People v. Reyes

CourtListener 10634340Calctapp16 juil. 2025

Texte intégral

Filed 6/17/25; Certified for Partial Pub. 7/16/25 (order attached)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B329858
(Super. Ct. No. 2022020343)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Ventura County)

v.

RAYMOND REYES,

Defendant and Appellant.

Raymond Reyes appeals his convictions by jury on one
count of attempted murder (count 1; Pen. Code, §§ 664/187, subd.
(a)),1 one count of shooting at an inhabited dwelling (count 2;
§ 246), one count of possession of a firearm by a felon (count 3;
§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)), one count of possession of ammunition by a
felon (count 4; § 30305, subd. (a)(1)), and one count of graffiti
vandalism, raised to a felony (count 5; § 594, subd. (b)(2)(A),
186.22, subd. (d)). The jury found true allegations appellant

1 Unlabeled statutory cites are to the Penal Code.
committed counts 1, 2, and 5 for the benefit of a criminal street
gang. (§ 186.22, subds. (b)(1)(C), (b)(4)(B), (d).) He received a
determinate term of 29 years and four months in prison, plus an
indeterminate term of 55 years to life.
Assembly Bill no. 333 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (AB 333),
requires bifurcating trial on gang enhancement allegations upon
defendant’s request. (§ 1109; Evid. Code, § 352.) The trial court
granted appellant’s request to bifurcate here. Appellant contends
the court nevertheless committed reversible error because it
admitted “unlimited, cumulative gang evidence” during the first
phase of trial. He next contends the court erred by allowing an
expert witness for the prosecution to identify appellant as the
suspect who appeared in surveillance footage. Lastly, he
contends the court should have granted his motion to dismiss the
People’s gang allegations under section 1118.1. We will affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The Shooting
M.C. visited an Oxnard marijuana dispensary on August
28, 2021. He left the store and began walking to his friend’s
house. As he approached an intersection, a car approached from
the right and stopped. The door opened. The driver emerged,
yelled “Colonia,” and fired a gun at him several times. M.C.
immediately turned and ran in the opposite direction. One bullet
struck his lower back. Another bullet struck an occupied home.
M.C. ran to his friend’s house and collapsed. Paramedics
took him to Ventura County Medical Center. Surgeons opened
his chest and removed three liters of blood from his abdomen.
His heart stopped beating on the operating table but restarted
after surgeons manually massaged it. M.C. required five

2
surgeries and remained in the hospital for over a month. He lost
sections of his liver, stomach, and small intestine.
Arrest
Police found four nine-millimeter bullet casings and one
unspent round on the street. Two home security cameras
captured video of the shooting. Another five cameras captured
the shooter’s car approaching and leaving the scene. A license
plate search showed appellant was the registered owner. Police
arrested him a month later during a traffic stop in Bakersfield.
Corporal Jason Radcliffe of the Oxnard Police Department
participated in the arrest. He questioned appellant for several
hours then transported him to Ventura County.
Post-Arrest Evidence
Officers searched appellant’s apartment and found an
empty gun case for a Glock 43 nine-millimeter pistol, an extended
magazine, and several rounds of ammunition. The apartment
also contained Dallas Cowboys memorabilia, a “Colonia” hat, and
clothing like that worn by the shooter in the videos.
Police detectives retrieved data from appellant’s cell phone
as well. It contained text messages between appellant’s
girlfriend and him about a recently murdered member of the
Colonia Chiques street gang called “Lazy Eye.” Messages
between appellant and another individual named “Big Snoopy”
showed they drove together from Bakersfield to Oxnard to attend
a memorial car wash for Lazy Eye on August 28. Big Snoopy told
appellant to “take your t”; appellant responded, “For sure.”
Appellant’s Instagram account included other messages with
Colonia gang members and showed he went by the moniker
“Thief.”

