Baksh v. Goetz CA2/2

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Filed 6/27/25 Baksh v. Goetz CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO

AJIM BAKSH, B339183
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Los Angeles County
v. Super. Ct. No.
24STCV00856)
JUDY NAGY GOETZ, Individually
and as Trustee, etc.,
Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Holly J. Fujie, Judge. Affirmed.
Bobko Law, Patrick K. Bobko; Aleshire & Wynder and
Norman A. Dupont for Defendant and Appellant.
Alleguez Newman Goodstein, Gary J. Goodstein; Pettler,
Miller & Aldover and Ernesto F. Aldover for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
This appeal stems from a dispute over the proposed
construction of an “infinity” pool on a residential hillside. Judith
Nagy Goetz, individually and as Trustee of the Nagy Trust dated
May 10, 1988 (collectively Goetz), sought a writ of administrative
mandate challenging the decision by the City of Torrance (City)
to approve the pool. The pool was to be built on the backyard
slope of a home next to a home owned by Goetz. The petition
asserted the City’s approval of the pool violated the California
Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). The trial court denied
Goetz’s petition.
Ajim Baksh (Baksh) is the real party in interest in the
CEQA litigation. After the City approved his plans for the pool
and Goetz’s CEQA petition was denied, Baksh filed this action
against Goetz for malicious prosecution. Baksh alleged Goetz
lacked probable cause and acted with malice as shown by her
unsuccessful CEQA litigation and inappropriate behavior toward
him.
In response, Goetz filed a special motion to strike Baksh’s
complaint under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16,
commonly known as the anti-SLAPP statute.1 The trial court
denied the motion after finding Baksh established a probability of
prevailing on his malicious prosecution claim. Goetz appeals
from the order denying the anti-SLAPP motion.
We conclude Baksh presented sufficient evidence of his
probability of prevailing on his malicious prosecution claim and
affirm the order.

1 Statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure
unless otherwise indicated.

2
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Facts
In 1986 and 1998, landslides involving hillside residences
occurred in the City. As a result, the City adopted building and
zoning codes governing hillside residential development. (See
Torrance Mun. Code, § 91.1.1 et seq.)
Paseo de las Tortugas is a street in a hillside residential
development within the City’s Hillside Overlay District.
(Torrance Mun. Code, § 91.41.1 et seq.) The street is lined with
single-family homes in the R-1 zoning district. The home fronts
are at street-level; the backyards extend down to retaining walls.
Below the walls, the hillside continues to descend. As hillside
residents, homeowners are subject to the City’s code sections
governing home renovation and hillside excavation. (Torrance
Mun. Code, §§ 91.41.6—91.41.7, 91.41.9—91.41.13.) The code
expressly exempts “swimming pools” from its hillside regulations.
(Torrance Mun. Code, § 91.41.14.)
Baksh owns a home at 5109 Paseo de las Tortugas. Goetz
owns the adjacent home at 5105 Paseo de las Tortugas. Goetz
does not live in the home; her mother and sister live there. The
backyards of the two homes share the same hillside.
In 2019, Baksh was granted a Minor Hillside Exemption
(MHE) permit to remodel his home after he revised his building
plans in response to Goetz’s objections.
Baksh then decided to construct an infinity pool and deck
on the hillside below his retaining wall. The pool was to be
surrounded on three sides by a deck. The fourth side was to
feature an exposed “infinity edge” and an unseen catch basin.
The pool machinery, which would pump the water into the pool,
was to be placed in the interstitial space below the pool deck.

