CourtListener 10615454•People v. Mix CA4/1
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Filed 6/23/25 P. v. Mix CA4/1
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California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D083066
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. FELSS1003876)
ROBERT MIX,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Bernardino
County, Lorenzo R. Balderrama and Kawika Smith, Judges. Affirmed.
Rudy Kraft, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A.
Sevidal and Randall D. Einhorn, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
The Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA) (Welf. & Inst. Code,1
§ 6600 et seq.) “authorizes the involuntary commitment of certain convicted
sex offenders—termed ‘sexually violent predators,’ or SVPs—who are found
to have mental disorders that make them likely to reoffend after release
from prison.” (Camacho v. Superior Court (2023) 15 Cal.5th 354, 367
(Camacho).) Here, the district attorney petitioned to commit Robert Mix
under the SVPA following his conviction for committing a sexual offense
against a child. A jury eventually found that Mix qualified as an SVP, and
the trial court committed him to the State Department of State Hospitals
for an indefinite term.
Mix appeals the commitment order, contending the trial court erred
in denying his motion to dismiss the petition based on a violation of his
constitutional right to a timely trial. He further argues the judge who heard
the motion to dismiss should have recused himself because it was alleged
that he contributed to the pretrial delay. Lastly, Mix claims the court erred
in denying four of his Marsden2 motions to replace his appointed counsel.
Although the pretrial delay in this case was substantial—almost nine
years from the petition to the motion to dismiss, and another four years to
trial—we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the
motion to dismiss, as the defense was primarily responsible for the delays.
Indeed, Mix executed written waivers of his right to a timely trial that
account for more than half of the pretrial delay. We further conclude that
Mix has failed to preserve his recusal argument for appeal, and that the
1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
2 People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118.
2
court properly denied his Marsden motions. Accordingly, we affirm the
commitment order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 1998, Mix was convicted of assault with intent to commit criminal
sexual conduct in Michigan. Ten years later, he pleaded guilty to committing
a lewd act with a child under age 14 (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a)) in this state.
For the latter offense, he was sentenced to three years in prison with credit
for time served. He was released on parole, and then violated parole by
associating with sex offenders and using marijuana. He was ordered to
return to prison for nine months.
A. Initial Proceedings
Before his scheduled release from prison, the Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation referred Mix to the Department of Mental
Health (DSH3) for an evaluation. Based on record review, risk assessment,
and clinical examination by two psychologists—Drs. Douglas R. Korpi and
Erik L. Fox—DSH recommended that the San Bernardino District Attorney
petition to civilly commit Mix under the SVPA. On September 14, 2010, the
San Bernardino District Attorney filed a petition to commit Mix as an SVP
for an indefinite term.
Upon receiving the petition, the trial court (Judge Katrina West) set
a probable cause hearing for September 17, 2010. On that date, Deputy
District Attorney (DDA) Maureen O’Connell and Deputy Public Defender
(DPD) Chris Williams appeared before the court. The public defender was
appointed to represent Mix. Williams accepted the court’s appointment,
3 The Department of Mental Health is now known as the State
Department of State Hospitals. For clarity, we use the current acronym,
“DSH.”
3
denied all allegations in the petition, and requested a one-week continuance
to allow him time to confer with Mix. The court granted the request and
set a status conference for September 24, 2010. Williams stated that Mix
preferred not to be present at the next hearing, and waived his presence.
To align the schedules of the court and the expert witnesses, the probable
cause hearing was continued to February 7 and 8, 2011.
DPD Pamela King took over Mix’s case shortly before the probable
cause hearing. Following the hearing, at which Mix was personally present,
the trial court (Judge Harold T. Wilson) found probable cause to believe that
Mix met the criteria to qualify as an SVP. It therefore ordered him
committed to Coalinga State Hospital4 pending trial. The parties agreed to
return on June 9, 2011 for a status conference. Mix waived his presence for
that date.
For reasons the record does not make clear, counsel did not return
before the court (Judge Katrina West) until July 8, 2011. On that date, King
advised the court that Mix would be undergoing treatment “for some time.”
The parties agreed to set a status conference for January 20, 2012. King then
obtained three additional continuances to allow Mix to continue treatment
and to secure a Litmon5 waiver from him. In the meantime, the prosecution
requested and received updated evaluations from Drs. Korpi and Fox.
4 Between early 2011 and late 2012, Mix was actually placed in
Atascadero State Hospital because he was simultaneously committed under
the Mentally Disordered Offenders (MDO) Act (Pen. Code, § 2962). When
commitment beyond his parole period was not recommended (id., § 2970),
he was transferred to Coalinga in January 2013.
5 In People v. Litmon (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 383, the court recognized
that defendants in SVP proceedings are entitled to a speedy trial under the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. (Id. at p. 406.)
4
On April 30, 2012, Mix filed his first Litmon waiver, which stated:
“I, Robert Mix, hereby requests [sic] of this court that this
case not be set for further hearing or trial for the next eight
(8) months from the date of signing of this document[6], or
until respondent advises this court that he wishes his case
to proceed. I am in Phase 2 and wish to avail myself of this
program. I understand that this request may affect my
rights and remedies of due process under the Litmon case.
Specifically, I understand that I have a right to a speedy
trial. However, by requesting postponement of my case,
I understand that I am waiving my right to a speedy trial
under Litmon.”
On May 4, 2012, pursuant to the waiver, the court set a status
conference for December 7, 2012. On that date, King requested a
continuance to prepare a second Litmon waiver. Soon thereafter, she was
appointed to the bench. In February and March 2013, the trial court (Judge
Steven C. Malone) continued the matter to allow the public defender’s office
to reassign the case.7 On April 5, 2013, DPD David McClave took over Mix’s
representation. He sought a continuance, indicating the Litmon waiver
remained forthcoming. On May 5, 2013, Mix filed his second Litmon waiver,
seeking a continuance for seven months from the date of signing (April 17,
2013, to expire November 17, 2013) so he could continue participating in
treatment.
B. First Marsden Motion
In the Fall of that year, DPD Frank Loo took over Mix’s case. On
October 4, 2013, before the previous waiver expired, Loo filed a “trial memo”
6 The waiver was signed April 17, 2012. Accordingly, this waiver would
expire December 17, 2012.
7 During this time, DPDs Jeff Lowry and Lyly Brantley specially
appeared one time each on behalf of Mix.
5
stating that “Mix wanted a quick trial date” and requesting his trial be set as
soon as possible.” Loo reiterated this request at a status conference before
the court (Judge James M. Dorr) on November 8, 2013. He then requested
to continue the matter until January 3, 2014 to allow him to confer with Mix.
