CourtListener 10633387•People v. Villa CA3
Texte intégral
Filed 7/15/25 P. v. Villa CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
----
THE PEOPLE, C100738
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 15F01261)
v.
ADAM VILLA,
Defendant and Appellant.
Defendant Adam Villa appeals from sentencing after remand. Defendant contends
the trial court abused its discretion in (1) imposing the middle term for attempted
robbery when he was entitled to the lower term under Penal Code1 section 1170,
subdivision (b)(6), and (2) declining to strike a firearm enhancement under section 1385,
subdivision (c). We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In October 2017, an amended information charged defendant, Frank Camacho, and
Joshua Thomas Parrish with the premeditated attempted murder (§§ 664/187, subd. (a);
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
1
count one) and attempted robbery in concert of G.H. (§§ 664/211, 213, subd. (a)(1)(A);
count two), as well as alleged various firearm enhancements against defendants
(§§ 12022.5, subd. (a)(1), 12022.53, subds. (b), (c)).2
In December 2017, a jury found defendant guilty of both counts and found true all
firearm enhancements, but determined the attempted murder was not premeditated. The
trial court sentenced defendant to the middle term of seven years on count one, one year
consecutive on count two, 20 years on a firearm enhancement associated with count one
(§ 12022.53, subd. (c)), six years eight months on the firearm enhancement associated with
count two (stayed under section 654), for an aggregate sentence of 28 years in state prison.
On appeal, defendant argued his conviction for attempted murder must be reversed
under Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015). In July 2020,
this court modified the judgment by imposing and staying under section 654 a full term for
attempted robbery and the associated firearm enhancement and affirmed the judgment as
modified. (People v. Villa (July 14, 2020, C089392 [nonpub. opn.].) The California
Supreme Court granted review and transferred the matter to us with directions to vacate our
decision and reconsider the matter in light of Senate Bill No. 775 (Stats. 2021, ch. 551).
(People v. Villa (May 9, 2022, C089392) [nonpub. opn.] (Villa II).)
In Villa II, we summarized the underlying facts as follows: “In February 2015,
defendant, Parrish, and Camacho arrived at the victim’s home under the pretext of
purchasing marijuana. When the victim opened the door, defendant pointed a gun [at] his
face. The victim, who was unarmed, began fighting with defendant over the gun.
Meanwhile, the two other men, who also were armed, pushed their way inside. During the
melee, the three intruders each shot at the victim a total of five to 10 times. The victim’s
2 The information also charged Camacho with assault of E.M. (§ 245, subd. (b); count
three) and alleged two firearm enhancements on that count (§§ 12022.5, subds. (a), (d)).
The information further alleged firearm enhancements under section 12022.53,
subdivision (d) on counts one and two against only Camacho and Parrish.
2
friend, who was visiting the victim at the time of the incident, testified at trial that he heard
defendant say, ‘[E]verybody just chill out. We’re here just to take [stuff].’ Defendant,
Parrish, and Camacho also beat up the friend. Eventually, the victim chased the three
intruders outside and the men left in a waiting vehicle. [¶] The victim suffered gunshot
wounds to his legs, abdomen, and bladder. His bladder had to be sewn up, and he was
forced to wear a colostomy bag for a year and a half. He also was shot in his buttocks, and
other shots grazed his stomach and back. These injuries required the victim to undergo
seven or eight separate surgeries.” (Villa II, supra, C089392.)
We vacated our prior decision, reversed defendant’s attempted murder conviction and
associated firearm enhancement, remanded the matter to afford the People the opportunity to
retry the attempted murder conviction and firearm enhancement, and if the People declined
to do so, instructed the trial to conduct a full resentencing on the remaining attempted
robbery conviction and enhancement. (Villa II, supra, C089392.)
In July 2022, the People declined to retry defendant on the attempted murder
conviction and enhancement.
In January 2024, defendant filed a sentencing brief with extensive exhibits, arguing
that the trial court (1) could not impose the upper term for attempted robbery under the
amendment to section 1170, subdivision (b)(2), and (2) must sentence defendant to the
lower term under section 1170, subdivision (b)(6) because of his youth at the time of the
offense (22 years old). Defendant further argued all firearm enhancements should be
stricken under section 1385, because multiple enhancements were alleged in a single case
(§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(B)). Defendant also contended that sentencing on the various firearm
enhancements must be limited to 10 years so that the aggregate sentence is less than 20
years (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(C)). Finally, defendant contended the enhancement was
connected to defendant’s prior victimization or childhood trauma and should be stricken
(§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(E)).
