CourtListener 10632649•In re S.D. CA5
Texte intégral
Filed 7/14/25 In re S.D. CA5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
In re S.D., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile
Court Law.
THE PEOPLE, F088155
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. JW135696-00)
v.
OPINION
S.D.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. Marcus Cuper,
Judge.
Candice L. Christensen, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General,
Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorney General, Darren K. Indermill and John W.
Powell, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
INTRODUCTION
Appellant S.D. challenges the juvenile court’s order setting his baseline term of
confinement at seven years after finding true he committed first degree murder, first
degree robbery and that the murder was committed during the perpetration of a robbery.
On appeal, S.D. contends the juvenile court abused its discretion when it set his
baseline term of confinement at seven years rather than at six years. The People disagree
and contend the juvenile court exercised reasonable discretion in setting the baseline term
of confinement at seven years. We conclude S.D. fails to demonstrate the juvenile court
abused its discretion and affirm the judgment.
BACKGROUND
D.K. Sr. lived in a house on University Avenue in Bakersfield with his son, D.K.
Jr., his daughter J.K. and D.K. Jr.’s children F.K., Jo.K. and B.K. D.K. Jr. was blind in
one eye. In August 2022, J.K. invited two homeless teenagers, S.D. and K.M., to stay
with them. The house had one bedroom that was described as the “safe room” with an
ammunition reloader and two safes that contained about 40 guns, jewelry, money and
some silver coins. D.K. Sr. kept a shotgun in his bedroom, either under the mattress or
against the wall.
On August 21, 2022, Jo.K. saw S.D. and K.M. playing with D.K. Sr.’s shotgun and
heard them shooting a gun three or four times outside in front of the house. S.D. and
K.M. went back inside the house and began kicking the door to the safe room trying to
get in. Jo.K. heard S.D. and K.M. grabbing items inside the safe room, and heard
“dinging sound[s]” like shotgun shells hitting the floor. S.D. and K.M. went into the
backyard and Jo.K. heard two more gunshots. Jo.K. heard S.D. talking on the phone in
the backyard and heard him say, “There’s safes in the room and I got in.” Jo.K. observed
a hole in the bottom of the door to the safe room. When F.K., B.K., and D.K. Jr. came
home, they noticed that the safe room door had been damaged. The bottom of the door
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was broken in such a way that a person would have been able to crawl through it. Jo.K.
told D.K. Jr. that S.D. and K.M. had entered the safe room and had fired guns outside.
Around 11:00 p.m., J.J., picked up A.M. in a vehicle and drove to the University
Avenue residence to rob it. Around that time, B.K. overheard S.D. on the phone in the
living room saying, “you [can] come over. We’re ready. We have the gun.”
Approximately 30 minutes later, F.K. and B.K. were in their bedroom with D.K. Jr. when
they heard a loud bang and saw two masked individuals enter the room, one carrying
D.K. Sr.’s shotgun. The intruder with the shotgun, A.M., pointed it at D.K. Jr.’s face and
said “give me everything you’ve got .…” D.K. Jr. then grabbed the shotgun barrel and
tried to take the shotgun from A.M. While they struggled over the shotgun, the second
intruder, J.J., punched D.K. Jr. in the back of the head and stabbed D.K. Jr. in the back
multiple times with a screwdriver. F.K. noticed S.D. in the room watching and egging on
the intruders saying “[G]et that [N*****].” F.K. recalled screaming for S.D. to help her
father, but S.D. “completely ignored” her.
During the struggle, D.K. Jr. eventually gained some leverage on the shotgun,
pushed the barrel upward, pulled the trigger and fired it straight into the air, hitting A.M.
in the head. After the gun was shot, the second intruder, J.J., ran out of the house and fled
the scene. S.D. fled the scene, but later returned and surrendered to the police.
A.M. died at the scene from the shotgun injury to his head. DNA evidence found
on the screwdriver used to stab D.K. Jr. showed J.J. was a potential contributor.
Before the incident, F.K. helped S.D. create a new Instagram account using F.K.’s
phone number. After the robbery, F.K. logged into S.D.’s Instagram account using her
phone number and saw S.D. posted a video in his story about the ammunition that D.K.
Sr. kept in the safe room. Instagram messages revealed S.D. conspired with A.M. and J.J.
to rob the house and gave them the green light on the night of the incident. S.D.’s
messages revealed the person that was home did not have a gun on him, was blind in one
eye, there was money and more guns in the house and it was okay to come in. Messages
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between S.D., A.M. and J.J. revealed the planning involved to rob the house, noting there
were three safes in the house with a lot of guns and money, that S.D. would kick open the
door to the safe room ahead of time, that A.M. and J.J. needed to use a car, that it had to
be that night because the dad was gone and only the son who is blind in one eye was
there. Before the incident, S.D. indicated they could come right now, that the adult did
not have a gun on him, and to let S.D. know when they got to the house.
