CourtListener 10626820•Walton v. Willow Parks Apts CA6
Texte intégral
Filed 7/10/25 Walton v. Willow Parks Apts CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
JOICE WALTON, H051432
(Santa Clara County
Plaintiff and Appellant, Super. Ct. No. 18CV329332)
v.
WILLOW PARKS APTS, LLC et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
Joice Walton was injured in July 2016 when she fell on an outdoor staircase at the
San Jose apartment complex where she lived. Walton sued the building owners, alleging
that her injuries were caused by a dangerous condition of property—specifically a
shadow cast on the staircase from an adjacent bush partially obscuring a landscaping
light. The matter went to trial, after which the jury returned a verdict for defendants,
finding no dangerous condition.
On appeal, Walton argues the trial court abused its discretion by excluding from
evidence a photograph she took of the staircase the night after she fell and a subsequent
photograph of the staircase after the bush had been removed. Walton also contends the
trial court abused its discretion by precluding her from testifying that the shadow was
caused by the bush, while allowing the defense expert to testify to the contrary.
We find no prejudicial error and we affirm.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The injury
Walton has lived at the Willow Parks Apartment complex in San Jose for more
than 30 years.
On the evening of July 4, 2016, she had been meeting with a colleague, Paul
Smith, in the living room of her apartment. After they finished their meeting, Walton
escorted Smith out of her apartment. The two walked through the lobby and out the front
door of the building towards a concrete staircase that leads down to a sidewalk and street
below.
Walton initially testified at her deposition that it was approximately 7:00 p.m. or
8:00 p.m. when she and Smith left the apartment building that evening. As discussed
further below, Walton subsequently testified at trial that “it might have been later.”
Walton and Smith began descending the 10-step staircase, Walton holding onto
the handrail on the left side, and Smith on the right side. According to Walton, “all of a
sudden,” she looked down and saw a “huge black hole” that covered the bottom four
steps of the staircase. It “scared the heck” out of her—she did not know what it was, and
she lunged forward, or “jumped,” to avoid it.
Walton testified that she landed on both her knees at the bottom of the staircase on
the cement. She felt “a bit of pain” from the jarring in her knees, and she was
embarrassed and humiliated. After the fall, Walton got up and she and Smith walked
across the street to his car. Walton then walked back to her apartment and went to sleep.
The next day, Walton felt pain when she woke up and noticed a “horizontal gash”
and swelling in her knee. Later that evening, around the same time as she had fallen the
night before, Walton walked back to the staircase “to see what happened to cause [her] to
fall.” She observed a “big black shadow” on the stairs, as well as a bush next to the left
side of the stairwell. Walton later testified at trial that, aside from the shadow, there were
no defects or anything else wrong with the staircase itself.
2
A few days after the fall, Walton visited her doctor for a preexisting appointment,
at which they discussed her knee pain as well. After examining Walton, the doctor
prescribed Neosporin for an “abrasion” on her knee, and ibuprofen for the pain, and
referred her to an orthopedist.
Walton testified that her knee pain proceeded to worsen over time, despite
ongoing physical therapy and periodic cortisone injections. In April 2017, Walton
suffered another fall at the Willow Parks Apartment complex. On that occasion, Walton
was ascending a staircase from the building’s parking garage, when her knees buckled.
She tried to break her fall, jamming her arm and hitting both of her knees on the ground.
Walton eventually had knee replacement surgery for both knees and rotator cuff
surgery for her shoulder after the complaint was filed.
B. Complaint and motions in limine
Walton filed suit on June 4, 2018, naming Willow Parks Apartments, LLC and its
holding company Cirrus Asset Management, Inc. as defendants (together, Willow Parks).
The complaint set forth causes of action for premises liability and negligence, alleging
that Walton had fallen twice on stairs located at the apartment complex, severely injuring
her knees and requiring surgery.
