People v. Streams CA5

CourtListener 10622146Calctapp2 juil. 2025

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Filed 7/2/25 P. v. Streams CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE,
F088348
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. BF194541A)
v.

KENYON STREAMS, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. Charles R.
Brehmer, Judge.
John L. Staley, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General,
Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorney General, Ivan P. Marrs and Angelo S. Edralin,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
A jury convicted defendant and appellant Kenyon Streams of pandering, and the
trial court imposed a sentence of three years imprisonment. On appeal, defendant
contends only that the trial court unconstitutionally and reversibly erred by giving the
jury an instruction that defined the term “procure” in a manner that was overly broad and
contrary to its ordinary meaning. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
On April 28, 2023, an undercover Bakersfield police officer was working in an
area of Bakersfield known for prostitution. The undercover officer noticed a silver SUV
and a prostitute (B.S.) standing next to the SUV talking to the driver. The undercover
officer observed that B.S. would stay near the SUV as she attempted to wave down
passing cars. The undercover officer also noticed that the driver’s window was rolled
down and the SUV did not move. After about 90 minutes, B.S. got into the SUV and
drove away. The undercover officer believed that the driver of the SUV had been
providing protection for B.S.
A marked patrol vehicle stopped the SUV. Defendant was the driver of the SUV.
In response to questions from the undercover officer, defendant disclosed that: he was a
security guard and B.S. was his girlfriend; he had driven B.S. to the area from Fresno; he
knew B.S. was engaging in prostitution but did not like or condone her doing so; he was
making sure B.S. was good, looking out for her, providing security for her, and acting as
her lookout; he was not being paid by B.S.; and he was just waiting on B.S. so that he
could go home. Defendant was arrested for pandering.
On February 15, 2024, the Kern County District Attorney filed an amended
information and charged defendant with: one count of pandering (Pen. Code,1 § 266i;
count 1); and one count of driving without a license (Veh. Code, § 12500, subd. (a);
count 2).

1 Unless otherwise noted, all further statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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The trial court dismissed count 2 on May 30, 2024.
On June 3, 2024, trial commenced.
At the end of trial, the trial court instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 1151, the
standard instruction for the crime of pandering. In part, CALCRIM No. 1151 informed
the jury that it did not matter whether B.S. was already a prostitute, and the prosecution
must prove that: (1) defendant successfully procured B.S. to become a prostitute; and
(2) defendant intended to influence B.S. to be a prostitute. However, without objection
from defense counsel, the court granted the prosecution’s request for a definition of the
term “procure.” In relevant part, the court instructed the jury as follows: “In the context
of Pandering, the term ‘procure(d)’ is defined to mean ‘assisting, inducing, persuading or
encouraging’ a person to engage in prostitution.” The prosecutor argued that defendant
was guilty of pandering because he encouraged B.S. by making it easier for her to engage
in prostitution, and he assisted B.S. by transporting her from Fresno to engage in
prostitution and by providing her with protection while she engaged in prostitution.
On June 6, 2024, the jury found defendant guilty on count 1.
On July 12, 2024, the trial court sentenced defendant to the low term of three
years.
On July 15, 2024, defendant filed his notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
INSTRUCTIONAL ERROR
A. Parties’ Arguments
Defendant argues that the trial court’s definition of “procure” improperly included
the concept of “assisting,” which is inconsistent with the ordinary meaning of “procure.”
Defendant argues that Merriam-Webster’s online dictionary lists three definitions of
procure, all of which involve an affirmative effort on behalf of the person engaged in an
activity. Similarly, all other conduct identified in section 266i involves affirmative and
material conduct. However, “assisting” is so broad that it can include passive conduct