On March 23, 2023, an amended original juvenile wardship petition was filed,
pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602,1 alleging S.D. committed first
degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a), count 1), with an enhancement for
committing the crime while perpetrating a robbery (id., § 189), and first degree robbery
within a dwelling house while acting in concert with others (id., § 213, subd. (a)(1)(A),
count 2).
A joint contested jurisdictional hearing for S.D. and J.J. began January 3, 2024.
The juvenile court found counts 1 and 2 against S.D. true beyond a reasonable doubt, and
the robbery enhancement true. At the May 21, 2024 dispositional hearing, the court
adjudged S.D. a ward of the court and committed him to the APEX academy for a
baseline term of seven years. S.D. filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
I. The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion
S.D. contends the juvenile court abused its discretion in setting his baseline term
of confinement at seven years, arguing there was no substantial evidence that his
rehabilitation would require such lengthy commitment. The People contend the juvenile
court exercised reasonable discretion, supported by the record.
1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
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A. Relevant Factual and Procedural History
The probation department concluded in its report that the violent nature of S.D.’s
offenses, his well-documented and ongoing propensity for violence, and his lack of
remorse warranted a commitment to APEX Academy. As to the appropriate baseline term
of confinement, probation noted that S.D.’s baseline range is four to seven years due to
his offenses. Probation recommended S.D.’s “baseline term be set at seven years based
upon the circumstances and gravity of the commitment offense, [S.D.’s] mental health
needs, the confinement time considered reasonable and necessary to achieve the
rehabilitation of [S.D.], and [S.D.’s] development history .…”
S.D.’s counsel disagreed with the probation officer’s recommendation of a seven-
year baseline term of confinement and argued that a baseline term of six years would be
more appropriate. The prosecutor requested that the juvenile court follow the probation
officer’s recommendation and set the baseline term of confinement at seven years.
The juvenile court noted that it considered the arguments from counsel, the victim
impact statements, S.D.’s psychological assessment, a letter written by S.D., and the
probation officer’s report. The court explained it considered this information, the fact
that S.D. was a minor under the age of 18 years, and 14 years or older, at the time of the
commission of the offenses for which he is being committed, the severity of the offenses
for which he has been most recently adjudicated and ordered consecutive periods of
confinement. The court considered the individual facts and circumstances of the case in
determining the maximum period of confinement, ordered that S.D. be committed to the
APEX Academy and set S.D.’s maximum age of jurisdiction at 25 years old.
The court then discussed its determination of the appropriate baseline term of
confinement as follows:
“The offense for which [S.D.] is before the Court falls under
Category A, with a base line term range of four to seven years. In
establishing a base line term of confinement, the Court has considered the
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California Rules of Court,[2] [rule] 5.806(b)(1) through (4), all of the factors
listed. And in order to meet the developmental and treatment needs of
[S.D.] and to prepare him for a period of supervision in the community, the
base line term is set at seven years.
“When determining the base line term, the Court has considered the
circumstances and gravity of the offense, [S.D.’s] history in the juvenile
justice system, the confinement time necessary to rehabilitate him, and his
developmental history.”
Additionally, the court added that it determined that “[l]ess restrictive programs
would be unsuitable in meeting rehabilitation and community safety goals” based on “the
factors in section 875[, subdivision ](a)(3), which consists of the minor’s age,
developmental maturity, mental and emotional health, sexual orientation, gender identity
and expression, disabilities, and special needs.” The court stated it was “fully satisfied
that the treatment and security needs of [S.D.] will be met by the programming,
treatment, and education provided by APEX program,” which it felt was an appropriate
plan.
Near the conclusion of the hearing, the juvenile court addressed S.D. directly,
stating:
“[S.D.], I gave you a base line term of seven years because you
caused an incredible amount of harm in this case, and I think there’s an
extensive amount of programming that you’re going to need to go through.
“Part of my job is to protect the community at these sentencings.
They’re also called dispositions. In juvenile court, it’s a balance of
protecting the community and rehabilitation for you. And based on the
crime before this Court, the Court believes it’s going to take the full seven
years to get that done; however, the amount of time you actually spend at
APEX is largely going to be dictated by the amount of effort you put into
the program. Meaning, you can get out much earlier if you actually put in
the effort and actually try to make the change.
