Katkin v. Komorebi CA6

CourtListener 10633893Calctapp16 juil. 2025

Texte intégral

Filed 7/16/25 Katkin v. Komorebi CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

ANDREW KATKIN, H050891
(Monterey County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. 21PT000030)

v.

AMADASOPHIA KOMOREBI,

Defendant and Appellant.

Amadasophia Komorebi (Mother) and Andrew Katkin (Father) are the parents of a
now nearly six-year-old child, A.K. For her first 17 months, A.K. lived with Mother in
Massachusetts, but in December 2021, Mother brought A.K. to California to meet Father.
Nearly three months later, in late February 2021, based in part on concerns about A.K.’s
health and development, the trial court issued an emergency order granting temporary
physical custody to Father. Later, after an evidentiary hearing and a trial, the court
granted Father temporary legal custody, and eventually it granted Father permanent legal
and physical custody over A.K.
Mother appeals these custody orders. She argues that the trial court lacked
jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act
(UCCJEA) (Family Code, § 3400 et seq.) because Massachusetts was A.K.’s home state
when this case commenced in February 2021. (Subsequent undesignated statutory
references are to the Family Code.) Alternatively, Mother challenges the trial court’s
orders on procedural and substantive grounds.
As explained below, we conclude that the trial court had jurisdiction under the
UCCJEA and that Mother’s procedural and substantive challenges are unavailing. We
therefore affirm the judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
Consistent with the applicable standards of review, we state the facts in the light
most favorable to the judgment. (See, e.g., Los Angeles Unified School Dist. v. Casasola
(2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 189, 194, fn. 1; In re Janee W. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1444,
1448, fn. 1.)
A. A.K.’s Birth
In the spring of 2018, Mother and Father met in Massachusetts, they entered into a
romantic relationship, and Mother became pregnant. Father accused Mother of “birth
control sabotage,” and Mother accused Father of not disclosing that he was married.
Consequently, their relationship soured, and in February 2019 they largely broke off
contact. A.K. was born in July 2019 in Massachusetts, and Mother raised A.K. there for
the next 17 months without Father, who told Mother he did not intend to be part of A.K.’s
life.
B. Travel to California
In the spring of 2020 Mother called Father, and the two began talking again.
Eventually, Father suggested that Mother bring A.K. to California to see him, and he paid
for Mother to fly to California with A.K. and stay in Monterey. A.K. and Mother arrived
on December 1, 2020.
For the better part of the next three months, A.K. stayed with Mother in California.
At some point, Mother filed for child support in California. In addition, Mother applied
for public assistance, obtained an electronic banking transfer card from the State of
California, and began receiving monetary assistance.
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During this period, Father became concerned about A.K.’s health and
development. In particular, Father was concerned that A.K. was abnormally small,
weighing less than 20 pounds at 18 months, which he contended put her below the second
percentile for weight. He also was concerned that A.K. had not had routine medical
checkups or vaccines, was not permitted to drink water, and was kept on a strict vegan
diet that did not provide adequate nutrition. Finally, Father was concerned that A.K. did
not know any words beyond those Father had taught her and that Mother was
overwhelmed by caring for A.K.
C. Proceedings Below
1. The Ex Parte Emergency Application
In mid-February, Mother informed Father that soon she would be leaving with
A.K. but refused to tell him where she was going and instead said that he would no
longer be able to see A.K. As Mother, who was apparently born under the name Amanda
Rodriguez, had previously lived in Mexico, did not have a job, and had obtained a
passport for A.K., Father worried that Mother would remove A.K. from California and
endanger her health.
On February 16, 2021, Father filed a petition to establish parental rights and, two
days later, an ex parte application for a temporary emergency order. In support of the
emergency order request, Father filed a declaration detailing his concerns about the
health and development of A.K. Father also noted that Mother had applied for public
assistance as well as child support in California. Finally, Father described his efforts to
learn about parenting as well as his family support.
On February 23, 2021, the trial court issued an emergency order granting Father
temporary physical custody of A.K. The order gave Mother three hours daily of
parenting time, but required that another adult be present to prevent abduction and
prohibited Mother from taking A.K. outside of Monterey, Santa Cruz, San Mateo, and
San Luis Obispo counties. The order also required that A.K. be immediately evaluated
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by a pediatrician. Finally, the order scheduled a hearing on temporary custody for a
month later on March 18, 2021.
On February 25, 2021, with the help of the police, Father took physical custody of
A.K.
2. The Temporary Custody Hearing
Before the temporary custody hearing, Mother filed a declaration and a
memorandum of points and authorities. Mother argued that under the UCCJEA the trial
court lacked jurisdiction over A.K.’s custody because A.K. was in California only
temporarily and her home state was Massachusetts. According to Mother, she and A.K.
had been in California for three months on a “vacation,” “extended winter recess,” or
“holiday visit,” and they intended to return to Massachusetts afterwards. (Boldface
omitted.) Mother also disputed Father’s contentions about A.K.’s health and
development, and she questioned Father’s fitness as a parent, asserting that he had drug
and mental health problems, did not take good care of A.K., and only became interested
in obtaining custody of A.K. after she filed for child support, which Mother admitted she
had done in California. Mother did not discuss whether that she had applied for public
assistance in California.
After receiving additional evidence and briefing from Father, and conducting a
hearing, the trial court issued an order awarding Father temporary legal and physical
custody. The trial court found that it had jurisdiction under the UCCJEA. It determined