3
Defendant’s exhibits included statements to an investigator by defendant’s mother
and siblings describing the neglect and emotional trauma defendant experienced from being
raised by drug-addicted parents and then in foster care; a report from Dr. Anne McBride,
who evaluated defendant in 2018 and found him at moderate risk for future violence, and in
November 2023, reevaluated defendant, opining defendant was currently at low risk for
future violence and finding that defendant’s severe addictions to opioids, cannabis, and
sedatives were in sustained remission (with maintenance therapy in the case of opioids);
defendant’s renunciation of affiliation with the Varrio Diamonds gang; records of the
courses and therapeutic programs defendant participated in while in prison; general
education development (GED) and reentry courses defendant took; his certificate of
baptism; defendant’s postrelease plans; and defendant’s letters and a poem expressing
remorse for his conduct.
In February 2024, the People filed a sentencing memorandum opposing dismissal of
the firearm enhancement under section 1385, attaching as exhibits defendant’s rule violation
reports and his RAP sheet. The People contended dismissal would endanger public safety
and was not in the interests of justice, arguing defendant committed a planned home
invasion robbery while armed with a firearm and shot at the victim. The People conceded
for purposes of section 1170, subdivision (b)(2) that the jury did not find any factors in
aggravation. The People, however, asserted that the statute excepted prior convictions from
the proof requirements for aggravating factors and argued the exception applied here, given
defendant’s felony conviction in 2013 for narcotics possession followed by the current
conviction in 2017 for the more serious crime of attempted armed robbery. Lastly, the
People argued defendant posed a danger to the public if released based on his conduct in
prison, including an incident of sexual conduct with a visitor (November 2019), fighting
(September 2019), possession of a controlled substance, and battery on an inmate
(December 2021).
4
In February 2024, defendant filed a rebuttal brief, arguing defendant was not a danger
to the public, as demonstrated by his participation in education and therapeutic opportunities
in prison during the COVID pandemic, as well as his renouncement of gang affiliation.
Defendant further argued that he had a stable support group and maintained ties with his
wife, children, and siblings while in custody. Defendant contended that his rule violations
for disobeying an order, failing to meet work expectations, and sexual contact with his wife
did not show he was a potential danger to the public. Defendant maintained that the other
incidents in prison— the last of which occurred in December 2021—were “stale.”
On February 23, 2024, the trial court conducted a resentencing hearing. At the outset
of the hearing, the trial court stated it had reviewed the sentencing briefs filed by the parties,
including “every page” of the attached exhibits, as well as the probation department’s
original report.
After defendant read a statement and counsel for defendant and the People presented
argument, the trial court explained its proposed sentence. The trial court first explained why
it disagreed with defendant’s argument for imposition of the use of a gun enhancement as
opposed to the discharge of a firearm enhancement. Noting it had presided over defendant’s
trial, the trial court observed reducing the enhancement to gun use with a 10-year penalty as
opposed to discharge of the weapon with a 20-year penalty whitewashed what defendant
did. Defendant shot the victim in the buttocks while he was battling Parrish on the lawn.
The trial court expressed difficulty in determining that the public would be safe given
defendant’s conduct, notwithstanding many months of rehabilitation. The trial court
observed that, based on Dr. McBride’s report, defendant participated in 30 to 50 educational
programs during a one-and-one-half year period from the end of June 2020 to mid-
November 2021, but after that, defendant and another inmate were involved in a “[t]wo-on-
one” assault on another inmate in December 2021, during which defendant “revert[ed] to his
prior self.” The trial court found a similarity between this attack and the attack by defendant
and his two codefendants on the victim in this case, i.e., “Three-on-one, two-on-one.” The
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trial court observed that defendant’s rehabilitation really began in January 2022 and
expressed concern that 26 months might not be sufficient to conclude the community would
not be at risk if defendant were released.
The trial court also raised defendant’s narcotics use. Defendant was addicted to
marijuana and heroin at the time of the current offense. Five bindles of heroin were found
in his cell that defendant admitted were his. The trial court expressed concern that the
community would be at risk if defendant could not control his addiction.
