CourtListener 10623845•People v. Castro CA6
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Filed 7/7/25 P. v. Castro CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE, H051479
(Monterey County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. 22CR002763)
v.
ANGEL CASTRO CASTRO,
Defendant and Appellant.
A jury convicted defendant Angel Castro Castro of implied malice
murder (Pen. Code,1 § 187, subd. (a); count 1), gross vehicular manslaughter
while intoxicated (§ 191.5, subd. (a); count 2), driving under the influence
(DUI) of alcohol causing injury (Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (a); count 3) and
hit and run resulting in injury (id., § 20001, subd. (a); count 4) for an incident
in which he drove while intoxicated and killed Manuel Garcia. The trial
court sentenced Castro to two years on count 4 plus 15 years to life in prison
on count 1 and stayed the sentences on counts 2 and 3 pursuant to section
654.
1 All further unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.
On appeal, Castro contends that the trial court erred by instructing the
jury using CALCRIM No. 520 (CALCRIM 520) without modifying the
instruction to reflect the language referencing a “ ‘high degree of probability’ ”
of death from People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981 (Reyes), issued one month
prior to his trial. In addition, Castro asserts that the court erred by allowing
the jury to convict him on both count 2, gross vehicular manslaughter while
intoxicated (§ 191.5, subd. (a)), and count 3, driving under the influence
causing injury (Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (a)).
The Attorney General agrees that this court should strike the
conviction for count 3 and the accompanying enhancement but contends that
the trial court did not err in its instructions to the jury.
For the reasons stated below, we decide that the conviction for count 3
and the related enhancement must be vacated and remand for resentencing.
We reject Castro’s contention of instructional error.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2
A. Facts and Charges
In the afternoon of March 21, 2022, Martin E.3 was driving on highway
68 towards Salinas when he observed a dark van—later identified as Castro’s
green van—driving “uncomfortably close” behind him in the fast lane.
Martin changed lanes to allow the van to pass.
After passing Martin’s car, Castro’s van struck Joel M.’s vehicle from
behind while Joel was stopped at a light at the corner of Highway 68 and
2 We set forth the relevant facts from the trial evidence in the light
most favorable to the jury’s verdict. (People v. Luo (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 663,
668, fn. 2; People v. Campbell (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 463, 469.)
3 We refer to nonlaw enforcement witnesses by first name and the first
initial of their last name and subsequently by first name only to protect their
privacy interests. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.90(b)(10).)
2
Blanco Road. Castro struck Joel’s vehicle “[v]ery hard,” injuring Joel’s right
shoulder and propelling Joel’s vehicle into another vehicle (the first collision).
Martin witnessed the accident. Castro did not stop following the first
collision but proceeded straight through the intersection and continued on
Main Street in Salinas.
Martin followed Castro’s van to obtain the vehicle’s license plate
number; Castro looked back at Martin. Castro stopped the van at a stop sign
on Iverson Street, at which point Martin was able to take photographs of the
van and its license plate.
Joshua S., an off-duty firefighter, observed Castro’s van turning right
from Iverson Street onto Blanco Road, heading westward. Joshua noted that
Castro’s van was damaged in the front and Castro was speeding. Joshua and
Castro proceeded in the same direction on Blanco Road; Castro passed
Joshua’s vehicle. Castro drove erratically, weaving through the lanes on
westbound Blanco Road, despite the lack of traffic. Joshua observed Castro
frequently looking behind him.
As they approached West Alisal Street, Joshua saw Castro briefly look
behind him and make a quick U-turn at the intersection of Blanco Road and
West Alisal Street (in violation of a “no U-turn” sign). At the time Castro
made the U-turn, Garcia was driving on his motorcycle eastbound on Blanco
Road, approaching the intersection of Blanco Road and West Alisal Street.
Castro’s van turned into the path of Garcia’s motorcycle. Garcia collided with
Castro’s van (the second collision).
When Joshua arrived at the scene approximately 30 seconds later,
Castro’s van was gone. Joshua attempted to render aid to Garcia, who was
later pronounced dead at the scene.
3
That afternoon, Paul A. was traveling northbound on Hitchcock Road
when he witnessed Castro’s green van heading in his direction from his right.