The matter proceeded to trial in March 2023. Prior to jury selection, the parties
filed various motions in limine relevant to this appeal. First, Willow Parks moved to
prohibit any testimony, argument, or evidence—without qualified expert testimony—as
to the nature of any alleged defects of the lighting or walking surface of the premises
where Walton claimed to have fallen. As Willow Parks argued, Walton was expected to
offer evidence of a shadow on the staircase caused by lighting, but had no expert to
testify to that subject.
Second, Willow Parks moved to exclude any post hoc photos of the accident scene
by Walton that lacked foundation. Willow Parks stated that Walton was expected to offer
photographic evidence as to the lighting and shadows of the staircase at the time she fell.
3
However, they argued, the photos were not taken at the time of the accident and were not
taken by any retained accident reconstructionist or other expert.
Third, Willow Parks moved to exclude any evidence of corrective conduct or
procedures after the accident. Specifically, Willow Parks argued that Walton should be
precluded from introducing evidencing depicting the post-accident staircase with the
adjacent bush removed, pursuant to Evidence Code section 1151, which provides:
“When, after the occurrence of an event, remedial or precautionary measures are taken,
which, if taken previously, would have tended to make the event less likely to occur,
evidence of such subsequent measures is inadmissible to prove negligence or culpable
conduct in connection with the event.”
Fourth, Walton moved for an order limiting the testimony of Willow Parks’s
biomechanical engineering and accident reconstruction expert Kirsten White on certain
topics. Specifically, Walton sought to preclude White from offering opinions that were
not disclosed at her deposition regarding the landscaping light under the bush next to the
staircase at the time Walton fell, or opinions regarding the type of light emanating from
the light and how it would cast shadows on the staircase.
The trial court granted these motions, as explained in further detail below.
C. Trial
Witness testimony commenced on March 22, 2023.
Walton testified to her two staircase falls at the apartment complex, and her knee
pain and surgeries, as described above. With respect to the time of her first fall on the
staircase, Walton testified that, although she had stated at her deposition the accident had
occurred between 7:00 p.m. and 8:00 p.m., “after some recollection over time, it might
have been darker, it might have been later.” Further, as to her first fall on July 4, 2016,
Walton alleged there was a shadow across the lower part of the stairs that obstructed her
vision in some manner and caused her to stumble forward and fall.
4
Willow Parks’s expert Kirsten White testified that sunset on July 4, 2016, was at
8:32 p.m., while the end of civil twilight was 9:02 p.m. Civil twilight, White explained,
is defined as the “period of time after the sun goes beneath the horizon when there’s
sufficient ambient light for people to perform … ordinary activities outdoors,” or “when
the illumination level is sufficient that most ordinary outdoor activities can be done
without artificial lighting after sunset.”
White also relied on various Google Earth images of the staircase and the
apartment complex from March 2015 and January 2016, as well as a Google Earth street-
view image of the staircase and surrounding areas from May 2016.
White noted that the images depicted a bush next to the left side of the staircase, as
well as a landscaping light underneath it, and she then testified as to where the light could
project and where it could fall. According to White, “because the landscaping light is
shorter than the steps, it’s underneath them, it’s not going to cast light on the top of the
steps.” As a result, “it’s not going to cast a shadow on the top of those steps because it’s
underneath,” and “it cannot cast a shadow.”
Following the close of evidence on March 24, 2023, the jury returned its verdict
later that day. The jury answered the questions on the special verdict form as follows:
“(1) Did Willow Park Apartments, LLC own or control the property? Yes. (2) Was the
property in a dangerous condition at the time of the injury? No.”
Judgment was entered on July 10, 2023. Walton timely appealed.
II. DISCUSSION
On appeal, Walton argues that the trial court abused its discretion by: (1)
excluding the photograph she took of the outdoor staircase the night after she fell; (2)
excluding the photograph she took from the same location, after the bush next to the
staircase had been removed; and (3) precluding her from testifying that the shadow on the
staircase was cast by the bush, yet allowing White to testify that it was not.
5
A. Standard of review
We review a trial court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. (San Lorenzo
Valley Community Advocates for Responsible Education v. San Lorenzo Valley Unified
School District (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1356, 1414.) “A ruling that constitutes an abuse
of discretion has been described as one that is ‘so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable
person could agree with it.’ ” (Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern
California (2012) 55 Cal.4th 747, 773 (Sargon).)
