CourtListener 10617841•People v. Sanford CA3
Texte intégral
Filed 6/26/25 P. v. Sanford CA3
Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Butte)
----
THE PEOPLE, C095503
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. Nos. 21CF04465,
21CF04671)
v.
OPINION ON TRANSFER
SAMUEL SANFORD,
Defendant and Appellant.
After the trial court found defendant Samuel Sanford guilty of attempted arson and
resisting a peace officer, it imposed a sentence that included the three-year upper term on
the attempted arson conviction. Defendant appealed, arguing insufficient evidence
supported his attempted arson conviction and the case must be remanded for resentencing
because the trial court’s imposition of the upper term sentence did not satisfy the new
requirements of Senate Bill No. 567 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 567), which
took effect while his appeal was pending and applies retroactively to his case.
In an unpublished opinion, we affirmed the judgment, concluding sufficient
evidence supported defendant’s conviction, and the trial court’s consideration of the
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aggravating circumstances, while inconsistent with Senate Bill 567’s requirements, was
harmless error. (People v. Sanford (May 1, 2023, C095503) [nonpub. opn.].) The
California Supreme Court granted review, then ordered this court to vacate its decision
and reconsider the cause in light of People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730 (Lynch).
Having done so, we will affirm defendant’s conviction but remand the matter for a
resentencing hearing.
FACTS AND HISTORY OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This appeal involves the joint sentencing in two cases. In case No. 21CF04465,
defendant pleaded no contest to bringing methamphetamine into a jail facility. (Pen.
Code, § 4573.5; statutory section citations that follow are found in the Penal Code unless
otherwise stated.) Before defendant was sentenced, the prosecution charged him with
attempted arson (§ 455, subd. (a)); resisting a peace officer (§ 148, subd. (a)(1)); and
possession of drug paraphernalia (Health & Saf. Code, § 11364, subd. (a)) in case No.
21CF04671. The prosecution also alleged defendant committed the attempted arson
while he was released on bail or his own recognizance. (§ 12022.1.) The prosecution
later dismissed the count charging possession of drug paraphernalia.
At trial, two witnesses testified for the prosecution. The first, a city park
employee, testified she saw defendant in a park one morning. She saw defendant bent
over a stump with an open flame. Defendant was holding the flame “towards the stump,
like he was trying to light something on the stump on fire.” Defendant did the same thing
a “couple of times.” She could not tell if defendant was using a lighter or just a lit match.
The witness called police and continued to watch defendant. She was concerned
defendant was going to start a fire on top of the stump, although she did not see if there
was anything on top of the stump.
Police Sergeant John Sanzone testified he responded to a report of a man trying to
start a fire in a local park. When he arrived at the park, he saw defendant crouched near a
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tree stump in a field holding an open flame. The flame was less than an inch from the
ground. Sergeant Sanzone noted there was dry vegetation in the area. There was
currently an active forest fire burning in the area and there had been a recent arson
nearby. The sergeant arrested defendant and found a lighter in his pocket. He also found
a glass pipe for smoking methamphetamine.
The trial court found defendant guilty of attempted arson and resisting a peace
officer and found true the enhancement allegation. At the sentencing hearing, the court
noted it had read and considered the probation report, which noted defendant had
received three felony convictions and three misdemeanor convictions since 2011.
Defendant had served terms in state prison and had multiple probation and parole
violations. Defense counsel acknowledged defendant’s “prior history,” but noted the
offenses in the current case were drug related and asked defendant be placed in a
treatment program. The prosecutor argued defendant had received ample opportunities to
seek treatment and had a track record that included 12 separate violations during his most
recent parole term.
In aggravation, the court found defendant had numerous prior convictions; had
served prior prison terms; and his prior performance on probation and parole was
unsatisfactory. The court found no mitigating factors. Thus, the court imposed the upper
term of three years for the attempted arson conviction, for a total aggregate sentence of
five years eight months.