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that does not have an actual connection to prostitution. Defendant contends that the court
should have either omitted the word “assist,” used the phrase “materially assisted,” or
added additional language that required a causal connection between defendant’s conduct
and B.S.’s prostitution activities. Defendant argues that under any standard, the
instruction was prejudicial because he only stood by and passively watched B.S., which is
not sufficiently related to B.S.’s prostitution activities.
The People argue defendant has forfeited any instructional error by failing to
object. Alternatively, the People argue in part that the trial court did not err because the
instruction it provided to the jury was consistent with long-standing case law defining the
term “procure” and legislative acquiescence in that definition.
B. Legal Standards
1. Instructional Error
Claims of instructional error are reviewed de novo. (People v. Lewis (2023) 14
Cal.5th 876, 900; People v. Thomas (2023) 14 Cal.5th 327, 382.) Thus, an “ ‘appellate
court reviews the wording of a jury instruction de novo and assesses whether the
instruction accurately states the law.’ ” (Lewis, at p. 900; quoting People v. Mitchell
(2019) 7 Cal.5th 561, 579.) If a defendant contends that an instruction misstates the law,
the reviewing court “ ‘must consider whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the trial
court’s instruction[] caused the jury to misapply the law in violation of the
Constitution.’ ” (Lewis, at p. 900; quoting Mitchell, at p. 579.) If reasonably possible to
do so, reviewing courts interpret an instruction in a manner that supports the judgment, as
opposed to defeating it. (People v. Mani (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 343, 377; People v.
Quinonez (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 457, 465.) “ ‘Jurors are presumed able to understand
and correlate instructions and are further presumed to have followed the court’s
instructions.’ ” (Thomas, at p. 382; quoting People v. Sanchez (2001) 26 Cal.4th 834,
852.)

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2. Section 266i – Pandering
Section 266i has six parts that define the crime of pandering. (§ 266i, subd. (a);
People v. Campbell (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 463, 485 (Campbell).) The six parts “do not
state different offenses but merely define the different circumstances under which the
crime of pandering may be committed.” (People v. Lax (1971) 20 Cal.App.3d 481, 486;
see Campbell, at p. 485.) As relevant here, a person is guilty of pandering if he
“[p]rocures another person for the purpose of prostitution.” (§ 266i, subd. (a)(1); accord,
Campbell, at p. 485; People v. Chatman (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 989, 993 (Chatman).)
The term “procures” in the context of section 266i, subdivision (a)(1) means “ ‘assisting,
inducing, persuading or encouraging’ [another] to engage in prostitution.” (Campbell, at
p. 485; see People v. Schultz (1965) 238 Cal.App.2d 804, 812 (Schultz); People v.
Montgomery (1941) 47 Cal.App.2d 1, 12 (Montgomery), disapproved on other grounds
by People v. Zambia (2011) 51 Cal.4th 965, 981 (Zambia).) Pandering does not require
monetary gain and thus, unlike the related crime of pimping under section 266h, does not
involve a defendant deriving support from another person’s prostitution. (Campbell, at
p. 487; compare § 266i, subd. (a) with § 266h, subd. (a).) The pandering statute is
designed to discourage prostitution “ ‘by discouraging persons other than the prostitute
from augmenting and expanding a prostitute’s operation, or increasing the supply of
available prostitutes.’ ” (Zambia, at p. 973.)
C. Analysis
1. Forfeiture
There is no dispute that defense counsel failed to object to the trial court’s
definition of the term “procure.” Generally, the failure to object to a jury instruction will
forfeit the error. (People v. Virgil (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1210, 1260; People v. Sexton (2019)
37 Cal.App.5th 457, 466.) However, forfeiture will not be found when the defendant
contends the instruction is an incorrect statement of the law. (People v. Hudson (2006) 38
Cal.4th 1002, 1011–1012; Sexton, at p. 466.) Here, defendant claims that the court’s