that Massachusetts did not have home state jurisdiction over A.K. because A.K. had not
been present in Massachusetts for the preceding six months and Mother’s applications for
child support and public assistance in California showed that her absence from
Massachusetts was not temporary. Although the trial court found that California did not
have home state jurisdiction either, the court concluded that it had jurisdiction under
UCCJEA because both A.K. and Father had a significant connection to California. The
trial court also granted Mother four hours of daily visitation, but imposed travel
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restrictions and required A.K. to undergo thorough medical evaluations as well as a full
custody evaluation.
3. The Evidentiary Hearing
In the summer of 2021, the trial court modified its temporary custody order to
award joint legal and physical custody to Mother and Father and to give each equal time
with A.K. The court also scheduled an evidentiary hearing regarding the child custody
evaluation and a move-away request by Mother.
The evidentiary hearing was conducted over four days in late January and early
February 2022. Father presented 17 witnesses, including both Mother and himself.
Mother presented one witness: Dr. Regina Marshall, the custody evaluator appointed by
the trial court, whose report recommended that Mother be awarded physical custody of
A.K. and permitted to move with her to Massachusetts. On cross-examination, Father
brought out that Mother had given Dr. Marshall videos of A.K. that were supposedly
taken in Massachusetts before her arrival in California but in fact were taken months later
in California, that Mother had not informed Dr. Marshall about her personal relationship
with the midwife whom she presented as a collateral professional contact, and that Dr.
Marshall was unaware that A.K.’s pre-school and pediatrician were considering banning
Mother from their facilities. Father also presented expert testimony concluding that Dr.
Marshall’s evaluation of the psychological testing that she conducted may have been
infected by implicit bias.
On the stand, Mother admitted her personal relationship with the midwife and that
videos she had given Dr. Marshall were taken in California. Mother denied that she had
applied for public assistance in California or intended to stay in California, but admitted
that as late as February 24, 2021 she was contemplating buying a used car to avoid
paying further rental fees.
On April 14, 2022, the trial court awarded Father temporary sole legal custody of
A.K. In so doing, the court found that most of Mother’s testimony was not credible and
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was contradicted by documents or credible contrary testimony. The court also found that
Mother was unlikely to cooperate with Father if awarded legal custody. Accordingly, in
addition to granting Father legal custody, the court ordered that A.K. not be removed
from California and that Mother have joint physical custody only if she stayed in
California. The court also ordered both Father and Mother to undergo therapy and
complete co-parenting courses. Finally, the court scheduled a review hearing, which
eventually was set for September 22, 2022.
4. Mother’s Abduction of A.K.
In the months leading up to the review hearing Mother was banned from A.K.’s
preschool due to erratic behavior, and A.K’s pediatrician considered doing the same.
Mother also made repeated allegations of abuse by Father, all of which the police found
unsubstantiated, and on one occasion she refused to exchange custody of A.K. based
upon what she asserted were “doctor’s orders.” Consequently, on July 29, 2022, the trial
court issued an order barring Mother from A.K.’s preschool and requiring custody
exchanges to occur at the police department.
Finally, in mid-September 2022, approximately a week before the review hearing,
Mother moved out of her residence in California and took A.K. to Massachusetts. Father
obtained an emergency order in Massachusetts awarding him sole legal and physical
custody, and in light of Mother’s abduction and removal of A.K., the (California) trial
court temporarily awarded Father sole legal and physical custody of A.K. and provided
for visitation by Mother through phone, FaceTime, or Zoom.
5. The Review Hearing and Final Custody Award
In late January 2023, the trial court held another evidentiary hearing concerning
custody. Both Father and Mother offered witnesses, submitted exhibits, and presented
argument, and on February 23, 2023 the trial court entered a final order awarding
permanent legal and physical custody to Father. In addition to once again finding that
Mother’s testimony was not credible, and that she had violated court orders by taking
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A.K. out of California without court authorization or Father’s consent, the court found
that it was in A.K.’s best interests for Father to have sole legal and physical custody.
However, the court provided for continued visitation by Mother by phone, Facetime, or
Zoom.
6. Appeal
Mother has tried to appeal several times. In June 2022, Mother filed a notice of
appeal from the April 2022 judgment awarding Father temporary sole legal custody of
A.K., which was dismissed as premature. Another notice of appeal filed by Mother in
October 2022 from the denial of a motion for reconsideration was also dismissed.
Finally, on March 9, 2023, Mother filed a timely notice of appeal from the February 2023
order concerning permanent custody.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Jurisdiction
Mother argues that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the
custody of her daughter A.K. because A.K.’s home state was Massachusetts, where she
was born and lived for 17 months before coming to California. We are not persuaded.
As explained below, the trial court had sufficient grounds for finding that, by the time the
proceedings below commenced, A.K. no longer had a home state and that the court had
substantial connection jurisdiction under the UCCJEA.
1. The UCCJEA
The Legislature adopted the UCCJEA for the stated purpose, among other things,
of “avoiding jurisdictional competition and conflict.” (Kumar v. Superior Court (1982)
32 Cal.3d 689, 695.) The statute provides the exclusive method for determining subject
matter jurisdiction in child custody cases (§ 3421, subd. (b)), and it gives jurisdictional
priority to the home state of the child in question. (Schneer v. Llaurdao (2015) 242
Cal.App.4th 1276, 1287 (Schneer).)