Notwithstanding that, a trial court’s discretion is not unlimited—rather, “it must be
exercised within the confines of the applicable legal principles.” (Sargon, supra, 55
Cal.4th at p. 773.) “ ‘The discretion of a trial judge is not a whimsical, uncontrolled
power, but a legal discretion, which is subject to the limitations of legal principles
governing the subject of its action, and to reversal on appeal where no reasonable basis
for the action is shown.’ ” (Id., quoting 9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Appeal,
§ 364, p. 420.)
“ ‘The scope of discretion always resides in the particular law being applied, i.e.,
in the “legal principles governing the subject of [the] action....” Action that transgresses
the confines of the applicable principles of law is outside the scope of discretion and we
call such action an ‘abuse’ of discretion. [Citation.] ... [¶] The legal principles that govern
the subject of discretionary action vary greatly with context. [Citation.] They are derived
from the common law or statutes under which discretion is conferred.’ ” (Sargon, supra,
55 Cal.4th at p. 773, quoting City of Sacramento v. Drew (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1287,
1297–1298.)
B. Analysis
1. Photographs
Walton argues the trial court abused its discretion by excluding from evidence two
specific photographs she took—the photograph of the staircase the night after her first
6
accident, and a subsequent photograph of that staircase after the adjacent bush had been
removed.
(a) Background
Willow Parks argued in support of its motion in limine that the first photograph
had not been taken at the same time the accident occurred, and therefore did not depict
the scene of the accident at the time of the accident. Walton had stated at her deposition
that she had taken the photograph the night after she fell—July 5, 2016—at
“approximately” the same time as the fall, which she testified occurred between 7:00 p.m.
and 8:00 p.m. However, Willow Parks argued, the photograph “looks like it was taken
later at night with no natural sunlight with only … light from artificial sources casting the
shadow. …” As their expert would testify, at the time the accident occurred—between
7:00 p.m. and 8:00 p.m. in the middle of summer—“there’s still ambient sunlight, as we
all know.”
Counsel for Walton confirmed at the hearing that the accident occurred between
7:00 p.m. and 8:00 p.m., and that the photograph was taken “the very next day at
approximately the same time.”
The trial court agreed with Willow Parks, stating that “it doesn’t look like 7:00 to
8:00 o’clock on a July day.” The court then asked if there was a time stamp for the
picture, to which Walton’s counsel replied, “Would we be able to get back to the Court
with the time stamp if we’re able to locate it”? The court replied, “Sure,” adding that “I
don’t think this is 8:00 o’clock or 7:00 o’clock on a summer day, the lighting that we
would see. This looks much darker. … So I don’t think this is a fair depiction of a
summer day, of a summer evening in July.”
Counsel responded: “And we would like to provide that. We’ll see if we can find
it by the end of the day.” The following day, Walton did not provide any time stamp.
The court stated: “at this time, the photos are not being admitted because I
7
haven’t received anything further to show that they were at the time or that they are more
probative than prejudicial. So, given my ruling yesterday, they’re not going to be
admitted at this time.”
The trial court also expressed concern with the vantage point of the photograph,
noting that it appeared to be taken from the center or right side of the top of the staircase,
while Walton had testified at her deposition that she descended the left side, holding onto
the handrail. As the court explained, “that could make a difference on the shadows also.
It’s not the perception she had because this is from the middle.”
With respect to the second photograph—depicting the staircase after the adjacent
bush had been removed—the trial court held it was inadmissible pursuant to the court’s
order granting Willow Parks’s motion in limine to exclude evidence of subsequent
remedial conduct after the accident. The court explained that “the feasibility of the
removal can be asked without referring to it being -- that it was removed because I agree
remedial corrective conduct generally is excluded, and, you know, if you just ask general
questions about the feasibility of removal, that’s separate and apart. It’s not mentioning
that it’s already been removed or that you removed it subsequently.”