On that date, the court set a jury trial date for November 10, 2014.
On January 27, 2014, Mix sent a written request for a Marsden hearing
to the trial court. He specifically noted that he did not want the public
defender’s office to represent him anymore. He wanted counsel from the bar
panel. The motion was heard on March 21, 2014.8
At the outset of the closed hearing, in response to a question from the
trial court (Judge Lorenzo R. Balderrama), Mix would not say he felt Loo had
not properly represented him. But he expressed concern that Loo was new
to SVP cases. He also believed they had “a little conflict of interest” because
there were three witnesses from Atascadero State Hospital9 that he wanted
to testify in his case, but Loo did not think their testimony was necessary.
Mix observed that Loo was his “fifth lawyer in less than three years.”
He explained that when Pamela King was his attorney, he believed that he
would complete two years of sex offender treatment and then proceed to trial.
But now, with Loo, he must “start all over again.”
The trial court noted it was not unusual for attorneys to leave offices
and new attorneys to take over a case, and “that’s why we have files” and
“lawyer-client meetings to get to know each other.” Upon confirming Mix
had no other complaints, the court asked for a response from Loo.
8 This was the first time Mix appeared in court since the probable cause
hearing. His presence at the intervening hearings was waived by counsel.
9 See footnote 4, ante.
6
Loo explained that although he had only been handling SVP cases since
Fall 2013, he had two years’ experience working on cases involving pleas of
not guilty by reason of insanity and seven years with the public defender’s
office generally. Before joining that office, he had about 15 years’ experience
in criminal and civil litigation. With respect to Mix’s case in particular, Loo
recalled that he had visited Mix three times, and they had spoken over the
phone several times. He sent an investigator to interview the witnesses that
Mix was interested in and determined they would not give helpful testimony.
Loo briefly spoke with Dr. Korpi about this case and retained a defense
expert, Dr. Christopher Fisher, who interviewed Mix.
The trial court ultimately denied the Marsden motion, finding that Loo
was properly and dutifully representing Mix, including following up on the
witnesses that Mix had brought to his attention.
Back in open court, Loo advised the court that Mix had just signed a
third Litmon waiver, to last one year from the date of filing (March 21, 2014,
to expire March 21, 2015) in order to continue treatment. The court
accordingly set a status conference for January 30, 2015.
C. On and Off the “Trial Track”
About one week before that date, on January 21, 2015, Mix filed a
fourth Litmon waiver for another year from the date of signing (January 8,
2015, to expire January 8, 2016) in order to continue treatment. The court
continued the status conference to June 5, 2015.
By the time of the June 5 conference, DPD Nazim Sial had taken over
Mix’s representation. At Sial’s request, the court continued the conference to
December 4, 2015, within the previous time waiver. On that date, Mix filed
a fifth Litmon waiver for an additional six months “in order to prepare for
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trial.”10 The status conference was continued to May 26, 2016, and a trial
date was set for July 11, 2016.
On April 7, 2016, DDA Daniel Ross—who had taken over for
O’Connell—and Sial agreed to continue trial until August 1, 2016. But as of
June 2, 2016, they were still waiting for updated evaluations, and Ross had
personal matters arise in August, so counsel agreed to reset trial for October
17, 2016.
Then, on August 4, 2016, counsel agreed to continue trial to January
30, 2017. The defense was preparing a motion to quash Ross’s subpoena for
records from Coalinga based on principles of confidentiality. Sial represented
that, “based on discussions with Mr. Mix, he’s agreeable to the continuance.”
At a hearing on October 26, 2016, counsel stipulated to the trial court
ordering Coalinga to produce a more limited set of records.
Around the same time, Sial asked the court to continue trial to April
10, 2017. The reason for the request was not entirely clear at the time, but
Sial noted he expected to be in trial until “at least January, February.” Ross
did not object. Sial subsequently requested to continue trial to June 26, 2017,
and then to September 25, 2017. Ross, again, did not object. On March 17,
2017, Mix filed his sixth Litmon waiver, agreeing to postpone the proceedings
10 This waiver sought to postpone the proceedings for six months from the
date of signing. The waiver is signed and dated November 23, 2016. Since
the waiver was filed before then—in December 2015—we assume the
signatories (Mix and a witness) accidentally dated it November 2016, instead
of November 2015. This is supported by the fact that, at the hearing on
December 4, 2015, Sial advised the court that “[w]e filed a six-month waiver
this week . . . .” Moreover, as discussed below, it would not make sense for
Mix to sign a waiver in November 2016, because the parties were actively
setting (and continuing) trial dates during that time period.
8
for six months from the date of filing (until September 17, 2017). This waiver
did not specify the reason he wanted to delay the proceedings.
On July 14, 2017, counsel appeared for a status conference and asked
to continue trial to October 16, 2017. At the same time, Sial advised the
court that Mix’s “eagerness to go to trial” depended “on whether or not any
of the evaluators flip” so it was “possible we could end up vacating those
trial dates” as well. He expected updated evaluations by September. On
September 1, 2017, Sial advised the court that Mix had “recently requested to
continue his case so that he can do more sex offender treatment before trial.”
Ross agreed to vacate the existing trial dates. Later that same month, on
September 21, 2017, Mix filed his seventh Litmon waiver to postpone the
proceedings another year from the date of filing (until September 21, 2018).
At the next hearing, on September 22, 2017, Sial requested, and Ross
agreed, to schedule a status conference for May 25, 2018. On that date, the
conference was continued to July 20, 2018. Before then, on July 10, 2018,
Mix filed his eighth Litmon waiver to postpone the proceedings for six
months from the date of signing (July 3, 2018) “in order to prepare for trial.”
D. Second Marsden Motion
Two months later, in September 2018, the appellate court in People v.
Superior Court (Vasquez) (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 36 (Vasquez) affirmed the
dismissal of an SVP petition based on a violation of the defendant’s right to a
timely trial. The court attributed the “extraordinary” 17 year pretrial delay
to “a systemic breakdown in the public defender system.” (Id. at p. 41.)
