CourtListener 10615462•Leondis v. PayPal CA1/1
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Filed 6/23/25 Leondis v. PayPal CA1/1
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
PAUL LEONDIS,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v. A170987
PAYPAL, INC.,
(Alameda County
Defendant and Respondent.
Super. Ct. No. RG21090434)
After plaintiff Paul Leondis was unable to access a payment of $1,073
sent to him via PayPal, Leondis sued PayPal for conversion; breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; breach of the implied duty to
act with reasonable care; breach of fiduciary duty; negligence; and violation of
California’s Unfair Competition Law (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq.;
UCL). PayPal eventually moved for summary judgment, which the trial
court granted. Leondis, appearing in propria persona, challenges the
judgment on numerous grounds. While Leondis was clearly frustrated by his
experience with PayPal, he has failed to demonstrate any prejudicial error by
the trial court. Many of his arguments on appeal were either not properly
preserved in the trial court and thus have been forfeited or have been waived
on appeal due to deficiencies in his appellate briefing, most notably the lack
of developed legal analysis and/or failure to provide adequate record
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citations. We affirm.
PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS
Before discussing Leondis’s claims of error, we find it necessary to
stress “[p]erhaps the most fundamental rule of appellate law”—i.e., “that the
judgment challenged on appeal is presumed correct, and it is the appellant’s
burden to affirmatively demonstrate error.” (People v. Sanghera (2006)
139 Cal.App.4th 1567, 1573.) “ ‘This means that an appellant must do more
than assert error and leave it to the appellate court to search the record and
the law books to test his [or her] claim.’ ” (L.O. v. Kilrain (2023)
96 Cal.App.5th 616, 619.) Rather, “ ‘[i]n order to demonstrate error, an
appellant must supply the reviewing court with some cogent argument
supported by legal analysis and citation to the record. Rather than scour the
record unguided, we may decide that the appellant has forfeited a point urged
on appeal when it is not supported by accurate citations to the record.
[Citations.] Similarly, we may disregard conclusory arguments that are not
supported by pertinent legal authority.’ ” (Champir, LLC v. Fairbanks Ranch
Assn. (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 583, 597 (Champir).) This is no less true when
we are exercising our de novo review over an order granting summary
judgment. (Reyes v. Kosha (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 451, 466, fn. 6 [“Although
our review of a summary judgment is de novo, it is limited to issues which
have been adequately raised and supported in plaintiffs’ brief.”]; see Bernard
v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 1203, 1205 [the problem
caused by inadequate citations to the record is “especially acute” when an
appeal is taken from a summary judgment].)
Leondis’s briefing suffers from these deficiencies. While Leondis’s
unrepresented status may explain these shortcomings, it does not excuse
them. (Burnete v. La Casa Dana Apartments (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1262,
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1267 [“ ‘ “the in propria persona litigant is held to the same restrictive rules
of procedure as an attorney” ’ ”].) Those representing themselves are afforded
no additional leniency or immunity from the rules of appellate procedure
simply because of their propria persona status. (See Nwosu v. Uba (2004)
122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246–1247.)
As a second consideration before we proceed to Leondis’s claims of
error, we point out that our factual discussion is largely based on the
declaration of Steve Tarvin filed in support of PayPal’s summary judgment
motion. In the trial court, Leondis objected to Tarvin’s declaration in his
responses to PayPal’s separate statement on grounds of hearsay, lack of
foundation, and violation of Code of Civil Procedure, section 437c, subdivision
(d). He also asserted the declaration contradicted previous testimony and
was, at times, conclusory. The trial court did not consider Leondis’s
evidentiary objections; specifically, because it found them procedurally
deficient for failure to comply with California Rules of Court, rule 3.1354(a).
That rule states: “Unless otherwise excused by the court on a showing of
good cause, all written objections to evidence in support of or in opposition
to a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication must be
served and filed at the same time as the objecting party’s opposition or
reply papers are served and filed.”
In his appellate briefing, Leondis asserts the trial court improperly
refused to hear his objection, made during the summary judgment hearing,
that the Tarvin declaration was improperly made on information and belief.
It is true that evidentiary objections may be raised in the trial court at the
hearing on summary judgment (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (b)(5)), and if
such objections are not directly addressed by the trial court, they are
preserved on appeal. (Reid v. Google, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 512, 531–532; see
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Code Civ. Proc., § 473c, subd. (q).) However, in his appellate briefing,
Leondis provides no analysis as to why the court assertedly abused its
discretion, citing only general legal tenets and making conclusory assertions.
