People v. Castro CA2/8

CourtListener 10633389Calctapp15 juil. 2025

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Filed 7/15/25 P. v. Castro CA2/8
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

THE PEOPLE, B338912

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. KA118463-01)
v.

ROBERTO VERDUGO
CASTRO,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Jacqueline Lewis, Judge. Appeal dismissed.

Nancy Gaynor, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.

No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.

_______________________
Pursuant to People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216
(Delgadillo), we review an order denying Roberto Verdugo
Castro’s petition for resentencing under Penal Code1 section
1172.1, subdivision (a)(1). Because we find the order is not
appealable, we dismiss the appeal.
BACKGROUND
In 2019, a jury convicted appellant Roberto Verdugo Castro
of kidnap for robbery, two counts of second degree robbery,
criminal threats, attempted first degree burglary, fleeing a
pursuing peace officer while driving recklessly, unlawful driving
of a vehicle without the owner’s consent, and carrying a loaded
firearm with intent to commit a felony. The jury also found true
firearm allegations on several of the counts. The trial court
imposed a sentence of life plus 25 years in prison.
On April 26, 2024, Castro filed a petition for recall and
resentencing pursuant to section1172.1, subd. (a)(1) (formerly
sections 1170, subdivision (d)(1) and 1170.03). He asked the trial
court to recall and reduce his sentence based on his youth at the
time of the offenses, his rehabilitation efforts while in custody,
and other post-conviction factors. Attached to the petition,
among other items, was a laudatory note about his participation
in an Ironwood State Prison cancer awareness walk-a-thon
fundraiser.
On May 10, 2024, the trial court issued two orders on the
petition. In the first signed order, the court stated: “Court has
reviewed and considered Petitioner’s request under [Assembly
Bill No. 600 and Penal Code section 1172.1]. No further action

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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will be taken.” That same day, the trial court also issued a
minute order as follows: “On 04/26/24 the court received a
petition for recall and resentencing pursuant to Penal Code
section 1172.1 (titled Petition for Resentencing (Penal Code
section 1170(d)(1) section 1170.03)) from defendant. Pursuant to
section 1172.1, subdivision (c), a defendant is not entitled to file a
petition seeking relief from the court under section 1172.1. If a
defendant requests consideration for such relief, the court is not
required to respond. Accordingly, the court will take no further
action on defendant’s petition.” Castro timely appealed.
We appointed counsel to represent Castro on appeal. On
March 19, 2025, counsel filed a no issue brief pursuant to People
v. Delgadillo. Counsel advised us they told Castro he could file
his own supplemental brief within 30 days and would send
Castro transcripts of the record on appeal as well as a copy of the
brief.
On March 20, 2025, this court sent Castro notice that a
brief raising no issues had been filed on his behalf. We advised
him he had 30 days within which to submit a supplemental brief
or letter stating any issues he believes we should consider. We
also advised him that if he did not file a supplemental brief, the
appeal may be dismissed as abandoned.
On June 18, 2025, Castro filed a supplemental brief in
which he contends that the trial court’s decision declining to
consider his petition is not valid because the petition was not
fully argued. He also argues: 1) his counsel on appeal provided
ineffective assistance of counsel because she advised our court
about case law holding the trial court order is not appealable and
she did not raise his contentions challenging the fairness of this
trial; 2) his conviction was based on hearsay and faulty forensic