On October 17, 2018, Mix appeared telephonically and raised his
second Marsden motion to replace Sial. Before he was excluded from the
courtroom, Ross offered his perspective on the issues he anticipated Mix
would raise. Ross explained that when he was assigned to Mix’s case two-
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and-a-half years prior, the case was “on a fast track to trial in the late
summer or early fall” of 2016. During that summer, however, the district
attorney’s office “became aware of an uncharged allegation of sexual
molestation” by Mix. The office investigated the allegation and turned
witness statements over to the defense, which seemingly prompted Mix to file
a Litmon waiver. By the following summer, updated evaluations continued
to indicate that Mix met the SVP criteria. As Ross understood it, Mix’s
position at that time was that he would only proceed to trial if “one or more
of the evaluators flipped,” so he signed another Litmon waiver.
In the closed courtroom, Mix, Sial, and the SVP unit supervisor, Ed
O’Brien, remained. As relevant here, Mix asserted that his due process right
to a speedy trial had been violated. He had been committed for eight years,
and had six different attorneys. “Enough is enough,” he said. He had
repeatedly asked his attorneys “to push for trial” since 2013. Although he
signed the Litmon waivers, he only did so because his attorneys needed him
to; he was forced to choose between his rights to a speedy trial and to
competent counsel. Mix requested a bar panel attorney to investigate and
file a motion to dismiss. Sial could not handle the motion, Mix explained,
“because he’s part of the problem.”
In response, Sial conceded that Mix had been requesting a trial. In the
three years he had represented Mix, he arranged for Dr. Fisher to evaluate
Mix around July 2016, and engaged an investigator and a social worker to
prepare a release plan for Mix. He acknowledged “that some of the delay in
Mr. Mix’s case” was due to the fact that he had been handling probable cause
hearings, trials, and writs for several other clients. Sial’s caseload fluctuated
between 19 and 23 cases. O’Brien then weighed in as to any alleged
“structural issue.” From his perspective, the reason Mix’s case had not yet
10
gone to trial was because he “agreed to take the matter off the trial track” in
2017 when his updated evaluations were not favorable. Mix agreed to
continue treatment in hopes that one of the doctors would “flip.” To the
extent Mix now prioritized his speedy trial right, the unit would “honor that”
and assign his case to whichever attorney was soonest available to go to trial.
Sial concurred that, in 2017, Mix wanted to continue the case to pursue
additional treatment.
Given Mix’s recent Litmon waiver and his decision to “get off the trial
track,” the court denied his Marsden motion. But it intended to set his case
for trial as soon as possible, within the next few months. The court believed
that Sial or someone else from the public defender’s office would adequately
represent him. Back in open court, both counsel and Mix agreed to give the
defense time to complete Mix’s release plan, request updated evaluations,
and then set a trial date. By late November 2018, Mix’s case was reassigned
to DPD Harry Gobrecht.
Before trial dates were set, the court indicated it was considering
revisiting its ruling on the Marsden motion. On December 19, 2018, in Mix’s
telephonic presence, the court reversed its earlier denial of the Marsden
motion, citing a breakdown in communication. It relieved the public
defender’s office and appointed bar panel counsel Victor Marshall to
represent Mix. Marshall, who was present in court, accepted the
appointment. The court reiterated it hoped to try the case as soon as
possible and set a status conference for January 18 and trial for June 24,
2019. Ross confirmed he would request updated evaluations right away.
E. Motion to Dismiss
On January 18, February 20, and March 13, 2019, the parties sought
continuances. Marshall was waiting for transcripts in order to investigate
11
and prepare a motion to dismiss. At the March 13 hearing, Ross noted that
the prosecution was ready to go to trial in June, but the motion to dismiss
was beginning to conflict, timing-wise, with the current trial date. At Ross’s
suggestion, the court ordered Coalinga to permit Mix to appear telephonically
at the next hearing to ascertain his priorities. On March 27, 2019, Marshall
was still waiting for transcripts. Mix, appearing telephonically, maintained
he did not want to waive his right to a speedy trial. The court therefore
decided to keep the June 24, 2019 trial date and monitor the transcripts issue
until then.
The defense filed its motion to dismiss on June 14, 2019. In critical
part, the motion contended it was the “systemic failure” of the public
defender’s office that caused the almost nine-year delay in Mix’s case. The
“cycle of changing public defenders” required repeated continuances so
counsel could get up to speed on the case, but they were never ready to go to
trial. With each continuance and waiver, Mix faced a “Hobson’s choice” of
either going to trial with an unprepared lawyer or giving up his right to a
speedy trial. He only signed the waivers to allow his attorneys to prepare for
trial. The defense faulted the prosecutor for never objecting, and the trial
court for granting continuances without finding good cause and failing to
relieve the public defender’s office sooner. The defense further argued that
Mix suffered prejudice insofar as he had been “locked up” for several years
awaiting trial, which caused him much anxiety, the inability to freely
associate with his friends and family, and the loss of “what could have been
the most productive years of his life.”
Relying on People v. Landau (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1 (Landau), the
prosecution asserted the court should set aside the time periods covered by
Litmon waivers and individually analyze each intervening, nonwaived time
12
period. Applying that framework, the prosecution argued that only the initial
19-month period between September 2010 (when the petition was filed) and
April 2012 (when the first Litmon waiver was filed) was sufficiently lengthy
to trigger a speedy trial analysis. As to that initial period, the prosecution
contended that Mix’s speedy trial claim failed because every continuance was
requested by his counsel, with his consent and/or at his request, as a matter
of defense strategy to avoid SVP commitment. He never asserted his speedy
trial right during this time period. Moreover, he suffered no prejudice
because he was simultaneously committed as an MDO and there was no
reason to believe his defense had been impaired. The prosecution disavowed
any systemic issue in the public defender’s office, arguing that although
several attorneys had been appointed to represent Mix, that alone does not
constitute a systemic breakdown. The prosecution highlighted the work
Mix’s counsel had done to prepare the defense, including retaining an expert,
and the fact that the SVP unit had recently added two attorneys.
Due to the court’s unavailability the following two weeks, as well as the
likelihood that Mix would need to be transported to court for the motion to
dismiss and trial, the court set an evidentiary hearing on the motion for July
8, 2019, with trial to follow depending on the outcome of that hearing. Mix,
who was present via telephone, agreed to this plan. The July 8 hearing was
subsequently continued to July 11, 2019 for unclear reasons.
1. Evidentiary Hearing
The hearing began on July 11 with the testimony of the supervisor of
the SVP unit, DPD Ed O’Brien. He explained that he had been supervising
the civil commitment unit since 2009, save for a couple of years between 2010
and 2012 when he was assigned elsewhere.
13
Soon after joining, O’Brien divided the unit so that certain attorneys
were focusing on SVP cases, with an eye toward bringing those cases to trial
faster. O’Brien acknowledged that, in March 2014, Mix was “rightfully”
concerned about the number of attorneys that had been assigned to his case.