“We’ve got a lot of kids in there that have committed the exact same
crime, and a lot of them get out early because they take it seriously. Other
2 All undesignated rules are to the California Rules of Court.
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kids go in there, and they don’t really take it seriously, and they cause
problems, and they do the full seven years.
“So I’m going to encourage you, when you get to APEX, to take the
program seriously. And it’s everyone’s goal at this point for you to get
rehabilitated. And if you do that, when you come back every six months
for a review, you can have time taken off your sentence.”
Neither S.D. nor his counsel objected to the baseline term of seven years.
B. Standard of Review
A juvenile court’s commitment decision is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (In re
Robert H. (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1317, 1330 (Robert H.).) The reviewing court will
“‘“indulge all reasonable inferences to support the decision of the juvenile court and will
not disturb its findings when there is substantial evidence to support them.”’” (Ibid.)
The abuse of discretion standard of review “asks in substance whether the ruling
in question ‘falls outside the bounds of reason’ under the applicable law and the relevant
facts [citations].” (People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 162; accord, In re Oscar A.
(2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 750, 755 [“‘“[D]iscretion is abused whenever the court exceeds
the bounds of reason, all of the circumstances being considered.”’”].) “‘A [juvenile]
court [also] abuses its discretion when the factual findings critical to its decision find no
support in the evidence.’” (In re Khalid B. (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 1285, 1288.)
C. Applicable Law
Effective May 14, 2021, Senate Bill No. 92 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) added
section 875 et seq. to the Welfare and Institutions Code. (Stats. 2021, ch. 18, § 12; In re
J.B. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 410, 427, fn. 2 (dis. opn. of Lie, J.).) “Section 875,
subdivision (b)(1), provides that the court must ‘set a baseline term of confinement’ that
‘shall represent the time in custody necessary to meet the developmental and treatment
needs of the ward and to prepare the ward for discharge .…’” (In re Jose R. (2024) 102
Cal.App.5th 839, 846, fn. omitted (Jose R.) “The baseline term is subject to potential
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downward modification … during progress review hearings that must be held at least
once every six months. (§ 875, subds. (b)(1) & (e).)” (Id. at pp. 846–847.)
Effective July 1, 2023, the juvenile court was required to set the baseline term
using an offense-based matrix developed by the Judicial Council. (§ 875, subds. (b)(1) &
(h); rule 5.806.) Within this range, the juvenile court must review and consider the
following criteria in order to select the individual baseline term, and may give weight to
any relevant factor listed under the criteria:
(1) The circumstances and gravity of the commitment offense, which includes:
(A) the severity and statutory degree of the offense for which the youth has been
committed to the secure youth treatment facility; (B) the extent of harm to victims
occurring as a result of the offense; (C) the role and behavior of the youth in the
commission of the offense; (D) the role of coparticipants or victims in relation to the
offense; and (E) any exculpatory circumstances related to the commission of the offense
including peer influence, immaturity or developmental delays, mental or physical
impairment, or drug or alcohol impairment.
(2) The youth’s prior history in the juvenile justice system, which includes:
(A) the youth’s offense and commitment history; (B) the success of prior efforts to
rehabilitate the youth; and (C) the effects of the youth’s family, community environment,
and childhood trauma on the youth’s previous behavior that resulted in contact with the
juvenile justice system.
(3) The confinement time considered reasonable and necessary to achieve the
rehabilitation of the youth, which includes: (A) the amount of time the youth has already
spent in custody for the current offense and any progress made by the youth in
programming and development; (B) the capacity of the secure youth treatment facility to
provide suitable treatment and education for the youth; (C) special needs the youth may
have in relation to mental health, intellectual development, academic or learning
disability, substance use recovery, and other special needs that must be addressed during
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the term of confinement; (D) whether the youth is pregnant, is a parent, or is a primary
caregiver for children; and (E) the availability of programs and services in the community
to which the youth may be transitioned from secure commitment to less restrictive
alternatives.
(4) The youth’s developmental history, which includes: (A) the age and overall
maturity of the youth; (B) developmental challenges the youth may have in relation to
mental health, intellectual capacity, educational progress or learning disability, or other
developmental deficits, including specific medical or health challenges; (C) the youth’s
child welfare and foster care history, including abandonment or abuse by parents or
caregivers or the incarceration of parents; (D) harmful childhood experiences, including
trauma and exposure to domestic or community violence, poverty, and other harmful
experiences; and (E) discrimination experienced by the ward based on gender, race,
ethnicity, sexual orientation, or other factors. (Rule 5.806(b).)
