the offenses. As to counts 1, 2, and 3, it was alleged
that he personally used a firearm in the commission and attempted
commission of the offenses. As to counts 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6, it was alleged that
the offenses were committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang. It was
also alleged that Avila had a prior serious felony conviction and a prior strike
conviction.
On October 8, 2014, Avila pled guilty to the three counts in the
felony complaint, including the attempted murder count, and the gang
enhancement. As the factual basis for his guilty plea to attempted murder, he
admitted that on December 11, 2012, “I attempted to murder John Doe for
the benefit of Citron Street, a criminal street gang, with the specific intent to
assist the criminal conduct of Citron Street.”
The trial court sentenced Avila to an aggregate term of 17 years
in state prison.
II.
RESENTENCING PETITION
A. Petition
On September 5, 2023, Avila filed a form petition for
resentencing of his attempted murder conviction. In his petition, he stated
that (1) he was charged with attempted murder under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine; (2) he accepted a plea offer in lieu of trial at
which he could have been convicted of attempted murder; and (3) he could not
presently be convicted of attempted murder because of changes made to
sections 188 and 189, effective January 1, 2019.
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B. Opposition
In response, the district attorney requested the trial court deny
the petition at a prima facie hearing. The district attorney argued Avila was
guilty of attempted murder under current law because: (1) he admitted to
being the actual perpetrator in his plea form; (2) “no one else [was] charged
with this attempted murder”; and (3) “the evidence presented during the
preliminary hearing indisputably shows that [Avila] was the actual
perpetrator of the attempted murder[.]”
A copy of the preliminary hearing transcript was attached. At the
preliminary hearing, three police officers testified. Shortly after the shooting,
Officer Christy interviewed Witness M, who stated he saw a Hispanic male
running away from a gray car being driven by another Hispanic male.
Witness M saw the driver shoot at the victim multiple times before driving
away. The officer also interviewed Witness A about 45 minutes after the
shooting. Witness A told the officer she saw a man in a gray or silver car fire
three or four shots at the victim before driving away. As the shooter drove
away, he hit a small child.
Officer Browne interviewed Witness A eight days later. She told
him she did not see the shooting, but heard about it from her cousin.
Immediately after her cousin informed her about the shooting, Witness A saw
a gray vehicle pass by. Witness A and her father followed the vehicle, and
saw it hit a little girl before continuing and ultimately parking in a driveway.
Witness A testified the sole occupant of the vehicle was a light skinned
Hispanic male. Witness A identified the victim’s photo when shown a
photographic sixpack containing his picture. She initially could not identify
the driver from another sixpack, but eventually selected Avila’s photo as
resembling the suspect due to his skin tone.
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Officer Phillips testified that on the day of the shooting, he
learned about the shooting, including that witnesses had said a silver car was
involved and it was related to the Citron street gang. From his prior contacts
with Avila, a Citron gang member, the officer recalled Avila drove a silver
car. Officer Phillips contacted Avila’s probation officer, and about two hours
later, he was able to detain Avila, who was driving his car. Two other male
Hispanics were in the vehicle, one in the front passenger seat. Officers
recovered a loaded handgun from the car’s center vehicle.
Officer Phillips interviewed Avila the next afternoon at the police
station. Avila stated he could not recall what happened during the time of the
shooting because he had blacked out after drinking. After the officer informed
Avila that a little girl had been run over and was not in good condition, Avila
got upset and said he wanted to write an apology letter to the little girl.
When the officer provided a pen and paper, Avila wrote an apology letter. In
the officer’s presence, he also called his girlfriend and informed her that he
“had [run] over a little girl.”
C. Reply
In reply to the district attorney’s opposition, Avila argued the
trial court could not consider the facts elicited at the preliminary hearing
because he did not stipulate to the transcript as a factual basis for his plea.
He further argued his guilty plea did not preclude resentencing relief because
he merely admitted liability to attempted murder in generic language.
D. Order Denying Resentencing Petition
Following the prima facie hearing, the trial court denied the
resentencing petition without an order to show cause. It concluded Avila was
ineligible for resentencing relief because “[t]he record of conviction refutes the
possibility that [Avila] was convicted under a natural and probable
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consequences doctrine.” The court explained: “[Avila] was charged alone. He
admitted to personally attempting to murder John Doe in his [plea] form.
[Avila] did not reference any other co-participant in the [plea] form such that
malice could have been imputed to [Avila] based on his participation in
another offense. Consideration of the preliminary hearing transcript supports
this finding and does not necessitate judicial fact-finding. There is no
allegation or evidence of an accomplice in [Avila]’s case, nor does [Avila]
articulate a scenario under which he could have been prosecuted under a
natural and probable consequences theory. The uncontradicted evidence
introduced at the preliminary hearing shows that [Avila] acted alone by
shooting at the victim from his car. Nobody else was present in [his] car at
the time of the shooting and witnesses identified petitioner as the shooter.
When law enforcement ultimately apprehended [Avila], he was driving a car
matching the shooter’s description and had a loaded handgun in the center
console. Based on this uncontradicted evidence, [Avila] could not have been
prosecuted under a natural and probable consequences theory and thus he
fails to establish a prima facie case for relief.”
On January 30, 2024, Avila timely noticed an appeal from the
order denying his resentencing petition.
DISCUSSION
I.