Paul observed that the van was traveling at a high rate of speed on a dirt
road through a strawberry field. Paul was not sure if the van was going to
stop, so he stopped, despite having the right of way. The van crossed in front
of Paul and eventually stopped at the corner of Foster Road and Davis Road,
near the Salinas ponds. A few minutes after the van stopped, Paul observed
Castro exit the van, gather a few items, and start walking. When Paul
noticed the stopped traffic and emergency vehicles on Blanco Road, he went
over to the scene of the second collision. He asked California Highway Patrol
Officer Eric Dutra if the police were looking for a green van and pointed
Dutra in the direction of Castro’s van.
Officer Dutra approached Castro, smelled the odor of alcohol on Castro,
detained him, and notified California Highway Patrol Officer Matthew
Babcock.4 Another California Highway Patrol Officer, Anthony Rivera, also
arrived at the scene and observed next to the road a 24-ounce can of beer
about 100 feet away from where Castro was standing with Dutra. The beer
can was still cool to the touch despite the warm day. Rivera later discovered
an empty 24-ounce beer can inside Castro’s van.
When Officer Babcock first spoke with Castro approximately one hour
later, Babcock observed Castro “had red, watery eyes,” smelled of alcohol, and
had small pieces of glass on his clothing and skin and in his hair. Castro told
Babcock that he had had three cans of beer between 3:15 and 3:30 p.m.
Babcock conducted field sobriety tests on Castro and observed signs of
4 When asked by Officer Dutra and, later, Officer Babcock whether he
had been involved in the second collision and whether he had been driving
the green van at some point, Castro replied in the negative.
4
impairment, including eye twitches and tremors, swaying while standing,
slurred speech, and difficulty remembering and following directions. Babcock
concluded from the field sobriety tests that Castro “was under the influence
and not able to safely operate a motor vehicle.”
Officer Babcock administered two preliminary alcohol screening (PAS)
tests on Castro approximately two hours after the second collision. Castro’s
blood alcohol concentration on the first test was .084. It was .083 on the
second test. After receiving the PAS test results, Babcock placed Castro
under arrest.
On August 18, 2023, the Monterey County District Attorney filed a first
amended information charging Castro with the murder of Garcia (§ 187,
subd. (a); count 1), gross vehicular manslaughter of Garcia while intoxicated
(§ 191.5, subd. (a); count 2), felony driving under the influence of alcohol and
causing injury to Garcia (Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (a); count 3), hit and run
resulting in injury to Garcia (id., § 20001, subd. (a); count 4), and
misdemeanor driving when his privilege had been suspended for a prior DUI
conviction (id., § 14601.2, subd. (a); count 5). The amended information
alleged with respect to count 2 that Castro had suffered a prior conviction for
driving under the influence (§ 191.5, subd. (d)). For count 3, it alleged that
Castro (1) personally inflicted great bodily injury upon Garcia (§ 12022.7,
subd. (a)) and (2) had a prior conviction for driving under the influence within
the past 10 years (Veh. Code, § 23560). For count 4, it alleged that Castro
had fled the scene (id., § 20001, subd. (c)).
That same day, Castro pleaded not guilty to counts 1 through 4. He
pleaded no contest to count 5 and admitted the prior conviction
enhancements attached to count 2 (§ 191.5, subd. (d)) and count 3 (Veh. Code,
§ 23560).
5
On August 21, 2023, the district attorney orally amended the first
amended information to reflect that the allegation that Castro fled the scene
applied to count 2 rather than count 4. Castro’s jury trial began that same
day.
B. Jury Instructions
After the close of evidence and before counsel gave closing arguments,
the trial court discussed the jury instructions with the district attorney and
defense counsel. Neither the district attorney nor defense counsel objected to
the wording of CALCRIM 520.
