In re P.P. CA1/1

CourtListener 10617756Calctapp26 juin 2025

Texte intégral

Filed 6/26/25 In re P.P. CA1/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

In re P.P., a Person Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.

SOLANO COUNTY HEALTH AND
SOCIAL SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A171814
v.
(Solano County
C.P. et al.,
Super. Ct. No. J45631)
Defendants and Appellants.

This is our second opinion in this dependency proceeding involving
P.P., the four-year-old son of P.S. (mother) and C.P. (father) (collectively,
parents). When he was almost two years old, P.P. was detained after
ingesting methamphetamine. In our first opinion, we affirmed the juvenile
court’s jurisdictional and dispositional orders finding that P.P. was a person
described by Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 300, subdivision (b), and
removing him from parents’ care. (In re P.P. (Oct. 18, 2023, A167129)
[nonpub. opn.].)

1 All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
Soon after our first opinion issued, both parents’ reunification services
were terminated. Subsequently, mother filed a petition under section 388
seeking P.P.’s return to her custody or reinstatement of her services. The
juvenile court denied mother’s section 388 petition and then terminated her
and father’s parental rights under section 366.26, rulings from which parents
now appeal.
Mother claims the juvenile court applied the wrong legal standard to
deny her section 388 petition, requiring reversal of both that ruling and the
termination of her parental rights. Mother and father both claim that the
court also erred by concluding they did not establish the parental-benefit
exception to termination under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i). We
affirm.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND
A. Proceedings Leading to Our Prior Opinion
The background of this case through the January 2023 jurisdictional
and dispositional hearing is set forth in our first opinion. To summarize, P.P.
was born in November 2020, at which time mother tested positive for
methamphetamine and tetrahydrocannabinol (THC). She had a history of
methamphetamine use going back to the early 2000’s.
In August 2022, mother brought P.P. to the emergency room because
she suspected he had ingested methamphetamine. An initial toxicology
screen was presumptively positive for the drug. Mother told a social worker
that father and P.P.’s paternal grandmother, with whom the family lived,
used methamphetamine. Mother claimed she had been clean from
methamphetamine for 12 to 13 years, relapsed in 2017, and used “on and off”
until April 2020, when she found out she was pregnant with P.P. Although

2
mother initially claimed she had not used methamphetamine since 2020, she
eventually admitted to relapsing two days before she brought P.P. to the
hospital. P.P. was removed from parents’ care.
The Solano County Health and Social Services Department
(Department) filed a petition alleging the juvenile court had jurisdiction over
P.P. under section 300, subdivision (b)(1), based on his ingestion of
methamphetamine while in parents’ care; mother’s history of using that drug;
and the “filthy” condition of the paternal grandparents’ home. The court
ordered P.P. detained, and he was placed in a foster home. Parents were
ordered to engage in drug testing and allowed to have supervised visits with
their son.
A contested jurisdictional and dispositional hearing was held five
months later. During that period, mother tested positive for marijuana and
amphetamines in late August and early September 2022, and missed all but
one of her other scheduled tests. Father tested positive for amphetamines
once and missed all other scheduled tests. Parents regularly attended visits,
and mother engaged in other services, including a parenting program. The
Department recommended that parents receive reunification services.
At the contested hearing in January 2023, parents claimed P.P.
ingested the paternal grandfather’s medication, not methamphetamine.
Evidence was presented that the grandfather sometimes threw his
medication on the floor, where P.P. could have accessed it. When mother took
P.P. to the emergency room, the hospital did only a presumptive drug test,
not a confirmatory one, increasing the possibility of a false positive. P.P. also
did not display many of the usual signs of methamphetamine intoxication.
Both parents acknowledged relapsing soon after P.P. was removed but
otherwise denied recent methamphetamine use.

3
The juvenile court sustained the allegations that P.P. ingested
methamphetamine while in parents’ care and dismissed the allegations
involving the grandparents’ home’s condition. The court found that out-of-
home placement was necessary and ordered reunification services for both
parents. The court emphasized that parents were required to submit to
random drug tests through the probation department unless other
arrangements were approved.
Mother and father appealed from the dispositional order. Father’s
appellate counsel filed a no-issues statement, and we dismissed father’s
appeal. We then filed an opinion rejecting mother’s claims involving her self-
representation at the jurisdictional and dispositional hearing and her
argument that inadequate evidence supported the juvenile court’s
dispositional removal order.
B. Proceedings Leading to Termination of Parents’ Services
P.P. was moved to a new foster home in November 2022. Less than two
months later, the foster family gave notice they no longer wished to have P.P.
in their care. The foster agency had inadvertently shared the family’s contact
information with parents, and the family felt “unsafe and threatened”
because “mother was texting and calling the resource mother often.” Over
mother’s objection, P.P. was moved to an out-of-county placement in
February 2023.
A March 2023 interim review report stated that parents continued to
visit P.P. consistently and the visits were “going well.” Mother and father
continued to resist drug testing as ordered, and testing through alternative
means that met the Department’s requirements was still not in place for
either parent. At a hearing the following month, mother said she felt like a
“prisoner” testing at the probation department and it “[gave] her anxiety.”