“The court must select a baseline term that is no longer than necessary to meet the
developmental needs of the youth and to prepare the youth for discharge to a period of
probation supervision in the community.… The court must state on the record its reasons
for selecting a particular term, referencing each of the criteria and any factors the court
deemed relevant.” (Rule 5.806(b).)
The Advisory Committee comment to rule 5.806 notes that “the committee sought
to accomplish three primary goals that should serve as objectives for the court when
setting a baseline term: positive youth development, public and community safety, and
the establishment of flexible and fair commitment terms.” (Advisory Com. com.,
rule 5.806.) “A primary objective of a commitment to a secure youth treatment facility
must be an evidence-based and trauma-responsive effort to promote healthy adolescent
development.” (Ibid.) “The flexibility inherent in the matrix is intended to result in a
baseline term of commitment that is no longer than necessary to protect the public but is
of sufficient length to assure the victim and the community that the harm committed can
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be redressed by the juvenile justice system in a developmentally appropriate manner and
thus reduce the need for the youth to be transferred to criminal court.” (Ibid.)
D. Analysis
Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s decision that S.D. should be
committed to APEX for a seven-year baseline term of confinement. The record shows
the court considered the factors under rule 5.806(b) in concluding that a seven-year
baseline term of confinement was required in order to meet S.D.’s developmental and
treatment needs. Therefore, S.D. fails to show the court abused its discretion in setting a
baseline term of seven years.
Here, the record demonstrates the juvenile court followed the applicable rules and
criteria in setting S.D.’s baseline term at seven years. Rule 5.806(b) states, “the court
must review and consider each of the criteria listed in paragraphs (1) through (4)[, and]
may give weight to any relevant factor, including but not limited to the factors listed
below each one.” At the hearing, the juvenile court stated that in setting the baseline at
seven years, it “considered [rule] 5.806(b)(1) through (4), all of the factors listed.” The
court expressed that it had “considered the circumstances and gravity of the offense,
[S.D.’s] history in the juvenile justice system, the confinement time necessary to
rehabilitate him, and his developmental history.” (See rule 5.806(b)(1)–(4).)
We examine the record for evidence supporting each factor separately. First, the
court considered the circumstances and gravity of the case under rule 5.806(b)(1), which
weighed in favor of the seven-year baseline term. S.D. committed a category A offense,
which was first degree murder. The crimes involved a home invasion robbery with an
unprovoked attack on the victims, which resulted in the death of one of S.D.’s
accomplices. The probation report highlights S.D.’s childhood trauma, which may have
impacted his thought process and impulse control except these offenses were not the
result of impulsive actions. Rather, the home invasion robbery was well planned and
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calculated in advance. The court told S.D. that he “caused an incredible amount of harm
in this case .…”
Under rule 5.806(b)(2), S.D.’s history also weighed in favor of the seven-year
baseline term. The court was aware S.D. had no prior juvenile petitions. However,
probation reported S.D. had a history of sexually inappropriate and violent behavior
beginning in kindergarten. S.D. had physically assaulted students and staff and had been
suspended numerous times. S.D. had been involved in several incidents during his time
at the youth detention center. Within one year, S.D. had been involved in approximately
14 fights, tagged his room with gang-related material, possessed contraband, and bragged
about his charges. The court was also aware of S.D.’s childhood trauma, which
contributed to his behavior. Child Protective Services received 23 referrals in which S.D.
was the victim, but also four referrals where S.D. sexually abused his sister.
Significantly, probation noted S.D. expressed no remorse for his actions. S.D.
lacked empathy and failed to fully recognize the gravity of his actions or the importance
of managing his anger and understanding appropriate boundaries. Probation concluded it
was likely that S.D.’s “trauma, unstable living environment, and his association with a
criminal street gang since age 13, influenced his participation” in the offenses. This led
to S.D. becoming desensitized to violent behavior and having to problems taking a
leadership role in carrying out violent offenses. Probation concluded S.D. has “deeply
rooted mental health concerns that will take years of treatment in order for [S.D.] to be
successfully rehabilitated.”