As given to Castro’s jury, CALCRIM 520 stated, in pertinent part: “The
defendant had implied malice if: [¶] 1. He intentionally committed the act;
[¶] 2. The natural and probable consequences of the act were dangerous to
human life; [¶] 3. At the time he acted, he knew his act was dangerous to
human life; [¶] AND [¶] 4. He deliberately acted with conscious disregard
for life. [¶] . . . [¶] An act causes death if the death is the direct, natural,
and probable consequence of the act and the death would not have happened
without the act or failure to act. A natural and probable consequence is one
that a reasonable person would know is likely to happen if nothing unusual
intervenes. In deciding whether a consequence is natural and probable,
consider all of the circumstances established by the evidence.”
C. Jury’s Verdict and Castro’s Sentence
The jury returned guilty verdicts on counts 1 through 4 and found true
the remaining enhancements on counts 2 and 3.
The trial court sentenced Castro to an aggregate term of 2 years plus
15 years to life in prison for counts 1 and 4. The court stayed the sentences
on count 2 and the related prior conviction and fleeing the scene
enhancements, and on count 3 and the related great bodily injury
6
enhancement pursuant to section 654. The court did not impose sentence on
the prior conviction enhancement for count 3. Although the amended minute
order for the sentencing hearing states the court sentenced Castro to 180
days in county jail on count 5, the court did not orally pronounce a sentence
on count 5.
D. Prior Criminal History
Prior to the incident underlying Castro’s present convictions, Castro
had incurred three prior convictions for driving under the influence. In
January 2008, he pleaded guilty in Monterey County to driving under the
influence (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (a)). The trial court advised Castro that
his conviction could be alleged as a prior offense and that he could be charged
with murder if he causes a person’s death while driving under the influence
(id., § 23593).
In November 2010, in San Mateo County, Castro pleaded no contest to
driving while having a .08 percent or higher blood alcohol level (Veh. Code,
§ 23152, subd. (b)) and admitted as true an allegation that he had a prior
conviction for driving under the influence within 10 years. He signed an
advisement of rights, waiver, and plea form in which he acknowledged he
understood the following advisement: “ ‘You are hereby advised that being
under the influence of alcohol or drugs, or both, impairs your ability to safely
operate a motor vehicle. Therefore, it is extremely dangerous to human life
to drive while under the influence of alcohol or drugs, or both. If you continue
to drive while under the influence of alcohol or drugs, or both, and, as a result
of that driving, someone is killed, you can be charged with murder.’ ”
In May 2018, Castro entered a plea of no contest in Monterey County to
two counts of driving under the influence (Veh. Code, § 23152, subds. (a) &
(b)) and admitted enhancements for having a blood alcohol concentration of
7
0.15 percent or more by weight (id., § 23578) and prior convictions for driving
under the influence (id., §§ 23152, 23540, 23546). The parties stipulated to
the fact that, during the incident, Castro had a blood alcohol level of .16/.17
percent when he caused a collision that resulted in minor injuries. Castro
acknowledged that he understood that driving under the influence “is
extremely dangerous to human life” and he could be charged with murder if
he causes a person’s death while driving under the influence (id., § 23593).
II. DISCUSSION
Castro’s challenge to the instruction on implied malice murder given at
his trial relies on the California Supreme Court’s June 29, 2023 decision in
Reyes and a March 2024 revision to CALCRIM 520. Castro contends that the
trial court erred in instructing the jury using CALCRIM 520 without
incorporating into the instruction the language from the later-revised
instruction that the jury must find that his act involved “a high degree of
probability that death would result.”5 Castro maintains that he was
prejudiced by the instructional error because the district attorney “presented
no evidence of the high probability of death associated with driving under the
influence.”
In addition, Castro asserts that the trial court should have
incorporated the “high degree of probability” language into both the second
(actus reus) and third (mens rea) elements of the definition of implied malice
in CALCRIM 520 because the same words in different parts of the instruction
5 Castro argues that this issue is cognizable even though he did not
raise this issue in the trial court. “The appellate court may . . . review any
instruction given . . ., even though no objection was made thereto in the lower
court, if the substantial rights of the defendant were affected thereby.”
(§ 1259; People v. Thomas (2023) 14 Cal.5th 327, 382.) On this basis, we
consider the merits of Castro’s claim despite his failure to raise it below.