Defense counsel argued that the substantial time, 26 months in the trial court’s
calculation, that defendant devoted to rehabilitation and was free from any rule violation did
not tell the whole story and that defendant had become a person who did not want to harm
other people and had learned to be part of the community. Counsel concluded: “So
Mr. Villa is ready to step out and be part of us and rejoin his family and his children. And
I’m asking the Court to see his rehabilitative efforts in that light, and I don’t think that we
can just put a strict timeline on that, and I’m not saying that that’s absolutely what the Court
is doing, but again, I think that [for] Mr. Villa, his time has come. He has gathered the tools
he needs, and I’m asking the Court to resentence him to ten years -- and I’m not saying no
sentence for the gun enhancement. That’s not what I’m saying. I’m not saying no
punishment -- to ten years for the gun enhancement for the gun, and whatever term the
Court feels appropriate for the 211 part of the case, so be it. But to tell Mr. Villa that his
efforts just aren’t enough, when he’s made such tremendous strides and has truly changed, I
don’t think reflects the reality of Adam Villa as he sits here today. And I’m asking the Court
to sentence based on that.”
The trial court assured defendant it did not consider what he had done for
rehabilitation as not enough, but rather that he was not finished. The court said defendant
should be congratulated for what he has done and commented that the number of people in
the courtroom supporting defendant was impressive.
6
The trial court then read a statement relating its sentencing decision. The court
recounted the facts of the crime. Based on these events, the trial court found that defendant
had a preexisting relationship with the victim, a long-running association with Parrish and
Camacho from their neighborhood and the Varrio Diamonds gang, and defendant and his
then girlfriend picked up and dropped off Parrish and Camacho. Defendant not only knew
the victim but also knew about the money generated by his marijuana business and the
layout of his residence. Defendant and his codefendants were armed as a show of force to
compel the turnover of the property they were seeking. Defendant’s girlfriend served as the
getaway driver.
Turning to Dr. McBride’s report that defendant currently presented a low risk of
danger after presenting a moderate risk in 2018, Dr. McBride concluded that defendant’s
violent behavior had decreased since his incarceration in 2015. The trial court noted,
however, that in July 2017 defendant was involved in a fight with another inmate in jail, in
September 2019 a guard observed defendant striking another inmate in the face and torso,
and in December 2021 defendant and another inmate began striking another inmate in the
face and chest and ignored a guard’s directive to stop. Defendant had no other violent
incidents but was cited in 2019 for sexual contact with his visiting wife and in 2020 for
possession of five bindles of heroin hidden in an inhaler with his name on it. His other
violations involved failure to meet work expectations and disobeying an order, both in 2021.
Against these factors, the trial court observed that in the past 26 months defendant
renounced his gang affiliations, accepted religion, and explored his life and its relationship
to the attack on G.H. But despite rehabilitative coursework that began in July 2020,
defendant and another inmate assaulted another inmate in December 2021. The trial court
therefore faced the question of whether the vicious and calculated nature of the crime and
the immense injuries to G.H. were “swept away” by defendant’s 26 months of rehabilitation.
The trial court found that, given the egregious nature of the underlying facts of the
robbery and shooting, defendant’s continued assaults in custody, his possession of heroin,
7
and his inability to obey institutional rules, shortening defendant’s sentence by striking the
firearm enhancement (§ 12022.53, subd. (c)) or reducing the enhancement to firearm use
(§ 12022.5, subd. (a)) would endanger public safety and result in physical or serious injury
to others, and, as such, it was not in the interest of justice to grant defendant’s request to
strike the firearm enhancement. The trial court acknowledged what it believed was the
rebuttable presumption that the enhancement must be dismissed because of defendant’s
childhood trauma (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(E)) and being subject to multiple firearm
enhancements (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(B)). But the court had already concluded that reducing
defendant’s sentence would endanger public safety, therefore it was not in the interest of
justice to dismiss the enhancement based on these mitigating circumstances.
