CourtListener 10617043•Habib v. Abdalla CA1/1
Texte intégral
Filed 6/25/25 Habib v. Abdalla CA1/1
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
YASMIN HABIB,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
A171487
v.
MOHAMED ABDALLA, (Alameda County
Super. Ct. No. HF18905111)
Defendant and Respondent.
Plaintiff Yasmin Habib (mother) filed notices of appeal from an
August 21, 2024, short form order continuing a hearing on a motion to modify
child support; an August 27, 2024, minute order modifying travel restrictions
for the parties’ children (minors); and a September 11, 2024, order declaring
her a vexatious litigant. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
In May 2018, mother petitioned for dissolution of her marriage to
respondent Mohamed Abdalla (father). Four years later, in July 2022,
judgment of dissolution was filed. Over the ensuing years, the parties filed
various requests for modification of custody and visitation orders and
restraining orders.
As relevant here, in July 2024, father, fearing mother “may flee with
the children,” sought changes in custody orders and requested minors’
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passports be turned over to him. Father also sought an order declaring
mother a vexatious litigant.
The following month, minors’ counsel filed a request to be relieved as
counsel and for appointment of new counsel. Counsel cited as the reason for
the request a “breakdown in attorney client/communication and interference”
by mother. According to counsel, mother had “undermined” his
attorney/client relationship with minors by having minors record him, despite
previously telling mother not to do so and despite admonishment by the
court; had not made minors available for in-person meetings; and had
directed one minor to “write letters to the court, circumventing” counsel.
Additionally, mother had not supported minors’ participation in therapy with
father, which was a “huge problem.” Finally, although recognizing it would
be “a shocking upheaval” in minors’ lives, counsel agreed with father’s
request that custody be changed. Counsel also “doubt[ed] [mother or the
oldest daughter] would obey such an order,” and he “suspect[ed] they might
even flee the area.”
The day after minors’ counsel filed his request to withdraw, father filed
a request for orders for temporary emergency custody of minors, possession of
the minors’ passports, and for child abduction prevention, citing mother’s
lack of compliance with custody and visitation orders, that mother was facing
over 30 counts of contempt of court, and minors’ counsel’s concern that
mother was an “urgent flight risk.” Father requested an order preventing
mother from traveling outside of the county, California, or the United States
with minors without permission of the court. Father further asserted mother
has family in Europe and has traveled with minors to visit family in Morocco
without first informing him. Father also claimed mother had previously
taken minors from Egypt without his permission when they had resided
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there, and she had, “by her own admission . . . violated court ordered custody
and visitation.” Additionally, father maintained mother did not have strong
ties to California because she “is not working and has not had full-time
employment in years.” Finally, he claimed mother had a “history” of not
cooperating in parenting and taking minors without his permission. In this
regard, father pointed to the numerous contempt charges, mother’s “excessive
court filings,” minors’ counsel’s statements that it was “ ‘obvious [mother]
doesn’t support the minors having a relationship with their father’ ”; and
counsel’s suspicion “ ‘they might flee the area.’ ”
The court granted ex parte emergency custody and child abduction
prevention orders and set a hearing. These included “Travel restrictions”
that neither party could remove minors from the country, state, and more
specifically Alameda County, unless the court allowed the parties to do so
after a noticed hearing.
The day before the hearing, father filed an amended request for
emergency and child abduction prevention orders, which the court granted.
The amended order included findings that there “is a risk” (boldface omitted)
mother will take minors “without permission” (boldface omitted) because she
“has violated—or threatened to violate—a custody or visitation (parenting
time) order in the past”; mother “does not have strong ties to California”;
mother has a history of “not cooperating with the other parent or party in
parenting”; and she “has family or emotional ties to another country, state, or
foreign country.” The court maintained the travel restrictions it had
previously imposed but only as to mother and maintained the scheduled
hearing date set for the following day.
At the hearing, on August 27, mother took issue with the court’s
findings, asserting she has “roots” in California because she had gone to
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school in the United States since elementary school and had thereafter
moved to California. She argued it was father, not her, who had ties to
Egypt. As to “not cooperating,” she claimed she responded to father “[w]ithin
24 hours.” She also claimed she had “pushed” minors to see their father, but
after they “beg[ged]” not to go, she no longer pushed them to do so.