8
should have the same definition. He maintains that this instructional error
prejudiced him because the district attorney did not present evidence that he
was told—and, thus, he could not have known—that the dangerousness of
drunk driving “amounted to a high degree of probability that drunk driving
would result in death.” Castro argues that we should reverse his conviction
for second degree implied malice murder on these grounds.
In addition, Castro argues that count 3, as a lesser included offense of
count 2, and the related enhancement should be reversed.
The Attorney General maintains the trial court did not err in its
instructions to the jury but concedes that count 3 and the attendant
enhancement should be stricken from the judgment.
A. CALCRIM 520
1. Applicable Law
“Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being . . . with malice
aforethought.” (§ 187, subd. (a).) Such malice “may be express or implied.”
(§ 188, subd. (a).) “Malice is implied when no considerable provocation
appears, or when the circumstances attending the killing show an abandoned
and malignant heart.” (Id., subd. (a)(2).)
“Murder is committed with implied malice when ‘the killing is
proximately caused by “ ‘an act, the natural consequences of which are
dangerous to life, which act was deliberately performed by a person who
knows that his [or her] conduct endangers the life of another and who acts
with conscious disregard for life.’ ” ’ ” (Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 988,
quoting People v. Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139, 143 (Knoller).) Thus,
“implied-malice murder has a physical component: an act whose natural
consequences are dangerous to life. And it has a mental component:
defendant’s deliberate performance of the act with conscious disregard for
9
life, knowing the act endangers another’s life.” (In re Ferrell (2023) 14
Cal.5th 593, 604 (Ferrell).)
In earlier implied malice murder jurisprudence, the California
Supreme Court described the test for the physical component in two ways.
First, as “an act that involves a high degree of probability that it will result
in death.” (People v. Thomas (1953) 41 Cal.2d 470, 480 (conc. opn. of Traynor,
J.) (Thomas).) Later, as “ ‘an act, the natural consequences of which are
dangerous to life.’ ” (People v. Phillips (1966) 64 Cal.2d 574, 587 (Phillips),
overruled on another ground in People v. Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 490,
fn. 12 (Flood).)
In People v. Watson (1981) 30 Cal.3d 290 (Watson), the California
Supreme Court “held that these two definitions of implied malice in essence
articulated the same standard.” (Knoller, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 152; see also
People v. Nieto Benitez (1992) 4 Cal.4th 91, 104 (Nieto Benitez); People v.
Dellinger (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1212, 1218–1219 (Dellinger).) The Watson court
stated that implied malice murder “has been committed when a person does
‘ “ ‘an act, the natural consequences of which are dangerous to life, which act
was deliberately performed by a person who knows that his conduct
endangers the life of another and who acts with conscious disregard for life.’ ”
. . ..’ [Citations.] Phrased in a different way, malice may be implied when
defendant does an act with a high probability that it will result in death and
does it with a base antisocial motive and with a wanton disregard for human
life.” (Watson, at p. 300, italics added.)
“[T]he mental component of implied malice . . . requires a defendant to
act with a conscious disregard for life, knowing his act endangers another’s
life.” (Ferrell, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 597.) “The mental component calls for a
subjective inquiry into a defendant’s state of mind and requires ‘a
10
determination that the defendant actually appreciated the risk involved, i.e.,
a subjective standard.’ ” (Id. at p. 604.)
“[M]alice may be implied when a person drives a motor vehicle under
the influence of alcohol and kills someone.” (People v. Lagunas (2023) 97
Cal.App.5th 996, 1005 (Lagunas); Watson, supra, 30 Cal.3d at pp. 300–301.)
“Since Watson, appellate courts have upheld numerous murder convictions in
cases where defendants have committed homicides while driving under the
influence of alcohol. [Citations.] These opinions have generally relied on
some or all of the factors that were present in Watson: ‘(1) blood-alcohol level
above the .08 percent legal limit; (2) a predrinking intent to drive;
(3) knowledge of the hazards of driving while intoxicated; and (4) highly
dangerous driving.’ [Citation.] However, ‘courts have recognized that there
is no particular formula for analysis of vehicular homicide cases, instead
requiring a case-by-case approach.’ ” (People v. Suazo (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th
681, 692–693 (Suazo); accord Lagunas, at p. 1005.)