Accordingly, he has waived his evidentiary complaint. Moreover, even if we
were to consider his evidentiary argument, which we do not, we would find no
prejudicial error. Only one portion of one sentence of Tarvin’s declaration
was based on information and belief, and we have disregarded that part of
that sentence. The remainder of Tarvin’s declaration is based on personal
knowledge as a legal specialist in the executive escalations department at
PayPal. Given his position, Tarvin was “familiar with PayPal’s User
Agreement, account and transaction record systems and customer service
channels.” Thus, there are no foundational issues in connection with his
declaration, nor has there been any violation of Code of Civil Procedure
section 437c, subdivision (d).
Other than the objections to the Tarvin declaration, Leondis’s
objections largely related to issues of whether and when his account was
verified, which, as we discuss below, is not material for purposes of this
summary judgment.
With these observations, we turn to Leondis’s challenge to the trial
court’s grant of summary judgment.
BACKGROUND
PayPal and its History with Leondis
PayPal is an online platform used by individuals and businesses to
send and receive money and to buy and sell things. As a condition of using
the platform, all users must agree to the terms of PayPal’s user agreement.
For security purposes, PayPal requires users to maintain a confirmed bank
account attached to their PayPal account; such an account is considered a
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“verified” account. When a confirmed bank account is removed, the PayPal
account becomes “unverified,” resulting in limitations on how the account can
be used, including inability to claim a payment.
Leondis has had a PayPal account since September 2009. From
December 8, 2009, through January 5, 2019, he maintained a verified PayPal
account with a linked bank account. Leondis contacted PayPal on January 5;
thereafter, his account became unverified. PayPal agents do not add or
remove bank account information without the account holder’s direction,
authorization, or consent.
On January 10, Leondis used the PayPal platform to invoice J. Lanning
in the amount of $1,073. However, he was unable to retrieve the funds sent
by Lanning. PayPal subsequently informed Leondis he would need to claim
the money manually because he was not a verified PayPal user and gave him
some instructions on how to do so. It further stated that if Leondis did not
claim the money by February 9, the transaction would be canceled and the
money returned to Lanning.
Thereafter, on or about January 22—in response to customer service
communications from Leondis regarding the failed transaction—PayPal
provided him with a provisional credit of $1,073 while it investigated his
claim. But it cautioned that if the claim was denied, “the provisional credit
[would] be reversed and charged against [his] PayPal account.”
On or about February 9, the transaction was cancelled, and the funds
were returned to Lanning. PayPal suggested Leondis contact Lanning to
agree on an alternate payment method. There is no indication in the record
Leondis ever did so.
On February 12, Leondis linked a bank account to his PayPal account,
and the account was restored to verified status.
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PayPal subsequently notified Leondis the provisional credit would be
reversed because it had rejected his claim and the funds at issue had been
returned to Lanning. The credit was reversed on or about February 21.
Two years later, on February 19, 2021, Leondis filed the instant
complaint against PayPal, alleging causes of action for conversion, breach of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, breach of the implied
duty to act with reasonable care, breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, and
violation of the UCL.
Summary Judgment Motion
PayPal filed its summary judgment motion in December 2022. It
argued, among other things, that the bulk of Leondis’s claims were barred by
the terms of the user agreement, which, as we shall discuss, absolves PayPal
from liability for any losses resulting from an inability to use its platform or a
suspension or other action taken with respect to a user’s account, including
actions taken negligently. With respect to Leondis’s tort claims, PayPal
argued, among other things, that they were barred by the economic loss rule
because Leondis’s losses were solely economic in nature and arose in the
context of a contractual agreement.
Leondis filed opposition, claiming the user agreement was either
unlawful or unconscionable. He objected to the application of Delaware law;
argued it was not clear PayPal’s factual showing was sufficient to shift the
burden of proof; raised numerous evidentiary objections to PayPal’s showing;
and claimed his own evidence contradicted PayPal’s stated reason for
freezing the payment and showed PayPal’s instructions as to how to unfreeze
the payment were contradictory and fraudulent. Leondis filed his own
declaration in support, attaching a copy of his complaint and attesting all the
factual allegations therein were true and correct and based on his personal
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knowledge. He also declared he had a reasonable expectation California law
would apply and asked the trial court to take judicial notice of various
California statutes, a California rule of court, California decisional law, and a
2002 federal case involving PayPal decided under California law.