The court added later that the photograph also suffered the same infirmity as the
first one—it did not indicate when it was taken.
In conclusion, the trial court stated: “All right. So at this time, I’m not letting in
the photos until I have a foundation laid that they were taken at the time, around the time
and date of the accident.”
(b) Evidentiary standards
Our Supreme Court has articulated the standards for authenticating and admitting
photographs into evidence.
Photographs are considered writings as defined by the Evidence Code. (People v.
Goldsmith (2014) 59 Cal.4th 258, 266 (Goldsmith); Evid. Code, § 250.) “Authentication
of a writing, including a photograph, is required before it may be admitted in evidence.”
8
(Goldsmith, supra, at p. 266; Evid. Code, §§ 250, 1401.) “Authentication is to be
determined by the trial court as a preliminary fact [Evid. Code, § 403, subd. (a)(3)] and is
statutorily defined as ‘the introduction of evidence sufficient to sustain a finding that it is
the writing that the proponent of the evidence claims it is’ or ‘the establishment of such
facts by any other means provided by law.’ ” (Goldsmith, supra, at p. 266; Evid. Code,
§ 1400).
“The statutory definition ties authentication to relevance. As explained by the
California Law Revision Commission’s comment to [Evidence Code] section 1400,
‘[b]efore any tangible object may be admitted into evidence, the party seeking to
introduce the object must make a preliminary showing that the object is in some way
relevant to the issues to be decided in the action. When the object sought to be introduced
is a writing, this preliminary showing of relevancy usually entails some proof that the
writing is authentic—i.e., that the writing was made or signed by its purported maker.”
(Goldsmith, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 266 [“authentication is essentially a subset of
relevance”].)
The “first step” in authenticating a photograph “is to determine the purpose for
which the evidence is being offered. The purpose of the evidence will determine what
must be shown for authentication, which may vary from case to case. [Citation.] The
foundation requires that there be sufficient evidence for a trier of fact to find that the
writing is what it purports to be, i.e., that it is genuine for the purpose offered.”
(Goldsmith, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 267, citing People v. Valdez (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th
1429, 1434–1435.)
(c) Analysis
With respect to the first photograph—depicting the staircase the night after her
first accident—Walton argues that she “could have and would have laid a proper
foundation” for the photograph, because she “was prepared to testify that she personally
took the photograph, she took it the day after the accident at approximately the same time
9
in which her fall occurred, and that the photo correctly depicted how the stairs and the
shadow looked at the time of her fall.” According to Walton, that testimony by itself
would have been sufficient to authenticate the photograph under the principle that “[t]he
essential element is that it be shown in some way that the picture does correctly depict
what it purports to show, in other words that it be verified or authenticated as a genuine
picture of what it purports to depict,” citing People v. Doggett (1948) 83 Cal.App.2d 405,
409. Further, she states, “a photo may be authenticated by witness testimony that it is an
accurate reproduction of what it purports to be,” citing People v. Bowley (1963) 59
Cal.2d 855, 859.
Walton also argues that her deposition testimony that the accident had occurred
between 7:00 p.m. and 8:00 p.m. was merely an approximation and that at trial she “was
prepared to testify, and did testify, that she didn’t know exactly what time the fall
occurred.”
Willow Parks argues that the photograph “lacked foundation because it was not an
accurate representation of what Walton purported it to be: the left side of the staircase
between 7:00 p.m. and 8:00 p.m. on July 4, 2016.” According to Willow Parks, the trial
court correctly concluded that the photograph “did not depict ‘the lighting that we would
see’ at 7:00 p.m. or 8:00 p.m.—i.e., it was not ‘a fair depiction of a summer day, of a
summer evening in July’ because it looked ‘much darker.’ ”
We need not resolve this dispute because we conclude that, even if the trial court
abused its discretion by excluding the photograph, Walton has failed to establish any
prejudice. “The erroneous exclusion of evidence does not require reversal except where
the error caused a miscarriage of justice.” (San Diego Gas & Electric Company v.