The record further supports the court’s imposition of a seven-year baseline term
was reasonable and necessary to achieve S.D.’s rehabilitation under rule 5.806(b)(3). The
probation officer’s report noted that S.D. had been involved in 14 fights during his time at
the youth detention center, had been found in possession of an altered toothbrush, which
could have been utilized as a weapon, tagged his room with gang-related slogans, and
bragged to others about his charges. S.D. also had a history of substance abuse, gang
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involvement, and a propensity for violence. The probation officer reasoned the seven-
year baseline term was necessary because “It will take time for the mental health team to
build rapport, help [S.D.] see the discrepancy between his thinking, beliefs, actions, and
values and goals, and get him to the point where he is willing to take responsibility for his
actions and is willing to meaningfully participate in treatment. Then it will take extensive
treatment to effectuate change in his behavior so he can successfully rehabilitate. It could
take years for [S.D.] to get to this point based on his pre-contemplative stage of change,
and the extent of treatment he will need to address his trauma, family dynamics,
propensity toward violence, gang entrenchment, drug use, and mental health and
criminogenic needs.”
The last factor under rule 5.806(b)(4), S.D.’s developmental history, also supports
the baseline term of seven years. The probation report addresses S.D.’s childhood
trauma, including witnessing violence in the home, and being subject to physical abuse,
neglect and possible exploitation, which likely desensitized S.D. to violence at a young
age. S.D. responded by acting out in violence, such as attempting to strangle another
student at school when S.D. was just five years old. S.D. had numerous incidents of
fighting, defiance, assaults and disrespecting authority figures. S.D. attributed his
criminal behavior to his trauma and unstable living environment, stating that the gang
provided him a family and father-figure-type relationships. By turning to a criminal
street gang at 13 years old, S.D. was likely exposed to community violence, and his
delinquent behaviors were likely reinforced. Participation in the current offenses likely
increased his status in the gang, giving him respect and notoriety. Not only will it take
time to address these layers in S.D., but it will also be important to address his lack of
empathy toward the victims, who suffered mental, emotional and physical trauma as a
result of his actions.
Thus, the record contains substantial evidence in support of the juvenile court’s
decision setting the baseline term at seven years. (See Robert H., supra, 96 Cal.App.4th
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at p. 1330.) The court considered the relevant factors and set S.D.’s baseline term at
seven years “because [he] caused an incredible amount of harm in this case,” and
concluded that “there’s an extensive amount of programming that [S.D. is] going to need
to go through.” The court’s conclusion that it would “take the full seven years” to
rehabilitate S.D. is supported by substantial evidence. (See ibid.) Accordingly, S.D. fails
to demonstrate the court abused its discretion in setting his baseline term at seven years.
Significantly, S.D. does not argue that the juvenile court failed to consider the
proper factors under rule 5.806(b). Rather, S.D. discusses the relevant facts before the
court and disagrees with the court’s decision. Under rule 5.806(b)(1), S.D. states that he
was only 14 years old at the time of the offenses, that there is a recognized inherent
difference between juveniles and adults for sentencing purposes, and that due to his youth
and immaturity, S.D. did not fully appreciate the dangers involved. Under
rule 5.806(b)(2), S.D. states this was his first juvenile petition and, thus, there had been
no prior efforts to rehabilitate him. S.D. points out his childhood abuse and trauma,
which led to his delinquent behavior, agreeing that he is in need of rehabilitation and
admitting he deserves to go to APEX. Under rule 5.806(b)(3), S.D. admits that while in
detention he was involved in tagging, possession of contraband and 14 mutual fights, but
disputes the probation claim that he did not participate in treatment other than meeting
with a mental health clinician. S.D. states he participated in alternative program days
where he completed worksheets and participated in discussions facilitated by the Reentry,
American with Disabilities Act and Programming Unit to help redirect his behaviors in
custody. Last, under rule 5.806(b)(4), S.D. concedes his history of aggressive behavior
and gang association, but adds that he has a learning disability, attention deficit
hyperactivity disorder and began smoking marijuana at 13 years old.
The record shows the juvenile court carefully considered all the evidence and
criteria under rule 5.806(b) in imposing the seven-year baseline term. S.D.’s
disagreement with the court’s ruling based on facts before the court does not establish
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that the challenged ruling was an abuse of discretion. (See People v. Superior Court
(Alvarez) (1997) 14 Cal.4th 968, 978 [a discretionary sentencing decision will not be
reversed merely because reasonable people might disagree, and an appellate court is
neither authorized nor warranted in substituting its judgment for the judgment of the trial
judge], superseded by statute on other grounds as indicated in People v. Lynall (2015) 233
Cal.App.4th 1102, 1108.) S.D. fails to demonstrate the court’s decision was arbitrary or
lacking in factual support. (See Jose R., supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 846.) Accordingly,
we cannot conclude the juvenile court abused its discretion.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
MEEHAN, J.
WE CONCUR:
LEVY, Acting P. J.
FRANSON, J.
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