Regarding selection of defendant’s term for attempted robbery, the trial court noted
the parties’ agreement that under section 1170, subdivision (b)(2) the court could not impose
the upper term but only the middle term of three years or the lower term of one and one-half
years. The court rejected defendant’s assertion that the lower term must be imposed under
section 1170, subdivision (b)(6)(B) due to his youth, observing defendant did not explain the
connection between his age and the charged conduct. Further, defendant’s conduct did not
bear the hallmarks of youthful immaturity, i.e., “impetuosity and the failure to appreciate
risks and consequences.” The plan and execution of the attempted robbery created a
reasonable inference that defendant appreciated the risks and consequences of this conduct
and did not act impulsively without considerable thought and effort.
As for aggravating factors, the trial court found that the crime involved great violence
(Cal. Rules of Court,3 rule 4.421(a)(1)), the victim was lulled into complacency by a
telephone call from defendant that he would come by without mentioning two others
coming with him (rule 4.421(a)(3)), defendant occupied a position of leadership or
dominance over the other participants in the crime (rule 4.421(a)(4)), the method and
3 Undesignated rule references are to the California Rules of Court.
8
manner in which the crime was executed showed preplanning (rule 4.421(a)(8)), the robbery
was designed to obtain a valuable commodity, i.e., the marijuana or the money it generated
(rule 4.421(a)(9)), and defendant took advantage of a position of trust and his prior
relationship with the victim to lure him to open the door of his residence (rule 4.421(a)(11)).
The trial court further found that defendant engaged in violent conduct indicating a serious
danger to society (rule 4.421(b)(1)), and defendant was on probation at the time of the crime
(rule 4.421(b)(4)). The trial court concluded that aggravating factors outweighed the
mitigating factor of defendant’s youth such that the lower term would not be in the interests
of justice.
Finally, noting that defendant did not seek a lower term in his briefs based on
childhood trauma under section 1170, subdivision (b)(6)(A), the trial court nonetheless
addressed the issue. The trial court found that, based on defendant’s personal history
recounted to Dr. McBride and statements of defendant’s family members, defendant did
suffer psychological, physical or childhood trauma that contributed to commission of the
offenses. However, the same aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factor of
childhood trauma, such that the lower term would not be in the interests of justice.
Accordingly, the trial court sentenced defendant to the middle term of three years for
attempted robbery plus 20 years for the firearm enhancement (§ 12022.53, subd. (c)), for a
total term of 23 years in state prison. The court imposed and suspended 10-year sentences
on the other firearm enhancements (§§ 12022.5, subd. (a); 12022.53, subd. (b)).
Defendant timely appeals.
DISCUSSION
I
Middle Term Sentence
Defendant contends the trial court erred in imposing the middle term rather than the
lower term. Defendant maintains the lower term was the presumptive term given the
presence of mitigating factors enumerated in section 1170, subdivision (b)(6), i.e., youth and
9
childhood trauma, and the trial court lacked discretion to determine that aggravating factors
outweighed mitigating factors unless the aggravating factors were established consistent
with section 1170, subdivision (b)(2). Alternatively, defendant claims that the trial court
erred because the aggravating factors did not outweigh mitigating factors such that the
middle term was in the interests of justice.
We review a trial court’s sentencing decisions for abuse of discretion. (See People v.
Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825, 847.) “A court abuses its sentencing discretion when it
acts arbitrarily and capriciously, relies on improper matter in reaching its decision, or is
unaware of the scope of its discretion so that it does not exercise informed discretion at all.”
(People v. Knowles (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 757, 765.) On appeal, a judgment of the trial
court is presumed correct, and a party attacking the judgment must affirmatively
demonstrate prejudicial error. (People v. Garza (2005) 35 Cal.4th 866, 881.)
Section 1170 generally provides for midterm sentences and prohibits upper term
sentencing unless the factors in aggravation are stipulated by the defendant, proven to a fact
finder beyond a reasonable doubt, or relate to a prior conviction that is established by a
certified record of conviction. (§ 1170, subd. (b)(1)-(3).) Section 1170 also contains a
presumption in favor of the lower term if certain mitigating circumstances were a
contributing factor in the commission of an offense, including if the defendant is younger
than 26 years old (or was at the time of the crime) or suffered childhood trauma that
contributed to commission of the offense. (People v. Knowles, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at
p. 765; § 1170, subd. (b)(6)(A), (B); see also rules 4.423(b)(6) [circumstances in mitigation
include when a defendant is under 26 years of age, or was under 26 years of age when the
offense was committed], 4.423(b)(3) & (4) [circumstances in mitigation include when a
defendant experienced childhood trauma that “was a factor in the commission of the crime,”
or the “commission of the current offense is connected to the defendant’s prior victimization
or childhood trauma”].)