Schmidt (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 1280, 1301–1302; Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.) A
miscarriage of justice occurs when, “after an examination of the entire cause, including
the evidence,” the reviewing court believes “it is reasonably probable that a result more
10
favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the error.”
(Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.)
Moreover, an appellant must affirmatively show prejudicial error. (Scheenstra v.
California Dairies, Inc. (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 370, 403.) To satisfy that burden, an
“appellant must provide an argument and legal authority to support [its] contentions. This
burden requires more than a mere assertion that the judgment is wrong. ‘Issues do not
have a life of their own: If they are not raised or supported by argument or citation to
authority, [they are] ... waived.’ ” (Benach v. County of Los Angeles (2007) 149
Cal.App.4th 836, 852 (Benach).)
Walton has failed to satisfy this burden here. Instead, she merely asserts that
“absent the trial court’s evidentiary errors, it is reasonably probable that the result would
have been more favorable to plaintiff.” With respect to the first photograph, she fails to
articulate any prejudice resulting solely from its exclusion, arguing only that the trial
court’s errors were cumulatively prejudicial: “had the jury been able to hear plaintiff
testify that the large black shadow on the steps was caused by the bush adjacent to the
steps, which partially blocked the landscaping light, and had it been able to view the two
photos which would have confirmed plaintiff’s testimony as to the shadow, and
contrasted the very different appearance of the steps and shadows after the removal the
bush, it is well more than reasonably probable, and certainly more than an abstract
possibility, that the jury would have found that the placement of the light and the bush
created a dangerous condition on the stairs.”
Because, as we explain in the sections that follow, we find no abuse of discretion
or other error, there could be no cumulative prejudice even if we concluded the trial
court’s exclusion of the first photograph was an abuse of discretion. Yet because Walton
has failed to explain how or why admitting the first photograph, by itself, would make it
reasonably probable that a result more favorable to her would have been reached, we
11
consider the argument forfeited. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13; Benach, supra, 149
Cal.App.4th at p. 852.)1
With respect to the second photograph—depicting the staircase after the adjacent
bush had been removed—Walton argues the trial court abused its discretion for the same
reasons as the first photograph. That is, she contends that because she was “ready,
willing and able to provide the evidence required to authenticate the photograph,” the
trial court should have admitted it.
However, Walton ignores the central basis of the trial court’s ruling excluding this
photograph—the fact that it purported to depict the accident scene after subsequent
remedial action had been taken, in violation of Evidence Code section 1151. Walton did
not challenge that aspect of the court’s ruling in her opening brief.
In her reply brief, Walton argues for the first time that the photograph was not
made inadmissible by Evidence Code section 1151 because it was not offered to prove
negligence or culpable conduct, but rather “to show causation, that the shrub, which
blocked the ground light, was the cause of the shadow which fell on the stairs.”
We consider the argument forfeited, as Walton did not raise it in her opening brief.
(Claudio v. Regents of the University of California (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 224, 230
[review limited to issues adequately raised and briefed]; Neighbours v. Buzz Oates
1
Nor can we conclude on our own that it is reasonably probable that a result more
favorable to Walton would have been reached with the photograph in evidence. As we
have summarized, Walton initially testified at her deposition that it was approximately
7:00 p.m. or 8:00 p.m. when she fell on the stairs. Although she subsequently testified at
trial that “it might have been later,” she acknowledged her deposition testimony on cross-
examination. In other words, the trial testimony at best creates contradictory evidence
regarding whether the photograph actually depicted the accident scene at the time she
fell, which does not make a more favorable result “reasonably probable,” as opposed to a
mere “abstract possibility.” (Cassim v. Allstate Insurance Co. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 780,
800.)
12
Enterprises (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 325, 335, fn. 8 [“points raised in the reply brief for
the first time will not be considered, unless good reason is shown for failure to present
them before”].)
2. Trial testimony
Walton argues the trial court abused its discretion by precluding her from
testifying that the shadow on the stairs was caused by the adjacent bush, yet allowing
White to testify that it was not.