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Cell tower data showed appellant’s phone made an
outgoing call in Bakersfield at 7:50 a.m. on the day of the
shooting. It then made and received a series of calls between
12:10 p.m. and 4:06 p.m. near Oxnard’s Del Sol Park—the site of
Lazy Eye’s car wash. The phone went off network between 5:00
p.m. and 7:18 p.m. Its activity between 7:38 p.m. and 9:59 p.m.
showed it returning to Bakersfield along the 126 and I-5
freeways.
Appellant texted Big Snoopy four days later about tattooing
“E” and “S” on his knees. Photos on his phone taken the next day
showed these tattoos on his freshly-shaven knees. Big Snoopy
sent a text message asking appellant to send “a picture of the
toy,” then adding, “Someone want[s] to buy it.” Appellant
responded, “Yeah, my boy. It’s right here. Just let me know.”
The phone contained a photo of a Glock 43 pistol taken within
four minutes of these messages. A nightstand similar to one in
appellant’s bedroom in Bakersfield appeared in the background.
The phone also contained three screen shots of internet news
stories relating to M.C.’s shooting.
Pre-Trial Detention
While appellant awaited trial, surveillance cameras at the
Ventura County Pretrial Detention Center recorded him
scrawling “COX3CH” and “Thief” on the wall of the recreation
yard with a piece of roof tar. Staff identified the graffiti as
typical of La Colonia Chiques, the jail’s largest gang.
Appellant spoke to his girlfriend on a recorded jail phone
while detained. During one call, he told her he was “involved in a
shooting.” He then backtracked by saying “they’re accusing,
they’re accusing me of, of, of being involved in a shooting,” and “I
wasn’t involved in nothing.”

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Trial
Appellant’s trial took place in four phases over 14 days.
The court granted his motion to bifurcate the gang allegations
under amended section 1109. It denied his motion to exclude
gang evidence from the guilt phase altogether, however, finding it
relevant to motive and intent. (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (b).) It
also denied his motion to sever the vandalism charge from trial
on the four charges related to the shooting.
The jury found appellant guilty on all five charges in the
first phase. It found true allegations that: he committed the
offenses in counts 1, 2, and 5 for the benefit of a criminal street
gang (phase two); he suffered a prior strike, a carjacking
conviction, in 2011 (phase 3); and that several aggravating
factors were present as to each offense (phase 4).2
DISCUSSION
Gang Evidence
Appellant contends the court erred by admitting
“unlimited, cumulative gang evidence” during the guilt phase of
his trial. We conclude no error occurred.

2 The jury found the following aggravating factors true in

phase four of the trial: the crime involved great bodily harm, etc.
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(1); count 1); appellant was
armed with and used a weapon (id., rule 4.421(a)(2); counts 1 and
2); the victim was particularly vulnerable (id., rule 4.421(a)(3);
count 2); the manner in which the crime was carried out indicates
planning, sophistication, and professionalism (id., rule
4.421(a)(8); counts 1 and 2); appellant engaged in violent conduct
that indicates a serious danger to society (id., rule 4.421(b)(1); all
counts); and that appellant served a prior prison term (id., rule
4.421(b)(3); all counts).

5
AB 333, titled the STEP Forward Act of 2021, revised the
substantive and procedural requirements for imposing gang
enhancements in California. The bill cited studies suggesting
such evidence “may lead to wrongful convictions” when admitted
during the guilt phase of trial and recognized bifurcating trial as
a way to “help reduce its harmful and prejudicial impact.” (Stats.
2021, ch. 699, § 2(e) & (f).) The bill codified a defendant’s right to
have gang enhancement charged under section 186.22 tried
separately from guilt on the underlying offenses. (Id., § 5.)3
The trial court granted appellant’s request to try the gang
enhancements separately but denied his motion to exclude all
gang evidence because it was relevant “with respect to identity
and motive.” Appellant describes the People’s evidence about
gang culture and his affiliation with the Colonia Chiques as
“incessant” and far beyond that required to prove his guilt. He
argues AB 333’s amendments require courts to more rigorously
scrutinize gang evidence for prejudice, even if such evidence is
relevant to proving a defendant’s guilt on the underlying charges.
Failing to perform this function rendered his trial fundamentally