2. Standard of Review
We review a claim of instructional error de novo to ascertain whether
the instruction accurately states the applicable law. (People v. Ramirez
(2023) 98 Cal.App.5th 175, 218.) In doing so, we consider the challenged
instruction in the context of all the instructions given to the jury and the trial
record. (People v. Rivera (2019) 7 Cal.5th 306, 326; People v. Ortiz (2023) 96
Cal.App.5th 768, 815–816.) “ ‘ “A defendant challenging an instruction as
being subject to erroneous interpretation by the jury must demonstrate a
reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the instruction in the way
asserted by the defendant.” ’ ” (People v. Thomas, supra, 14 Cal.5th at
p. 382.) We assume that jurors are intelligent and capable of understanding
the instructions. (Ibid.; People v. Covarrubias (2016) 1 Cal.5th 838, 915.)
11
If a trial court incorrectly instructs on an element of a charged offense,
the applicable standard of prejudice is the Chapman standard. (Neder v.
United States (1999) 527 U.S. 1, 9–10.) Under the Chapman standard, a
federal constitutional error requires reversal unless the People show the
error was “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Chapman v. California
(1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 (Chapman); Flood, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 475.)
3. Analysis
a. Actus Reus
Castro contends that the California Supreme Court’s decision in Reyes,
issued approximately one and one-half months prior to Castro’s trial, defined
an act that is “ ‘dangerous to life’ ” as used in implied malice murder as one
that “involves a high degree of probability that it will result in death.” His
argument is based on the following sentence in Reyes: “To suffice for implied
malice murder, the defendant’s act must not merely be dangerous to life in
some vague or speculative sense; it must ‘ “involve[] a high degree of
probability that it will result in death.” ’ ” (Quoting Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th
at p. 989.) He asserts that Reyes requires courts to instruct juries using an
implied malice murder instruction that includes the “high degree of
probability” of death language, and that, by failing to do so, the trial court
committed prejudicial error.
Castro also relies on a March 2024 revision to CALCRIM 520. (People
v. Collins (2025) 17 Cal.5th 293, 306, fn. 3.) Using the revised CALCRIM
520, the implied malice instruction given to Castro’s jury would have read, in
pertinent part (with revisions shown in italics): “The defendant had implied
malice if: [¶] 1. He intentionally committed the act; [¶] 2. The natural and
probable consequences of the act were dangerous to human life in that the act
involved a high degree of probability that it would result in death; [¶] 3. At
12
the time he acted, he knew his act was dangerous to human life; [¶] AND
[¶] 4. He deliberately acted with conscious disregard for human life.” (See
CALCRIM 520 (March 2024 rev.).)
We are not persuaded that the trial court erred by omitting the
italicized language from the instructions given to Castro’s jury.
In Reyes, our Supreme Court neither modified the legal definition of
implied malice murder nor overruled long-standing precedent that the
Thomas and Phillips decisions articulate the same standard for implied
malice murder. Rather, the Supreme Court reviewed the defendant’s petition
for resentencing under section 1172.6 and decided there was insufficient
evidence to support the conclusion that defendant was guilty of implied
malice murder as a direct perpetrator. (Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 989.)
The court decided that the defendant’s conduct in traveling to rival gang
territory with other gang members was “merely . . . dangerous to life in [a]
vague or speculative sense” (ibid., italics added) and did “not by itself give rise
to a high degree of probability that death will result.” (Ibid.) The court did
not state that the “dangerous to human life” standard was itself vague or
speculative, only that the facts proffered to support such a finding were vague
and speculative and, thus, insufficient to meet the existing standard. (Id. at
p. 990.)
In Reyes, by citing Knoller to support the sentence on which Castro
relies, the Supreme Court reiterated the long-held precedent that “under the
objective component of implied malice, ‘ “ ‘dangerous to life’ ” ’ means the
same thing as a ‘ “high degree of probability that” ’ the act in question ‘ “will
result in death.” ’ ” (Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 989, quoting Knoller,
supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 152, italics added.) The court in Reyes neither
overturned nor otherwise questioned its prior decisions in which it held that
13
“dangerous to life” and “high degree of probability” state the same standard,
such as in Watson, Dellinger, Nieto Benitez, and Knoller.