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In June 2020, Baksh commissioned Hamilton & Associates,
a geotechnical engineering company, to investigate the feasibility
of building the pool on the hillside. The company performed
three monitored “test borings” of the hillside to remove soil
samples for laboratory testing. On August 25, 2020, the company
reported: (1) no groundwater was found within the depths of the
pool; (2) no danger of a landslide existed from earthquake-caused
liquefaction; (3) the pool could be safely constructed by employing
the proper designs, construction, and (4) the company proposed
the use of steel pipes to protect the hillside and the pool.
In December 2020, Baksh applied to the Planning Division
within the Community Development Department for a MHE
permit to build the pool and submitted the geotechnical report.
Goetz opposed Baksh’s application. She contended the pool
would obstruct her home’s ocean view and undermine the
stability of the shared hillside as prohibited by Torrance
Municipal Code sections 91.41.6 and 91.41.9. Baksh agreed to
modify his plans and lower the construction of the pool an
additional five feet below the retaining wall to preserve Goetz’s
ocean view.
The Community Development Director approved Baksh’s
application for a MHE permit, noting the City’s Building and
Safety and Grading Divisions would “require detailed
information regarding the construction method to ensure proper
Code compliance.” Then, to be issued a building permit, Baksh
had to ensure the pool and deck met the City’s building, grading,
and safety standards, including geotechnical safety standards.
Without a building permit, the construction would not occur.

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B. Administrative Appeals
In June 2021, Goetz appealed the Community Development
Director’s decision to the City Planning Commission. She argued
the decision was contrary to the Torrance Municipal Code. The
pool would impede her ocean view, light, air, and privacy rights.
Goetz also pointed to the possibility of soil erosion from pool
water run-off which could trigger a landslide. She maintained
the proposed pool would adversely affect the environment and
was thus not exempt from a CEQA environmental impact report
(EIR) before a MHE permit could be granted.
Baksh provided the Commission with photographs of a
hillside infinity pool at a neighboring home. The home located at
5207 Paseo de las Tortugas is three houses down from Baksh’s
home and four houses down from Goetz’s home. The homes all
share the same hillside.2 The City Council approved a MHE
permit for the 5207 home in 2016.
At the appeal hearing, the Planning Commission
unanimously denied Goetz’s appeal. The Commission specifically
determined Baksh’s pool was “Categorically Exempted by the
Guidelines for Implementation of the [CEQA]; Article 19, Section
15303(e),” i.e., the CEQA exemption for swimming pools. This
meant the City would not delay its approval of the requested
MHE; no EIR was necessary.
In August 2021, Goetz appealed the City Planning
Commission’s decision to the City Council. At the October 26,
2021 hearing, Goetz argued sufficient evidence did not support

2 Goetz has not provided the complete administrative
record. But according to the City’s and Baksh’s joint trial brief
for the writ petition, one of the pools “sits just ‘yards’ away from
the 1986 landslide,” citing the Administrative Record.

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the Commission’s finding of a CEQA categorical exemption.
Goetz also submitted a geological survey report by SPC
Engineering. The SPC Engineering consultant had visited the
pool site and reviewed relevant photographs, design drawings,
and historical and public records. In the consultant’s opinion, “A
geotechnical investigation is warranted, considering the geologic
history of the site with significant slope stability problems, as
well as to identify the geotechnical parameters for design.”
Baksh informed the City Council that a geotechnical report of the
hillside had already been submitted. Ultimately, the City
Council denied the appeal and approved the requested MHE
permit.
C. CEQA Litigation
Goetz filed a verified petition for writ of mandate and
preliminary injunction to compel the City (1) to set aside the
approval of the MHE permit because the Class 3 exemption did
not apply; and (2) to prepare an EIR before any construction took
place. The trial court denied the writ petition following a trial.
D. Malicious Prosecution Action and Anti-SLAPP
Motion
Thereafter, Baksh filed this action against Goetz for
malicious prosecution and civil harassment. For his malicious
prosecution claim, Baksh asserted the CEQA litigation
terminated in his favor and was brought by Goetz without
probable cause and with malice.
In turn, Goetz filed a special motion to strike the action
under the anti-SLAPP law.
Following a hearing, the trial court found both claims arose
from protected speech. However, the court determined Baksh
established a likelihood of prevailing on his malicious prosecution

