CourtListener 10631683•In re E.R. CA2/5
Texte intégral
Filed 7/10/25 In re E.R. CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
In re E.R., III. et al., Persons B338585
Coming Under the Juvenile (Los Angeles County
Court Law. Super. Ct. No.
21CCJP03615A–B)
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF
CHILDREN AND FAMILY
SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
E.R., Jr.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Jean M. Nelson, Judge. Affirmed in part and dismissed
in part.
Paul Couenhoven, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, Jessica Buckelew, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_____________________
I. INTRODUCTION
E.R., Jr. (father) appeals from the juvenile court’s order
granting the Welfare and Institutions Code section 3881 petition
of the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family
Services (Department) to modify his visitation with his children
E.R., III. and H.R. (the children) from unmonitored to
monitored.2 Father also contends the Department and the court
failed to comply with their inquiry duties under the Indian Child
Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA; 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) and related
California statutes (§ 224 et seq.). We affirm the order granting
the Department’s section 388 petition and dismiss as moot
father’s ICWA challenge.
1 Further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code unless otherwise stated.
2 The children’s mother, A.S., is not a party to this appeal.
Father has another child, A.P., with D.P. A.P. is not a subject of
and D.P. is not a party to this appeal.
2
II. BACKGROUND
On March 1, 2022, and April 6, 2022, the Department filed
first amended section 300 petitions as to E.R., III and H.R.,
respectively. In counts a-1 and b-1,the amended petitions
alleged, as later sustained by the juvenile court, that father’s
history of engaging in domestic violence with mother and his
violation of a restraining order that prevented father from having
contact with mother, endangered the children’s physical health
and safety, and placed the children at risk of serious physical
harm, damage, and danger.3
At the May 3, 2022, adjudication and disposition hearing,
the juvenile court ordered father to complete a domestic violence
program for perpetrators; a developmentally appropriate
parenting program; individual counseling to address case issues,
childhood trauma, and the cycle of domestic violence and its
effect on children; and to drug test upon reasonable suspicion of
substance abuse. The court granted father monitored visits two
to three times a week for two to three hours a visit. Father was
ordered to abide by any restraining order in place and he and
mother were not to visit the children together.
On March 13, 2024, the juvenile court ordered that father
was to have unmonitored visits with the children in a public
3 The b-1 counts alleged that father’s conduct constituted a
risk of a failure to protect. The a-1 counts did not. The first
amended petitions also alleged counts b-2, b-3, and b-4 against
mother.
3
place, two to three times a week for two to three hours a visit.
Father was not to involve “another partner”4 in the visits.
One month later, on April 13, 2024, father was arrested for
inflicting corporal injury on a spouse or cohabitant for an assault
on D.P. According to the Department’s report, D.P. stepped
outside of father’s home to take a telephone call. When she
returned, father accused her of stealing his game controller.
Father and D.P. argued. Father struck D.P. in the face,
“bust[ing] her lip.” D.P. left and walked to the nearest law
enforcement office to file a report against father.
The social workers in father’s dependency case with A.P.
told the social worker in this case that father told his anger
management counselor he had “‘messed up.’” One of the social
workers, however, said father had a different version of the
altercation than D.P. Father said he ran into D.P. at a train
station on his way to work and she began to harass him. He
attempted to “engage” law enforcement officers who were
present, but they told him to go to the police station to file a
report. When he arrived at the police station,5 he was informed
D.P. had filed a report before him and “because of ‘OJ’ he was
going to get arrested.”
The Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department report about
the altercation stated D.P. said she was in a dating relationship
with father for three years. There had been multiple past
domestic violence issues she had reported to law enforcement.
4 Father had a separate dependency case regarding A.P. that
concerned domestic violence with D.P.
5 The Compton Sheriff’s Station and not a police station was
involved in this incident.
4
She spent the prior night at father’s home. Father woke her in
the morning and accused her of stealing his “‘PS5’” remote
control. Father then punched D.P. three times in the face,
lacerating her lip, and strangled her for four seconds. D.P. left to
go home, but ran into father at the train station. They argued
and then walked to the Compton Sheriff’s Station.