In Reyes, the Supreme Court neither criticized nor suggested any
modifications to CALCRIM 520. In its only reference to the instruction, the
court stated only that CALCRIM 520 “alone . . . does not encompass the
elements of aiding and abetting implied malice murder as set out in [People
v.] Powell [(2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 689].” (Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 991,
italics added.) Further, “ ‘[j]ury instructions, whether published or not, are
not themselves the law, and are not authority to establish legal propositions
or precedent. They should not be cited as authority for legal principles.’ ”
(People v. Jo (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 1128, 1157, fn. 7; People v. Morales (2001)
25 Cal.4th 34, 48, fn. 7.)
We decide that the trial court did not err in giving the then-current
CALCRIM 520 instruction during Castro’s trial.
b. Mens Rea
“For malice to be implied, a defendant must be subjectively aware that
their acts or omissions endangered the life of” the victim. (Collins, supra, 17
Cal.5th at p. 321.) The CALCRIM instruction on implied malice’s subjective
knowledge element did not change post-Reyes. As currently worded,
CALCRIM 520 instructs that, to satisfy the mental component of implied
malice murder, the prosecution must demonstrate that the defendant knew
the act he or she committed was “dangerous to human life.” (CALCRIM 520
(March 2024 rev.).)
Castro maintains that the trial court should have incorporated the
“high degree of probability” language into the mens rea component of the
implied malice murder instruction provided to his jury because the mens reas
component should match the revision to the actus reus component. He
14
further argues that the district attorney did not present any evidence he was
aware that driving under the influence created “a high degree of probability”
of death.
The California Supreme Court has long distinguished between the
actus reus and mens rea components of implied malice murder by
emphasizing that the former is an objective standard and the later a
subjective one. (Knoller, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 157; see also Collins, supra,
17 Cal.5th at p. 322, citing Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 989.)
In Knoller, the California Supreme Court rejected the same argument
Castro advances in this appeal regarding the subjective component of implied
malice murder. The trial court in Knoller granted a new trial to a defendant
who had been convicted of second degree murder on an implied malice theory.
The trial court based its ruling on a finding of insufficient evidence that the
defendant subjectively knew “her conduct involved a high probability of
resulting in the death of another.” (Knoller, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 142.) The
Supreme Court ruled that the trial court had erred in granting a new trial on
this basis because subjective knowledge of the high probability of death is not
an element of implied malice. (Id. at p. 157.) The court reasoned that “ ‘high
probability of death’ ” is part of the objective component of implied malice, not
the subjective component. (Ibid.)
As discussed ante (pt. II.A.3.a.), the California Supreme Court’s
decision in Reyes did not overrule Knoller. Indeed, post-Reyes, the court
characterized the “ ‘ “ ‘high degree of probability that [the act] will result in
death’ ” ’ element” as “objective.” (Collins, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 322.) We
therefore decide the trial court did not err in its instruction on the mental
component of implied malice murder.
15
c. Harmless Error
Even if the trial court erred in failing to modify the then-current
CALCRIM 520 instruction in the manner Castro now suggests, we decide
that any such error was harmless. (Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24.)
Castro admitted to having drunk three cans of beer before driving and
he had blood alcohol concentration levels of .084 and .083 two hours later. He
drove erratically, quickly, and aggressively, first tailgating Martin’s vehicle,
then crashing “[v]ery hard” into Joel’s vehicle and causing it to hit a third
vehicle, and weaving between the two westbound Blanco Road lanes before
making an illegal U-turn into oncoming traffic on eastbound Blanco Road and
causing the collision with Garcia.
Castro had been convicted three times before for driving under the
influence of alcohol. In each instance, the trial court informed him, and he
acknowledged that driving under the influence is dangerous to human life,
and that if he continued to drive under the influence and someone was killed
as a result, he could be charged with murder. Evidence of prior reckless
and/or drunk driving tends to establish a “defendant’s knowledge—gained in
the course of the prior misconduct—of the natural consequences, dangerous
to life, of the reckless operation of a motor vehicle, and of his persistence in
that behavior, thus evidencing a conscious disregard for the lives of others on
the road.” (People v. Ortiz (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 104, 111–112.)