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Under the UCCJEA, California courts have jurisdiction to make an initial child
custody determination if California is or was the home state of a child. Specifically,
California courts have jurisdiction if California was the child’s “home state” on the date
that the custody proceedings commenced. (§ 3421, subd. (a)(1).) California courts also
have jurisdiction if California was the child’s “home state” within six months before the
proceeding commenced, and the child is absent from the state, but a parent continues to
live in the state. (Ibid.) “Home state” is defined to be “the state in which a child lived
with a parent or a person acting as a parent for at least six consecutive months
immediately before the commencement of a child custody proceeding.” (§ 3402,
subd. (g).) Moreover, if a child is only temporarily absent from a state, the child is
considered present in that state during his or her temporary absence. (Ibid. [“A period of
temporary absence of any of the mentioned persons is part of the period.”].)
If California does not have home state jurisdiction, it may have another type of
jurisdiction. Most pertinently, where no other state has or exercises home state
jurisdiction, California courts may exercise substantial connection jurisdiction. (§ 3421,
subd. (a)(2).) Substantial connection jurisdiction may be exercised if no other state has
home state jurisdiction under the UCCJEA or if a court with home state jurisdiction
declines to exercise it because California provides a more appropriate forum. (§ 3421,
subd. (a)(2).) However, to exercise substantial connection jurisdiction, two additional
conditions must be satisfied: (1) the child and at least one parent must have “a significant
connection with this state other than mere physical presence,” and (2) there must be
“[s]ubstantial evidence” in California “concerning the child’s care, protection, training,
and personal relationships.” (§ 3421, subds. (a)(2)(A), (B).) California courts also may
exercise jurisdiction over a child where no courts in other states have or are willing to
exercise either home state or significant connection jurisdiction. (§ 3421, subds. (a)(3),
(4).)