4
The juvenile court urged her “to test as they are asking you,” and mother
agreed she could do so.
Mother filed a section 388 petition in April 2023, seeking P.P.’s return
to her custody or unsupervised and overnight visits. Mother noted she had
begun drug testing through her doctor at Kaiser and submitted a few
negative test results. She had also moved out of the paternal grandparents’
home into a new residence. In response, the Department emphasized that
the testing through Kaiser was not sufficiently monitored. Moreover, even
the results mother submitted showed inconsistent testing.
The Department was also concerned about a recent incident of domestic
violence between parents. On April 16, 2023, during an argument in the car,
father punched mother in the back of the head six times. Mother called the
police, and father was arrested. Mother also reported other recent incidents
where father had “punched and choked” her. Mother told the social worker
she nonetheless planned to stay with father, and she continued to have
substantial contact with him. The Department opposed unsupervised visits,
much less P.P.’s return to mother, until she “participate[d] in three random
and observed tests through Probation with clean results and there is a viable
plan to ensure safety from domestic violence with . . . [father].”
After a contested hearing in June 2023, the juvenile court denied
mother’s section 388 petition.2 The court stated that its “biggest concern”
was mother’s failure to engage in monitored drug testing as required. The
court told mother, “You’ve wasted so much time. You have wasted months of
time with Kaiser testing and doing something different than the testing that
is being requested of you by the Department.” The court also stated that

2 Mother appealed from this ruling, and we dismissed the appeal after

her counsel filed a no-issues statement. (In re P.P. (Dec. 20, 2023, A168484).)

5
testing through dependency drug court, which mother had also done, was
insufficient. The court unambiguously ordered mother “to test with
Probation as directed,” telling her she would not receive unsupervised visits
until she provided negative results from approved testing.
The Department filed a six-month status review report later in
June 2023. Parents continued to visit P.P. consistently, with mother reported
to be “loving and nurturing” and father’s visits reported to be “positive and
appropriate.” Mother was engaged in parenting classes and substance-abuse
meetings, and she was meeting weekly with a therapist. But, as already
revealed in connection with her section 388 petition, mother refused to test
through the probation department. Specifically, she missed 30 tests between
February and May. Father generally refused to follow his case plan, and
though he had recently enrolled in parenting classes, he did not participate in
drug testing or mental health services. The Department also remained
concerned about the recent domestic violence between mother and father.
Despite mother’s refusal to drug test and continued relationship with
father, the Department judged her progress toward reunification to be
adequate. Father, on the other hand, had made minimal progress, and his
failure to engage in services made reunification “unlikely.” The Department
recommended that mother’s reunification services be continued and father’s
services be terminated.
The six-month-review hearing was ultimately continued to late fall and
combined with the twelve-month-review hearing. A September 2023
addendum report stated that in July, mother reported she was using
methamphetamine every other week and marijuana daily. She tested
positive for methamphetamine and THC five times between June and August
and missed all her remaining tests. Mother enrolled in an outpatient drug

6
treatment program but did not attend any of the virtual sessions. She also
failed to provide the social worker with verification of her attendance at
substance abuse meetings. She did, however, maintain her participation in
parenting education and individual therapy. Father drug tested only once, in
August, and the test was positive for amphetamines. He had completed a
parenting program, and he provided verification of his attendance at
substance abuse meetings during the reporting period.
As a result of the April 2023 domestic violence incident, mother and
father began visiting separately with P.P. Mother also had short phone visits
with P.P. Mother was “very engaged” with her son during visits, and they
enjoyed visiting each other. Mother had not missed a single visit except to
attend court, and she always completed make-up visits. Father attended
most visits, which were usually positive, but he yelled at mother at the end of
one of his visits when she would not let him sit in her car while she attended
her visit. The Department continued to recommend that mother’s
reunification services be continued and father’s be terminated.
In October 2023, the Department submitted a second addendum report.
Mother did not complete any ordered drug tests in September or October,
except for one in late October that remained pending.3 Mother also took two
oral swab tests through dependency drug court, one of which was positive for
methamphetamine. After some false starts, she enrolled in an outpatient
drug treatment program, but she had not begun drug testing through it. She
had also stopped individual therapy after “firing” her therapist. Mother
continued to have consistent and appropriate visits with P.P.