The civil commitments unit had “several transfers” in and out “for a time.”
But the SVP team had been “stable” for the past five years. Then, in early
2018, two attorneys were added to the team, increasing the total to five or six
dedicated SVP attorneys. The new additions decreased the pretrial caseload
of each attorney, ranging from 4 or 5 cases to 12 or 14 cases each, depending
primarily on how many clients were ready to go to trial. The team typically
received one or two new cases each year.
With respect to Mix’s case specifically, O’Brien reviewed the attorneys’
notes in the file (from March 2014 to present)11 and observed the case had
been on and off the “trial track” a few times, with Mix’s consent and/or at his
request, for strategic reasons. He pinpointed March 2014, August 2016, and
September 2017 as times Mix got off the trial track. Generally, when Mix
was delaying trial, it was in order to participate in sex offender treatment
and hopefully “flip a doctor” and improve his chances at trial. In the summer
of 2016 specifically, Mix and Sial chose to take the case off the trial calendar
when the additional allegation of abuse came to light. Any time there was a
Litmon waiver, that indicated to O’Brien that Mix was not prioritizing trial.
O’Brien was familiar with the Vasquez case, and affirmed that the SVP
team did not experience the resource cuts at issue there. To the contrary, the
team added two new attorneys in 2018, and was supported by the office’s
investigators, social workers, and other staff. O’Brien noted that Sial never
11 The trial court found the business records exception to the hearsay rule
(Evid. Code, § 1271) applied to these notes.
14
asked him to reassign Mix’s case. If he had, someone on the team was
available to try the case.
The hearing resumed on July 15 and 16, 2019 with the testimony of
DPD Nazim Sial. When Sial first joined the SVP team in 2013, there were
three attorneys on the team, and each had about 18 or 19 cases. Sial’s
caseload fluctuated between 18 and 23 cases over the next several years,
until the team received two new attorneys in 2018, which eventually reduced
his caseload to about 10 cases. Sial explained that he prioritizes his cases
depending on the age of the petition, whether the client is asking to go to
trial, and whether the client has received an evaluation concluding they do
not meet the SVP criteria. When he is actively preparing a case for trial, his
other cases go on the “back burner.”
The number of cases on the trial track at any given time, however, was
typically limited to about five or six cases per attorney. This was true for
Sial as well. At most, he had seven or eight cases on the trial track at once.
Among the cases on the trial track, some go back off the trial track, some are
dismissed, and some get reassigned. For instance, in 2015, two or three of
Sial’s clients demanding speedy trials were reassigned to other SVP
attorneys. Of course, some cases proceed to trial. In Sial’s estimation,
“a reasonable speed” would be three or four SVP trials a year.
As Sial explained, some clients choose to remain off the trial track
for several strategic reasons. They might choose to participate in treatment
and/or improve their behavior in the hospital, which helps their case by
showing they are not a current risk to the public. Delaying trial can benefit
the client by “put[ting] space between them and their past offenses,” and by
creating the possibility that an evaluator will flip, or a new evaluator will
become assigned to the case and reach a different conclusion. Also, when
15
the client reaches certain ages, their statistical likelihood of reoffending
decreases.
When Sial was first assigned to Mix’s case in August 2014, he
understood that Mix wanted to go to trial. But Sial had other cases
scheduled to go to trial ahead of his, and also dealt with a medical issue
that prevented him from trying any cases for some months. Around this
time, Sial advised Mix he was unsure whether he would personally be able
to try his case in 2015 under the circumstances. Sial recalled that Mix
“understood the reality of that and the need to get prepared on the case,
and so he was okay with talking about trial beginning in 2015.” Mix was
concerned “about the cost of his case getting reassigned again.” Mix
nevertheless maintained his desire to go to trial, and his case remained
on the trial track.
His case was set for trial in 2016, but that summer, the parties learned
of the new allegation of abuse against Mix. At the same time, Sial had
another case that was due to go to trial. Sial discussed these issues with Mix,
and he agreed to continue his trial to 2017. By the summer of 2017, Mix
decided he did not want to go to trial unless and until one of the evaluators
changed their opinion. His case was taken off the trial track for one year
so he could continue treatment. The following summer, in July 2018, Mix
agreed to postpone his trial six more months as Sial prepared to try another
case. Then, in October 2018, Mix made his Marsden motion.
Even though Sial was preparing for trial in other cases, he was still
working on Mix’s case. In the four-plus years that Sial represented Mix,
they spoke on the phone once or twice a month, and visited in person once
or twice a year. There was “a significant ramp up” in the time Sial spent on
Mix’s case in early 2017, when they were preparing for trial. This included
16
reviewing several thousand pages of documents—discovery, prior offenses,
and evaluations—discussing the case with Mix, contacting defense
evaluators, and engaging investigators and social workers to work on a
release plan.
Between 2014 and 2017, Sial admitted “there were definitely times”
when “the primary obstacle of us going to trial” was that he “was involved in
other cases.” Indeed, from Sial’s perspective, the fact that he had other cases
accounted for most of the delay until 2017. Although Mix seemed frustrated
at times because he wanted to go to trial, and he could have requested
another attorney, he chose to stick with Sial. He did not want his case to
be passed on yet again.
If Mix demanded a speedy trial and refused to sign any more waivers,
Sial did not know whether the case would be reassigned. He believed it
would depend on the caseloads of other attorneys on the team at that time.
He explained it is difficult to “hand off” SVP cases because they typically
involve records that are up to 20,000 pages in length, and it takes at least six
months to prepare a case for trial “given civil discovery deadlines, the need
for updated evaluations,” and “the need for defense evaluators.” Sial believed
that Mix understood this.
The hearing continued on August 14, 2019 with Mix’s testimony. Mix
testified that he told every attorney he had that he wanted a speedy trial.
He reiterated that when Pamela King represented him, he believed he would
participate in treatment for two years and then go to trial around 2013.
From Dave McClave to Frank Loo and then Nazim Sial, he consistently
wanted to go to trial. He acknowledged, however, that he did not demand a
speedy trial in court other than the 2013 trial memo and the 2018 Marsden
hearing. Every time he signed a Litmon waiver, it was because his counsel
17
needed time to prepare, and he wanted effective counsel. He felt he had no
choice but to sign the Litmon waivers and agree to the continuances.
Mix denied that it was more important to him to stay with Sial rather
than have a speedy trial. If he asked for new counsel, it would take time for
them to get up to speed. He did not want to start all over again, and he did
not want to risk being appointed a less skilled attorney, or an attorney he did
not get along with.