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If a court has jurisdiction to conduct an initial child custody determination under
the UCCJEA, it generally retains exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over child custody.
(§ 3422, subd. (a).)
2. Analysis
The trial court determined that it had significant connection jurisdiction over A.K.
because neither California nor Massachusetts had home state jurisdiction over A.K., and
both A.K. and Father have a substantial connection to California. Mother argues that the
trial court erred, primarily on the ground that Massachusetts was A.K.’s home state. As
explained below, we uphold the trial court’s determination because its finding that A.K.
had no home state under the UCCJEA is supported by substantial evidence and the record
supports the conclusion that the other requirements for significant connection jurisdiction
were satisfied.
The trial court’s findings concerning A.K.’s home state and significant connection
jurisdiction are reviewable under the substantial evidence standard. (See Schneer, supra,
242 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1283-1286.) Mother argues that these findings are subject to de
novo review because they concern subject matter jurisdiction and, in any event, the
relevant facts are “largely undisputed.” In fact, the most important fact concerning
A.K.’s home state—whether Mother intended to return to Massachusetts after staying in
California for three months—was disputed. In addition, while some decisions have
suggested that factual findings concerning UCCJEA subject matter jurisdiction are
reviewed de novo (Schneer, supra, 242 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1284-1285), the better
reasoned and more widely established view is that “ ‘when the facts are contested, a trial
court’s jurisdictional finding under the UCCJEA is reviewed under the deferential
substantial evidence standard.’ ” (A.H. v. Superior Court (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 504,
517, quoting Schneer, supra, at p. 1287; see also Eisenberg et al., Cal. Practice Guide:
Civil Appeals and Writs (The Rutter Group 2023) ¶ 8:130.3, p. 207 [“the more recent