DISCUSSION
I
Insufficient Evidence
Defendant argues there was insufficient evidence to support the specific intent of
the attempted arson conviction because no evidence shows defendant was trying to light
the vegetation on fire, rather than his methamphetamine pipe.
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When considering a claim of insufficient evidence, we examine the entire record
to assess whether any rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt. (People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 357.) Thus, “we review
the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and presume in support of the
judgment the existence of every fact the jury could reasonably have deduced from the
evidence. [Citation.] ‘Conflicts and even testimony [that] is subject to justifiable
suspicion do not justify the reversal of a judgment, for it is the exclusive province of the
trial judge or jury to determine the credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the
facts upon which a determination depends. [Citation.] We resolve neither credibility
issues nor evidentiary conflicts; we look for substantial evidence. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]
A reversal for insufficient evidence ‘is unwarranted unless it appears “that upon no
hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support” ’ the jury’s
verdict. [Citation.]” (Ibid.)
Section 455 defines attempted arson, saying, “Any person who willfully and
maliciously attempts to set fire to or attempts to burn or to aid, counsel or procure the
burning of any structure, forest land or property, or who commits any act preliminary
thereto, or in furtherance thereof, is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison . . .
[¶] The placing or distributing of any flammable, explosive or combustible material or
substance, or any device in or about any structure, forest land or property in an
arrangement or preparation with intent to eventually willfully and maliciously set fire to
or burn same, or to procure the setting fire to or burning of the same shall, for the
purposes of this act constitute an attempt to burn such structure, forest land or property.”
“ ‘In order to establish an attempt, it must appear that the defendant had a specific intent
to commit a crime and did a direct, unequivocal act toward that end; preparation alone is
not enough, and some appreciable fragment of the crime must have been
accomplished.’ ” (People v. Archibald (1958) 164 Cal.App.2d 629, 633.)
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Adequate evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion that defendant intended to
set fire to the stump or other vegetation in the park. An eyewitness testified that she saw
defendant holding an open flame close to a tree stump in the park, as if he was “trying to
light something on the stump on fire.” Her testimony was corroborated by Sergeant
Sanzone, who arrived shortly thereafter and saw defendant doing the same thing very
close to the ground near dry vegetation. A trier of fact could reasonably conclude, based
on defendant’s continued efforts to hold an open flame near flammable objects, that he
intended to start a fire. That defendant failed to do so in the observed time does not mean
that he lacked the necessary intent. Nor does the fact that defendant could have been
attempting to light a pipe to smoke methamphetamine; our task in substantial evidence
review is not to determine whether there are alternative conclusions the trier of fact could
have reached, but only whether the trier of fact’s actual conclusion is reasonable. (People
v. Zamudio, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 357.)
We are similarly unpersuaded by defendant’s reliance on People v. Carrasco
(2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 978 and People v. Archibald, supra, 164 Cal.App.2d 629. In
both cases, the respective courts found sufficient evidence for attempted arson
convictions, but neither set a floor for the amount or type of evidence required for such a
conviction, and thus neither requires a contrary finding in this case. (Carrasco, at
pp. 983-984; Archibald, at p. 633.) And neither case established a requirement of
“statements” by defendant or proof of specific motive to find specific intent. We
conclude substantial evidence supported the attempted arson conviction.
II
Senate Bill 567
In our previous opinion, we concluded Senate Bill 567 applied retroactively to
defendant’s nonfinal judgment. (Sanford, supra, C095503.) Remand for resentencing
was not required, however, because it was not reasonably probable the trial court would
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have found not true the factors it relied on to impose the upper term. (Ibid.) The
California Supreme Court ordered this court to reconsider defendant’s request for
resentencing in light of Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th 730. The parties filed supplemental
briefs. We conclude we must reverse defendant’s sentence and remand for resentencing
in compliance with Senate Bill 567.