3 Section 1109, subd. (a) now reads: “If requested by the
defense, a case in which a gang enhancement is charged under
subdivision (b) or (d) of Section 186.22 shall be tried in separate
phases as follows: [¶] (1) The question of the defendant’s guilt of
the underlying offense shall be first determined. [¶] (2) If the
defendant is found guilty of the underlying offense . . . there shall
be further proceedings to the trier of fact on the question of the
truth of the enhancement. Allegations that the underlying
offense was committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in
association with, a criminal street gang and that the underlying
offense was committed with the specific intent to promote,
further, or assist in criminal conduct by gang members shall be
proved by direct or circumstantial evidence.”

6
unfair, he posits, and requires vacating his convictions on all
counts under Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 [17
L.Ed.2d 705].
“California courts have long recognized the potentially
prejudicial effect of gang membership.” (People v. Albarran
(2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 214, 223.) Our Supreme Court has
“condemned the introduction of evidence of gang membership if
only tangentially relevant, given its highly inflammatory impact.”
(People v. Cox (1991) 53 Cal.3d 618, 660, overruled in part on
other grounds in People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390; see
People v. Cardenas (1982) 31 Cal.3d 897, 906 [prosecutor’s “broad
inquiries” about gang’s purported criminal activities “made it a
near certainty that the jury viewed appellant as more likely to
have committed the violent offenses charged against him because
of his membership”].) AB 333’s amendments to section 1109
foreclose prosecutors from bootstrapping marginally relevant
gang evidence into the guilt phase of trial under the pretext of
proving one or more enhancements. It also heightened the
standard of proof for proving such enhancements, whether
adjudicated with or apart from the underlying offenses.
We do not agree with appellant, however, that AB 333
alters how trial courts must navigate the waters of relevance and
prejudice under Evidence Code section 352. The bill codified the
judiciary’s longstanding concerns about gang evidence and
modified existing statutes to allay these concerns. If the
Legislature wanted to confine the trial court’s discretion it could
have done so. (See, e.g., College Hospital Inc. v. Superior Court
(1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 717, italics omitted [“Except insofar as it
increased the burden of proof applicable in all punitive damage
trials, nothing in the 1987 Reform Act indicates that the

7
Legislature intended to change the substantive elements of
punitive damage claims against health care providers . . . . The
Legislature could have amended Civil Code section 3294 to reflect
such changes in medical malpractice actions, but it did not do
so.”].)
“[E]vidence of gang membership is often relevant to, and
admissible regarding, the charged offense. Evidence of the
defendant’s gang affiliation—including evidence of the gang’s
territory, membership, signs, symbols, beliefs and practices,
criminal enterprises, rivalries, and the like—can help prove
identity, motive, modus operandi, specific intent, means of
applying force or fear, or other issues pertinent to guilt of the
charged crime.” (People v. Hernandez (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1040,
1049; see Tran, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 1208 [“gang evidence,
even if not admitted to prove a gang enhancement, may still be
relevant and admissible to prove other facts related to a crime”].)
Here, the trial court cautioned counsel that although it was
allowing gang evidence to show motive and intent, “[t]hat doesn’t
mean it’s, obviously, a full-blown gang testimony. I – there’s
clearly no need for predicate offenses and, you know . . . is this
particular group a recognized criminal street gang or not. But I
think in the context of what it was being offered for, it was
appropriate.”
Allowing significant evidence about appellant’s gang
affiliation was neither arbitrary, capricious, nor patently absurd.
The motive and intent for M.C.’s shooting was crucial to the
People’s case against appellant. M.C. was walking alone to a
friend’s house when an unfamiliar car approached. A man
stepped out of the car, shot him, and drove away. M.C. was not a
gang member and was not walking in Colonia territory.