3 At a later hearing, the social worker testified that the pending test

came back positive for methamphetamine and THC.

7
Father was mostly out of contact with the Department since the
previous report, although he sent the social worker a few text messages with
“inappropriate and aggressive language” complaining about how he was
being treated. Father refused to continue drug testing through the probation
department, and no further test results were submitted. He also missed
several visits with P.P.
The Department now recommended that both parents’ reunification
services be terminated. Although mother had finally enrolled in a drug
treatment program, she did not drug test consistently and had several
positive tests. She also continued to “lack . . . insight” about the reasons P.P.
entered foster care. Father had participated in services only minimally, and
his inappropriate behavior “[made] it difficult to assess his willingness and
ability to have his son in his care.” There was “no doubt that both parents
love[d] their son,” but their lack of participation in their case plan left “no
substantive probability that if given more time, either parent could safely
reunify with [him].”
A contested combined six- and twelve-month-review hearing was held
in November 2023. The juvenile court found that the Department had
provided reasonable services and that mother’s progress toward addressing
the causes necessitating out-of-home placement was “minimal” and father’s
was “none.” Parents’ reunification services were terminated, and a selection-
and-implementation hearing under section 366.26 was set for February 2024.
Parents were permitted to continue to visit P.P. on a “titrated” schedule,
moving from twice a week to once a month leading up to the section 366.26
hearing.

8
C. Proceedings Leading to Termination of Parental Rights
The Department filed a section 366.26 report in February 2024. The
report recommended that mother’s and father’s parental rights be terminated
and adoption be P.P.’s permanent plan. P.P. had been in his current
placement only since late December 2023, but the foster family was
interested in adopting him. Mother continued to visit P.P. regularly and
appropriately. The Department was concerned that she was back to living at
the paternal grandparents’ home and continued to have a relationship with
father. Although mother claimed she was drug testing at dependency drug
court, she still had not randomly drug tested through the probation
department as required. Father, meanwhile, had mostly been out of contact
with the Department and attended about half his scheduled visits with P.P.
Mother and father successfully moved for a bonding study, and the
section 366.26 hearing was continued. Around the same time, parents
learned for the first time that P.P. was in the car with his then-foster mother
when she was arrested for driving under the influence the previous October.
In April 2024, the juvenile court held a conference with counsel to discuss the
issue. The court stated it was “very uncomfortable with how this case is
progressing,” given that P.P. had already had six placements at such a young
age.4 It was also concerned about the drunk driving incident and the
Department’s failure to disclose it to parents. The court opined that the
system was doing P.P. more harm than good, saying that “every time
something goes wrong on our end, it leads the parents further away from
wanting to cooperate with us.” The court concluded, “I cannot feel okay with

4 The February 2024 section 366.26 report indicated that P.P.’s current

placement was his sixth placement. The record reflects that after his initial
removal in August 2022, P.P. changed placements a week later and then in
November 2022, February 2023, October 2023, and December 2023.

9
all these changes that are occurring with the minor when I know that there is
one consistent person in his life, and that has been his mom.”
Meanwhile, between January and March 2024, mother filed more
section 388 petitions, some without her counsel’s involvement.5 Again, she
sought P.P.’s return to her care. The Department responded to the petitions
in May, taking the position that mother failed to demonstrate changed
circumstances. The Department’s primary concern was mother’s continuing
failure to drug test as ordered. Between January and May, mother missed
22 tests and completed three, one of which was negative (in late April) and
two of which were positive for amphetamines (in mid-May). The Department
offered mother a hair strand test, which “would provide results for up to
90 days,” but she declined it.
Mother withdrew her pending section 388 petitions before the juvenile
court ruled on them, and she filed the one at issue in August 2024. Mother
requested that P.P. return to her custody with family maintenance or,
alternatively, that her reunification services be reinstated. In support of the
petition, mother provided evidence that she had moved from the paternal
grandparents’ house to a shelter, where P.P. could live with her; had resumed
individual therapy; and was participating in an outpatient drug program,
dependency drug court, and Narcotics Anonymous meetings. She had begun
testing through the probation department, and she tested through the
shelter, the outpatient program, and drug court as well. The test results

5 During the same period, father also filed two section 388 petitions

seeking additional reunification services. Father appealed from the juvenile
court’s denial of both petitions, and we dismissed the appeal after his
appellate counsel filed a no-issues statement. (In re P.P. (Oct. 1, 2024,
A170632).)

