CourtListener 10626113•Kosey v. Encompass Community Services CA6
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Filed 7/9/25 Kosey v. Encompass Community Services CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
JUN KOSEY, H052220
(Santa Cruz County
Plaintiff and Appellant, Super. Ct. No. 23CV02547)
v.
ENCOMPASS COMMUNITY
SERVICES, et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
Appellant Jun Kosey filed a lawsuit against Monarch Disabled Housing, Inc.
(Monarch) and Encompass Community Services (Encompass), alleging Kosey
experienced harassment and assaults while living as a tenant at a property controlled by
Monarch. Kosey alleges Encompass and Monarch, alleged to be a subsidiary of
Encompass, failed to take adequate measures in response. The trial court sustained
without leave to amend on the ground of uncertainty a demurrer by Monarch and
Encompass, to which Kosey filed no opposition, and judgment was entered.
Kosey appeals, arguing that Monarch and Encompass owed Kosey a duty of care
to protect against foreseeable future assaults and breached that duty. Kosey argues
further that leave to amend should have been granted.
We conclude Kosey’s failure in the appellate brief to address uncertainty as the
ground for the trial court’s order results in forfeiture of any argument as to that issue, and
that Kosey has also failed to show how the complaint’s defects can be cured, which is
Kosey’s burden. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
“Because this matter comes to us on demurrer, we take the facts from plaintiff’s
complaint, the allegations of which are deemed true for the limited purpose of
determining whether plaintiff has stated a viable cause of action. [Citation.]” (Stevenson
v. Superior Court (1997) 16 Cal.4th 880, 885.)
According to the allegations of Kosey’s complaint, Kosey is a tenant at a property
controlled by Monarch, which is a subsidiary of Encompass.1 Monarch is “special
housing for individuals diagnosed with psychiatric disabilities.” Kosey did not feel safe
at the property because of “various forms of physical and psychological abuse on the
property,” so Kosey sent text messages and e-mails to employees of the defendants
regarding these concerns. In the messages and e-mails, Kosey recounted several
incidents. In one such incident, Kosey stated that Kosey experienced harassment by two
other tenants, Sandra England and Valinda Stafford, when they called the police after
Kosey had a nightmare that caused Kosey to scream in the middle of the night. Kosey
alleges England called the police another time and told them Kosey was crying and
suicidal. Kosey’s concerns about England caused Kosey to request the installation of a
surveillance camera in the living room. In July 2022, Kosey sought a civil harassment
restraining order against England, but the trial court ruled there was insufficient evidence
to support Kosey’s claims.
Between November 2021 and January 2022, Kosey notified a “[h]ousing [s]upport
[s]pecialist” that Kosey had been assaulted by tenant Jon Jones on the property. Kosey
also alleges reporting a sexual assault by another tenant. In November 2021, Kosey
1
In a declaration submitted in connection with a motion to set aside the trial
court’s order sustaining a demurrer, Kosey asserted that she became unhoused on
September 11, 2023.
2
spoke with a deputy and stated that in July of that year, Kosey had “woken up naked in
Robin Seymour’s bed with no memory of what had happened.” The Sheriff’s office
initiated an investigation, during which one of the deputies informed Kosey that the
Sheriff’s office had attempted to contact property management, but had received no
response. Kosey inquired “why the Sheriff’s office was contacting property management
rather than question the accused or the witness.” Kosey alleges the “Sheriff’s
Department never investigated the allegations of sexual assault.”
Kosey alleges being assaulted on other occasions, including when away from the
property, as well as an instance when Kosey woke up in Jones’s bedroom. Jones told
Kosey he had assisted Kosey into the house because Kosey had been unable to walk
without assistance. Kosey sent an e-mail to the property manager in November 2021
notifying her that another individual had witnessed Jones assault Kosey when they were
walking to a nearby movie theater. In December 2021, the property management sent a
letter to all tenants advising them to lock their doors. At the end of December, following
an investigation, Kosey “received a response from Encompass . . . and their
attorneys . . .[accusing Kosey] of intimidating and harassing the other tenants.”