On April 24, 2024, the Department filed a section 388
petition to change the juvenile court’s order granting father
unmonitored visitation with the children to monitored visitation.
The Department’s request was based on the April 13, 2024,
domestic violence incident between father and D.P. that led to
father’s arrest.
On June 4, 2024, the juvenile court held a hearing on the
Department’s section 388 petition. Counsel for the children
joined in the Department’s request to modify father’s visits to
monitored.
The juvenile court granted the Department’s section 388
petition. It found father was very good at participating in
services and was very focused on his children—he loved and was
patient with them. It further found, however, there was a
significant change in circumstances in that father’s domestic
violence with D.P. continued. Father was unable to restrain
himself when he was around his romantic partners despite
protective orders prohibiting him from interacting with them.
Father also had lied when he told the Department he had not
been living with D.P. The court was concerned father would
allow a partner to attend an unmonitored visit with the children
and violence would occur—a “real risk” given father was living
with D.P. when he said he was not.
5
While this appeal was pending, on February 5, 2025, the
juvenile court conducted a permanency planning hearing and
ordered the parents to provide updated contact information for a
paternal grandfather E.R., Sr., paternal great-aunt A.D.,
paternal aunt M.R., maternal great-grandmother C.B., and
maternal great-aunt E.A.6 On May 6, 2025, the court conducted
another permanency planning hearing and found that the
Department had conducted a reasonable and diligent inquiry as
to Native American Ancestry, there was no reason to know that
the children were Indian children, and ICWA did not apply. The
court then terminated father’s parental rights to the children.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Section 388 Petition
Father contends the juvenile court abused its discretion
when it granted the Department’s section 388 petition to modify
his visitation with the children from unmonitored to monitored.
The court did not err.
1. Legal Principles and Standard of Review
Section 388, subdivision (a)(1) provides in relevant part
that “[a]ny parent or other person having an interest in a child
who is a dependent child of the juvenile court . . . may, upon
grounds of change of circumstance or new evidence, petition the
court . . . for a hearing to change, modify, or set aside any order of
6 We grant the Department’s request for judicial notice of the
court’s February 5, 2025, and May 6, 2025, minute orders.
6
court previously made . . . .” “‘The petitioner has the burden of
showing by a preponderance of the evidence (1) that there is new
evidence or a change of circumstances and (2) that the proposed
modification would be in the best interests of the child.’
[Citation.]” (In re J.M. (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 833, 845.)
We review a juvenile court’s ruling on a section 388 petition
for abuse of discretion and its factual findings for substantial
evidence. (In re J.M., supra, 50 Cal.App.5th at p. 846.)
2. Analysis
The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in granting
the Department’s section 388 petition to modify father’s visitation
with the children from unmonitored to monitored. Despite
father’s participation in services, he continued his pattern of
inflicting violence on his romantic partners. Only one month
after the court granted him unmonitored visits with the children,
father was unable to restrain himself from violently assaulting
D.P. over a matter as insignificant as a supposed stolen game
remote control. Father’s inability to restrain himself is
substantial evidence supporting the court’s conclusion that the
children were at risk of being exposed to future violent episodes
between father and a romantic partner if father’s visitation with
the children was unmonitored.
B. ICWA Compliance
Father next contends the Department and the juvenile
court failed to comply with their duty of continuing inquiry under
ICWA. According to father, the record does not reflect that the
7
Department made inquiry of extended family members7 with
whom the Department had contact including paternal
grandfather E.R., Sr., maternal grandmother T.A. (or T.S.),
paternal aunt M.R., and maternal aunt A.S.8
We requested the parties address in letter briefs whether
father’s challenge to the Department’s and the juvenile court’s
compliance with their ICWA inquiry duties was moot in light of
the continuing nature of those duties and the ongoing
proceedings in the juvenile court.