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testimony; 3) the prosecutor committed professional misconduct
at his trial; and 4) numerous charges against him were trumped
up.
DISCUSSION
I. Section 1172.1, the Recall and Resentencing Statute
Section 1172.1 endows a trial court with authority to recall
the sentences of incarcerated defendants and resentence them
under certain circumstances. Like its predecessor provisions,
section 1172.1 is a statutory exception to the general rule that
“ ‘once a judgment is rendered and execution of the sentence has
begun, the trial court does not have jurisdiction to vacate or
modify the sentence.’ ” (People v. King (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 629,
637–638, quoting People v. Torres (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th
1081, 1084.)
Under section 1172.1, a trial court may recall and
resentence “at any time” upon the recommendation of the
Secretary of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation,
the Board of Parole Hearings, the district attorney of the county
in which the defendant was sentenced, or the Attorney General if
the Department of Justice originally prosecuted the case.
(§ 1172.1, subd. (a)(1).) Until recently, the statute also provided
that a trial court may recall and resentence “on its own motion”
within 120 days of the date of commitment. Effective January 1,
2024, the 120-day provision was expanded. Now a trial court
may recall a sentence and resentence a defendant on its own
motion “at any time if the applicable sentencing laws at the time
of original sentencing are subsequently changed by new statutory
authority or case law.” (Ibid.; Assem. Bill No. 600 (2023–2024
Reg. Sess.).) Once a trial court decides to recall and resentence, it

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may either reduce the sentence by modification or vacate the
conviction and impose judgment on “any necessarily included
lesser offense or lesser related offense, whether or not that
offense was charged in the original pleadings.” (§ 1172.1,
subd. (a)(3).)
Notably, section 1172.1, by its terms, denies a defendant
the right to petition the court for recall and resentencing.
(§ 1172.1, subd. (c) [“[a] defendant is not entitled to file a petition
seeking relief from the court under this section,” and “[i]f a
defendant requests consideration for relief under this section, the
court is not required to respond.”].) As to a right to appeal, the
statute provides: “After ruling on a referral authorized by this
section, the court shall advise the defendant of their right to
appeal.” (Id., subd. (d).)
II. The Right to Appeal Generally
The right to appeal is statutory only, and a party may not
appeal a trial court’s judgment, order or ruling unless such is
expressly made appealable by statute. (Teal v. Superior Court
(2014) 60 Cal.4th 595, 598.) Criminal defendants are entitled to
appeal from “any order made after judgment, affecting the
substantial rights of the party.” (§ 1237, subd. (b).)
III. The Definition of “Substantial Rights”
Our Supreme Court has not provided “a comprehensive
interpretation of the term ‘substantial rights’ as used in section
1237, subdivision (b).” (People v. Loper (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1155,
1161, fn. 3 (Loper).) But Loper did discuss how to approach
formulating a definition. There, the court addressed the question
whether a defendant has the right to appeal a trial court’s denial
of a request for compassionate release properly made by the

5
Secretary of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
under section 1170, former subdivision (e). That statute is
similar to section 1172.1 in that both statutes do not give
defendants the right to make a request for relief themselves. For
relief under section 1170, only the Secretary of the Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation or the Board of Parole Hearings
may make such a request. (§ 1170, former subd. (e).)
In deciding that the denial of a request for compassionate
release affects substantial rights, our Supreme Court in Loper
noted: “Although the defendant has no independent right to
initiate compassionate release proceedings in the trial court, the
Secretary [of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation]
evaluated defendant’s medical condition and made a
recommendation for compassionate release on his behalf. By
providing a mechanism for releasing eligible prisoners from
custody, section 1170[, former subdivision] (e) implicates a
prisoner’s substantial interest in personal liberty. Moreover,
although section 1170 [,former subdivision] (e) authorizes the
trial court to exercise discretion whether to release a prisoner for
compassionate reasons, the statute also establishes clear
eligibility criteria (§ 1170 [,former subd.] (e)(2)), suggesting that
discretion is not unfettered when evidence is presented satisfying
the statutory criteria. These factors lead us to conclude the trial
court’s ruling clearly affected defendant’s substantial rights for
purposes of section 1237, subdivision (b).” (Loper, supra,
60 Cal.4th at p. 1161, fn. 3.)
We glean from this footnote that the combination of three
factors dictates whether a defendant’s substantial rights in
personal liberty are implicated: 1) the Legislature sets up a
mechanism for releasing eligible prisoners from custody; 2) that