Following a hearing, the trial court took the matter under submission
and issued a written ruling on March 12, 2024. The court concluded
Delaware law applied pursuant to the choice-of-law provision in the user
agreement and the parties’ release of liability in that agreement was valid
under such law, observing Leondis had not submitted any evidence to
support his argument the agreement was unconscionable. These rulings
foreclosed Leondis’s causes of action for negligence, breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, breach of the implied duty to perform
with reasonable care, breach of fiduciary duty, and conversion. With respect
to Leondis’s remaining cause of action under the UCL, the court concluded
the undisputed facts did not support a claim PayPal’s conduct was unlawful,
unfair, or fraudulent.
In making its ruling, the trial court did not consider the allegations of
the complaint in determining whether a disputed material fact existed.
Rather, it found Leondis’s attempt to use his complaint to establish material
facts “problematic” given that Code of Civil Procedure section 437c,
subdivision (p)(2) expressly provides a “plaintiff . . . shall not rely upon the
allegations or denials of its pleadings to show that a triable issue of material
fact exists.” (See College Hospital Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704,
720, fn. 7 [“It is generally understood . . . that a party cannot rely on the
allegations of his own pleadings, even if verified, to make or supplement the
evidentiary showing required in the summary judgment context.”].)
At oral argument in this court, Leondis maintained that, in addition to
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the allegations of his complaint, he provided other evidence establishing
disputed issues of material facts, precluding summary judgment. Leondis
appeared to be referring to a screen shot purporting to show his account was
verified as of January 14, 2019, and to comments made at the summary
judgment hearing regarding when and how his account was verified.
However, the only record citations he provides in his appellate briefing are to
his complaint (or the copy of the complaint attached to his declaration) and
the transcript of the trial court hearing. For this reason, alone, we cannot
consider this supposed evidence. (See Champir, supra, 66 Cal.App.5th at
p. 597.) Furthermore, this evidence, again, largely relates to issues of
whether and when his account was verified, which, as we discuss below, is
not material for purposes of this summary judgment.
DISCUSSION
Summary Judgment
“ ‘Summary judgment and summary adjudication provide courts with a
mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine
whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their
dispute. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(2); Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co.
(2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843 . . . (Aguilar).) A defendant moving for summary
judgment or summary adjudication may demonstrate that the plaintiff’s
cause of action has no merit by showing that (1) one or more elements of the
cause of action cannot be established, or (2) there is a complete defense to
that cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subds. (f)(2), (p)(2); Aguilar, . . .
at p. 849.) This showing must be supported by evidence, such as affidavits,
declarations, admissions, interrogatory answers, depositions, and matters of
which judicial notice may be taken.’ ” (Rondon v. Hennessy Industries, Inc.
(2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 1367, 1373 (Rondon); Code Civ. Proc., § 437c,
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subd. (p)(2); accord, Collin v. CalPortland Co. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 582,
587.)
“ ‘After the defendant meets its threshold burden, the burden shifts to
the plaintiff to present evidence showing that a triable issue of one or more
material facts exists as to that cause of action or affirmative defense. (Code
Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 850.) The
plaintiff may not simply rely on the allegations of its pleadings but, instead,
must set forth the specific facts showing the existence of a triable issue of
material fact. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) A triable issue of
material fact exists if, and only if, the evidence reasonably permits the trier
of fact to find the contested fact in favor of the plaintiff in accordance with the
applicable standard of proof. (Aguilar, . . . at p. 850.)’ ” (Rondon, supra,
247 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1373–1374.)
“ ‘In ruling on the motion, the trial court views the evidence and
inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the opposing party.
(Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 843; Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400 (2001)
25 Cal.4th 763, 768 . . . (Saelzler).) If the trial court concludes the evidence or
inferences raise a triable issue of material fact, it must deny the defendant’s
motion. (Aguilar, . . . at p. 843; Saelzler, . . . at p. 768.) But the trial court
must grant the defendant’s motion if the papers show there is no triable issue
as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as
a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).)’ ” (Rondon, supra,
247 Cal.App.4th at p. 1374.)
“ ‘ “We review an order granting summary judgment or summary
adjudication de novo. (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 860.) We
independently examine the record to determine whether a triable issue of
material fact exists. (Saelzler, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 767.) The trial court’s
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stated reasons for granting summary judgment or summary adjudication are
not binding on us because we review its ruling, not its rationale.” ’ ” (Rondon,
supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at p. 1374.)