10
Rule 4.421 cited by the trial court at the sentencing hearing sets forth circumstances
in aggravation that a court may consider in sentencing. If a presumptive lower term factor
contributed to an offense, the trial court may impose the middle term only if it finds that the
aggravating circumstances in rule 4.421 outweigh the mitigating circumstances such that
imposition of the lower term would be contrary to the interests of justice. (§ 1170,
subd. (b)(6).)
To begin with, we find no merit to defendant’s argument that the trial court erred in
imposing the middle term because there were no aggravating factors properly before the
court. Unlike the aggravating factors needed to impose the upper term, the aggravating
factors required to impose the middle term need not be established pursuant to the
heightened evidentiary requirements set forth in section 1170, subdivision (b)(2) and (3).
(People v. Hilburn (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 189, 202-205.) Instead, such factors need only be
established by a preponderance of the evidence by the trial judge. (Ibid.) We disagree with
defendant’s argument that evidentiary requirements for the upper term apply where, as here,
defendant requests the lower term based on mitigating circumstances enumerated in
section 1170, subdivision (b)(6). As courts have explained, the evidentiary requirements set
forth in section 1170, subdivision (b)(2) and (3) relate “solely to the prerequisites for
imposing the upper term” and therefore do not apply when a court is considering whether
the lower term would be “ ‘contrary to the interests of justice’ ” under section 1170,
subdivision (b)(6). (People v. Bautista-Castanon (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 922, 928-929.)
Applying the relevant standard, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in weighing aggravating factors against mitigating factors and imposing the
middle term. The trial court considered defendant’s argument that he was entitled to the
lower term based on his youth, noting, however, that “defendant’s conduct in this case bears
none of the hallmarks of youth-like immaturity, impetuosity and the failure to appreciate the
risks and consequences of his actions.” To the contrary, the court found that
“notwithstanding his age, the defendant clearly exhibited planning and sophistication, not
11
disorganization and the impulsivity of youth, in his efforts in executing the attempted
robbery, and, therefore, the statutory mandate in Penal Code section 1170(b)(6) does not
apply to the defendant, as he has not made an initial showing that his age was a contributing
factor in the offense.” (People v. Fredrickson (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 984, 993 [the
“ ‘contributing factor’ requirement is part of the [defendant’s] initial showing” for
application of § 1170, subd. (b)(6)].) The trial court further found that, to the extent
defendant met his initial burden, “the aggravating factors far outweigh the mitigating
factors, such that the lower term would be contrary to the interest of justice.” The trial court
made the same finding regarding defendant’s childhood trauma which the court
acknowledged did contribute to defendant’s commission of the offense. As described above,
the aggravating factors the court considered included six factors related to the crime
(rule 4.421(a)(1), (3), (4), (8), (9), (11)) and two factors related to defendant (rule
4.421(b)(1), (4)). Defendant has not shown that the trial court’s decision that six factors in
aggravation outweighed two in mitigation was arbitrary and capricious, and therefore an
abuse of discretion. (People v. Knowles, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 765.) It has long been
held that a single aggravating factor is sufficient to justify a sentencing choice. (People v.
Quintanilla (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 406, 413.)
Given our conclusion, we need not address defendant’s argument that reversal is
required because he suffered prejudice.
II
Firearm Enhancement
Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion in declining to strike the
firearm enhancement by “failing to give great weight to [defendant’s] childhood trauma, and
where the record lacked clear and convincing evidence that his release would endanger
public safety.”
We review denial of a motion to dismiss a sentence enhancement under section 1385
for abuse of discretion and its factual findings for substantial evidence. (People v. Mendoza
12
(2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 287, 298; People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 371; In re
White (2020) 9 Cal.5th 455, 470.) Substantial evidence exists if, reviewing “ ‘the whole
record in the light most favorable to the judgment[,]’ ” we conclude “ ‘ “ ‘ “ ‘the
circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings . . . .’ ” ’ ” ’ ” (People v. Alvarez
(2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 761, 774.) We also review the trial court’s determination whether
dismissal would endanger public safety under section 1385, subdivision (c)(2) for abuse of
discretion. (Mendoza, at p. 298; People v. Gonzalez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 215, 225.)