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weight of authority is that when the facts are contested, appellate review is governed by
the substantial evidence standard”].)
Under the substantial evidence standard, reviewing courts do “ ‘not reweigh the
evidence, evaluate the credibility of witnesses, or resolve evidentiary conflicts.’ ” (In re
Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 640 (Caden).) Instead, under the substantial evidence
standard, “the appellate court’s power begins and ends with a determination of whether
there is any substantial evidence” (Schmidt v. Superior Court (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 570,
582 (Schmidt))—that is, “ ‘ “evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value.” ’ ”
(People v. Ramirez (2022) 13 Cal.5th 997, 1197.) In determining whether a finding is
supported by substantial evidence, appellate courts review the record “in the light most
favorable to the prevailing party, resolve all conflicts in the evidence in favor of the
ruling or judgment being reviewed, and indulge all reasonable inferences in favor of the
family court’s findings.” (Schneer, supra, 242 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1286-1287.)
Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s findings concerning jurisdiction. As
noted above, the UCCJEA defines “[h]ome state” to mean “the state in which a child
lived with a parent . . . for at least six consecutive months” before commencement of a
child custody proceeding. (§ 3402, subd. (g).) Here, undisputed evidence showed that,
when Father filed this suit on February 16, 2021, A.K. had not been in Massachusetts for
the preceding six consecutive months. To the contrary, A.K. arrived in California on
December 1, 2020 and lived in the state for ten weeks before Father commenced this suit
on February 16, 2021.
It is true that under the UCCJEA children are deemed to remain in their home state
during any “temporary absence” (§ 3402, subd. (g)) and that Mother asserted that her stay
in California was a mere “vacation,” “extended winter recess,” or “holiday visit” intended
to introduce A.K. to her Father. (Boldface omitted.) However, the trial court had
substantial grounds for rejecting these assertions. First, by the time Mother was served
with temporary emergency orders on February 25, 2021, having arrived on
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December 1, 2020, she had been living in California for nearly three months—far longer
than a typical vacation, holiday visit, or winter recess, and much longer than needed to
introduce A.K. to Father. In addition, although Mother asserted that she and A.K. “were
originally set to go home to Massachusetts” in February, she had no return ticket or other
concrete plans for such return; to the contrary, in her declaration, she stated that she had
invitations to visit friends and family “in Florida, Puerto Rico, Hawaii, etc. before
returning home.” In light of this evidence, the trial court had substantial grounds to doubt
that Mother was in California on just a vacation or holiday visit.
In addition, there was evidence that Mother intended to stay in California
indefinitely. According to a declaration from Father, Mother not only filed for child
support in California; she also had applied for public assistance and had received a
California electronic banking transfer card and monetary assistance. In response, Mother
admitted that she had applied for California child support and did not deny that she had
applied for public assistance. Public assistance is generally limited to state residents
(Welf. & Inst. Code, § 17100; see also 51 Cal.Jur.3d (2025) Public Aid & Welfare, § 48,
p. 779, fn. omitted [“Generally, a person may not be granted indigent aid unless that
person is a resident of this state.”].) Consequently, it is reasonable to infer from Mother’s
application for public assistance in California, that she had become a resident of the state.
(In re S.W. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1501, 1509.)
In short, based on the evidence in the record, the trial court reasonably found that
Mother’s nearly three-month stay in California from December 2020 through February
2021 was not temporary, that therefore A.K. did not live in Massachusetts for the six
consecutive months prior to the commencement of this action, and that Massachusetts
was not A.K.’s home state for purposes of the UCCJEA. While the record could support
a contrary ruling, as noted above, appellate courts do not reweigh the evidence. (Caden,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 620.) Instead, our authority to review the trial court’s factual