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claim and denied the anti-SLAPP motion as to that cause of
action. The court granted the motion as to the second cause of
action for civil harassment, concluding the claim was
procedurally defective.3 Goetz appealed the order denying her
anti-SLAPP motion.
DISCUSSION
A. CEQA Overview
CEQA “establishes a comprehensive scheme to provide
long-term protection to the environment. It prescribes review
procedures a public agency must follow before approving or
carrying out certain projects.” (Berkeley Hillside Preservation v.
City of Berkeley (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1086, 1092 (Berkeley Hillside).)
“Under CEQA and its implementing guidelines, an agency
generally conducts an initial study to determine ‘if the project
may have a significant effect on the environment.’ ” (Friends of
College of San Mateo Gardens v. San Mateo Community College
Dist. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 937, 945.) “If there is substantial evidence
that the project may have a significant effect on the
environment,” then the agency must generate an EIR prior to
approving the pool. (Ibid.)
“For policy reasons, the Legislature has expressly exempted
several categories of projects from review under CEQA.
[Citation.] By statute, the Legislature has also directed the
Secretary of the Natural Resources Agency . . . to establish ‘a list
of classes of projects that have been determined not to have a
significant effect on the environment and that shall be exempt
from’ CEQA.” (Berkeley Hillside, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 1092.)

3 In light of the trial court’s ruling, only the malicious
prosecution claim is at issue.

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There are 33 categorical exemptions. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14,
§§ 15300–15333.4) Among them is the Class 3 exemption for
“Construction or Conversion of Small Structures,” which pertains
to “[a]ccessory (appurtenant) structures including . . . swimming
pools.” (Guidelines, § 15303, subd. (e).) As discussed, in denying
Goetz’s appeals, the City concluded Baksh’s pool fell into this
categorical exemption, thereby obviating the need for an EIR.
(Arcadians for Environmental Preservation v. City of Arcadia
(2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 418, 429 [“If an exemption applies, the pool
is excused from environmental review.”].)
Categorical exemptions can be subject to certain exceptions.
If an exception applies, the exemption is foreclosed, and an EIR is
necessary. (Arcadians for Environmental Preservation v. City of
Arcadia, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 436; Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14,
§ 15601, subd. (b)(2).) In her writ petition’s trial brief, Goetz
maintained based on the pool’s “unusual circumstances” the
Class 3 category exemption was unavailable, thereby requiring
an EIR. (See Guidelines, § 15300.2, subd. (c) [unusual
circumstances exception].) It was Goetz’s burden to prove the
exception applied to the pool. (Fairbank v. City of Mill Valley
(1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 1243, 1259.) This could be accomplished
with proof the pool presented unusual circumstances relating to
some feature—such as size and location—that distinguished it
from other swimming pools in the exempt class. (Berkeley
Hillside, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 1105.)

4 Sections 15000 et seq. of title 14 of the California Code of
Regulations are the implementing administrative regulations,
and are referred to as “Guidelines.” (See Muzzy Ranch Co. v.
Solano County Airport Land Use Com. (2007) 41 Cal.4th 372,
380, fn. 2.)

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B. Anti-SLAPP
The anti-SLAPP statute provides in relevant part that “[a]
cause of action against a person arising from any act of that
person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free
speech . . . in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a
special motion to strike [anti-SLAPP motion], unless the court
determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a
probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.” (§ 425.16,
subd. (b)(1).)
Ruling on an anti-SLAPP motion involves a two-step
process: First, the court must decide whether the defendant has
shown the challenged claim arises from activity protected by the
anti-SLAPP statute, and if so, the court then must decide
whether the plaintiff has shown a probability of prevailing on the
claim. (Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29
Cal.4th 53, 67.) Only a claim that both arises from protected
activity and lacks merit is a SLAPP subject to being stricken.
(Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 89; accord, Wilson v.
Cable News Network, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 871, 874.)
It is undisputed Baksh’s malicious prosecution claim arose
from protected activity. Therefore, we limit our inquiry to
whether Baksh met his second step burden: Did he show each
element of his malicious prosecution claim has at least minimal
merit?
We review a ruling on an anti-SLAPP motion de novo and
engage in the same two-step process as the trial court. (Park v.
Board of Trustees of California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th
1057, 1067.)