In February 2022, Kosey submitted a Violence Against Women Act application to
property management at Monarch, “seeking protection from harassment and retaliation.”
Kosey reported another sexual assault by Jones in March 2022, and a battery by
Jones in April 2022. With regard to the battery, Kosey stated that, “while Jones was
assisting [Kosey] in the shower, . . . Jones was angered by the sound of [Kosey’s]
singing” and struck Kosey in the face, knocking Kosey to the floor of the shower tub.
Jones knocked Kosey down more than once and kicked Kosey repeatedly. Kosey
obtained a restraining order against Jones and Jones was evicted from the property.
A few days after the assault, Kosey felt symptoms that Kosey interpreted as
cardiac arrest, and Kosey called an ambulance. Kosey ran to Jones’s room because Jones
was the only tenant who had ever shown kindness to Kosey. When paramedics arrived,
3
they saw a bottle of wine in Jones’s bedroom and insisted that Kosey was drunk, even
though Kosey and Jones told the paramedics that Kosey had not had any of Jones’s wine.
The paramedics took Kosey’s vital signs, finding no indication of a medical emergency,
and Kosey determined it had been a panic attack.
In May 2022, Kosey received a “Cure or Quit Notice” that “claimed that an
ambulance had been called due to [Kosey’s] level of intoxication.” Kosey alleges there
was no evidence Kosey had consumed any alcohol.
Kosey alleges “[t]here were several measures that [Monarch] could have taken and
neglected to do in response to the numerous reports they received, including the
following: . . . [Monarch] neglected to send Cure or Quit notices, letters, or warnings to
tenants who [Kosey] reported as having committed crimes or lease violations. [Monarch]
neglected to relocate tenants who reported serious issues . . . [and] [u]pon receiving
reports that [Kosey] did not feel safe on the property . . . [Monarch] could have
transferred [Kosey] to a different property.” “[Monarch] neglected to install security
cameras on the exterior of the building . . . [and] refused to allow [Kosey] to take security
cameras into the kitchen.”
In September 2022, Kosey received another “Cure or Quit” notice based on what
Kosey alleged were false accusations that Kosey had knocked over a vase that belonged
to England. Kosey responded with a “Cease and Desist letter” to Monarch.
In May 2023, England filed a report with the Sheriff’s Office claiming Kosey had
committed assault and battery against England. Kosey alleges the report was false and
retaliatory.
Kosey alleges that, as a result of the sexual assaults, assault and battery, and
harassment, discrimination, and retaliation that Kosey was subjected to, Kosey suffered
increased symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).
Kosey’s complaint, filed on October 27, 2023, sets forth the following causes of
action: (1) negligence; (2) defamation; (3) assault and battery; (4) sexual battery;
4
(5) sexual harassment (Civ Code, § 51.9); (6) harassment; (7) negligent leasing and
retention; (8) disability discrimination – refusal to make reasonable accommodation in
housing (Gov Code, § 12927, subd. (c)(1)); (9) retaliation (34 U.S.C., § 12941);
(10) failure to exercise due care in violation of California Civil Code section 1714,
subdivision (a); (11) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (12) negligent infliction
of emotional distress.2
In November 2023, Monarch and Encompass demurred to the complaint on the
grounds that the complaint fails to state a cause of action and is uncertain. (Code Civ.
Proc., § 430.10, subds. (e), (f).) Monarch and Encompass also filed a motion to strike
portions of the complaint.
Kosey did not file an opposition or appear at the February 9, 2024, hearing on the
demurrer and motion to strike. On April 8, 2024, the trial court issued an order
sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend and finding the motion to strike to be
moot. In its order, the court noted that the complaint “appears to be nearly identical to
the deficient complaint in 23CV01083 (which [Kosey] voluntarily dismissed on 10/27/23
instead of amending, following successful demurrer), and repeats the same allegations as
an earlier case, 22CV00194, which [Kosey] also voluntarily dismissed on 3/23/23.” The
court did not address any cause of action substantively, but stated: “None of the causes
of action list the defendant(s) who are allegedly responsible, and they all contain
rambling allegations of harm. It is not possible to determine which claim is made against
which defendant.”