The court granted counsel’s request to be relieved as counsel for minors
and appointed new counsel, granted emergency orders that minors’ current
passports be canceled, ordered that neither party may retrieve new passports
for minors “until further order of the court,” and maintained “the abduction
orders (Travel Restrictions)” as to mother, modifying them to include that
mother may take minors out of Alameda County to Contra Costa County to
see their therapist. Based on all it had heard “during the pendency of this
case,” the court had “strong beliefs that [mother] will do anything she felt she
needed to do to keep minors away from [father], whether it means disobeying
court orders or not. [¶] And the fact that the Court had indicated the
potential of changing custody, the Court agrees with [minors’ counsel’s]
statement that, if the Court were to actually do that, that [mother] could very
well flee with the minors. So the Court’s orders remain in effect.”
Two weeks later, on September 11, the court found mother was a
vexatious litigant pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 391,
subdivision (b)(1).
On September 16, mother filed two notices of appeal. The first states it
is an appeal from the August 27 minute order but attaches as the appealed
order a short form order following an August 21 hearing wherein child
support matters were continued to January 2025. The second notice states it
is an appeal from and attaches the September 11, 2024, vexatious litigant
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minute order rather than the court’s subsequent written order and findings
declaring her a vexatious litigant.
DISCUSSION
August 21 and September 11 Minute Orders
Although plaintiff purports to appeal from an August 21 minute order
continuing the hearing on custody and visitation issues, and from the
September 11 minute order declaring her a vexatious litigant, she makes no
argument as to either order in her opening brief on appeal. We therefore
deem any challenge to those two orders abandoned. (See Tanner v. Tanner
(1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 419, 422, fn. 2 [appellant who specifies judgment or
order in the notice of appeal but does not address that judgment or order in
the opening brief abandons that portion of the appeal].)
August 27 Order
Rather, mother’s opening brief (the only brief filed in this appeal)
focuses entirely on the child abduction prevention orders preventing her from
traveling outside of Alameda County with minors except for taking minors to
therapy in Contra Costa County. She maintains the trial court abused its
discretion “by imposing unreasonable travel restrictions” without “proper
consideration of the facts” and that it was father, and not her, who posed a
“significant flight risk.”
Family Code section 3048, subdivision (b)(1) provides, “In cases in
which the court becomes aware of facts that may indicate that there is a risk
of abduction of a child, the court shall, either on its own motion or at the
request of a party, determine whether measures are needed to prevent the
abduction of the child by one parent. To make that determination, the court
shall consider the risk of abduction of the child, obstacles to location,
recovery, and return if the child is abducted, and potential harm to the child
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if the child is abducted. To determine whether there is a risk of abduction,
the court shall consider the following factors: [¶] (A) Whether a party has
previously taken, enticed away, kept, withheld, or concealed a child in
violation of the right of custody or of visitation of a person. [¶] (B) Whether a
party has previously threatened to take, entice away, keep, withhold, or
conceal a child in violation of the right of custody or of visitation of a person.
[¶] (C) Whether a party lacks strong ties to this state. [¶] (D) Whether a party
has strong familial, emotional, or cultural ties to another state or country,
including foreign citizenship. This factor shall be considered only if evidence
exists in support of another factor specified in this section. [¶] (E) Whether a
party has no financial reason to stay in this state, including whether the
party is unemployed, is able to work anywhere, or is financially independent.
[¶] (F) Whether a party has engaged in planning activities that would
facilitate the removal of a child from the state, including quitting a job,
selling the primary residence, terminating a lease, closing a bank account,
liquidating other assets, hiding or destroying documents, applying for a
passport, applying to obtain a birth certificate or school or medical records, or
purchasing airplane or other travel tickets, with consideration given to
whether a party is carrying out a safety plan to flee from domestic violence.
[¶] (G) Whether a party has a history of a lack of parental cooperation or
child abuse, or there is substantiated evidence that a party has perpetrated
domestic violence. [¶] (H) Whether a party has a criminal record.” (Fam
Code, § 3048, subd. (b)(1)(A)–(H).)