Validity of PayPal User Agreement
PayPal’s standard user agreement contains a number of provisions
relevant to these proceedings. For example, the agreement provides:
“PayPal’s liability is limited with respect to your PayPal account and
your use of PayPal services. In no event shall PayPal be liable for lost
profits or any special, incidental or consequential damages . . . arising out of
or in connection with our websites, software, systems . . . operated by us or on
our behalf, any of the PayPal services, or this user agreement (however
arising, including negligence) unless and to the extent prohibited by law. [¶]
Our liability to you or any third parties in any circumstances is limited to the
actual amount of direct damages. In addition, to the extent permitted by
applicable law, PayPal is not liable, and you agree not to hold PayPal
responsible, for any damages or losses (including, but not limited to, loss of
money, goodwill, or reputation, profits, or other intangible losses or any
special, indirect, or consequential damages) resulting directly or indirectly
from: (1) your use of, or inability to use, our websites . . . operated by us or on
our behalf, or any of the PayPal services; . . . (6) a suspension or other action
taken with respect to your PayPal account.”
In addition, if a PayPal user receives “a payment for selling goods or
services that is later refunded or invalidated for any reason, [that user is]
responsible for the full amount of the payment sent to [the user] plus any
fees.” Moreover, “PayPal services are provided ‘as-is’ and without any
representation or warranty, whether express, implied or statutory.”
(Boldface omitted.) And, as is particularly relevant here, “PayPal does not
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guarantee continuous, uninterrupted or secure access to any part of the
PayPal services.” Indeed, PayPal retains “sole discretion” under the user
agreement to place “limitations” on a user account that “prevent [the user]
from completing certain actions . . . such as withdrawing, sending or
receiving money.” Finally, PayPal’s relationship with the user “is as a
payment service provider, and PayPal is an independent contractor for all
purposes. PayPal is not your agent or trustee.”
Leondis’s arguments embrace two recurrent themes. He argues
California law should govern this dispute despite the express choice-of-law
language in the user agreement that Delaware law applies. And he asserts
the user agreement is unconscionable under California law. Neither claim
has merit.
Pursuant to the user agreement, PayPal users agree “that, except to
the extent inconsistent with or preempted by federal law and except as
otherwise stated in this user agreement, the laws of the State of Delaware,
without regard to principles of conflict of laws, will govern this user
agreement and any claim or dispute that has arisen or may arise between
[the user] and PayPal.” “The interpretation of a choice of law clause on
undisputed facts presents a purely legal question which we review de novo.”
(Hughes Electronics Corp. v. Citibank Delaware (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 251,
257.)
A choice of law provision chosen by the parties to govern their
contractual rights and duties will be applied unless either: “ ‘(a) the chosen
state has no substantial relationship to the parties or the transaction and
there is no other reasonable basis for the parties choice, or [¶] (b) application
of the law of the chosen state would be contrary to a fundamental policy of a
state which has a materially greater interest than the chosen state in the
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determination of the particular issue and which . . . would be the state of the
applicable law in the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties.’ ”
(Nedloyd Lines B.V. v. Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal.4th 459, 465 (Nedloyd);
accord, Pitzer College v. Indian Harbor Ins. Co. (2019) 8 Cal.5th 93, 100–101.)
PayPal’s incorporation in Delaware establishes a substantial
relationship between the state and the parties. (Hambrecht & Quist Venture
Partners v. American Medical Internat., Inc. (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1532,
1545–1546 (Hambrecht & Quist) [“the parties to a contract have a substantial
relationship with the chosen state if one or more of them is incorporated
there”].) Thus, Delaware law applies to this dispute unless it is contrary to a
fundamental policy of California. (Nedloyd, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 465.) This
was Leondis’s burden to establish (Washington Mutual Bank v. Superior
Court (2001) 24 Cal.4th 906, 917), and he has failed to provide any reasoned
analysis in support of his belief that California law should apply here.