On March 25, 2024, before the order on the demurrer had been filed, Kosey filed a
motion to set aside the order sustaining the demurrer pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure
2
The causes of action are numbered differently in the body of the complaint than
on the first and second pages. We will use the numbering from the first and second
pages.
5
section 473, subdivision (b).3 Kosey asserted in the motion that Kosey became homeless
in September 2023 and traveled to Southern California to avoid harsh winter weather. In
Southern California, Kosey was affected by floods as well as the theft of Kosey’s phone.
On April 11, 2024, the trial court issued its Notice of Entry of Order Sustaining
Demurrer Without Leave to Amend and Notice of Entry of Judgment of Dismissal.
Kosey timely appealed.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Legal Principles
“In reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint against a general demurrer, we are
guided by long-settled rules. ‘We treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts
properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.
[Citation.] We also consider matters which may be judicially noticed.’ [Citation.]
Further, we give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its
parts in their context. [Citation.] When a demurrer is sustained, we determine whether
the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. [Citation.] And when
it is sustained without leave to amend, we decide whether there is a reasonable possibility
that the defect can be cured by amendment: if it can be, the trial court has abused its
discretion and we reverse; if not, there has been no abuse of discretion and we affirm.
[Citations.] The burden of proving such reasonable possibility is squarely on the
plaintiff. [Citation.]” (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.)
“We review a judgment of dismissal after an order sustaining a demurrer de novo,
exercising our independent judgment about whether the complaint states a cause of action
as a matter of law. [Citation.]” (Hanouchian v. Steele (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 99, 106.)
3
Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b) authorizes a court to
“relieve a party or his or her legal representative from a judgment, dismissal, order, or
other proceeding taken against him or her through his or her mistake, inadvertence,
surprise, or excusable neglect.”
6
“We will affirm the court’s ruling if it is correct under any legal theory raised in the
demurrer, whether the court relied on the theory or not. [Citation.]” (Debro v. Los
Angeles Raiders (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 940, 946.)
B. Failure to File Opposition
Kosey filed no opposition to the demurrer and did not appear at the hearing.
Generally, this would result in forfeiture of any new arguments Kosey might want to
raise on appeal.4 (Thompson v. Ioane (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 1180, 1192; Perez v.
Grajales (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 580, 591 [“arguments raised for the first time on appeal
are generally deemed forfeited”].) This is because “[a]ppellate courts are loath to reverse
a judgment on grounds that the opposing party did not have an opportunity to argue and
the trial court did not have an opportunity to consider. [Citation.]” (JRS Products, Inc. v.
Matsushita Electric Corp. of America (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 168, 178.)
There is an exception, however, when a pure question of law is raised. (Howitson
v. Evans Hotels, LLC (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 475, 489 [“A court of review has discretion
to consider an issue not raised in the trial court to the extent it presents a pure question of
law or involves undisputed facts.”]) “A demurrer is directed to the face of a complaint
[citation] and it raises only questions of law [citations]. Thus an appellant challenging
the sustaining of a general demurrer may change his or her theory on appeal [citation],
and an appellate court can affirm or reverse the ruling on new grounds. [Citations.]”
(B & P Development Corp. v. City of Saratoga (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 949, 959.)
As a result, although Kosey did not file an opposition to the demurrer, we consider
the arguments presented on appeal.
C. Appellant’s Burden on Appeal
In the opening brief, Kosey asserts Monarch and Encompass owed a duty of care
to protect Kosey, which they breached, but this argument is not tethered to any particular
4
We acknowledge that Kosey asserts that opposition to the demurrer was not
possible because Kosey was unhoused.