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C. Did Baksh Establish a Probability of Prevailing on
Each Element of His Malicious Prosecution Claim?
Again, the focus of our analysis is whether Baksh
established a probability of prevailing on each element of his
malicious prosecution claim. A malicious prosecution claim
“consists of three elements. The underlying action must have
been: (i) initiated or maintained by, or at the direction of, the
defendant, and pursued to a legal termination in favor of the
malicious prosecution plaintiff; (ii) initiated or maintained
without probable cause; and (iii) initiated or maintained with
malice.” (Parrish v. Latham & Watkins (2017) 3 Cal.5th 767,
775.)
The parties agree the CEQA litigation was initiated or
maintained by or at the direction of Goetz and terminated in
Baksh’s favor. However, the parties disagree whether Baksh
made a prima facie showing Goetz pursued the CEQA litigation
without probable cause and with malice. We begin with the lack
of probable cause element.
“ ‘In analyzing the issue of probable cause in a malicious
prosecution context, the trial court must consider both the factual
circumstances established by the evidence and the legal theory
upon which relief [was] sought’ ” in the earlier action. (Jay v.
Mahaffey (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1522, 1540.) “ ‘ “[P]robable
cause is lacking ‘when a prospective plaintiff and counsel do not
have evidence sufficient to uphold a favorable judgment or
information affording an inference that such evidence can be
obtained for trial.’ ” ’ [Citation.] ‘ “In a situation of complete
absence of supporting evidence, it cannot be adjudged reasonable
to prosecute a claim.” ’ [Citation.] ‘When there is a dispute as to
the state of the defendant’s knowledge and the existence of

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probable cause turns on resolution of that dispute . . . the jury
must resolve the threshold question of the defendant’s factual
knowledge or belief.’ ” (Daniels v. Robbins (2010) 182
Cal.App.4th 204, 222–223.)
Baksh demonstrated, with at least minimal merit, Goetz
lacked probable cause for her contention an EIR was necessitated
by the unusual circumstances exception to the Category 3
exemption. There was evidence in the administrative record of
the dimensions of Baksh’s infinity pool, the materials to be used
in its construction, and the way it was to be built on the hillside.
There was also evidence of the location of the proposed pool and
of other pools situated nearby on the same hillside. Goetz’s SPC
Engineering report advised that a geotechnical investigation
must be conducted before the pool was to be built. Historical
documents introduced by Goetz concerned the 1986 landslide in
the vicinity and Paseo de las Tortugas’s formal designation as
part of a hazardous landslide area. Goetz relied on this evidence
to show Baksh’s pool presented unusual circumstances relating to
its large size and dangerous location that distinguished it from
“typical backyard pools” and the nearby swimming pools. (See
Berkeley Hillside, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p.1105.) However, Goetz
offered no evidence of the circumstances related to these other
swimming pools against which the comparison of the unusual
and usual could be made. It was therefore not possible to
distinguish the features of Baksh’s pool from those of other
swimming pools in the exempt class.
We conclude for purposes of the second step anti-SLAPP
analysis, Baksh established a probability of prevailing on the
issue of whether Goetz pursued the CEQA Litigation without
probable cause.