(a) Background
As noted above, Willow Parks moved in limine to exclude lay testimony as to the
nature of any alleged defects of the lighting or walking surface where Walton claimed to
have fallen, including what caused the shadow Walton observed on the staircase. Willow
Parks explained that its expert White would testify that, in addition to the landscaping
light, there was a light across the street and a light on the exterior of the building.
The court granted the motion, explaining that Walton “can’t say what the cause of
the shadow was, from which light, because she doesn’t know. Okay? There was a shrub.
There was a shadow. I think she can say, ‘There was a shrub nearby, there was a shadow
there, and I fell,’ or ‘It caused me to be disoriented,’ but not which way the shadow or
which light it was coming from or whatever. Okay?” Walton’s counsel replied, “Okay.”
Meanwhile, Walton’s motion in limine sought to preclude White from offering
opinions that were not disclosed at her deposition, or opinions which pertained to how the
landscaping light cast shadows on the staircase. Willow Parks did not object to the first
portion of the motion, and conceded that White would not conduct any additional
inspection of the light or offer testimony regarding subjects like measurements, distance,
or luminosity. Nevertheless, Willow Parks argued that White should be allowed to testify
regarding whether the landscaping light would cast a shadow on the staircase given the
angle of the light, because she had done so at her deposition.
13
The trial court clarified its ruling as follows: “So I think that you two are clear on
what she can testify about. So if she gave the opinion during the deposition about the
ground light not casting the shadow, that’s free to come in. But not about, you know, it
wasn’t that -- you know, ‘It was only four inches, so it couldn’t have come from the
ground light. It had to come from the overhead light.’ [¶] But on the other hand, if she
said -- and I don’t know because I haven’t read the depo. If she said, ‘It came from the
overhead light because it was a three-foot wide shadow, and that could only come from
this direction, and that’s from this light,’ she can opine about that.”
Counsel for Walton responded: “Thank you, Your Honor.”
At trial, White then testified that “because the landscaping light is shorter than the
steps, it’s underneath them, it’s not going to cast light on the top of the steps.” As a
result, “it’s not going to cast a shadow on the top of those steps because it’s underneath,”
and “it cannot cast a shadow.”
Walton did not object to any of White’s testimony at trial.
(b) Evidentiary standards
Evidence Code section 800 provides that “[i]f a witness is not testifying as an
expert, his testimony in the form of an opinion is limited to such an opinion as is
permitted by law, including but not limited to an opinion that is: (a) Rationally based on
the perception of the witness; and (b) Helpful to a clear understanding of his testimony.”
(Evid. Code, § 800.)
Unlike an expert opinion, “the subject matter of lay opinion is ‘one of such
common knowledge that men of ordinary education could reach a conclusion as
intelligently as the witness,’ and requires no specialized background.” (People v.
Chapple (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 540, 547, quoting People v. Cole (1956) 47 Cal.2d 99,
103.)
14
(c) Analysis
The trial court concluded that Walton could not testify to “what the cause of the
shadow was, from which light, because she doesn’t know.” The trial court did not abuse
its discretion in reaching that conclusion.
First, there were multiple potential light sources in different locations, including
the landscaping light, the sun, an exterior building light, and a streetlight. Given that
evidence, the trial court’s determination that the cause of the shadow was not a subject of
common knowledge within the meaning of Evidence Code section 800 was not so
irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it, and it did not
transgress the confines of the applicable principles of law. (Sargon, supra, 55 Cal.4th at
p. 773.)
Walton argues that “[t]he concept that a shadow is cast when an object blocks a
light source, and the shape of the shadow mimics the shape of the object, is so basic and
so universally understood by lay people, that it does not require expert testimony,” and
that such concepts are regularly taught in pre-school and kindergarten. The trial court did
not agree, however—it recognized the multiple interacting light sources and determined
that, under these facts, it takes an expert to testify regarding the adequacy of the lighting.
That was not an abuse of discretion.