We review the challenged orders for an abuse of discretion. (See, e.g.,
Brewer v. Carter (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1312, 1319–1320 [applying abuse of
discretion standard of review where trial court ruling must account for and
consider various statutory factors]; In re Marriage of Smith (1990)
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225 Cal.App.3d 469, 479–480 [same].) “ ‘The abuse of discretion standard is
not a unified standard; the deference it calls for varies according to the aspect
of a trial court’s ruling under review. The trial court’s findings of fact are
reviewed for substantial evidence, its conclusions of law are reviewed de
novo, and its application of the law to the facts is reversible only if arbitrary
or capricious.’ ” (In re Marriage of Walker (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 137, 146,
quoting Haraguchi v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 706, 711–712.) A
proper exercise of discretion must be based upon factual findings that are
supported by substantial evidence. (See Department of Parks & Recreation v.
State Personnel Bd. (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 813, 831 [“[I]n the absence of any
substantial evidence supporting its findings, the Board has no discretion to
modify or revoke the discipline imposed by the appointing power.”].) “No
matter the reasoning of the trial court, we must uphold the ruling if it is
correct on any basis. [Citation.] We draw all reasonable inferences in
support of the court’s ruling and defer to the court’s express or implied
findings when supported by substantial evidence.” (J.M. v. G.H. (2014)
228 Cal.App.4th 925, 935.)
The trial court found there “is a risk” (boldface omitted) mother will
take minors “without permission” (boldface omitted) because she “has
violated—or threatened to violate—a custody or visitation (parenting time)
order in the past” (§ 3048, subd. (b)(1)(A) & (B)); mother “does not have
strong ties to California” (id., subd. (b)(1)(C)); mother has a history of “not
cooperating with the other parent or party in parenting” (id., subd. (b)(1)(G));
and she “has family or emotional ties to another country, state, or foreign
country”(id., subd. (b)(1)(D)). Indeed, the court concluded “[b]ased on
everything that the Court has heard during the pendency of this case,”
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mother may flee with the minors, especially in light of the court’s indication
it might change custody orders.
The trial court’s findings are amply supported by the declarations of
father and prior counsel for minors, and the history of the case with which
the court was fully conversant. Mother, herself, had told the court that while
she initially had “pushed” minors to attend visitation with their father, she
had stopped doing so because minors had asked that they not go. Mother has
also never disputed she has been unemployed for years. Indeed, in her
income and expenses declarations filed in June and September 2024 mother
indicated $0 for her salary. Although she claimed she had strong ties to
California because when she “had to flee from Egypt” she “came back to
California,” her credibility was a matter for the trial court and, as a court of
review, we cannot reweigh the evidence. (Niko v. Foreman (2006)
144 Cal.App.4th 344, 365 [Appellate courts “ ‘may not reweigh the evidence
or determine credibility,’ ” rather, “ ‘[c]redibility is a matter within the trial
court’s discretion,’ and the reviewing court must defer to the trial court’s
findings on credibility issues.”].) Finally, there were 34 counts pending for
contempt proceedings and mother was facing a “potential 170 days in
custody.”
Although mother contends the travel restriction “unfairly limits” her
ability to “care for and provide holiday experiences for her children,” she
acknowledges the court subsequently made allowances for her to travel to
Florida with minors to attend a family wedding. In fact, she contends this
allowance “demonstrates that the Family Court recognized [her] ability to
responsibly travel with her children” and that she “poses no flight risk and is
fully capable of complying with all legal obligations regarding custody and
visitation.” To begin with, the travel to Florida occurred after and pursuant
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to the challenged order. And in any case, this singular fact had it occurred
prior to the hearing, would not have compelled the trial court to disregard all
the other matters of concern the court took into account in issuing the orders
restricting travel.
DISPOSITION
The challenged orders are AFFIRMED. Parties to bear their own costs
on appeal.
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_________________________
Banke, J.
We concur:
_________________________
Humes, P.J.
_________________________
Smiley, J.
A171487, Habib v. Abdalla
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