7
cause of action. Kosey mentions both a tenant’s right to quiet enjoyment and possession
of premises, and premises liability. In the “discussion” portion of the opening brief,
Kosey asserts that a court has discretion to allow leave to amend, and that the court
“could, at its discretion, provide Plaintiff notice of the complaint’s deficiencies.” In
conclusion, Kosey states “the evidence supports a finding that the Defendants by their
conduct breached their duty to Kosey. Kosey respectfully asks that this Court reverse the
decision of the trial court and grant the plaintiff leave to amend her complaint.”
On appeal, Kosey has the burden of demonstrating error by the trial court.
(Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608-609 [“it is a fundamental principle of
appellate procedure that a trial court judgment is ordinarily presumed to be correct and
the burden is on an appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the record presented to the
appellate court, that the trial court committed an error that justifies reversal of the
judgment”]; E-Fab, Inc. v. Accountants, Inc. Services (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1315
[“On appeal from a judgment of dismissal after a demurrer has been sustained without
leave to amend, the plaintiff has the burden of proving error.”].)
To demonstrate error, “[a]n appellant must provide an argument and legal
authority to support his contentions. This burden requires more than a mere assertion that
the judgment is wrong.” (Benach v. County of Los Angeles (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 836,
852.) “[A]ppellant must present meaningful legal analysis supported by citations to
authority and citations to facts in the record that support the claim of error. [Citations.]”
(In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 408.) When an appellant asserts a point on
appeal “ ‘but fails to support it with reasoned argument and citations to authority’ ” this
Court may treat the point as forfeited. (Nelson v. Avondale Homeowners Assn. (2009)
172 Cal.App.4th 857, 862.) We are not required to search the record for error ourselves
(Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246), and “[w]e are not bound to develop
appellants’ arguments for them. [Citation.]” (In re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke (2008)
164 Cal.App.4th 814, 830 (Falcone & Fyke).)
8
The principles of review which require the appellant to show error apply with
equal force to parties representing themselves. (Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th
975, 984-985; Falcone & Fyke, supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at p. 830.) Kosey “ ‘is entitled to
the same, but no greater, consideration than other litigants and attorneys.’
[Citations.] . . . [W]e will bear in mind that an ‘ “order of the lower court is presumed
correct.” ’ [Citation.] Therefore, [the appellant] has the burden of affirmatively showing
any error. [Citation.]” (Tanguilig v. Valdez (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 514, 520.)
Kosey has not addressed most of the causes of action in the complaint to explain
why it was error to sustain the demurrer as to those causes of action. Kosey therefore has
forfeited any arguments regarding the demurrer to those causes of action. (See County of
Sacramento v. Singh (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 858, 870.) And as we will discuss, Kosey
has not addressed the trial court order’s central premise, that the complaint is subject to a
demurrer for uncertainty and is not amenable to amendment because it is essentially the
same complaint that Kosey has filed in prior lawsuits and failed to amend.
D. Uncertainty
The trial court in its order cited authority regarding the ground of uncertainty and
we read the order as relying on this ground to sustain the demurrer. (Code Civ. Proc,
§ 430.10, subd. (f).) The court also referenced two previous lawsuits filed by Kosey,
noting that the allegations in each case were similar, that Kosey voluntarily dismissed one
case instead of amending following a successful demurrer, and that Kosey also
voluntarily dismissed the other case. The court ultimately stated that it sustained the
demurrer without leave to amend in the current suit “as this is the same complaint about
the same allegations that Plaintiff has previously dismissed twice instead of amending.”
The fact that Kosey did not amend defects in the complaints from the previous lawsuits is
relevant to the issue of whether the trial court abused its discretion by failing to grant
leave to amend.
9
It bears repeating that “[a] cardinal rule of appellate review is that the judgment or
order of the trial court is presumed correct and prejudicial error must be shown.
[Citations.] ‘ “ ‘Although our review of a [demurrer] is de novo, it is limited to issues
[that] have been adequately raised and supported in [the appellant’s] brief. [Citations.]
