People v. Shelmon CA2/5

CourtListener 10620261Calctapp30 juin 2025

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Filed 6/30/25 P. v. Shelmon CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE, B337753

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. TA062504)
v.

MARLON LONQUANE
SHELMON,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Carol J. Najera, Judge. Appeal dismissed.

Law Offices of John F. Schuck and John F. Schuck, under
appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, and Sophia A. Lecky, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

******
In 2023, Marlon Lonquane Shelmon (defendant) repeatedly
moved the trial court to correct his 2004 sentence, claiming he
was awarded the incorrect amount of custody credits. The trial
court filed an amended abstract of judgment in January 2025. In
this appeal, defendant asserts the trial court erroneously failed to
award him 70 days of presentence conduct credit that he earned
between 2001 and 2003. Because the trial court lacked
jurisdiction to consider defendant’s post-judgment motions to
recalculate his custody credits (People v. Boyd (2024) 103
Cal.App.5th 56 (Boyd)) and because their recalculation involves
numerous factual issues, we dismiss the appeal for lack of
jurisdiction without prejudice to defendant filing a petition for a
writ of habeas corpus in the trial court.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1
Following a 2002 jury verdict finding defendant guilty of
two counts of attempted premeditated murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187,
664, subd. (a))2 as well as true findings on allegations that he
personally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury (§

1 Because this appeal raises no issues concerning the facts of
the underlying offenses, we omit a statement of facts. (See People
v. White (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 914, 916, fn. 2.)

2 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise indicated.

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12022.53, subd. (d)), that he committed these crimes for the
benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal
street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)), and that his 1999 conviction for
assault with a deadly weapon constituted a prior serious felony (§
667, subd. (a)) for which he served a prior prison term (§ 667.5,
subd. (b)), the trial court on January 31, 2003 sentenced
defendant to prison for 45 years to life. At that sentencing, the
trial court calculated that defendant had served 467 days in local
custody prior to sentencing, and accordingly awarded him 70
days of presentence conduct credit (calculated as 15 percent of
467 days). Defendant appealed, and we affirmed his convictions,
but remanded for resentencing to correct sentencing errors.
(People v. Shelmon (Feb. 17, 2004, B164961) [nonpub. opn.].)
In July 2004, at resentencing on remand, the trial court
imposed a sentence of life imprisonment on each of the attempted
murder counts with a parole eligibility date of 15 years, plus a
consecutive term of 25 years to life for the firearm enhancement,
and ran the two sentences concurrently. The court also imposed
a consecutive five-year term for the prior serious felony
conviction. The court carried forward its initial calculation of 467
days of actual presentence custody and 70 days of presentence
conduct credit.
In July 2023, defendant filed a motion pursuant to Penal
Code section 1237.1 seeking a correction of the record, and filed a
supplemental motion in February 2024. On March 12, 2024, the
trial court denied the motions, and defendant filed a timely notice
of appeal.
In December 2024, while this appeal was pending,
defendant filed a “Motion to Calculate Actual Custody Credits;
Motion to Correct Abstract of Judgment.” (This motion is not

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included in the record on appeal, so it is unclear precisely what
defendant was seeking to correct.) The trial court held a hearing
on January 7, 2025, and issued a new abstract of judgment on
January 22, 2025, which omitted the previously awarded amount
of 70 days of presentence conduct credits.
DISCUSSION
We must dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. A trial
court lacks “fundamental jurisdiction to consider [a defendant’s]
freestanding motion” to correct errors in sentencing credits for a
sentence that has “long been . . . final.” (Boyd, supra, 103
Cal.App.5th at pp. 61, 71; People v. Gonzalez (2025) 108
Cal.App.5th 741, 751; accord, People v. King (2022) 77
Cal.App.5th 629, 637 [unauthorized sentence doctrine “does not
itself create jurisdiction for the trial court to rule on a motion
challenging the legality of a sentence”].) That principle applies
here, as defendant has filed several freestanding motions to
correct the sentencing credits set forth in a 2004 abstract of
judgment. And because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to
entertain defendant’s motions, we lack jurisdiction to entertain
an appeal from those motions. (See People v. Fuimaono (2019) 32
Cal.App.5th 132, 135 [“Because the trial court lacked jurisdiction
. . . the appeal must be dismissed”].)3
Although we have the discretion to construe defendant’s
appeal of orders denying his freestanding motions as a petition
for a writ of habeas corpus addressed to this court, we will
generally exercise that discretion only when the issues presented

3 Because we dismiss for lack of jurisdiction on this ground,
we need not address whether we also lack jurisdiction because
the March 2024 notice of appeal does not challenge the
subsequently issued January 2025 abstract of judgment.

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are “purely legal.” (Boyd, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at pp. 71-72.)
Here, however, the proper calculation of defendant’s custody
credits entails several factual issues, such as:
-- The proper calculation of the number of days of
presentence conduct custody. The parties seem to accept as true
the trial court’s initial calculation of 467 days of actual custody
credit. However, the probation report indicates defendant was
arrested on October 31, 2001, and was initially sentenced on
January 31, 2003; this would yield 457 days of actual custody
credit, which would mean that the presentence conduct credits—
calculated at 15 percent of the actual custody credit due to the
violent nature of the felonies at issue (§§ 4019, subds. (a)(1), (b) &
(c), 2933.1, subds. (a) & (c); People v. Kennedy (2012) 209
Cal.App.4th 385, 395)—would come to 68 days (rather than the
70 days calculated by the trial court in 2003).
-- The proper calculation of the number of days of
actual custody between the date of arrest (on October 31, 2001)
and the date that credits were calculated for the January 2005
abstract of judgment (on January 7, 2025). (People v. Buckhalter
(2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 23; People v. Saibu (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th
1005, 1012; § 2900.1.) That comes to 8,469 days of actual custody
credit. However, the parties here only calculate the actual
custody credits from the date of the 2004 resentencing on
remand, which deprives defendant of many years of actual
custody credit.
We accordingly decline to exercise our discretion to
construe defendant’s appeal as a writ of habeas corpus, but do so
without prejudice to defendant filing a petition for such a writ
before the trial court, which is better equipped to fill in the gaps
in the record and address the fact-bound calculations we have

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identified above (plus any others that may surface).
DISPOSITION
Defendant’s appeal from the order of March 12, 2024 is
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction without prejudice to defendant
filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the trial court.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

______________________, P. J.
HOFFSTADT
We concur:

_________________________, J.
MOOR

_________________________, J.
KIM (D.)

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