Instead, he simply cites to various California statutes, asserting
without analysis that they are applicable and defeat the parties’ choice of
Delaware law. Given the insubstantiality of his briefing, Leondis has waived
the issue on appeal. But even were that not the case, there is no merit to his
argument. It is true that Civil Code section 1646 provides: “A contract is to
be interpreted according to the law and usage of the place where it is to be
performed; or, if it does not indicate a place of performance, according to the
law and usage of the place where it is made.” However, this statute applies
only in the absence of a contractual choice of law provision. (Hambrecht &
Quist, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1540–1541.) Civil Code section 1668
states, in turn: “All contracts which have for their object, directly or
indirectly, to exempt anyone from responsibility for [their] own fraud, or
willful injury to the person or property of another, or violation of law,
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whether willful or negligent, are against the policy of the law.” However, as
our Supreme Court recently clarified, the statute “does not preclude parties
from limiting their liability for pure breaches of contract absent a violation of
an independent duty that falls within the ambit of [Civil Code] section 1668.
Where the claims asserted are ‘nothing more than a breach of . . . contractual
obligations,’ [Civil Code] section 1668 does not apply. [Citation.] In such
cases, releases are governed by contract principles such as unconscionability.”
(New England Country Foods, LLC v. Vanlaw Food Products, Inc. (2025)
17 Cal.5th 703, 717.) Here, Leondis has not advanced causes of action for
fraud, willful misconduct, or violation of the law outside of his contractual
relationship with PayPal, making Civil Code section 1668 inapposite.
Leondis also cites to Civil Code section 1667 for the proposition
something is “unlawful” if it is “contrary to good morals” (italics omitted) and
suggests the Delaware choice-of-law provision is “immoral” because he has no
association with Delaware. But, as we have just recited, California law
allows a contractual choice-of-law provision to designate the state of a party’s
incorporation. Leondis also urges the contract is contrary to good morals
because it releases the dominant party from liability. However, our high
court’s recent decision in New England Country Foods makes clear California
law allows the parties to limit liability for contractually based claims.
Leondis additionally argues the user agreement is unlawful because it
contains a unilateral modification clause stating: “We may amend this user
agreement at any time by posting a revised version on our website. The
revised version will be effective at the time we post it. If we change the user
agreement in a way that reduces your rights or increases your
responsibilities, we will provide you with 30 days’ prior notice by posting
notice on the Policy Updates page of our website.” He has not, however,
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explained how this provision has any bearing whatsoever on the claims he
presents here or any reasoned analysis as to why it is unlawful.
Finally, in both his briefing on appeal and at oral argument, Leondis
appeared to argue that the user agreement is unconscionable under
California law because it is a contract of adhesion. PayPal admitted at oral
argument that the user agreement is adhesive in nature but, correctly,
pointed out this does not necessarily make it unconscionable. The doctrine of
unconscionability “ ‘ “is concerned not with ‘a simple old-fashioned bad
bargain’ [citation], but with terms that are ‘unreasonably favorable to the
more powerful party.’ ” ’ ” (Chen v. PayPal, Inc. (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 559,
578, italics added (Chen).) Ordinary contracts of adhesion, which are
regularly enforced, contain “ ‘ “a degree of procedural unconscionability.” ’ ”
(Baltazar v. Forever 21, Inc. (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1237, 1244; see Chen, at p. 580
[agreeing with the trial court that any procedural unconscionability in
PayPal’s standard user agreement was “minimal”].) However, both
procedural and substantive unconscionability must be present in order for a
court to exercise its discretion to refuse to enforce a contract or clause under
the doctrine of unconscionability. (Chen, at p. 578.) Substantive
unconscionability focuses on whether contract terms are overly harsh or so
one-sided as to shock the conscious. (Ibid.) Thus, “ ‘[n]ot all one-sided
contract provisions are unconscionable.’ ” (Id. at p. 579.) Indeed, “ ‘ “ ‘a
contract can provide a “margin of safety” that provides the party with
superior bargaining strength a type of extra protection for which it has a
legitimate commercial need without being unconscionable.’ ” ’ ” (Ibid.) In
other words, asserting that a contract provision is adhesive is insufficient to
establish its substantive unconscionability.
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In sum, Leondis has presented no fundamental policy of California
which precludes the application of Delaware law to the instant dispute.
Under Delaware law, a contractual release of liability must be clear
and unequivocal, not unconscionable, and not against public policy. (Ketler v.
PFPA, LLC (Del. 2016) 132 A.3d 746, 747–748 (Ketler).) The language of the
user agreement is clear and unequivocal, and Leondis has advanced no
argument the agreement is unconscionable under Delaware law. As for
public policy, “[t]he public policy of [Delaware] is typically determined by the
Delaware General Assembly” and “[n]o Delaware statute has been identified
which bears on the validity of a release of prospective negligence.” (Id. at
p. 748.)