8
Appellant lived in Bakersfield and denied all material allegations
against him. The People were entitled to place this seemingly
random act into context. This included explaining why a shooter
would yell “Colonia” at a stranger strolling through a
neighborhood on a Sunday afternoon, then try to kill him. This
case involved more than a defendant charged with a crime who
also happens to be a gang member. (See People v. Garcia (2024)
107 Cal.App.5th 1040, 1050-1051 [court abused its discretion by
allowing gang evidence where “no admissible evidence existed
showing the crimes had any connection” to appellant’s gang].)
This case involved a defendant alleged to have committed a crime
because he was a gang member.
Moreover, the court instructed the jury “not [to] conclude
from this evidence that the defendant is a person of bad character
or that he has a disposition to commit crime.” (CALCRIM No.
1403.) We presume the jury followed this instruction. (People v.
Franklin (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 938, 953.) Appellant has failed
to show it is reasonably probable he would have obtained a more
favorable result had the court admitted less gang evidence.
(People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.)4
Corporal Radcliffe’s Testimony on the Shooter’s Identity
Appellant contends the investigating officer’s opinion
testimony about the identity of the shooter invaded the province
of the jury. We again disagree.
Corporal Jason Radcliffe served as the primary
investigating officer in appellant’s case. He testified at trial as
the People’s expert on the Colonia Chiques gang. He also

4 Having concluded the trial court properly admitted the

gang evidence, we do not reach the issue of its decision not to
sever the vandalism charge.

9
testified as a percipient witness about his investigation of the
shooting and appellant’s arrest in Bakersfield. He described
questioning appellant for several hours after the arrest. The
People asked whether he “form[ed] an opinion as to who the
shooter was on the surveillance video.” Corporal Radcliffe
responded, “[o]ff the totality of the surveillance cameras and then
holding out until I actually had physical contact and the
conversation with Mr. Reyes, I believe 100 percent that was Mr.
Reyes who conducted the shooting.” He explained how the car
appellant was driving at the time of his arrest appeared identical
to the one in the video, including a small dent on the left rear
quarter panel. The last three digits of the license plate matched
as well. Appellant was wearing a blue tank top like the one worn
by the shooter. Radcliffe concluded: “[T]hen actually getting to
sit down, talk and see Mr. Reyes and deal with his – his
appearance and mannerisms, I was absolutely confident that Mr.
Reyes was the shooter.”
Appellant argues Corporal Radcliffe usurped the function of
the jury when he opined that appellant shot M.C. He compares
Radcliffe’s testimony to that of a similar “dual purpose” witness
in People v. Rouston (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 997 (Rouston). The
witness in Rouston, like here, served as both primary investigator
and gang expert. He testified defendant fired the shot that
struck the victim. He based his opinion mostly on an
eyewitness’s account of the crime, as well as audio recordings of
the shooting and forensic evidence about bullet trajectories.
Rouston reversed, concluding the witness “provided improper
opinions on [the defendant’s] guilt.” (Id. at p. 1011.) It stated:
“The jury heard the other witness testimony and was equally
competent ‘to weigh the evidence and determine what the facts

10
were.’” (Ibid., quoting People v. Vang (2011) 52 Cal.4th 1038,
1048.) “Given [his] status as a gang expert, the designated
investigator who testified repeatedly throughout the trial, and a
detective, ‘the jury had every reason to look to [him] as a far
better judge than they could be’ regarding the reliability of other
witnesses’ testimony, and what inferences to draw from the
prosecution’s other evidence.” (Id. at p. 1012, quoting People v.
Brown (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 140, 169.)
Rouston is distinguishable. Corporal Radcliffe did not base
his opinion on the testimony of other witnesses, or claim special
expertise in identifying people using video. He identified
appellant as the shooting suspect only after participating in his
arrest, questioning him, and comparing his “appearances and
mannerisms” to those he observed in the video’s footage prior to
the arrest. The trial court properly allowed this testimony.
Denial of Section 1118.1 Motion
Section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1), provides a sentence
enhancement of ten years for “a person who is convicted of a
felony committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in
association with a criminal street gang, with the specific intent to
promote, further, or assist in criminal conduct by gang members.”
The jury found gang allegations “true” as to counts 1, 2 and 5 in
the second phase of trial. The court denied appellant’s motion for
judgment of acquittal on the enhancements.
Appellant acknowledges the People introduced extensive
evidence of his gang affiliation during the guilt phase of trial. He
argues the People’s failure to reintroduce this evidence in the
second phase of trial—which focused instead on the predicate
offenses committed by other members of the La Colonia
Chiques—means the jury’s true findings on the section 186.22