APPLICABLE LAW
Section 1172.6, subdivision (a) provides in relevant parts that a
“person convicted of . . . attempted murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine . . . may file a petition with the court that sentenced
the petitioner to have the petitioner’s . . . attempted murder . . . conviction
vacated and to be resentenced on any remaining counts when all of the
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following conditions apply: [¶] (1) A complaint . . . was filed against the
petitioner that allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory of . . .
attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine. [¶]
(2) The petitioner . . . accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial at which the
petitioner could have been convicted of murder or attempted murder. [¶] (3)
The petitioner could not presently be convicted of . . . attempted murder
because of changes to [s]ection 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019.”
The petitioner has the burden of making a prima facie case for
resentencing relief. The prima facie stage bar is “‘very low.’” (People v. Lewis
(2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 972 (Lewis).) “If the petitioner makes a prima facie
showing that the petitioner is entitled to relief, the court shall issue an order
to show cause.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (c).)
The court may deny the petition at the prima facie stage if the
record of conviction discloses that the petitioner is ineligible for relief as a
matter of law. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 970-971.) “In reviewing any
part of the record of conviction at this preliminary juncture, a trial court
should not engage in ‘factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the
exercise of discretion.’” (Id. at p. 972.) “When the petitioner’s conviction
resulted from a guilty plea rather than a trial, the record of conviction
includes the facts ‘the defendant admitted as the factual basis for a guilty
plea.’” (People v. Gaillard (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 1206, 1211-1212, quoting
People v. Gallardo (2017) 4 Cal.5th 120, 136.) The record of conviction also
includes the preliminary hearing transcript. (See People v. Patton (2025) 17
Cal.5th 549, 568 (Patton) [“[T]here is no dispute that the record of conviction
the parties may consult at the prima facie stage includes a preliminary
hearing transcript preceding a guilty plea”].) This is the case even if the
defendant did not stipulate to the transcript or its contents. (Id. at p. 569
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[“The absence of such a stipulation during an earlier plea colloquy does not
eliminate th[e] role” “a transcript can play at the prima facie stage of the
resentencing process”].) We review de novo the trial court’s determination
that the petitioner failed to make a prima facie showing for relief. (People v.
Williams (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1244, 1251; People v. Eynon (2021) 68
Cal.App.5th 967, 975 (Eynon).)
II.
ANALYSIS
As noted above, the Attorney General concedes Avila has stated a
prima facie case, and the record of conviction does not conclusively establish
he is ineligible for resentencing relief. We accept the concession.
Avila satisfied the first prong of the prima facie case because the
felony complaint generically charged him with premeditated attempted
murder. At the time Avila was charged, under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, an aider and abettor could be found guilty of
premeditated attempted murder, even if the aider and abettor did not
personally act with premeditation and deliberation, as long as the direct
perpetrator acted with premeditation and deliberation. (See People v. Favor
(2012) 54 Cal.4th 868, 880, superseded by statute on other grounds as stated
in People v. Hin (2025) 17 Cal.5th 401, 442.) Thus, “the generic [attempted]
murder charge allowed the prosecution to proceed on any theory of liability,
including natural and probable consequences . . . .” (Eynon, supra, 68
Cal.App.5th at p. 977.)
The fact that Avila was the only person charged with the
attempted murder only suggests he was the sole perpetrator. It does not
conclusively establish that fact. “[W]e are aware of no authority requiring
prosecutors to try all codefendants together, so this single charging document
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does not foreclose the possibility of other people having been charged for
related crimes.” (People v. Estrada (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 328, 339
(Estrada).)
As to the second prong, Avila accepted a plea in lieu of going to
trial at which he could have been convicted of attempted murder under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine. Thus, he satisfied this element
of the prima facie case.
Additionally, Avila’s plea to the attempted murder charge did not
foreclose resentencing relief. He admitted that he “attempted to murder John
Doe for the benefit of Citron Street, a criminal street gang, with the specific
intent to assist the criminal conduct of Citron Street.” However, Avila “did
not plead to any particular type of malice when pleading to attempted
murder. Further, he did not admit to any specific theory of attempted
murder. Instead, the record shows that he pleaded to the generic charge of
attempted murder without the ‘willful, deliberate, and premeditated’
allegation. He did not admit he harbored an intent to kill.” (Estrada, 101
Cal.App.5th at p. 338.) In sum, Avila’s admissions in his plea did not
foreclose the possibility that malice was imputed to him under the natural
and probable consequences doctrine.
The third and final prong of the prima facie case requires that
Avila “could not presently be convicted of . . . attempted murder because of
changes to [s]ection 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019.” (§ 1172.6
(a)(3).) Avila satisfies this element because attempted murder under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine no longer exists due to the
changes to sections 188 and 189. (People v. Coley (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 539,
548.) The preliminary hearing transcript did not disqualify Avila because it
did not conclusively establish that “he was the sole and direct perpetrator of
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the shooting such that his conviction was not based on the natural and
probable consequences theory.” (Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 563.) Avila
admitted to the hit and run, but he never admitted to the shooting. When he
was apprehended two hours after the shooting, he was accompanied by two
other males, who could have been the shooter. Although Witness A told
Officer Christy that Avila was the lone shooter, she later told Officer Browne
she did not witness the shooting. Witness M, who witnessed the shooting,
never identified Avila as the shooter. In short, the trial court could not have
relied on the facts in the preliminary hearing transcript to find that Avila
was the sole shooter as a matter of law. Accordingly, the trial court erred in
denying the resentencing petition at the prima facie stage.
DISPOSITION
The order denying Avila’s resentencing petition is reversed. On
remand, the trial court is directed to issue an order to show cause and to
conduct further proceedings as required under section 1172.6.
DELANEY, J.
WE CONCUR:
MOTOIKE, ACTING P. J.
SCOTT, J.
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