In other words, given the record, the trial court correctly concluded the
PayPal user agreement at issue, including its limitation on PayPal’s liability,
is valid.
The User Agreement Forecloses Leondis’s Claims
That the user agreement is valid is fatal to the bulk of Leondis’s claims.
As we have recited, the agreement shields PayPal from liability for losses
resulting from an inability to use any of the PayPal services or the
suspension or other action taken with respect to a PayPal account, even when
negligent. Leondis’s claims all arise out of his inability to use PayPal’s
interface to retrieve the Lanning payment and PayPal’s subsequent removal
of the provisional credit following its investigation and rejection of Leondis’s
claim. Since PayPal retained “sole discretion” under the user agreement to
place “limitations” on a user account that “prevent [the user] from completing
certain actions . . . such as withdrawing, sending or receiving money,”
restricting Leondis from withdrawing the Lanning payment was authorized
by the agreement. Its subsequent reversal of the provisional credit it
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extended to Leondis was also authorized by the user agreement, and
specifically by the provision stating if a PayPal user receives “a payment for
selling goods or services that is later refunded or invalidated for any reason,
[that user is] responsible for the full amount of the payment sent to [the user]
plus any fees.”
Since PayPal was authorized to act as it did under the user agreement,
Leondis’s causes of action alleging breaches of implied duties necessarily fail.
(See Kuroda v. SPJS Holdings, LLC (Del. Ch. 2009) 971 A.2d 872, 888 [an
“implied covenant cannot be invoked to override the express terms of the
contract”].) Moreover, the user agreement expressly states that PayPal is not
acting as an agent or trustee, making Leondis’s breach of fiduciary claim
meritless.
Leondis’s tort claims for negligence and conversion also fail under
Delaware’s economic loss rule, which “ ‘is a court-adopted measure that
prohibits certain claims in tort where overlapping claims based in contract
adequately address the injury alleged.’ ” (Veriton Partners Master Fund, Ltd.
v. Cornell (Dist. Del. 2020) 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97323, p. *7.) In other
words, where an action is based entirely on a breach of the terms of a
contract between the parties, and not on a violation of an independent duty
imposed by law, a plaintiff must sue in contract and not in tort. Here,
Leondis’s relationship with PayPal is solely a creation of contract. To say
PayPal was negligent in its provision of services or somehow converted
Leondis’s property for its own use, is also to say it was in breach of contract.
Accordingly, these tort claims are prohibited under Delaware law.
Finally, to succeed on his UCL claim, Leondis was required to establish
PayPal engaged in unlawful, fraudulent, or unfair conduct. (Bus. & Prof.
Code, § 17200.) The trial court concluded the undisputed evidence could not
16
support a finding PayPal engaged in any of the prescribed behaviors. While
Leondis contends the trial court’s rejection of his UCL claim was “frivolous,”
he supplies no reasoned argument why this is the case and therefore has
waived the argument on appeal. Furthermore, to defeat summary judgment,
disputed facts must be material. “To be ‘material’ for purposes of a summary
judgment proceeding, a fact must relate to some claim or defense in issue
under the pleadings, and it must also be essential to the judgment in some
way.” (Riverside County Community. Facilities Dist. v. Bainbridge 17 (1999)
77 Cal.App.4th 644, 653.) In his opposition memorandum, Leondis claimed
PayPal made “numerous false and fraudulent statements” when he contacted
the company in an attempt to unfreeze the Lanning payment, “some
appearing to attempt to generate new business . . . under false pretenses.”
But these are not material facts; they are unsupported conclusions and
conjecture. (See Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 850 [A triable issue of
material fact exists if, and only if, the evidence reasonably permits the trier
of fact to find the contested fact in favor of the plaintiff in accordance with the
applicable standard of proof.].) As for Leondis’s assertion there are disputed
issues of fact regarding when his account was verified and when it was not,
the record is to the contrary. PayPal’s evidence—based on company
records—shows that Leondis’s account was unverified from January 5 to
February 12, 2019. That Leondis may have been able to withdraw a payment
during that timeframe or view a computer screen at one point stating his
account was verified speaks, at most, to inadvertence or mistake for which
PayPal is not contractually liable and which is insufficient to support a claim
under the UCL.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The parties shall each bear their own costs
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on appeal.
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_________________________
Banke, J.
We concur:
_________________________
Humes, P. J.
_________________________
Langhorne Wilson, J.
A170987, Leondis v. PayPal
19
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