“The abuse of discretion standard is highly deferential. When, ‘ “as here, a discretionary
power is statutorily vested in the trial court, its exercise of that discretion ‘must not be
disturbed on appeal except on a showing that the court exercised its discretion in an
arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of
justice.’ ” ’ ” (Mendoza, at p. 298; see also Carmony, at p. 377 [“[A] trial court does not
abuse its discretion unless its decision is so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person
could agree with it”]; People v. Garcia (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 848, 857 [a trial court’s
“risk finding” that dismissal of an enhancement would endanger public safety “will be
upheld ‘if it falls within “the bounds of reason, all of the circumstances being
considered” ’ ”].)
Taking defendant’s second claim first, we reject the premise that section 1385,
subdivision (c)(2) required the trial court to find by clear and convincing evidence that
dismissal of the firearm enhancement would endanger public safety.
Section 1385, subdivision (c)(2) provides: “In exercising its discretion under this
subdivision, the court shall consider and afford great weight to evidence offered by the
defendant to prove that any of the mitigating circumstances in subparagraphs (A) to (I) are
present. Proof of the presence of one or more of these circumstances weighs greatly in
favor of dismissing the enhancement, unless the court finds that dismissal of the
enhancement would endanger public safety. ‘Endanger public safety’ means there is a
13
likelihood that the dismissal of the enhancement would result in physical injury or other
serious danger to others.”
Thus, section 1385, subdivision (c)(2) “provides that in determining whether to
dismiss an enhancement ‘under this subdivision,’ the court must consider nine listed
mitigating circumstances if proven by the defendant (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(A)-(I)), ‘unless
the court finds that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public safety’ (id.,
subd. (c)(2)). That provision means that if the court finds that dismissal of an enhancement
‘would endanger public safety,’ then the court need not consider the listed mitigating
circumstances. (§ 1385[, subd. ](c)(2).)” (People v. Mendoza, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at
p. 296, fn. omitted.) While section 1385, subdivision (c) mandates the trial court give “great
weight” to enumerated factors, contrary to defendant’s claim, the legislative history shows
that the Legislature amended the statute to eliminate reference to a requirement that the
court find by clear and convincing evidence that dismissal of an enhancement would
endanger public safety, replacing it with the flexible discretionary language that now
appears in section 1385, subdivision (c)(2). (See People v. Ortiz (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th
1087, 1096-1097; People v. Anderson (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 233, 240.) Moreover,
section 1385, subdivision (c)(2) “does not require the trial court to consider any particular
factors in determining whether ‘there is a likelihood that the dismissal of the enhancement
would result in physical injury or other serious danger to others.’ ” (Mendoza, at p. 299.)
Here, the trial considered several factors in deciding whether dismissing the
enhancement would endanger the public. The trial court considered the calculation and
planning that went into the current offense, the violence of its execution that included
defendant’s shooting at the victim, and the terrible injuries the victim suffered. The court
also considered defendant’s long-term, severe addiction to heroin and other drugs and the
discovery of heroin concealed in his cell, raising concerns that defendant could not control
his addiction if released into the community. Defendant was involved in several violent
incidents while incarcerated, including a two-on-one assault on an inmate that occurred after
14
a year and one-half of rehabilitation during which defendant was free from rules violations.
The trial court acknowledged defendant’s subsequent efforts at rehabilitation leading to 26
months before the sentencing hearing without a rules violation. But given the nature of the
crime, defendant’s assaults in prison, and his drug addiction, the trial court found it would
endanger public safety to dismiss the firearm enhancement and release defendant into the
community. Defendant has not shown this determination was an abuse its discretion.
Because we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding dismissal
would endanger public safety, defendant’s second claim fails that the trial court did not give
great weight to defendant’s childhood trauma. Having found that dismissal of the
enhancement would endanger the public, the trial court was not required to consider
mitigating circumstances listed in the statute. (People v. Mendoza, supra, 88 Cal.5th at
p. 296.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
/s/
Mesiwala, J.
We concur:
/s/
Robie, Acting P. J.
/s/
Feinberg, J.
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