In Lynch, our Supreme Court explained, “[e]ffective January 1, 2022, [] section
1170, subdivision (b) (hereafter section 1170[, subdivision] (b)) was amended to prohibit
imposition of an upper term sentence unless aggravating circumstances justify that term
and the facts underlying any such circumstance, other than a prior conviction, ‘have been
stipulated to by the defendant or have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial
by the jury or by the judge in a court trial.’ [Citation.] Allegations of prior convictions
may be tried by the court alone and proven by certified records of conviction.” (Lynch,
supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 742, fn. omitted.) This amendment has been uniformly applied
retroactively to defendants whose judgments were not final on direct appeal at the time
the statute took effect. (Id. at pp. 742, 746.)
“[A] court reviewing a case where the former version of section 1170[,
subdivision] (b) was employed must apply the Chapman standard of review. [Citation.]
Accordingly, in a case where the judgment is not yet final, a sentence imposed under
former section 1170[, subdivision] (b) must be reversed and remanded unless the
reviewing court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury, applying that same
standard, would have found true all of the aggravating facts upon which the court relied
to conclude the upper term was justified, or that those facts were otherwise proved true in
compliance with the current statute.” (Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 742-743; see also
id. at p. 768.)
In addition, when the trial court imposed a sentence before the statute’s 2022
amendment, as it did here, the appropriate remedy “ ‘is to remand for resentencing unless
the record “clearly indicate[s]” that the trial court would have reached the same
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conclusion “even if it had been aware that it had such discretion.” ’ ” (Lynch, supra,
16 Cal.5th at p. 771.) This requirement “must be satisfied in addition to a finding of
harmlessness regarding any omitted factual finding” because “neither a Chapman nor a
Watson review ‘can adequately indicate that resentencing is unnecessary upon retroactive
application of amended section 1170[, subdivision ](b).’ ” (Id. at p. 772.) Our high court
has cautioned that in applying the “clearly indicates” standard, “ ‘it is almost always
speculative for a reviewing court to say what the sentencing court would have done if it
had known the scope of its discretionary powers at the time of sentencing.’ ” (Id. at
p. 776.)
Here, the facts underlying the court’s three findings for imposing the upper term
for the attempted arson conviction -- (1) that defendant had numerous prior convictions,
(2) had served prior prison terms, and (3) had unsatisfactory performance on probation
and parole -- were not found true by a trier of fact or stipulated to by defendant.
Accordingly, applying Senate Bill 567 retroactively, it was error to consider those factors
as supporting the imposition of an upper term sentence.
Assuming, without deciding, the error was harmless under Chapman, however, the
record does not “provide a clear indication of what” the trial court would have done had it
understood the scope of its discretion. (Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 776.) Although the
trial court weighed the aggravating circumstances and found no mitigating circumstances,
it did not provide any “definitive statements . . . to clearly indicate it would not impose a
lesser sentence under any circumstances.” (Id. at p. 777 [citing statements that trial court
was aware of upcoming legislation or that defendant was “ ‘deserving [of] the ultimate
sentence’ ” as examples of “definitive statements” as to sentencing].)
The People point to the trial court’s general denial of probation and the lack of
mitigating circumstances as clear indices the trial court would impose the upper term
sentence on remand. But our Supreme Court rejected similar reasoning in Lynch, noting
that although the trial court “found eight circumstances in aggravation and none in
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mitigation,” a trial court’s statements about the “ ‘length of the original sentence and
attendant decisions, such as imposing consecutive sentences, imposing middle or upper
term sentences, or declining to strike enhancements, is not sufficient to provide a clear
indication of what a sentencing court might do on remand if it had been fully aware of the
scope of its discretionary powers.’ ” (Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 777.) As such, the
matter must be remanded for resentencing.
DISPOSITION
Defendant’s conviction is affirmed. The sentence is reversed and the matter
remanded to the trial court for full resentencing, further litigation of the aggravating
circumstances, and for the trial court to exercise its discretion under the current section
1170, subdivision (b).
HULL, Acting P. J.
We concur:
ROBIE, J.
MAURO, J.
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