10
submitted showed a May 31 positive test for methamphetamine but several
negative tests over the next two months.
In August, the Department also filed an addendum section 366.26
report. The Department continued to recommend that parents’ parental
rights be terminated and adoption be P.P.’s permanent plan. The foster
parents provided a stable, positive home for P.P. and were committed to
adopting him. The Department had also received the bonding study, which a
psychologist completed the previous month. The study concluded that
mother had a “moderately strong and positive” parent-child relationship with
P.P. and father had a “relatively weak and moderately positive” one. The
study also concluded that discontinuing both relationships “would not
negatively affect [P.P.’s] long-term well-being.”
The Department confirmed that mother had moved into a shelter, but
only after the paternal grandmother decided to sell the grandparents’ home.
Mother began regularly drug testing as required in late May, missing eight
unexcused tests and returning twelve negative tests. The Department
acknowledged mother’s change in living situation and willingness to test
were positive changes. But she continued to “minimize” father’s domestic
violence, and the status of parents’ relationship was unclear. The
Department opined that P.P. had an “urgent need for permanency,” and it
was unfair to delay permanency “pending [mother’s] commitment to her
journey of sobriety.”
The following month, the Department filed a response to mother’s
section 388 petition. Since the previous report, mother submitted a negative
hair-strand test. Mother was participating consistently in the outpatient
treatment program, and her counselor reported that she was highly
motivated. The Department “commend[ed mother] for her efforts,” but it

11
“maintain[ed] that (21) negative tests out of (168) [scheduled] tests [was] not
changed circumstances, but rather changing circumstances.” The
Department also reiterated its concerns about mother’s failure to address
domestic-violence issues.
A contested hearing on mother’s section 388 petition and termination of
parental rights under section 366.26 was held over several days in late
September and October 2024. Numerous witnesses testified, including the
psychologist who prepared the bonding study, the assigned social worker,
several of mother’s service providers, and mother herself. In support of
granting the petition, mother argued she had made numerous positive
changes, including maintaining her sobriety, testing regularly, and
improving her living situation. Parents also argued they established the
parental-benefit exception to terminating parental rights.
The juvenile court denied mother’s section 388 petition on the basis
that she failed to demonstrate “a substantial change of circumstance.” The
court commended mother for the “very positive change” of becoming willing to
work on herself. But she was at just “the beginning” of addressing her issues.
First, although she was engaged in outpatient drug treatment, she had not
completed the program. She was “on step four of twelve” at Narcotics
Anonymous, further indicating she was merely “in the process of really
getting to know [her]self and what ha[d] put [her] in this situation.” Mother
had been at the shelter, which provided an 18-month program that included
substance abuse support, for only about four months, and her caseworker
recommended she stay the full term. Finally, the court was concerned that
mother lacked insight about domestic violence in her relationship with
father, an issue she had done little to address. Addressing mother, the court
concluded, “I can tell you that this was a very difficult decision for me . . . . I

12
very much want [P.P.] to be in your care. . . . But I can’t ignore that you’re
just in the beginning stages, and what you’re showing is a changing of your
circumstances, a changing of your understanding.”
As for the section 366.26 issues, the juvenile court found that P.P. was
adoptable, which neither parent disputed. The court then concluded that the
parental-benefit exception did not apply to either parent. After indicating
that mother presented “truly probably the strongest parental exception . . .
case that we have had in a very long time,” the court determined that she
satisfied the first two elements of the exception, regular visitation and a
beneficial relationship, but failed to establish the third element, detriment to
P.P. if parental rights were terminated. In explaining its ruling, the court
observed that P.P. was doing well in his placement and considered his foster
parents to be parental figures. It agreed with the bonding study that “the
minor [did] not seem to depend on the relationship with . . . parents for his
healthy emotional, mental[,] or developmental growth.” He enjoyed visits
with mother, but he did not display any distress in returning to the foster
parents, who could give him a permanent, stable home. Though there would
be “some harm” from losing his relationship with mother, it was outweighed
by the benefits he would derive from being adopted.
As for father, the juvenile court found he failed to meet the first two
elements of the parental-benefit exception. Unlike mother, father had “not
had consistent visits with [P.P.]” and “missed several visits by choice.” The
court also agreed with the bonding study’s conclusion that P.P. did not have
“a very strong relationship with . . . father.” Indeed, the bonding study
“indicated that it would . . . be detrimental to the minor” to continue his
relationship with father. Having concluded the exception did not apply to
either parent, the court terminated mother’s and father’s parental rights.

