CourtListener 10620148•People v. Green CA4/3
Texte intégral
Filed 6/30/25 P. v. Green CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, G063910
v. (Super. Ct. No. RIF2205655)
LACEY KARY GREEN, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside
County, Walter H. Kubelun, Judge. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and
remanded with directions.
John L. Staley, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Collette
C. Cavalier and Emily Reeves, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
* * *
After a jury convicted defendant Lacey Kary Green on four counts
involving unlawful sexual related behavior with a minor, the trial court
sentenced him to an aggregate determinate prison term of three years and
four months. Green contends the court erred by subjecting him to unlawful
multiple punishment in violation of Penal Code section 654.1 We find no
merit in Green’s challenge to the sentence on two of the counts. In contrast,
the Attorney General concedes, and we agree, two of the counts could not be
separately punished because they were based on the same acts, intent, and
objectives. Accordingly, we vacate the sentence and remand the case for
resentencing.
FACTS
Prior to the events leading to his conviction, Green created a user
profile on an online dating platform called “MeetMe.” The profile included his
picture and listed him as being 39 years old.
One day, Green sent a message on MeetMe to a profile with the
name of Destiny. Unbeknownst to him, law enforcement created and
controlled the profile. Destiny was listed as being 18 years old and the picture
associated with the profile was of a 12- to 14-year-old girl. In response to
Green’s message, Destiny identified herself as 13 years old and said she was
on MeetMe to meet friends. The two exchanged some additional messages
over the course of an hour and then exchanged phone numbers. Shortly
thereafter, Green reached out to Destiny via text message saying he
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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“wish[ed] [she] was older.” She responded saying they could “watch a movie
and chill.” Green asked for an additional picture of her; Destiny sent a
different picture of the same 12- to 14-year-old girl. Green told her she was
“so pretty” and sent her two pictures of himself.
A couple days later, Green messaged Destiny and told her she
had pretty eyes. They exchanged additional messages, and Green eventually
asked her if she had “done anything sexual” with guys or herself. She
responded she had not, and Green said he assumed she had not but was just
asking.
Over the course of the next week, Green sent multiple messages
to Destiny and she responded to some. In one set of messages, Green asked
Destiny if she “had ever taken a sexy pic” or a “naked pic.” When she inquired
why he asked about a naked picture, Green said it was “[b]ecause [he] was
going to ask for one.” No pictures were sent.
In another message on a different day, Green conveyed he
“wish[ed] one day [they] could see each other.” The text message conversation
continued, and at various points Green conveyed the following to Destiny: “I
know I just want to kiss you”; “I just want to make you feel good”; “I want to
touch your pussy and have sex with you. That’s my plan.” They agreed to
meet up the following day, but that meeting did not take place for logistical
reasons on law enforcement’s end.
Two days after the first scheduled meetup, Green messaged
Destiny asking if they could meet the following Friday—a little over a week
away—and she agreed to meet him in person. Before that day came, they
exchanged text messages about condoms. Green said, “I can’t have kids so we
don’t need one, and it’s better without trust [sic].” The second scheduled in-
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person meetup did not occur because Green was going to be late due to work
and Destiny indicated she could not do the later time.
During the following week, prompted by questions from Green if
they could make plans to meet, he and Destiny agreed once again to try to
meet in person. They agreed to meet at a certain fast food restaurant in the
City of Riverside. At Destiny’s request, he said he would bring her a certain
soda and try to bring her donuts. He asked her if she was “ready to have sex.”
On the day of the third scheduled in-person meetup, Green
arrived at the agreed upon location at the agreed upon time. Law
enforcement effectuated a traffic stop and arrested him. A search of his
vehicle revealed a cold soda of the type Destiny requested.
A complaint charged Green with the following: unlawfully
contacting or communicating with a minor (§ 288.3, subd. (a); count 1);
unlawfully arranging a meeting with a minor (§ 288.4, subd. (b); count 2);
attempting to use a minor to perform prohibited acts (§§ 311.4, subd. (c), 664;
count 3); and attempting lewd acts with a child (§§ 288, subd. (a), 664; count
4).
A jury convicted Green on all counts. The trial court sentenced
him to a total of three years and four months in prison, consisting of two
years on count 2, a consecutive one-year term on count 1, a consecutive four-
month term on count 3, and a concurrent term of 18 months on count 4.
Green timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Green’s arguments on appeal solely concern the imposed
sentence. He contends the trial court erred in imposing terms for each count
without staying any of them pursuant to section 654. From his perspective,
the sentence on counts 1, 3, and 4 should have been stayed because he “had a
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single intent and objective for all four crimes.” We conclude section 654
precluded Green from being separately punished on counts 2 and 4 only.
Section 654 “prohibits the imposition of punishment for more
than one violation arising out of an ‘act or omission’ which is made
punishable in different ways by different statutory provisions.” (People v.
Beamon (1973) 8 Cal.3d 625, 636, fn. omitted (Beamon).) Its application
generally requires evaluating two aspects of the particular circumstances in a
case. One aspect concerns whether the violations arise out of a singular act.