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findings “begins and ends with a determination of whether there is any substantial
evidence.” (Schmidt, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 582.)
Mother denies that the record proved that A.K. had a significant connection to
California. However, A.K. was only 17 months old when she arrived in California, and,
as the trial court observed, the ensuing three months that she spent in the state amounted
to approximately 15 percent of her life. Mother fails to offer any argument or authority
explaining why this evidence is insufficient to establish a substantial connection. We
therefore treat this argument as forfeited: As the Supreme Court has noted, “ ‘[e]very
brief should contain a legal argument with citation of authorities on the points made. If
none is furnished on a particular point, the court may treat it as waived, and pass it
without consideration.’ ” (People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793; see also In re
A.C. (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 661, 672 [“ ‘When an appellant fails to raise a point, or assert
it but fails to support it with reasoned argument and citations to authority, we treat the
point as waived.’ ”].) Mother has similarly forfeited her objections to the trial court’s
finding that there was substantial evidence in California concerning A.K.’s care,
protection, and personal relationships.
In her reply brief, Mother raises several additional objections to the trial court’s
jurisdictional determination. Among things, she contends that the UCCJEA requires a
child to have lived in a state for at least six consecutive months prior to any custody
proceedings being brought and that California was required to defer to Massachusetts’s
“stronger connection” to A.K. In fact, as noted above, while the UCCJEA defines
“[h]ome state” to be where a child has lived for six consecutive months before
commencement of suit (§ 3402, subd. (g)), and gives the child’s home state jurisdictional
priority (§ 3421, subd. (a)(1)), it provides for significant connection jurisdiction where
there is no home state jurisdiction (§ 3421, subd. (a)(2).) Moreover, appellants are
generally not permitted to assert arguments in reply briefs that they have not raised in
their opening briefs and given respondents a chance to address. (See, e.g., People v.
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Tully (2012) 54 Cal.4th 952, 1075 (Tully) [“It is axiomatic that arguments made for the
first time in a reply brief will not be entertained because of the unfairness to the other
party.”]; see also United Grand Corp v. Malibu Hillbillies, LLC (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th
142, 158 (United Grand) [“ ‘Fairness militates against allowing an appellant to raise an
issue for the first time in a reply brief because consideration of the issues deprives the
respondent of the opportunity to counter the appellant by raising opposing arguments
about the new issue.’ ”].)
We therefore conclude that the trial court properly determined that it had subject
matter jurisdiction under the UCCJEA. In light of this conclusion, we decline to reach
Mother’s contention that the trial court erred in exercising temporary emergency
jurisdiction over A.K.
B. Due Process
In addition to challenging the trial court’s jurisdiction over A.K.’s custody, Mother
argues that the court deprived her of due process by removing A.K. from her custody
without a fair hearing. Because there is no dispute concerning the procedures employed
below, we review this argument de novo. (Severson & Werson, P.C. v. Sepehry-Fard
(2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 938, 944.) We conclude that due process was satisfied. After
granting Father temporary physical custody in an emergency order, the trial court
promptly scheduled a hearing at which Mother was able to submit evidence and present
arguments, and later the court conducted two evidentiary hearings with live witnesses
before awarding Father permanent custody.
Both the California Constitution and the federal Constitution guarantee that
individuals will not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.
(U.S. Const., 14th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 7.) As parents have a “fundamental
liberty interest . . . in the care, custody, and management of their children,” they are
entitled to due process in judicial proceedings affecting child custody. (Santosky v.
Kramer (1982) 455 U.S. 745, 753.) Accordingly, in custody proceedings, parents are
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entitled to notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard. (Today’s Fresh Start, Inc. v.
Los Angeles County Office of Education (2013) 57 Cal.4th 197, 212.) However, due
process is a flexible concept, and “the precise dictates of due process . . . vary according
to context.” (Ibid.) Consequently, in determining what due process requires in a
particular context, California courts examine three factors identified by federal law—“the
private interest affected, the risk of erroneous deprivation, and the government
interest”—and a fourth factor recognized by the California Supreme Court: “ ‘ “the
dignitary interest in informing individuals of the nature, grounds, and consequences” ’ ”
of an action. (Id. at p. 213; see also Mathews v. Eldridge 1976) 424 U.S. 319, 335
[discussing federal law].)
The temporary emergency order issued by the trial court on February 23, 2021
satisfied due process. Where a child’s health or safety is in danger, or there is a risk that
a child will be removed from a jurisdiction, the government has a strong interest in
immediately protecting the child and maintaining the status quo. Consequently, in the
emergency context, due process permits courts to issue a temporary custody order based