Issues not raised in an appellant’s brief are deemed waived or abandoned.’ ” ’
[Citations.]” (Center for Biological Diversity v. California Department of Conservation,
etc. (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 210, 226; see also Nielsen v. Gibson (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th
318, 324 [“On appeal, we must presume the trial court’s judgment is correct. [Citation.]
In service of that rule, we adopt all intendments and inferences to affirm the judgment or
order unless the record expressly contradicts them.”].)
Because the trial court sustained the demurrer on the ground of uncertainty, it did
not substantively address the allegations of the complaint and whether any of Kosey’s
causes of action stated a claim. Kosey does not address uncertainty at all in the opening
brief and we therefore deem the issue forfeited. Consequently, Kosey has not
demonstrated that the trial court’s order sustaining the demurrer on the ground of
uncertainty should be reversed.
Kosey asks for leave to amend the complaint, pointing to the strong policy
favoring amendment. Kosey asserts the trial court erred in denying this opportunity. We
review the denial of leave to amend for abuse of discretion. (Blank v. Kirwan, supra, 39
Cal.3d at p. 318.) A trial court abuses its discretion only when, having considered all the
circumstances, its decision exceeds the “bounds of reason.” (Denham v. Superior Court
(1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 566.) “ ‘A ruling that constitutes an abuse of discretion has been
described as one that is “so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree
with it.” [Citation.]’ ” (In re Marriage of Brewster & Clevenger (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th
481, 500, quoting Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California (2012) 55
Cal.4th 747, 773.) The burden to show an abuse of discretion has been described as a
“ ‘daunting task’ confronting an appellant who seeks reversal of a trial court’s
10
discretionary ruling. [Citation.]” (Dreamweaver Andalusians, LLC v. Prudential
Insurance Company of America (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 1168, 1171.)
Providing no explanation of how any defects in the complaint could be cured,
Kosey states that this Court could give notice of the complaint’s deficiencies. Similarly,
Kosey asserts Encompass and Monarch “have failed to meet their burden of proving that
amendment to her pleading would be futile.” But it is Kosey’s burden to show how the
complaint can be amended. (Hendy v. Losse (1991) 54 Cal.3d 723, 742 [“The burden is
on the plaintiff . . . to demonstrate the manner in which the complaint might be amended.
[Citation.]”]; Cooper v. Leslie Salt Co. (1969) 70 Cal.2d 627, 636 [“Plaintiff must show
in what manner he can amend his complaint and how that amendment will change the
legal effect of his pleading.”].) Kosey has not met this burden.
It is unclear on the record before us how documents from other related cases came
to be in front of the trial court on demurrer, but Kosey does not challenge the trial court’s
consideration of these cases, or the trial court’s interpretation of their significance.5 The
presumption of correctness therefore compels us to uphold the trial court’s factual
findings in this regard, including the fact that Kosey’s complaints in those cases included
nearly identical allegations to those in this case, and that Kosey dismissed those actions
rather than amend to correct any defects.
Kosey failed to amend the pleadings in related cases on at least two previous
occasions in the trial court below, and has failed to meet the required burden of showing
how the complaint can be successfully amended here. Under these circumstances, we
cannot find that the trial court abused its discretion when it sustained the demurrer
without leave to amend. (Hardy v. Admiral Oil Co. (1961) 56 Cal.2d 836, 842 [where a
“party had previously been given three successive opportunities to amend and thus had
ample notice of the defective state of its pleadings, yet had repeatedly failed to remedy
5
Kosey references the two prior cases in the appellate brief, and acknowledges
requesting entry of dismissal in both cases.
11
such defects, the trial court cannot be said to have abused its discretion in granting the
motion without further leave to amend”]; Ion Equipment Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110
Cal.App.3d 868, 878 [“The right to amend is not unqualified.”].)
Because Kosey has not met the burden to show error on appeal, we affirm the
judgment.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. In the interests of justice, each party shall bear its costs
on appeal.
12
_______________________________
Greenwood, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
______________________________________
Lie, J.
______________________________________
Rodriguez, J.*
H052220
Kosey v. Encompass Community Services et al.
_____________
* Judge of the San Diego County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to
article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
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