13
II.
DISCUSSION
A. No Error Appears in the Denial of Mother’s Section 388 Petition.
Mother claims the juvenile court applied the wrong legal standard in
denying her section 388 petition on the basis that she failed to demonstrate
changed circumstances. She also claims the evidence required a finding in
her favor on that issue. We reject both contentions.6
Under section 388, a juvenile court order may be modified “when the
moving party (1) presents new evidence or a change of circumstance and
(2) demonstrates modification of the previous order is in the child’s best
interest.” (In re Matthew M. (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 1186, 1194 (Matthew M.);
§ 388, subd. (a)(1).) As the moving party, mother had the burden to
demonstrate these requirements by a preponderance of the evidence.
(Matthew M., at p. 1194; In re N.F. (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 112, 120 (N.F.).)
“The section 388 modification procedure [provides] an ‘ “escape mechanism”
when parents complete a reformation in the short, final period after the
termination of reunification services but before the actual termination of
parental rights.’ ” (In re J.M. (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 833, 845–846.) As such,
the statute “is vital to the constitutionality of [the] dependency scheme as a
whole, and the termination statute, section 366.26, in particular.” (In re
Kimberly F. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 519, 528, italics omitted.)
We review the denial of a section 388 petition for an abuse of discretion.
(N.F., supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 121.) A juvenile court “ ‘abuses its

6 As a result, we need not address mother’s claim that the evidence also

compelled a finding that the requested change was in P.P.’s best interests.
We also necessarily reject her claim that the erroneous denial of the
section 388 petition requires reversal of the order terminating parental
rights.

14
discretion when it applies the wrong legal standard or its factual findings are
not supported by substantial evidence.’ ” (In re R.F. (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th
718, 728.) But if the court finds against the party with the burden of proof,
“ ‘it is misleading to characterize the failure-of-proof issue as whether
substantial evidence supports the judgment.’ ” (In re Aurora P. (2015)
241 Cal.App.4th 1142, 1156.) Rather, “the question is ‘whether the evidence
compels a finding in favor of the appellant[] as a matter of law.’ ” (Id. at
p. 1163.) Thus, where, as here, the court determined “the moving party failed
to carry [the] initial burden to demonstrate new evidence or change of
circumstance,” we consider only “whether that finding is erroneous as a
matter of law.” (Matthew M., supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 1194.)
1. The trial court applied the appropriate legal standard.
Mother first argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion by
finding she made “ ‘a very positive change [in her] willingness to . . . work on
herself’ ” but nonetheless denying the section 388 petition because her
circumstances were only “ ‘changing,’ ” not changed. She claims the court
thereby required her to show that her circumstances were “completely
changed,” in violation of section 388’s “statutory mandate and Legislative
intent.”
“ ‘Not every change in circumstance can justify modification of a prior
order’ ” under section 388. (N.F., supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 120.) The
change “must be material” (ibid.), such that “the problem that initially
brought the child within the dependency system [is] removed or ameliorated.”
(In re A.A. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 597, 612.) Where a parent’s substance
abuse is at issue, “a showing of materially changed circumstances requires
more than a relatively brief period of sobriety or participation in yet another
program.” (N.F., at p. 121.)

15
The distinction between “changed” and “changing” circumstances is
“frequently drawn in cases concerning section 388.” (N.F., supra,
68 Cal.App.5th at p. 121, fn. 3 [collecting cases].) As N.F. explains, the
distinction is “another way of describing” the difference “between changes
that are material and those that are not. However expressed, the point is
that section 388 requires a change that is relevant and substantial (rather
that irrelevant or de minimis) when considered in light of all the
circumstances in the case.” (Ibid.) Thus, to the extent mother claims the
juvenile court erred merely by characterizing her circumstances as
“changing,” we reject her position. The court’s language did not suggest that
she was required to demonstrate her circumstances were “completely
changed,” as opposed to materially changed.
Mother argues that the juvenile court’s reliance on the distinction
between “changed” and “changing” circumstances “was ‘too cavalier given the
important role section 388 petitions play in the constitutionality of
California’s dependency scheme.’ ” (Quoting In re Serenity S. (2020)
55 Cal.App.5th 355, 379.) In dicta, Serenity S. questioned whether the lower
court properly determined that a father failed to establish changed
circumstances. (Ibid.) But the child in that case was removed “based only on
allegations against [the] mother,” and the father presented significant
evidence that he had addressed the “problems arising from his poverty” that
led to his being denied custody. (Id. at pp. 359, 379.) Among other things,
“he had finally obtained a permanent full-time job at higher pay as well as
health care and childcare assistance that would benefit [the minor].” (Id. at
p. 379.) Here, in contrast, the juvenile court found that mother’s primary
change was her willingness to address the key problem that led to P.P.’s
removal, her substance abuse. Thus, characterizing her circumstances as