Mix maintained he wanted to go to trial even though he never received
a negative evaluation—meaning, an evaluation concluding he did not meet
the SVP criteria—from Drs. Fox and Korpi. His desire for a speedy trial only
strengthened in 2016 when the defense expert, Dr. Fisher, gave him a
negative evaluation. Mix denied that he wanted to go off the trial track in
the summer of 2017 in order to flip a doctor. Although he got the impression
that one of the doctors might flip if he participated in further treatment, he
still wanted to go to trial. The reason they did not go to trial at that time was
because Sial was not ready. Mix also denied that the new allegations that
came to light in 2016 deterred him from pursuing trial.
2. Argument and Decision
After Mix’s testimony, the court heard argument from counsel.
Marshall emphasized that the reason for the delay was the systemic
breakdown in the public defender’s office. In his view, the office did not have
enough SVP attorneys, and those it had were coming and going. Considering
the number of cases the team had, and the pace at which cases were brought
to trial, it was not possible for Mix to receive a timely trial. He suggested
that adding two attorneys to the team was an attempt to correct the issue,
and thus evidence that there was a problem. He also highlighted that the
court and prosecution bore some blame in failing to push the case along.
18
Ross, in response, agreed the “key” or “threshold” issue was whether
there was systemic breakdown. If not, then every request for continuance
by the defense was attributable to Mix, and all of his Litmon waivers were
enforceable. Ross maintained there was no systemic breakdown. The delay
was the result of individual attorneys prioritizing their caseloads in
consultation with their clients. Mix made an informed choice to postpone his
trial in order to keep his current counsel, to deal with the new allegations of
sexual abuse in the summer of 2016, and to flip an evaluator in the summer
of 2017. A heavy caseload, or a turnover of attorneys, does not constitute
systemic breakdown. The decision to bring in additional attorneys was
prophylactic, not corrective. He then reiterated his analysis of the discrete
time periods between waivers, described above. He added that Mix “ratified”
each nonwaived period by filing another waiver.
The trial court took the matter under submission, and ultimately
denied the motion to dismiss at a hearing on September 25, 2019.
Referencing People v. Williams (2013) 58 Cal.4th 197 (Williams), the court
observed that a systemic breakdown requires evidence identifying systemic
or institutional problems in a public defender’s office, not just problems with
individual attorneys. For example, in Vasquez, supra, 27 Cal.App.5th 36, the
court found systemic breakdown based on evidence of a 50 percent cut to the
public defender’s office funding and staffing in that county. (Id. at p. 41.)
Here, there was no such evidence. To the contrary, the court found “all the
delays were caused by [Mix] and his attorney as tactical decisions for [him]
to achieve a better result at trial while [he] participated in [treatment] and
continually sought updated evaluations, hoping that an evaluator would flip
his evaluation from positive to a negative position . . . .” To the extent Mix’s
claims of disagreement with Sial were “to be believed,” the court found that
19
was “a matter between [Mix] and his attorney and not a breakdown of the
public defender system.”
Absent evidence of systemic breakdown, the court attributed each
request or acquiescence by defense counsel to Mix, and gave effect to the
Litmon waivers he signed. Upon reviewing the series of waivers, the court
found that Mix waived his due process right to a speedy trial for the following
time periods: April 2012 to December 2012; April 2013 to November 2013;
March 2014 to June 2016; and November 2016 to October 2018. Following
Landau, supra, 214 Cal.App.4th 1, it analyzed the remaining unwaived
periods individually: September 2010 to April 2012 (19 months); December
2012 to April 2013 (four months); November 2013 to March 2014 (four
months); June 2016 to November 2016 (five-and-a-half months); and October
2018 to present (10 months).12
Applying the Barker factors13 to those discrete time periods, the court
found that the initial 19-month period—from September 2010 to April 2012—
was “presumptively prejudicial since it is over a year.” With respect to that
12 Our calculation of the waived and unwaived periods is slightly different
from the trial court, consistent with the prosecution’s calculation set forth
in its supplemental opposition to the motion to dismiss. We suspect the
difference is attributable to the error on the November 23, 2015 Litmon
waiver (see fn. 10, ante), which caused the trial court to count that waiver
twice (as effective December 4, 2015 and November 23, 2016). In any event,
Mix did not raise any error on this point in the trial court or on appeal.
13 As discussed in greater detail below, the high court in Barker v. Wingo
(1972) 407 U.S. 514 prescribed a four-factor balancing test for determining
whether a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial was violated.
The factors are: (1) length of the delay; (2) reason for the delay; (3) the
defendant’s assertion of their right; and (4) prejudice to the defendant. (Id.
at p. 530.) These factors are used to evaluate a claimed denial of a timely
trial in the SVPA context as well. (Camacho, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 379.)
20
period, it found the reason for the delay was attributable to Mix, as the
defense requested all of the continuances. Moreover, Mix never asserted his
speedy trial right during that period, and he suffered no prejudice since he
was dually committed as an MDO during that time.
As to the next three time periods—December 2012 to April 2013 (four
months); November 2013 to March 2014 (four months); and June 2016 to
November 2016 (five-and-a-half months)—the court found they were “all less
than a year old” and therefore did “not trigger presumptive prejudice.” In
any event, it found that Mix “requested all of the continuances” during these
periods “which were granted by the Court with reasons given.” During these
periods, the court found that Mix never asserted his speedy trial rights—he
was engaged in treatment instead—and he was not prejudiced.
Regarding the final period—October 2018 to present (10 months)—
the court again found the delay did “not cross the threshold of presumptive
prejudice.” It nevertheless analyzed the remaining factors, finding “the
delays were at the request of [Mix], or as a consequence of seeking a new
attorney, or pursuing his speedy trial litigation.” It recognized that Mix
asserted his speedy trial right in the Marsden hearing in October 2018.
But Mix then agreed to postpone trial in order to complete his release plan.
When he decided not to complete that plan in December 2018, both counsel
and Mix personally agreed to a June 2019 trial date. From then on, the
parties were litigating the speedy trial motion, and Mix “cannot claim a
speedy trial violation regarding the time necessary to litigate his speedy
trial violation.” It also saw no evidence of actual prejudice to Mix.
The court lastly commented, based on its experience handling SVP
cases, “that such delays on the part of SVP respondents and their attorneys is
not unreasonable and makes perfect sense. When respondents are facing the
21
potential of an indefinite commitment as [SVPs], they may very well be
reluctant to face a jury with such SVP allegations unless there is a better
chance at success, such as the completion of [treatment], or the successful
flipping of an evaluator from positive to negative.”