Lastly, with respect to White’s expert testimony, Walton argues that the trial court
violated its own ruling on the motion in limine by allowing White “to offer ‘analysis’
related to the ground light, and what it could or could not illuminate, based on her review
of multiple Google Earth and Google Street View photographs, all taken from various
angles, on various dates and times, (none of which were taken on or near the evening of
July 4, 2016), some of which had been altered, and which showed a ground light which
was not even the same ground light which had been in place on July 4, 2016.”
According to Walton, that constituted an abuse of discretion because: (1) it
violated the court’s own ruling on the motion in limine; (2) White’s analysis was based
15
on unauthenticated photographs which did not depict the scene at the time of the
accident; and (3) whether or not the landscaping light could have cast the shadow was
within the common experience of lay people.
We decline to reach these arguments because we conclude Walton has forfeited
them. As noted above, Walton did not object during the entirety of White’s testimony.
“It is hornbook law that a timely and specific objection is required to prevent the
consideration of certain evidence; the failure to object at all waives any claim of error.”
(Coit Drapery Cleaners, Inc. v. Sequoia Ins. Co. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1595, 1611,
citing Evid. Code, § 353 [“A verdict or finding shall not be set aside, nor shall the
judgment or decision based thereon be reversed, by reason of the erroneous admission of
evidence unless: (a) There appears of record an objection to or a motion to exclude or to
strike the evidence that was timely made and so stated as to make clear the specific
ground of the objection or motion; and (b) The court which passes upon the effect of the
error or errors is of the opinion that the admitted evidence should have been excluded on
the ground stated and that the error or errors complained of resulted in a miscarriage of
justice.”].)
Walton does not dispute that she did not object during White’s testimony. Instead,
she argues that her motion in limine to limit White’s testimony was sufficient to preserve
the objection. She contends the trial court specifically held that White “could not
elaborate with measurements or any other new opinions related to the ground light
because they had not been offered in her deposition but that is exactly what she did.”
However, Walton does not explain in any way how White’s trial testimony
exceeded her deposition testimony—indeed, Walton never provided any deposition
testimony to the trial court in support of her motion in limine or at the hearing.
As Willow Parks notes, citing Kelly v. New West Federal Savings (1996) 49
Cal.App.4th 659 (Kelly), without any supporting evidence to suggest what opinions had
been rendered at the depositions, a court and the parties are left to guess what opinions
16
during trial may be included within the scope of the ruling. (Kelly, supra, at p. 670.)
“Under appropriate circumstances, a motion in limine can serve the function of a ‘motion
to exclude’ under Evidence Code section 353 by allowing the trial court to rule on a
specific objection to particular evidence. [¶] ... [¶] In other cases, however, a motion in
limine may not satisfy the requirements of Evidence Code section 353. For example, it
may be difficult to specify exactly what evidence is the subject of the motion until that
evidence is offered. Actual testimony sometimes defies pretrial predictions of what a
witness will say on the stand. Events in the trial may change the context in which the
evidence is offered to an extent that a renewed objection is necessary to satisfy the
language and purpose of Evidence Code section 353. … In these kinds of circumstances,
an objection at the time the evidence is offered serves to focus the issue and to protect the
record.’ ” (Kelly, supra, at pp. 670–671, quoting People v. Morris (1991) 53 Cal.3d 152,
188–190 [disapproved on another ground in People v. Stansbury (1995) 9 Cal.4th 824,
830, fn. 1].)
To the extent Walton believed that White’s testimony conflicted with the trial
court’s ruling on the motion in limine, she was obligated to object. Her failure to do so
constitutes forfeiture.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondents may recover their costs on appeal.
17
___________________________________
Wilson, J.
WE CONCUR:
__________________________________________
Grover, Acting P. J.
______________________________________
Lie, J.
Walton v. Willow Parks Apts, LLC et al.
H051432
Vous vous demandez comment ce texte s’applique à votre situation ?
Consultation gratuite, sans engagement
Décrivez votre situation. Notre équipe vous recontactera par e-mail pour votre consultation.
Poursuivez vos recherches dans ChatGPT ou Claude
Connectez Omnilex pour rechercher dans le corpus juridique depuis votre assistant IA.