16
“changing” did not hold her to an unduly high standard. Rather, it reflected
the court’s legally appropriate determination that she was in only “the
beginning stages” of achieving the required material change.
2. The evidence did not compel a finding of changed
circumstances.
Mother also claims that even if the juvenile court applied the correct
legal standard, it still abused its discretion by denying her section 388
petition because “[s]ubstantial evidence supported a finding of change of
circumstances and not a contrary finding.” She recites at length the evidence
of her recent sobriety and her motivation to remain drug free. But even if we
agree with mother that she decisively proved she “had been sober for 90 days”
and “had been regularly attending outpatient drug treatment . . . for two
months,” this evidence did not require a finding in her favor as a matter of
law. (See Matthew M., supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 1194; In re Aurora P.,
supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at p. 1156.) As we have said, short periods of sobriety
generally do not qualify as changed circumstances under section 388. (See,
e.g., In re Cliffton B. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 415, 423 [seven months of
sobriety insufficient where father had history of “periods of sobriety
alternat[ing] with recurring drug use”]; In re Kimberly F., supra,
56 Cal.App.4th at p. 531, fn. 9 [“It is the nature of addiction that one must be
‘clean’ for a much longer period than 120 days to show real reform”].)
Likewise, given her history, mother’s recent participation in more structured
drug treatment did not establish a material change in her circumstances.
(See, e.g., N.F., supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 121 [mother’s completion of 90-
day inpatient drug treatment insufficient to demonstrate changed
circumstances]; In re C.J.W. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1075, 1079, 1081 [no
error in denial of section 388 petition where parents’ focused efforts to
address drug use “were only three months old”].)

17
Nor did the evidence of mother’s commitment to recovery compel a
finding of changed circumstances. Mother suggests that in light of this
evidence, the juvenile court could not reasonably infer “that she was likely to
relapse in the future.” But the issue was what change had already occurred,
not what mother’s mindset suggested about her chances of future success.
The juvenile court clearly credited her, as do we, with a sincere commitment
to achieve sobriety, and this change in attitude was a necessary stepping
stone to recovery. But even though mother was “exerting [herself]
considerably to improve,” her efforts did not amount to a material change in
her circumstances as a matter of law. (In re C.J.W., supra, 157 Cal.App.4th
at p. 1081.) In short, the court did not abuse its discretion by denying
mother’s section 388 petition on the ground that she failed to demonstrate
changed circumstances.
B. The Juvenile Court Properly Found that the Parental- benefit
Exception Did Not Apply to Either Parent.
Both parents claim the juvenile court erred by determining they did not
meet the parental-benefit exception to termination of parental rights. We are
not persuaded.
1. General legal standards
After a juvenile court determines that a child is adoptable, it must
“terminate parental rights and order the child placed for adoption” unless a
statutory exception applies. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1).) One such exception is
the “parental-benefit exception,” whose scope the Supreme Court clarified in
In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614 (Caden C.). To establish the exception,
a parent has the burden to show, by a preponderance of the evidence:
“(1) regular visitation and contact, and (2) a relationship, the continuation of
which would benefit the child such that (3) the termination of parental rights
would be detrimental to the child.” (Id. at pp. 631, 636, italics omitted.)