11
enhancements were not supported by sufficient evidence. We
disagree.
Section 1109, subdivision (a) requires a gang enhancement
to be tried separately from the underlying offense “[i]f requested
by the defense.” The statute does not expressly foreclose or limit
the jury from considering evidence admitted during the guilt
phase during a later phase of trial, such as a bifurcated
proceeding on gang enhancements or aggravating factors. We
decline to interpret the statute as creating evidentiary silos. This
would compel the parties to perform the wasteful exercise of
readmitting all relevant testimony and exhibits at each phase of
trial. The plain language of section 1109 reflects the
Legislature’s intent to limit gang enhancement evidence during
the guilt phase of trial—not the other way around. The
uncodified language contained in AB 333 reflects this. (See Stats.
2021, ch. 699, § 2(d)(6) [“Gang enhancement evidence can be
unreliable and prejudicial to a jury because it is lumped into
evidence of the underlying charges which further perpetuates
unfair prejudice in juries and convictions of innocent people”].)
During her phase two opening, the prosecutor told jurors
“you’ll be instructed at the end of this that you can use all of the
evidence that you’ve already listened to throughout that first
phase of the trial within this case.” She invited jurors to consider
first phase evidence throughout her closing statement as well.
Appellant did not object or raise the issue in his motion for
judgment of acquittal. The court instructed the jury to
“impartially compare and consider all the evidence that was
received during this phase of the trial.” It then stated it had
“misspoke[n],” and re-instructed them to “impartially compare
and consider all the evidence that was received during the trial.”

12
(Italics added.) Again, appellant did not seek to correct this
instruction.
Lastly, appellant contends the evidence is insufficient to
support the “true” finding on the gang enhancement as to count
two (shooting at an occupied dwelling), even if jurors properly
considered evidence introduced in phase one. He argues the
People introduced no evidence he intended to benefit La Colonia
Chiques by shooting the house. We disagree. Surveillance videos
and testimony from several witnesses showed appellant stopped
his car in the middle of a neighborhood, stepped out, yelled
“Colonia,” held his gun at waist height, and opened fire on M.C.
against a backdrop of single-family homes. Jurors could
reasonably conclude from these facts that appellant had the
required mental state when he fired the shot that struck an
occupied dwelling. (See People v. Albillar (2010) 51 Cal.4th 47,
59-60 [“In considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence to support an enhancement, we review the entire record
in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether
it contains substantial evidence”].)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

CODY, J.

We concur:

GILBERT, P. J. BALTODANO, J.

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Anthony J. Sabo, Judge
Superior Court County of Ventura
______________________________

The Law Office of John Derrick, John Derrick, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Nicholas J. Webster, Amanda V.
Lopez and Christopher G. Sanchez, Deputy Attorneys General,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Filed 7/16/25

CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B329858
(Super. Ct. No. 2022020343)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Ventura County)

v. ORDER CERTIFYING
OPINION FOR PARTIAL
RAYMOND REYES, PUBLICATION
(No Change in Judgment)
Defendant and Appellant.

THE COURT*:
The opinion in the above-entitled matter filed on June 17,
2025, was not certified for publication in the Official Reports. For
igood cause, pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 8.1105

and 8.1110, it now appears the opinion should be published in the
Official Reports except the sections entitled Gang Evidence and
Corporal Radcliffe’s Testimony on the Shooter’s Identity under the
main heading titled DISCUSSION. It is so ordered.
There is no change in the Judgment.
CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION.

___________________________________________________________
GILBERT, P.J. BALTODANO, J. CODY, J.

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