Thus, the court concluded there was no violation of Mix’s due process
right to a speedy trial and denied the motion to dismiss. The defense then
requested a stay of the proceedings to pursue a petition for writ of mandate.
Mix filed the writ in pro per, which was summarily denied on May 15, 2020.
F. Trial and Commitment Order
Mix ultimately went to trial in the Spring of 2023, with bar panel
attorney Mustafa Abdul-Rahman representing him. At trial, evidence was
presented that Mix sexually abused several young girls. One expert opined
that Mix met the SVP criteria, while two reached the opposite conclusion.
A jury found true that Mix qualified as an SVP. The trial court ordered Mix
committed to DSH.
DISCUSSION
A. The Trial Court Acted Within Its Discretion In Denying Mix’s
Motion to Dismiss Based On An Alleged Speedy Trial Violation
Mix principally contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to
dismiss. He maintains that he wanted to go to trial throughout the
proceedings, his many Litmon waivers were invalid because he had no choice
but to sign them, and the delay in his case was attributable to the
prosecution, the trial court, and a breakdown in the public defender system.
To the contrary, we conclude the denial of Mix’s motion was reasonable and
supported by the record.
22
1. Standard of Review
“We review for abuse of discretion a trial court’s ruling on a motion to
dismiss for prejudicial pretrial delay.” (Vasquez, supra, 27 Cal.App.5th at
p. 55; accord, In re Kerins (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 1084, 1099 (Kerins); People
v. DeCasas (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 785, 801 (DeCasas).) “Under that
standard, ‘[t]he trial court’s findings of fact are reviewed for substantial
evidence, its conclusions of law are reviewed de novo, and its application of
the law to the facts is reversible only if arbitrary and capricious.’ ”
(Camacho, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 383.)
2. The Barker Framework
Significant pretrial delays in SVP cases—reaching 15 years or more—
“ ‘can and do occur.’ ” (Camacho, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 376 & fn. 2.) This
is generally attributable to a few unique features of the SVPA. First, “SVP
trials, unlike criminal trials and most types of civil trials, are not subject
to statutory time limits.” (Id. at p. 377.) Second, “SVP trials are unlike
criminal trials in that they are not aimed primarily at establishing an
individual’s liability for past events, but instead at establishing the
individual’s present need for mental health treatment. Although an SVP
proceeding may involve inquiry into certain facts about an individual’s
criminal history, the central focus of an SVP trial is whether the individual
currently has a mental disorder that poses a danger to the public and thus
requires hospitalization.” (Ibid., italics added, citations omitted.)
Third, “[o]nce a judge has found probable cause to believe an individual
is an SVP, that individual is held in a state hospital and begins to receive
mental health treatment—even before trial is ever held. For this reason,
both sides may have a common interest in delaying trial. From the
individual’s perspective, allowing more time for treatment may ultimately
23
improve the chance of success at trial, insofar as treatment may help address
a mental disorder that a jury might otherwise find poses a risk to the
public. . . . For the state’s part, there are limited incentives to expend the
resources necessary to push the case toward trial when, following a finding of
probable cause, the individual is already being hospitalized and receiving
treatment.” (Camacho, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 377, citations omitted.)
While lengthy pretrial delays are common in SVPA cases, that does not
mean that any amount of delay under any circumstance is constitutionally
tolerated. Individuals “facing SVP commitment have a due process right to a
timely trial.” (Camacho, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 368; see also Vasquez, supra,
27 Cal.App.5th at p. 57 [ “the SVPA is a civil commitment proceeding, not a
criminal prosecution to which the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial
attaches”].) To evaluate claims of excessive pretrial delay under the due
process clause, we borrow the framework used to assess alleged speedy trial
violations under the Sixth Amendment in criminal cases, as set forth in
Barker v. Wingo (1972) 407 U.S. 514 (Barker). (Camacho, at pp. 379, 381.)14
The high court in Barker “identified four factors for courts to examine:
the length of the pretrial delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s
assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant caused by the delay.”
(Camacho, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 380, citing Barker, supra, 407 U.S. at
p. 530.) “The defendant carries the ‘burden of demonstrating a speedy trial
14 Prior to Camacho, many California courts evaluated speedy trial claims
in SVPA cases under the Barker framework and the general balancing test
described in Mathews v. Eldridge (1976) 424 U.S. 319. Camacho held it was
unnecessary to apply the Mathews test; the Barker framework sufficed.
(Camacho, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 379, 381–382.) In this case, the trial
court applied both Barker and Mathews in denying Mix’s motion to dismiss.
In light of Camacho, Mix expressly acknowledges it is not necessary to
address Mathews on appeal. We agree.
24
violation under Barker’s multifactor test.’ ” (Camacho, at p. 380.) “Because
none of these factors is dispositive, ‘courts must still engage in a difficult and
sensitive balancing process’ to determine whether trial has been
unconstitutionally delayed.” (Ibid.) “In other words, there is no algebraic
formula. The court must use its informed judgment in assigning the weight
to be allocated to each factor considered in a given case.” (Landau, supra,
214 Cal.App.4th at p. 37.) We address each of the four factors in turn.
a. Length of the Delay
The length-of-delay factor “is actually a double enquiry.” (Doggett v.
United States (1992) 505 U.S. 647, 651 (Doggett).) “Simply to trigger a speedy
trial analysis, an accused must allege that the interval between accusation
and trial has crossed the threshold dividing ordinary from ‘presumptively
prejudicial’ delay, since, by definition, he cannot complain that the
government has denied him a ‘speedy’ trial if it has, in fact, prosecuted his
case with customary promptness.” (Id. at pp. 651–652, citation omitted.)
In this threshold context, “ ‘presumptive prejudice’ does not necessarily
indicate a statistical probability of prejudice; it simply marks the point at
which courts deem the delay unreasonable enough to trigger the Barker
enquiry.” (Doggett, supra, 505 U.S. at p. 652, fn. 1; see also Camacho, supra,
15 Cal.5th at p. 383 [this factor “operates as a threshold hurdle; ‘[u]ntil there
is some delay which is presumptively prejudicial, there is no necessity for
inquiry into the other factors that go into the balance’ ”].) In criminal cases,
“courts have generally found postaccusation delay ‘presumptively prejudicial’
at least as it approaches one year.” (Doggett, at p. 652, fn. 1.)