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definition of “procure” was incorrect. Therefore, the issue has not been forfeited.
(Hudson, at pp. 1011–1012; Sexton, at p. 466.)
2. Improper Definition of “Procure”
Since the 1941 decision of Montgomery, it has been understood in California that
the term “procure” for purposes of pandering means “ ‘assisting, inducing, persuading or
encouraging’ [another] to engage in prostitution.” (Campbell, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at
p. 485; see Schultz, supra, 238 Cal.App.2d at p. 812; Montgomery, supra, 47 Cal.App.2d
at p. 12.) Consistent with this understanding, the trial court instructed the jury that
“procure” meant “ ‘assisting, inducing, persuading or encouraging’ a person to engage in
prostitution.” The court’s instruction/definition was clearly a correct statement of
California law. (Campbell, at p. 485; Schultz, at p. 812; Montgomery, at p. 12.)
Defendant argues that the concept of assisting is not consistent with dictionary
definitions of “procure.”2 However, that the trial court’s definition may have been more
expansive than a dictionary’s definition does not mean the court’s instruction was
erroneous. For 84 years, California case law has defined the term “procure” for purposes
of pandering as encompassing the actions of a defendant that assist another to engage in
prostitution. As Campbell recognized, the Legislature has amended section 266i many
times since Montgomery first defined “procure” in 1941, and since that definition was
reiterated in 1965 by Schultz, yet in none of those amendments did the Legislature choose
to address the term “procure.” (Campbell, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at p. 486, fn. 18.)
When a statute has been construed by the courts, and the Legislature does not change that
interpretation, generally it is presumed that the Legislature was aware of, and acquiesced

2 Defendant cites the following definitions of “procure” from the Merriam-
Webster online dictionary: (1) to get possession of something, or to obtain something by
particular care and effort; (2) to bring about or achieve something by effort; and (3) to
obtain someone to be employed for sex as for an individual or in a brothel. (See
Merriam-Webster Dict. Online (2025) <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
procure> [as of July 2, 2025], archived at <https://perma.cc/YY73-MCZY>.)

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in, the courts’ construction. (Zambia, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 976; People v. Bouzas
(1991) 53 Cal.3d 467, 475.) Because the Legislature has never addressed or changed the
meaning of “procure” in section 266i, we are satisfied that the Legislature has acquiesced
and accepted Montgomery’s 84-year-old definition. (See Zambia, at pp. 975–976
[finding acquiescence when § 266i had been amended six times without changing a 1973
statutory interpretation]; Bouzas, at p. 475 [finding acquiescence when a statute had been
amended 10 times over a period of 73 years without altering a statutory interpretation];
Campbell, at p. 486, fn. 18.) Therefore, it is the definition of Montgomery that controls
the meaning of the term “procure,” not the cited dictionary’s definitions.
Defendant argues the concept of “assisting” is so broad that it could capture
conduct that was not actually in furtherance of prostitution and that additional clarifying
language was necessary to demonstrate a causal connection between prostitution and
procuring through assisting. We agree that “assisting” is a broad term that could
encompass many actions by a defendant. However, the trial court’s definition of
“procure” did expressly include a causal relationship to prostitution. The instruction
informed the jury that “ ‘procure(d)’ ” in part meant “ ‘assisting . . .’ a person to engage
in prostitution.” (Italics added.) That is, “assisting” is tied directly to another’s
prostitution activities. Therefore, no additional clarifying instruction was necessary.
Finally, defendant argues that he merely sat in his truck and looked out for B.S.
and that such passive activity should not be viewed as pandering. We cannot agree.
Defendant’s statements to the police demonstrated that he knew B.S. was attempting to
engage in prostitution, he took B.S. from Fresno to Bakersfield so B.S. could attempt to
engage in prostitution, and he was protecting B.S. by being present and looking out to
make sure nothing happened to her while she attempted to engage in prostitution.
Providing transportation and protection enables a prostitute like B.S. to ply her trade and
expand into new areas, which is precisely what the pandering statute attempts to prevent.
(Zambia, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 973; see People v. Osuna (1967) 251 Cal.App.2d 528,

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532.) Moreover, case law has indicated that providing protection (Chatman, supra, 30
Cal.App.5th at p. 995) and transportation (Osuna, at p. 533) for a prostitute are actions
that can constitute pandering. Therefore, defendant’s actions were neither outside
Montgomery’s definition of “procure” nor so passive that they plainly fall outside the
reach of section 266i.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

DETJEN, J.
WE CONCUR:

LEVY, Acting P. J.

MEEHAN, J.

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