on the ex parte application of the non-custodial parent so long as the custodial parent is
given notice and promptly afforded a hearing in which to challenge the order. (See, e.g.,
Miller v. City of Philadelphia (1991) 174 F.3d 368, 372-374; see also Lossman v.
Pekarske (7th Cir. 1983) 707 F.2d 288, 291 [“When a child’s safety is threatened, that is
justification enough for action first and hearing afterward.”].) That is exactly what
happened here. On February 23, 2021, after Father submitted an ex parte request for an
emergency order due to the imminent danger that A.K. would be harmed or removed
from California, the trial court issued an emergency order granting Father temporary
physical custody of A.K., that order was served on Mother, and a hearing on temporary
custody was scheduled. Thus, the trial court’s emergency order satisfied due process.
The subsequent hearing concerning temporary custody also satisfied due process.
Prior to the hearing, Mother submitted briefing and evidence (a declaration with six
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exhibits attached). In addition, on March 18, 2021, a hearing was held at which Mother’s
counsel appeared and argued. Mother objects that there was no “full [and] fair
evidentiary hearing,” presumably on the ground that no live witnesses were presented.
However, Mother failed to file a witness list before the hearing, as required by the Family
Law Code (§ 217, subd. (c) [“A party seeking to present live testimony from witnesses
other than the parties shall, prior to the hearing, file and serve a witness list with a brief
description of the anticipated testimony.”]), and there is no indication in the record that
she objected to the lack of live testimony in the trial court. As a consequence, Mother
forfeited any right that she may have had to present live witnesses at the temporary
custody hearing. (Segal v. Fishbein (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 692, 709; see also In re
Marriage of Binette (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 1119, 1127 [Under the Family Code, “the
right to live testimony may be forfeited” where parties decide to rely solely on
declarations].) We also note that Mother was able to present live testimony at the
evidentiary hearing on permanent custody in January and February 2022 as well as the
evidentiary hearing held in January 2023.
In her reply brief, Mother objects that the trial court did not find that she was an
unfit parent and therefore should not have terminated her parental rights or assumed her
parental responsibility for making decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of
children. However, custody hearings do not terminate parental rights or determine how
they must be exercised. (See Dennis O. v. Stephanie O. (Alaska 2017) 393 P.3d 401, 408
[“custody hearings do not threaten termination of parental rights”].) Instead, they
determine how these rights will be divided between parents. Moreover, as noted above,
absent a good reason for failing to do so, points not raised in an appellant’s opening brief
are not entertained. (Tully, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 1075; United Grand, supra, 36
Cal.App.5th at p. 158.) As Mother did not object to the absence of findings concerning
fitness in her opening brief or offer a good reason for not doing do so, we deem this
argument forfeited. Similarly, as Mother did not make any argument concerning forum
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non conveniens in her opening brief or offer a good reason for not doing so, we deem the
forum non conveniens in her reply brief forfeited.
C. Additional Arguments
Mother asserts a number of additional arguments, which are addressed below.
1. Full Faith & Credit
Mother asserts that the trial court’s orders violate the Full Faith and Credit Clause
in the federal Constitution because the trial court did not believe that Massachusetts could
be trusted to enforce Father’s parental rights. We reject this argument for several
reasons.
First, Mother failed to raise this argument in the trial court, and “ ‘ “[a]s a general
rule, theories not raised in the trial court cannot be asserted for the first time on
appeal . . . .” ’ ” (Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Oracle Corp. (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 506, 548
(Hewlett-Packard); see also Sander v. Superior Court (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 651, 670
(Sander) [“ ‘It is axiomatic that arguments not raised in the trial court are forfeited on
appeal.’ ”].)
Second, Mother fails to cite any evidence supporting her assertion that the trial
court did not trust Massachusetts to enforce Father’s parental rights. Such conclusory
assertions are inadequate. “[I]t is a fundamental principle of appellate procedure that a
trial court judgment is ordinarily presumed to be correct and the burden is on an appellant
to demonstrate, on the basis of the record presented to the appellate court, that the trial
court committed an error that justifies reversal of the judgment.” (Jameson v. Desta
(2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608-609.) Consequently, a factual assertion may be deemed
forfeited where it is not supported by any citation to the record—especially where, as
here, it appears to have no support. (WFG National Title Insurance Company v. Wells
Fargo Bank (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 881, 894 [“we may decide that the appellant has
forfeited a point urged on appeal when it is not supported by accurate citations to the
record”]; see also Helm v. City of Los Angeles (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 1219, 1228, fn. 5
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[“It is not our role to scour the record to find evidence to support [the appellant’s]