If the accused makes this threshold showing, “the court must then
consider, as one factor among several, the extent to which the delay stretches
beyond the bare minimum needed to trigger judicial examination of the
25
claim. This latter enquiry is significant to the speedy trial analysis
because . . . the presumption that pretrial delay has prejudiced the accused
intensifies over time.” (Doggett, supra, 505 U.S. at p. 652, citation omitted.)
Here, Mix contends the trial court stumbled at the first step by setting
aside the time periods covered by Litmon waivers and only analyzing the
intervening, nonwaived periods. In other words, he argues the court erred in
conceptualizing the pretrial delay as five distinct periods of 19 months, four
months, four months, five-and-a-half months, and 10 months, instead of a
single nine-year period. Mix claims to have “found no support for the trial
court’s decision to break the delays into small pieces and then arbitrarily
declare them not long enough to create a presumption of prejudice so that
the first factor would not weigh in [his] favor.” He ignores the case the court
expressly relied on, Landau, supra, 214 Cal.App.4th 1.
In Landau, the defendant was tried on an SVP petition three times;
the first two trials ended in mistrial, and the third resulted in commitment.
(Landau, supra, 214 Cal.App.4th at pp. 8, 10.) On appeal, the defendant
contended the delay preceding each of his three trials amounted to a denial of
due process. (Id. at pp. 8, 27.) In applying the first Barker factor to the delay
preceding the first trial, the Landau court acknowledged “the length of the
delay was extreme if the entire delay”—five years and seven months—“is
considered.” (Id. at pp. 36–37, italics added.) “However, the reason for the
delay was, for the most part, because [defendant] either asked for it or
stipulated to it, often with what were purported to be time waivers.” (Id.
at p. 37.) When the delay is “at [defendant’s] request or with his consent,”
the Landau court opined, “the weight accorded the delay is reduced.” (Ibid.,
citing Barker, supra, 407 U.S. at p. 529.) “A potential civil committee may
not seek to continue his trial over and over again and then be heard to
26
complain the court violated due process by granting his requests.” (Landau,
at p. 37.) Focusing on the unconsented-to delay preceding the first trial, a
matter of 20 days, the court determined the presumption of prejudice was
not raised. (Id. at pp. 36–38.)
The Landau court nevertheless considered the remaining Barker
factors with respect to the unconsented-to 20-day period. It observed the
reason for that delay was “ ‘a particular two week spree’ ” of court congestion
when many court staff members were on vacation. (Landau, supra, 214
Cal.App.4th at p. 37.) There was no evidence the congestion was chronic
or systemic. (Ibid.) Moreover, the defendant did not assert his right to a
timely trial until 14 days into this 20-day period. (Ibid.) At that point, the
defendant demanded an immediate trial or dismissal, and his trial
commenced six days later. (Ibid.) Lastly, the court detected “no discernable
prejudice caused by this 20-day delay,” noting there was “no allegation that
the result of the first trial, already favorable, would have been any more
favorable had he received his trial in the middle of May 2006”—when he
stopped consenting to the delay—“instead of early June 2006.” (Id. at pp. 36–
37.) On balance, the court concluded the delay preceding the first trial did
not violate due process. (Id. at p. 38.) It employed a similar approach in
analyzing the delay preceding the second and third trials. (See id. at pp. 42–
44.)
Without discussing Landau, the appellate court in Kerins, supra,
89 Cal.App.5th seemed to take a similar approach. In evaluating the
defendant’s claim of unconstitutional pretrial delay, it measured the length
of the delay from the date the SVP petition was filed until the date defense
counsel filed a “ ‘waiver of presence and of trial,’ which included a declaration
from [the defendant] stating he asked [counsel] to ‘explore [his] legal
27
remedies’ and ‘delay [his] trial.’ ” (Id. at p. 1099.) Since the delay between
those two dates—14 years—was “extraordinary” even without the waived
period, the Kerins court opined that factor weighed “heavily” in the
defendant’s favor and proceeded to evaluate the remaining Barker factors.
(Kerins, at p. 1099.)
To be sure, in some SVPA cases the entire length of the pretrial delay
was considered in applying the first Barker factor, even if the defendant had
requested or agreed to continue trial for some amount of time, or waived
time. (See, e.g., Vasquez, supra, 27 Cal.App.5th at p. 61; DeCasas, supra, 54
Cal.App.5th 785.) But in those cases, the propriety of the Landau approach,
or something similar, was not in dispute. Indeed, the Attorney General often
concedes the length-of-delay factor in such cases.
Notably, in Camacho, the Attorney General urged the Supreme Court
to focus its inquiry on an eight-year period when the defendant did not
personally appear in court, as opposed to a four-year period when he
frequently appeared in court and entered a general time waiver. (15 Cal.5th
at p. 383.) At the same time, the Attorney General conceded that an eight-
year delay was “ ‘significant’ in its own right, and so ‘the length of the delay’ ”
weighed in the defendant’s favor. (Ibid.) The Camacho court agreed and
thus had no occasion to decide the issue. (Ibid.)
While the Landau approach may be uncommon, it has not been
squarely criticized, and Mix offers us no principled reason to reject it here.
To the extent the length of the delay operates as a threshold inquiry, the trial
court in this case analyzed the remaining Barker factors even for the shorter
periods of time it did not consider presumptively prejudicial. And although
the court did not expressly apply those remaining factors to the periods
covered by Litmon waivers, it seems the analysis could only go one way:
28
the reason for the delay was that Mix requested to postpone trial; when he
was waiving his right to a speedy trial, he was not asserting that right; and
he was accountable for any additional prejudice suffered by his own request
to delay the proceedings. (See, e.g., Williams, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 240
[thirteen month period where defendant “acquiesced in continuances” and
six-month period where he “consistently waived time . . . are properly charged
to defendant”].) Mix does not develop an argument otherwise.
Finally, Mix suggests his Litmon waivers were invalid because he
had no choice but to sign them. He maintains that if he refused to sign the
waivers, “he would either be taken to trial by an unprepared attorney or be
shifted to a new attorney who will still be unable to take him to trial in a
timely fashion.” In other words, he claims the only reason he signed the
waivers was because his attorneys were not prepared. Substantial evidence
supports the trial court’s implicit finding otherwise. (See Mathew Zaheri
Corp. v. New Motor Vehicle Bd. (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1305, 1313 [“[W]e
presume that the judgment is correct. As to factual matters not actually
and unequivocally determined in the opinion of the trial court, we imply
any necessary findings in support of the judgment which are supported by
the evidence”]; People v. Brents (2012) 53 Cal.4th 599, 618 [express and
implied findings are reviewed for substantial evidence].) Before Mix signed
his first Litmon waiver, Pamela King advised the court that he would be
undergoing treatment “for some time.” Indeed, the first, second, third, and
fourth waivers were for the express purpose of continuing treatment.
