People v. McDowell CA2/4

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Filed 6/24/25 P. v. McDowell CA2/4

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE, B337050
(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA330955)
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.

DAVIONE MCDOWELL,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
Mildred Escobedo, Judge. Reversed and remanded.
John Steinberg, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Idan
Ivri and Roberta L. Davis, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
In 2011, a jury convicted appellant Davione McDowell of one count of
first degree murder, three counts of attempted murder, and four counts of
attempted robbery. At the time of the crimes, McDowell was 17 years old.
The superior court sentenced McDowell to a total term of 95 years to life, plus
two life sentences. In 2023, McDowell petitioned for recall and resentencing
pursuant to Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (d) (§ 1170(d)).1 The statute
provides relief to juvenile offenders who were “sentenced to imprisonment for
life without the possibility of parole” (LWOP). (§ 1170(d)(1)(A).) The superior
court denied the petition to recall and resentence, finding that McDowell was
ineligible because he did not receive an LWOP sentence.
On appeal, McDowell argues that his sentence was the functional
equivalent of LWOP and he was therefore eligible for relief under section
1170(d). Respondent Attorney General agrees, as do we. We therefore
reverse the superior court’s order and remand the matter for further
proceedings.
BACKGROUND
I. Conviction and Sentencing
The underlying facts are detailed fully in this court’s prior opinion,
People v. McDowell (Nov. 13, 2012, B235921) [nonpub. opn.] (McDowell). We
summarize them briefly here.
On September 1, 2005, seven men were playing a game of dice in the
driveway of Johnny Stringer’s home. Approximately $1,000 in cash was
visible on the driveway. McDowell approached the group, pulled a gun out of
his pants pocket, and demanded the money. As the men turned and ran,
McDowell began shooting, killing Stringer and wounding three other men.
McDowell ran away without the money.
In 2011, a jury convicted McDowell of one count of first degree murder
(§ 187, subd. (a); count 1), three counts of premeditated attempted murder
(§§ 664, 187, subd. (a); counts 2, 3, 7), and four counts of attempted second
degree robbery (§§ 664, 211; counts 4, 5, 6, 8). The jury also found true
criminal gang and gun use enhancement allegations for each count.
(§§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1), 12022.53, subds. (b)-(d).)

1
All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
The court sentenced McDowell to consecutive terms on counts one
through three as follows: a base term of 25 years to life for murder (count 1),
plus 25 years for the gun enhancement; a life term for each of two attempted
murder counts (counts 2 and 3), plus terms of 20 and 25 years, respectively,
for the gun enhancements on those counts, for a total of 95 years to life, plus
two life terms. The court imposed concurrent terms on the remaining counts
(counts 4 through 8) and imposed and stayed the gang enhancements. This
court affirmed McDowell’s convictions, but corrected the sentence for the
attempted robbery convictions. (McDowell, supra.)2
II. Petition for Recall and Resentencing
In August 2023, McDowell filed a petition for recall and resentencing
pursuant to section 1170(d). He stated that he was born on October 1, 1987
and was 17 years and 11 months old at the time of his crimes in September
2005. Thus, he argued that he was eligible for relief pursuant to section
1170(d) because he was under 18 years of age at the time of his crimes, had
been incarcerated for at least 15 years, submitted a statement of remorse,
and satisfied the other statutory criteria for resentencing. (See § 1170,
subds. (d)(1)(A), (d)(2).) He also relied on People v. Heard (2022) 83
Cal.App.5th 608, 634 (Heard), which extended relief under section 1170(d) to
juvenile offenders serving de facto LWOP sentences. As such, although
McDowell was not expressly sentenced to LWOP, he argued that he was
eligible for relief because he had received a de facto LWOP sentence of 95
years to life. The People filed a response, arguing that the petition was
deficient because it failed to include an adequate statement of remorse as
required by section 1170(d).
At the March 5, 2024 hearing on the petition, the court stated that it
“disagree[d] with Heard. I think it was a wrong decision,” and that it would
“follow Penal Code section 3051.” In its written order denying the petition,
the court found that McDowell was not eligible for relief under section
1170(d) because he was not actually sentenced to LWOP. The court reasoned
that the controlling statutory authority was section 3051, which requires a