contention . . . .”].)
Third, the Full Faith and Credit Clause provides that “Full Faith and Credit shall
be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every
other State.” (U.S. Const., art. IV, § 1.) Mother does not point to any public act, record,
or judicial proceeding in Massachusetts that the trial court failed to honor. Indeed, the
only Massachusetts action relevant to the proceedings in the trial court appears to be an
emergency order issued after Mother abducted A.K. to Massachusetts, granting Father
sole legal and physical custody, which is perfectly consistent with the trial court orders
here.
2. Abandonment
Mother also argues that Father’s parental rights should be deemed terminated
because he abandoned A.K. before she was born and did not even attempt to exercise any
parental rights until Mother brought her to California 17 months later. Although
abandonment is a ground for petitioning to terminate parental rights (§ 7822, subd. (a)(2)
[permitting a petition for termination based on abandonment for six months or more]),
Mother does not point to any evidence of such a petition, and she did not argue in the trial
court that Father’s rights were terminated due to abandonment. Indeed, the only
references to “abandonment” in the clerk’s transcript are Mother’s assertions concerning
A.K.’s “fear of abandonment” by Mother and Mother’s notice of abandonment of appeal.
Consequently, this argument has been forfeited. (Hewlett-Packard, supra, 65
Cal.App.5th at p. 548; Sander, supra, 26 Cal.App.4th at p. 670.)
Mother also objects that the trial court’s final custody order did not provide for in-
person visitation and failed to set a schedule for visitation by phone, FaceTime, or Zoom.
Although Mother asserts that this provision violates her constitutional rights under
Washington v. Glucksberg (1997) 521 U.S. 702, she fails to explain how. That is
inadequate. Where a party cites a case without meaningful analysis, the presumption of
17
correctness controls, and the argument is forfeited. (See, e.g., Allen v. City of
Sacramento (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 41, 52 (Allen) [“citing causes without any discussion
of their application to the present case results in forfeiture”].)
3. Best Interests
Mother argues in her reply brief that there is substantial evidence that Father is
unfit and that the trial court ignored the best interests of A.K. in awarding Father custody.
Among other things, Mother accuses Father of drug use, child abuse and neglect,
evidence tampering, and attempting to exercise coercive control through manipulation of
the legal system. Although Mother made some of these accusations in her opening brief,
she failed to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court’s best
interests determination in that brief and therefore forfeited the substantial evidence
challenge in her reply. (Tully, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 1075; United Grand, supra, 36
Cal.App.5th at p. 158.) Further, the trial court articulated in writing its reasons for
finding that it was in A.K.’s best interests to grant Father custody as required where
allegations of alcohol or her substance abuse have been made. (§ 3011, subd. (a)(5)(A).)
We also note that Mother failed to satisfy the burden borne by appellants
challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a finding. “ ‘It is well-established
that a reviewing court starts with the presumption that the record contains evidence to
support every finding of fact’ ” and therefore a party challenging the sufficiency of the
evidence on appeal is “ ‘to set forth in their brief all the material evidence on the point
and not merely their own evidence.’ [Citations].” (Foreman & Clark Corp v. Fallon
(1971) 3 Cal.3d 875, 881.) Mother has not satisfied this requirement. For example,
notably absent from her briefs is any mention of the fact that she kidnapped A.K. and
took her to Massachusetts in September 2022, and while she includes over twenty pages
of quotations from Dr. Marshall’s custody evaluation report, she fails to reference any of
the evidence undermining that report, such as Mother’s admission that the videos of A.K.

18
that Dr. Marshall believed Mother took in Massachusetts before coming to California
were actually taken afterwards.
4. Remaining Objections
Mother makes several additional objections in her reply brief. For example, she
asserts that the trial court’s orders violated A.K.’s right to “maintain her primary bond”
with Mother and A.K.’s First Amendment right to association as well as being vague and
overbroad. These arguments have been forfeited because they were raised for the first
time on reply (Tully, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 1075; United Grand, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th
at p. 158) and because they are unsupported by any analysis of the cases that Mother cites
(Allen, supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at p. 52). Mother also asserts that there are “brand
new . . . circumstances not seen or heard by the Courts” warranting intervention and
points as well to a statement purportedly made by the trial court on July 22, 2021. We
cannot consider these factual assertions on appeal because, as a general rule, “ ‘[f]actual
matters that are not part of the appellate record will not be considered on appeal . . . .’ ”
(In re Bailey (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 837, 860.)
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

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____________________________
BROMBERG, J.

WE CONCUR:

____________________________________
DANNER, ACTING P. J.

____________________________________
WILSON, J.

Katkin v. Komorebi
H050891

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