18
Caden C. also clarified that a “hybrid” standard of review applies to a
juvenile court’s ruling on the parental-benefit exception. (Caden C., supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 641.) We review a court’s findings on the first two elements,
each of which requires “essentially a factual determination,” for substantial
evidence. (Id. at pp. 639–640.) In doing so, we “ ‘consider[] the evidence in
the light most favorable to the prevailing party, giving the prevailing party
the benefit of every reasonable inference and resolving all conflicts in support
of the order.’ ” (In re I.E. (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 683, 691.)
The juvenile court’s finding on the third element, which requires “a
delicate balancing” of “the harm of losing the relationship against the
benefits of placement in a new, adoptive home,” is reviewed for abuse of
discretion. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 640.) Under this standard, no
abuse of discretion occurs unless the juvenile court “ ‘ “ ‘has exceeded the
limits of legal discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently
absurd determination.’ ” ’ ” (Id. at p. 641.) Again, “ ‘the use of an incorrect
legal standard necessarily constitutes an abuse of discretion.’ ” (In re P.S.
(2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 541, 553.)
2. Mother’s claim
Mother argues the juvenile court applied the incorrect legal standard in
two respects when finding she did not satisfy the parental-benefit exception’s
third element, that terminating parental rights would be detrimental to the
child. In evaluating this element, a juvenile court “must decide whether it
would be harmful to the child to sever the relationship and choose adoption.”
(Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 633.) Specifically, the court must
determine whether “ ‘the harm [the child] would experience from the loss of
[a] significant, positive, emotional relationship with [the parent]’ ” outweighs
“the security and stability of a new home.” (Ibid.) This does not involve

19
“comparing the parent’s attributes as a custodial caregiver relative to those of
any potential adoptive parent(s),” as “[n]othing that happens at the
section 366.26 hearing allows the child to return to live with the parent.” (Id.
at p. 634.) Thus, the court “should not look to whether the parent can provide
a home for the child; the question is just whether losing the relationship with
the parent would harm the child to an extent not outweighed, on balance, by
the security of a new, adoptive home.” (Ibid.)
First, mother claims the juvenile court erred by determining that
terminating her parental rights “would not be detrimental to P.P. because he
did not rely on [her] for his ‘healthy emotional, mental[,] or development[al]
growth,’ ” since she was not required to show that “she played a classically
‘parental’ role in [her son’s] life” by attending to his daily needs. This
argument echoes a common challenge to rulings on the second element of the
parental-benefit exception, the existence of a beneficial relationship. Before
Caden C., courts generally required parents to show they “ ‘occupie[d] a
parental role in the child’s life, resulting in a significant, positive, emotional
attachment from child to parent,’ ” but “Caden C. did not use the words
‘parental role’ in its analysis.” (In re L.A.-O. (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 197, 209–
210.) Rather, Caden C. held that to establish the second element, “the parent
must show that the child has a substantial, positive, emotional attachment to
the parent—the kind of attachment implying that the child would benefit
from continuing the relationship.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 636.)
Based on the tension between the concept of a parental relationship and
Caden C.’s discussion of the required beneficial relationship, some post-
Caden C. decisions reversed orders terminating parental rights where the
lower court focused on the lack of a “parental bond” or “parental role” in

20
determining the statutory exception was not met. (E.g., In re L.A.-O., at
pp. 210–211; In re J.D. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 833, 863–865.)
Relying on such decisions, mother claims the juvenile court’s statement
that P.P. did not depend on her “for his healthy emotional, mental[,] or
developmental growth” was “the functional equivalent of requiring a non-
custodial parent to show they occupy a daily ‘parental role’ in that they
provide for the child’s everyday needs, something a parent who invokes this
exception is simply unable to show.” We are not persuaded. The observation
that the relationship was not crucial to P.P.’s growth did not amount to
requiring mother to demonstrate that she played a daily parental role in her
son’s life, in violation of Caden C., or that P.P. had “a ‘primary attachment’ ”
to her, in violation of a pre-Caden C. decision she also cites. (In re S.B. (2008)
164 Cal.App.4th 289, 299 (S.B.).) Rather, once it concluded that mother did
have a beneficial relationship with P.P., the juvenile court had to balance the
harm of losing that relationship against the “benefits of a new adoptive
home.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 633.) None of mother’s authorities
suggest the court was foreclosed from considering the nature of the
relationship, including mother’s relative lack of influence on P.P.’s growth, in
performing the required evaluation.
Second, mother claims the juvenile court erred by concluding that any
detriment to P.P. would be “offset simply because [he was] in a secure
placement with caregivers who could help mitigate the distress [he] would
feel at the loss of a significant relationship” with her. Again, she relies on
S.B., which questioned an argument that “any detriment to [the child] from
the loss of the parent-child relationship will eventually be ameliorated by
time and [the child’s] strong relationship with [the child’s primary
caregiver].” (S.B., supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at p. 299.) S.B. observed that