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mechanism is used to get the issue of release from custody before
the trial court; and 3) that mechanism includes a list of eligibility
statutory criteria that must then be followed by the trial court in
making its ruling, suggesting that the trial court’s discretion is
not unfettered. We also glean from the extended discussion in
Loper on standing that whether or not the defendant has the
express right to initiate the request for sentencing relief is
immaterial to determining whether substantial rights are
affected. (See Loper, supra, 60 Cal.4th at pp. 1161–1165
[defendant may appeal an adverse decision on a postjudgment
motion or petition if it affects substantial rights, even if someone
else brought the original motion].) Indeed, we find that it is use
of the mechanism set up by the Legislature, coupled with
legislatively mandated factors to consider, that are determinative
of whether substantial rights are affected by the statute.
Keeping these three factors in mind, we hold that section
1172.1 does not implicate a defendant’s substantial rights where,
as here, a defendant has personally filed a petition not authorized
by statute. It is true that the Legislature created a mechanism
for release, satisfying the first of the three criteria set out above.
However, that mechanism, authorized for use by only designated
entities or persons, was not followed in this case where section
1172.1, subdivision (c) expressly provides: “A defendant is not
entitled to file a petition seeking relief from the court under this
section. If a defendant requests consideration for relief under
this section, the court is not required to respond.” The statute
also expressly provides that where an authorized request for
relief is denied, a defendant must be advised of their appellate
rights, inferring a right to appeal a properly authorized request.
(§ 1172.1, subd. (d).

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Here, Castro filed an unauthorized request for relief to
which the trial court was not obligated to respond. Thus, the
second criterion—that the authorized mechanism be used to
obtain the requested relief – has not been satisfied. This, we
emphasize, has nothing to do with a standing analysis per se.
Neither has the third factor been met. We see nothing in
section 1172.1, which describes the factors a trial court must
consider in deciding whether to recall a sentence. The only
factors set out are those that will support extending the time
within which the trial court may recall and impose sentence. We
conclude that section 1172.1, as created by the Legislature, does
not implicate the substantial rights of defendants. Therefore,
orders denying requests for relief that do not properly invoke the
mechanisms set out by the statute are not appealable.
We also adopt the analysis of our colleagues in Division 2
who concluded that orders denying requests for relief from
defendants personally, as opposed to those from authorized third
parties, are not appealable. (People v. Hodge (2024)
107 Cal.App.5th 985.) As Presiding Justice Lui wrote, “[T]he
second sentence of section 1172.1, subdivision (c) does undermine
any claim that defendants have a substantial right at stake when
they file an unauthorized request for resentencing. That
sentence excuses the trial court from any responsibility to rule on
such a request, or even to respond. It follows that a defendant
who chooses to file an unauthorized request for resentencing has
no right to a ruling. The defendant may have a liberty interest at
stake in any decision as to whether they should remain
incarcerated. But a defendant has no right to demand that the
trial court actually make such a decision. If the defendant has no
right to a decision, the trial court’s choice not to make one does

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not deprive the defendant any right, much less a substantial
one.” (Id. at p. 996.) Under Hodge, where a statute expressly
relieves the court of any obligation to adjudicate a request for
relief filed by defendants personally, it follows that defendants do
not have a substantial right in this particular pathway toward
resentencing. (Ibid; see also People v. Faustinos (2025)
109 Cal.App.5th 687, 697 [order declining to act on defendant’s
unauthorized section 1172.1 petition not an appealable order].)
We add that our analysis does not change if the trial court
issues an order explaining why it is declining to act on the
request (instead of ignoring the request, as it is authorized to do).
It is the Legislature’s mechanism and the use of that mechanism
that is paramount in deciding whether substantial rights are
affected, not the format of the trial court’s order.
Because we find that the order declining to take any action
on the 1172.1 petition is not an appealable order, we do not
address Castro’s other complaints about his representation on
appeal and alleged trial errors.
We decline Castro’s request that we conduct an
independent review of the record. (Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th
at p. 232.)

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DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

STRATTON, P. J.

We concur:

WILEY, J.

VIRAMONTES, J.

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