Father responded the issue was not moot because the
record showed the Department and the juvenile court were not
aware their ICWA inquiries were incomplete. If they had been
aware of their continuing ICWA inquiry duties, they would have
asked the identified relatives with whom they had contact about
Indian ancestry during the three-year period after the court’s
May 3, 2022, jurisdictional finding.
The Department responded the issue was moot because,
during the pendency of father’s appeal, (1) the juvenile court
ordered the Department to prepare a report addressing ICWA
7 Under ICWA, “extended family member” includes the
Indian child’s grandparent, aunt or uncle, brother or sister,
brother-in-law or sister-in-law, niece or nephew, first or second
cousin, or stepparent. (25 U.S.C.A. § 1903(2); § 224.1, subd.
(c)(1).)
8 Father also identifies other relatives with whom the
Department had contact and who might have knowledge of the
children’s Indian ancestry but who are not extended family
members under ICWA: maternal great-grandmother C.B.,
maternal great-aunt E.A., and L.R. who is identified both as a
paternal aunt and as a paternal great-aunt.
8
and other issues, and (2) after reviewing the report the court
found the Department had conducted a reasonable and diligent
inquiry as to Native American ancestry, there was no reason to
know the children were Indian children, and ICWA did not apply.
Thus, the Department argues, father has obtained the relief he
sought in his appeal and his appeal is moot.
We agree with the Department that father’s appeal is moot,
but for a reason that differs from those the Department argues.
Given the procedural posture of the case at the time father filed
his notice of appeal from the juvenile court’s section 388 ruling,
there necessarily would have been further proceedings at which
father’s complaints of noncompliance could be raised and
addressed by the court. (In re Baby Girl M. (2022) 83
Cal.App.5th 635, 638–639; In re S.H. (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 166,
179 [“So long as proceedings are ongoing and all parties recognize
the continuing duty of ICWA inquiry, both [the Department] and
the juvenile court have an adequate opportunity to fulfill those
statutory duties”].) Indeed, as we describe above, on February 5,
2025, during the pendency of this appeal, the court ordered the
Department to prepare a report addressing ICWA and, on May 6,
2025, after apparently reviewing the report, the court made
ICWA findings.9 Father’s challenge to the Department’s and the
court’s compliance with their obligation of continuing inquiry
under ICWA therefore is moot.
9 As noted above, at the May 6, 2025, hearing the court
ordered father’s parental rights to the children terminated. On
our own motion, we take judicial notice of father’s appeal from
the court’s May 6, 2025, order terminating his parental rights
(case no. B346916). (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d)). We express no
opinion here about the correctness of the court’s ruling on the
adequacy of the Department’s ICWA inquiry at that hearing.
9
We have considered the factors bearing on discretionary
review of moot questions identified in In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th
266 at pages 286 through 287 and decline to exercise our
discretion here.
IV. DISPOSITION
The order granting the Department’s section 388 petition is
affirmed and father’s challenge to the Department’s and the
juvenile court’s ICWA compliance is dismissed as moot.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
KIM (D.), J.
I concur:
MOOR, J.
10
In re E.R. et al.
B338585
HOFFSTADT, P. J., concurring.
I agree with the majority that the juvenile court did not
abuse its discretion in granting the section 388 motion. I also
agree with the majority that father’s challenge to the court’s
continuing inquiry under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA)
(25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.; Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224 et seq.) is
moot. I disagree only as to why it is moot. I do not agree that all
challenges under ICWA are moot merely because proceedings are
ongoing (under In re Baby Girl M. (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 635,
638–639), but I agree that the ICWA challenge father presents in
this appeal is moot because the juvenile court has, after this
appeal was filed, made a new ICWA finding based on further
information, which renders any relief we grant vis-à-vis the
precursor order before us ineffective. (In re Julien H. (2016) 3
Cal.App.5th 1084, 1088, fn. 7 [challenge to superseded order on
the same topic is moot].)
____________________P. J.
HOFFSTADT
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