21
children can be expected to develop a secure relationship with their primary
caregiver, and the strength of that relationship “does not negate the harm [a
child] would experience from the loss of [the child’s] significant, positive,
emotional relationship with [the parent].” (Id. at pp. 299–300.) In other
words, “the proposition that [a child’s] loss may be healed by time and
support, even if true, does not support a finding [the child] would not be
greatly harmed by termination of parental rights.” (Id. at p. 300.)
Mother does not clearly identify which statements by the juvenile court
allegedly violated this aspect of S.B. She quotes the court’s statements about
P.P.’s attachment to the foster parents and its observation that his needs
were being met and “ ‘permanent, long-term stability [was] within reach,’ ”
but the court never suggested that P.P.’s relationship with his foster parents
would “negate” any harm he experienced from losing his relationship with
mother. Rather, as Caden C. requires, the court balanced the harm it
acknowledged would result from terminating mother’s parental rights
against the “instability” and “uncertainty” P.P. would experience if he were
not adopted. (See Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 634.) In performing this
balancing, the court was not precluded from considering the extent to which
P.P. was attached to and secure with his prospective adoptive parents.
In sum, mother fails to demonstrate the juvenile court applied
improper legal standards in concluding that she did not meet the third
element of the parental-benefit exception. Thus, although we recognize
mother’s strong love for P.P. and the effort she expended throughout this case
to preserve her relationship with him, the court did not err in terminating
her parental rights.

22
3. Father’s claim
Father claims the juvenile court erred in various respects by
determining that the parental-benefit exception did not apply to him. We
reject his claim that insufficient evidence supported the court’s first-element
finding that he did not have regular visitation and contact with P.P.
Therefore, we need not address his arguments regarding the exception’s other
two elements. (See In re Natasha A. (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 28, 38 [lower
court’s order may be affirmed if “correct on any ground”].)
Determining whether a parent has met the first element of the
parental-benefit exception “is straightforward. The question is just whether
‘parents visit consistently,’ taking into account ‘the extent permitted by court
orders.’ [Citation.] Visits and contact ‘continue[] or develop[] a significant,
positive, emotional attachment from child to parent,’ ” and a juvenile court
should focus on that aspect of visitation in evaluating the element. (Caden
C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632; In re Eli B. (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1061, 1069–
1070.)
The juvenile court found that “father ha[d] not had consistent visits
with [P.P.],” having “missed several visits by choice.” Substantial evidence
supports this finding. (See Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 639.) Father
visited P.P. consistently during the first year or so of the case. But father
began missing visits in the summer of 2023, after the Department required
parents to have separate visits because of the domestic violence incident that
April. According to the Department’s reports, father missed two visits each
in July, August, September, and October 2023, and one visit each in
December 2023 and January and February 2024.
The bonding study stated that father’s “visitation attendance ha[d]
been inconsistent since his visits were reduced to once a month” on the

23
titrated schedule implemented after the juvenile court terminated his
reunification services in November 2023. Similarly, the social worker
reported that father’s attendance was “on and off,” with father visiting P.P. in
June 2024 for the first time in two months. Father told the psychologist who
prepared the bonding study that he stopped visiting consistently “ ‘because
[he was] tired of confusing’ ” P.P. and “ ‘want[ed] him to have normalcy.’ ”
Despite this evidence of numerous missed visits over several months
preceding the section 366.26 hearing, father claims there was insufficient
evidence to support the juvenile court’s ruling solely because the bonding
study lacked “a discrete finding that [his] visitation was too inconsistent for
purposes of establishing a parental bond, especially as the study found there
was a bond.” Father offers no authority suggesting that the existence of a
parental bond can substitute for consistent visitation, much less that expert
evidence is required to establish the first element of the parental-benefit
exception. Here, the juvenile court relied on evidence that father was not
only routinely missing visits but intentionally pulling back from his
relationship with P.P. However understandable father’s feelings were given
the case’s posture, his failure to continue visiting consistently justified the
court’s finding that he did not establish the parental-benefit exception.
III.
DISPOSITION
The October 23, 2024 order denying mother’s section 388 petition and
the November 7, 2024 order terminating mother’s and father’s parental
rights to P.P. are affirmed.

24
_________________________
Humes, P.J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
Banke, J.

_________________________
Smiley, J.

In re P.P. A171814

25

Poursuivez vos recherches dans ChatGPT ou Claude

Connectez Omnilex pour rechercher dans le corpus juridique depuis votre assistant IA.