2
Subsequently, this court denied McDowell’s petition for resentencing
under section 1172.6 because he was the actual killer. (People v. McDowell
(Oct. 30, 2023, B320119) [nonpub. opn.].
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“youth offender parole hearing” after 15, 20, or 25 years of a juvenile
offender’s incarceration, depending on the sentence imposed. The court
concluded that section 3051 “legally eliminated de facto LWOP sentences for
juvenile offenders,” and therefore only juveniles expressly sentenced to
LWOP were eligible under section 1170(d)(1).
McDowell timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. Legal Principles
Under section 1170, subdivision (d)(1)(A), “[w]hen a defendant who was
under 18 years of age at the time of the commission of the offense for which
the defendant was sentenced to imprisonment for life without the possibility
of parole has been incarcerated for at least 15 years, the defendant may
submit to the sentencing court a petition for recall and resentencing.” Among
other things, the petition must include the defendant’s “statement describing
their remorse and work towards rehabilitation” and that at least one of four
qualifying circumstances is true. (§ 1170, subd. (d)(2).) If the court finds by a
preponderance of the evidence that a qualifying circumstance is true, the
court must recall the sentence and hold a resentencing hearing. (§ 1170,
subd. (d)(5).)
On its face, section 1170(d) limits relief to juvenile offenders sentenced
to LWOP. (People v. Olmos (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 580, 583; Heard, supra,
83 Cal.App.5th at pp. 622–626.) However, in Heard, the Court of Appeal held
that denying the opportunity to petition for section 1170(d) relief to juvenile
offenders sentenced to the functional equivalent of LWOP violates the
constitutional guarantee of equal protection. (Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th
at pp. 612, 634; see also People v. Sorto (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 435, 454
(Sorto) [agreeing with Heard].) The court rejected the People’s argument that
the Supreme Court in People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 held that
section 3051 had “reformed” the defendant’s sentence so that it was no longer
the functional equivalent of life without parole. (Heard, supra, 83
Cal.App.5th at pp. 628-629.) As the court explained, “although the
retroactive operation of section 3051 means [the defendant] will receive a
youth offender parole hearing in his 25th year of incarceration, his original
sentence remains binding.” (Id. at p. 629.) As such, notwithstanding section

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3051, section 1170(d) applied because the defendant’s sentence “was a de
facto life without parole sentence at the time it was imposed” and section
1170(d)(1)(A) referenced the “‘offense for which the defendant was
sentenced.’” (Heard, supra, at p. 629; see also Sorto, supra, 104 Cal.App.5th
at p. 448 [“that section 3051 superseded [the defendant’s] sentence is
irrelevant” because “it is enough that he ‘was sentenced’ to the functional
equivalent of” life without the possibility of parole]; People v. Bagsby (2024)
106 Cal.App.5th 1040, 1063 (Bagsby) [citing Sorto and Heard].)
We apply de novo review where, as here, the appeal turns on questions
of law and the application of law to undisputed facts. (People v. Ashford
University, LLC (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 485, 518.)
II. Analysis
McDowell contends that the superior court erred in finding that he was
ineligible as a matter of law for resentencing relief under section 1170(d). He
argues that the court was required to follow Heard and apply the statute to
him as a juvenile who was sentenced to a de facto LWOP sentence. The
Attorney General concedes the error. We agree as well. (See Heard, supra,
83 Cal.App.5th at p. 634; Sorto, supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at p. 439; Bagsby,
supra, 106 Cal.App.5th at p. 1063.)
The Attorney General also concedes that McDowell’s sentence meets
the requirement of a de facto LWOP sentence. We agree. The functional
equivalent of LWOP means that “the release date is near or beyond the
juvenile’s life expectancy.” (People v. Carter (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 985, 995,
citing People v. Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 276-277; see also People v.
Caballero (2012) 55 Cal.4th 262, 268.) McDowell, who was sentenced to 95
years to life plus two life terms, easily meets that standard. (See Bagsby,
supra, 106 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1047, 1051 [107-year-to-life sentence functional
equivalent of LWOP]; Heard, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th at pp. 612, 629 [same for
103-year-to-life sentence].) Thus, he is entitled to seek resentencing relief
under section 1170(d).
We therefore reverse the order denying McDowell’s section 1170(d)
petition. We reject McDowell’s request to order the superior court on remand
to grant the petition and transfer the case to juvenile court. Because the
court denied McDowell’s petition as a matter of law, it did not have the

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opportunity to consider the merits of the petition. Therefore, on remand, the
court shall consider the merits of McDowell’s petition and determine whether
he meets the requirements set forth in section 1170(d).
DISPOSITION
We reverse the superior court’s order denying McDowell’s petition for
recall and resentencing pursuant to section 1170(d) and remand this matter
for further proceedings on that petition.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

COLLINS, J.

We concur:

ZUKIN, ACTING P. J.

MORI, J.

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