(Id. at p. 637.) In the context of section 654, singular not only means one act
in the ordinary sense, but also “a course of conduct deemed to be indivisible
in time.” (Beamon, supra, 8 Cal. 3d. at pp. 637, 639, fn. omitted.) The other
aspect concerns the defendant’s objective and intent. (Id. at p. 638.) The focus
is whether the defendant entertained multiple criminal objectives which were
independent of each other, or instead had a sole principal objective to which
other objectives, if any, were merely incidental. (Id. at p. 639.)
Through evaluation and application of these factors, case law has
established certain overarching, interrelated principles. First, “where a
course of conduct is divisible in time it may give rise to multiple punishment
even if the acts are directive to one objective.” (People v. Louie (2012) 203
Cal.App.4th 388, 399 (Louie).) Second, “[i]f the separation in time afforded [a]
defendant[ ] an opportunity to reflect and to renew their intent before
committing the next crime, a new and separate crime is committed.” (Ibid.)
Third, “[i]f [a defendant] entertained multiple criminal objectives which were
independent of and not merely incidental to each other, [they] may be
punished for independent violations committed in pursuit of each objective
even though the violations shared common acts or were parts of an otherwise
indivisible course of conduct.” (Beamon, supra, 8 Cal.3d at p. 639.)
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Here, the trial court found “none of the convictions rise out of the
same set of operative facts. The defendant was convicted of four counts, each
count being a separate action and occurring on different dates; therefore,
[section] 654 does not apply.”2 We review the court’s determination about the
separate nature of the acts for substantial evidence and consider the evidence
in the light most favorable to the judgment. (People v. Cardenas (2015) 239
Cal.App.4th 220, 226; People v. Williamson (1979) 90 Cal.App.3d 164, 172.)
With respect to count 2, the jury found Green unlawfully went to
an arranged meeting with a minor with the intent to engage in a lewd act.
Consistent with the prosecutor’s closing argument and the jury instructions,
the offense was based on Green arranging to meet, and going to meet,
Destiny in person at a particular location on the day he ultimately was
arrested, for the purpose of engaging in sexual acts.
Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion that
count 1, communicating with a minor to commit lewd and lascivious acts, and
count 3, attempting to use a minor to perform prohibited acts, were each
based on a different set of acts than count 2, and were also not based on the
same acts as one another. Before Green arranged and went to meet Destiny
in person, he communicated with her over a period of several weeks. On the
first day, he learned Destiny was 13 years old. And early on, his messages to
her conveyed his intent to engage in sexual acts with her. Those messages,
related to count 1, took place long before Green set up the in-person meeting
with Destiny which led to his arrest. The temporal separation allowed Green
2 Green made no section 654 argument below, but none was
required to preserve the issue for appeal. (People v. Kelly (2018) 28
Cal.App.5th 886, 903.)
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to reflect and renew his intent, meaning his actions were not one indivisible
course of conduct. (See Louie, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 399.) The same is
true with respect to Green’s attempts to get Destiny to send him naked
pictures of herself, the acts on which count 3 was based.
Green argues he “had a single intent and objective for all four
crimes.” Even assuming he had a sole intent and objective of sexual
gratification, that does not preclude multiple punishment. (See People v.
Perez (1979) 23 Cal.3d 545, 552–553.) “Assertion of a sole intent and objective
to achieve sexual gratification is akin to an assertion of a desire for wealth as
the sole intent and objective in committing a series of separate thefts. To
accept such a broad, overriding intent and objective to preclude punishment
for otherwise clearly separate offenses would violate the statute’s purpose to
insure [sic] a defendant’s punishment will be commensurate with [their]
culpability. [Citation.] It would reward the defendant who has the greater
criminal ambition with a lesser punishment.” (Id. at p. 552.)
As for count 4, attempting to commit a lewd or lascivious act on a
child under 14 years old, the Attorney General concedes Green could not be
separately punished for it and count 2. We agree. As the prosecutor argued in
closing, “this ties everything together.” All the text messages with Destiny
evidenced Green’s intent and, as the prosecutor argued, his act of driving to
the agreed upon meeting point was the culminating act of all his preparatory
work establishing the attempt. With count 4 being based on the same acts,
intent, and objectives, as count 2, Green could not be punished for both.
The identified error requires a remand for resentencing. As of
January 2022, when faced with two counts which cannot be separately
punished, section 654 vests a trial court with discretion to choose which term
to impose and execute, and which term to impose and stay. And because the
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court’s calculus in that respect may impact other discretionary aspects of
sentencing, a full resentencing is appropriate.3 (See People v. Buycks (2018) 5
Cal.5th 857, 893; People v. Codinha (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 976, 994.)
DISPOSITION
The conviction is affirmed, the sentence is vacated, and the case
is remanded for resentencing. Upon completion of the new sentencing hearing
the trial court is directed to prepare an amended abstract of judgment and
forward a certified copy to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
DELANEY, J.
WE CONCUR:
SANCHEZ, ACTING P. J.
MOTOIKE, J.
3 Based on the date of Green’s original sentencing, the aggregate
sentence, and the credit he received for time served, it is unclear if Green has
finished serving his sentence. Neither party brings our attention to that
issue. Out of an abundance of caution, because even a completed sentence
may have disadvantageous collateral consequences depending on the
circumstances (see People v. Ellison (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1360, 1368–
1369), we find a remand for resentencing to be appropriate.
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