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It must be said our evaluation of the lack of probable cause
element was made more difficult by the trial court’s ruling on the
anti-SLAPP motion.
The court (Judge Holly J. Fujie) properly denied the motion
as to the malicious prosecution claim. In doing so, however,
Judge Fujie inexplicably chose to rely on the “location exception”
(Guidelines, § 15300.2, subd. (a)) in considering the lack of
probable cause. The judge held: Baksh “points out that this
location exception was inapplicable in the underlying CEQA
action because such an exception only applied to environmental
resources, not proximity to hazards. (Berkeley Hills Watershed
Coalition v. City of Berkeley (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 880, 891.)
Thus, this theory was pursued without probable cause.”
Judge Fujie correctly stated the law and a portion of
Baksh’s opposition to the writ petition. But, the judge also
expressly declined to address whether there was a lack probable
cause in terms of the unusual circumstances exception, even
though the applicability of that exception was the central issue in
the CEQA litigation.
Although Goetz referred to the location exception in her
writ petition, she did not develop an argument in support of that
exception in her trial brief. Nor did the trial court (Judge Joel L.
Lofton) mention the location exception in an extremely thorough
and well-reasoned decision denying the writ petition. It appears
the location exception was not the subject of the CEQA litigation.
Nor did Goetz raise it to the City at any administrative hearings.
Thus, any issues regarding the applicability of the location
exception have been forfeited. (See Findleton v. Coyote Valley
Band of Pomo Indians (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 565, 569 [failure to
raise them before Judge Lofton]; Jenkins v. Brandt-Hawley

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(2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1357, 1381 [failure to raise them before the
City].)
Unfortunately, Judge Fujie’s error in relying on the location
exception prompted the parties to argue the merits of the exception
for the first time in their appellate briefs. For our part, we affirm
Judge Fujie’s order denying the anti-SLAPP motion as employing
the wrong reason for the right result. It is a principle of appellate
review we are bound to uphold the trial court’s ruling if correct on
any basis including the wrong reason. (In re Marriage of Burgess
(1996) 13 Cal.4th 25, 32; Day v. Alta Bates Medical Center (2002)
98 Cal.App.4th 243, 252.)
D. Did Baksh Establish a Probability of Prevailing on
the Malice Element?
We next turn to the malice element. Malice in connection
with malicious prosecution “ ‘relates to the subjective intent or
purpose with which the defendant acted.’ ” (Soukup v. Law
Offices of Herbert Hafif (2006) 39 Cal.4th 260, 292.) Malice
“ ‘may range anywhere from open hostility to indifference’ ”; it is
not limited to “ ‘ill will toward plaintiff but exists when the
proceedings are [prosecuted] primarily for an improper purpose.’ ”
(Ibid.) As an element of malicious prosecution, malice “reflects
the core function of the tort, which is to secure compensation for
harm inflicted by misusing the judicial system, i.e., using it for
something other than to enforce legitimate rights and secure
remedies to which the claimant may tenably claim an
entitlement.” (Drummond v. Desmarais (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th
439, 452.)
In his complaint for malicious prosecution and declaration
supporting his opposition to Goetz’s anti-SLAPP motion, Baksh

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detailed how he was consistently harassed and intimidated by
Goetz since he began remodeling his home in 2019.
Baksh averred: Goetz frequently visited the home she
owned on Paseo de las Tortugas. On those occasions, she would
yell at Baksh, his workers, and City inspectors. Goetz would also
contact the City with unfounded complaints against Baksh.
Another time, Goetz began shaking Baksh’s temporary fence and
screamed it was not secure. She then turned away, dropped her
pants, and “mooned” Baksh and his workers. After Baksh was
granted his MHE permit for the pool, Goetz repeatedly appealed
and requested continuances. Goetz told Baksh he would never
have the pool built because she would keep appealing and
seeking continuances. Baksh attempted to have a cordial
relationship with Goetz without success. He also revised his
building plans in response to her concerns. Goetz said to Baksh,
“[Y]our kind does not belong here,” and, “[W]e don’t want you
here.” Baksh immigrated from Trinidad and Tobago to the
United States in the 1970’s.
There clearly was sufficient evidence from which it can be
found that Goetz pursued the CEQA litigation with malice.
Baksh established a probability of prevailing on the malice
element. In ruling on the anti-SLAPP motion, the trial court
agreed. Goetz does not challenge the finding of malice on appeal.

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DISPOSITION
The order denying Goetz’s anti-SLAPP motion as to the
malicious prosecution claim is affirmed. Baksh is entitled to his
costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

LUI, P. J.
We concur:

ASHMANN-GERST, J.

RICHARDSON, J.

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