Considering the challenged instruction in the context of the trial record
and given the presence of all the factors identified in Watson, we are
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have found Castro
guilty of implied malice murder despite the purported error. (See Suazo,
supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at pp. 692–693; Lagunas, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1005.)
16
B. Lesser-Included Offense Conviction
A person can generally be convicted of more than one crime arising out
of the same act or course of conduct, although not punished for both. (People
v. Reed (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1224, 1226; see §§ 954, 654.) However, “[a]
judicially created exception to the general rule permitting multiple conviction
‘prohibits multiple convictions based on necessarily included offenses.’ ”
(Reed, at p. 1227; see also People v. Ramirez (2009) 45 Cal.4th 980, 984.) If a
defendant is found guilty of both a greater and a necessarily lesser included
offense arising out of the same act and the evidence supports the verdict on
the greater offense, that conviction is controlling, and the conviction of the
lesser offense must be reversed. (People v. Sanders (2012) 55 Cal.4th 731,
736.)
The jury convicted Castro of violating Vehicle Code section 23153,
subdivision (a) (count 3) and section 191.5, subdivision (a) (count 2), both in
connection with the death of Garcia. Castro argues and the Attorney General
concedes that Vehicle Code section 23153, subdivision (a) is a lesser-included
offense of section 191.5, subdivision (a). The parties agree that this court
should strike the conviction for count 3 and the attendant enhancements
under section 12022.7, subdivision (a) and Vehicle Code section 23560.
In People v. Miranda (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 1464, a different panel of
this court held that a conviction of Vehicle Code section 23153, subdivision (a)
is a necessarily included offense of section 191.5, subdivision (a) when the
same person is the victim of both crimes. (Miranda, at p. 1468.) We
therefore direct the trial court to vacate Castro’s conviction for count 3 and
the accompanying enhancements.
17
C. Additional Errors in Sentencing and Abstract of Judgment
In addition, although not raised by either party, we observe that the
trial court erred by failing to orally pronounce sentence on count 5. A court
has the duty to pronounce sentence on every conviction, whether it is for a
felony or a misdemeanor. (People v. Codinha (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 976,
994.) Although the court could decide to give Castro credit on count 5 for
time he has already spent in custody, it should “first . . . pronounce a proper
sentence on” that count. (Ibid.) “ ‘When the mistake [in failing to pronounce
sentence on a count] is discovered while the defendant’s appeal is pending,
the appellate court should remand the case for a proper sentence.’ ” (Ibid.)
We thus remand the matter to the trial court to sentence Castro on count 5.
In addition, Castro’s felony abstract of judgment does not include the
prior conviction and fleeing the scene enhancements attached to count 2
(§ 191.5, subd. (d); Veh. Code, § 20001, subd. (c)). On remand, the trial court
should correct the abstract of judgment to reflect the prior conviction
enhancement on count 2 that Castro admitted (§ 191.5, subd. (d)) and the
jury’s true finding on the allegation that Castro fled the scene (Veh. Code,
§ 20001, subd. (c)).
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed. The matter is remanded to the trial court
with directions to (1) impose sentence on count 5 (Veh. Code, § 14601.2, subd.
(a)); and (2) vacate Castro’s conviction on count 3, driving under the influence
causing injury (Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (a)), and the accompanying great
bodily injury enhancement (Pen. Code, § 12022.7, subd. (a)) and prior
conviction enhancement (Veh. Code, § 23560). The trial court is ordered to
prepare an amended abstract of judgment reflecting these modifications and
including the enhancements on count 2 that were admitted or found to be
18
true (Pen. Code, § 191.5, subd. (d); Veh. Code, § 20001, subd. (c)), and to
forward a certified copy of the amended felony abstract of judgment to the
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. In all other respects, Castro’s
convictions are affirmed.
19
______________________________________
Danner, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
____________________________________
Wilson, J.
____________________________________
Bromberg, J.
H051479
People v. Castro
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