The sixth and seventh Litmon waivers did not specify the reason Mix
sought to postpone the proceedings. But based on subsequent explanations
29
and testimony provided to the trial court by Ross, O’Brien,15 and Sial, there
was evidence that Mix signed the sixth waiver after the new allegations of
sexual abuse came to light, and he signed the seventh waiver in order to
participate in further treatment when one of the evaluators did not “flip”
as expected.
The fifth and eighth Litmon waivers each asked the trial court to
postpone the proceedings for six months “in order to prepare for trial.” But
in each instance, the waiver was signed after Mix had been off the trial track
for several months participating in treatment. As Sial explained, it takes
about six months to prepare a case for trial “given civil discovery deadlines,
the need for updated evaluations,” and “the need for defense evaluators.”
Sial believed Mix understood this. Accordingly, when Mix signed these six-
month waivers, it was to afford Sial the minimum time necessary to become
familiar with the many months of treatment Mix had completed, receive and
review updated evaluations, arrange the testimony of defense experts, and
more. In other words, when Mix reasonably chose to participate in prolonged
treatment, it was naturally going to take time for Sial to refocus on his case
and prepare for trial. Under these circumstances, we do not consider it
unfair to hold Mix to these waivers. (Cf. Vasquez, supra, 27 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 62–63 [“it is unfair to give significant weight to [the defendant’s] failure
to assert his right to a speedy trial” where he failed to object to multiple
15 Mix urges this court to ignore O’Brien’s “uninformed” testimony since
he had no direct involvement in this case until the 2018 Marsden hearing.
But in reviewing the record for substantial evidence, we do “ ‘not reweigh
the evidence, evaluate the credibility of witnesses, or resolve evidentiary
conflicts.’ ” (In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 640.) As noted above,
the court found that O’Brien’s testimony was admissible under the business
records exception, and Mix does not challenge that ruling on appeal.
30
continuances during a two-year period in which a 50 percent reduction in
staffing hampered defense counsel’s ability to prepare for trial].)
In sum, Mix has failed to demonstrate the trial court abused its
discretion in evaluating the length-of-delay factor.
b. Reasons For the Delay
The second Barker factor “is the ‘flag all litigants seek to capture’
because the permissibility of pretrial delay depends to a great extent on who
bears responsibility for it and why.” (Camacho, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 383–
384, citation omitted.) “In analyzing the second factor, courts examine
‘whether the government or the criminal defendant is more to blame for th[e]
delay.’ Courts also examine why the delay occurred, for ‘different weights
should be assigned to different reasons.’ ” (Id. at p. 384, citations omitted.)
“If the government deliberately delays trial to hamper the defense, for
instance, that effort at manipulation ‘should be weighted heavily against the
government.’ ‘A more neutral reason such as negligence or overcrowded
courts should be weighted less heavily but nevertheless should be considered
since the ultimate responsibility for such circumstances must rest with the
government rather than with the defendant. Finally, a valid reason, such as
a missing witness, should serve to justify appropriate delay.’ ” (Camacho,
supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 384, citations omitted.)
“By contrast, ‘if delay is attributable to the defendant, then his waiver
[of his right to a speedy trial] may be given effect under standard waiver
doctrine.’ ” (Camacho, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 384, quoting Barker, supra, 407
U.S. at p. 529; accord, Vermont v. Brillon (2009) 556 U.S. 81, 90 (Brillon).)
This principle “accords with the reality that defendants” may seek to delay
trial for their own tactical reasons. (Brillon, at p. 90.) “Delays sought by
31
counsel,” whether appointed or retained, “are ordinarily attributable to the
defendants they represent.” (Id. at p. 85.)
Here, Mix does not dispute that all of the continuances in his case were
at the request or with the consent of the defense. He contends the trial court
erred in attributing these delays to him, instead of the state, in light of the
“systemic problems” in the public defender’s office. He further argues the
court erred in failing to recognize “its own responsibility for the delays” as
well as “the acts” of the prosecution’s office.
i. Systemic Breakdown
As noted above, in Brillon, supra, 556 U.S. 81, the high court held that
“delays sought by counsel,” whether appointed or retained, “are ordinarily
attributable to the defendants they represent.” (Id. at p. 85.) It observed,
however, that this general rule “is not absolute.” (Id. at p. 94.) “Delay
resulting from a systemic ‘breakdown in the public defender system’ could
be charged to the State.” (Ibid., citations omitted.) The high court did not
define “systemic breakdown,” although it determined the record in that
particular case did not establish any such breakdown. (Id. at pp. 87, 94.)
In Brillon, nearly three years elapsed between the defendant’s arrest
and his jury trial. (556 U.S. at p. 84.) In that time, the defendant was
appointed six different attorneys. (Id. at p. 85.) The first attorney moved for
two continuances, citing a heavy workload. The court denied the requests,
and then the defendant “fired” him. (Id. at pp. 85–86.) The second
immediately withdrew based on a conflict, and the third moved to withdraw
because the defendant threatened his life. (Id. at pp. 86–87.) The fourth and
fifth attorneys similarly requested continuances based on a heavy caseload
and a conflicting trial out of town, respectively. (Id. at pp. 87–88.) Before the
court ruled on their requests, they were dismissed based on issues with their
32
state contracts. (Ibid.) The sixth attorney brought the defendant to trial.
(Id. at p. 88.) The Brillon court discerned nothing in the record suggesting
that institutional problems caused these delays. (Id. at p. 94.)
In Williams, supra, 58 Cal.4th 197, the Supreme Court considered
whether a four-year period where defense counsel failed to make progress in
the defendant’s case was chargeable to the defendant—under the general rule
that delays sought by counsel are attributable to the defendant—or to the
state based on systemic breakdown in the public defender system. (Id. at
pp. 241, 245.) During the relevant period in Williams, the defendant was
first appointed a public defender. (Id. at pp. 215, 241–242.) The defendant
raised multiple Marsden motions against his first attorney based on his lack
of progress. (Id. at p. 241.) The attorney admitted he was “ ‘too busy,’ ” he
wanted “ ‘to get rid of a few cases,’ ” and being “ ‘in court every day, all day’
was impeding his ability to work on motions.” (Ibid.) More than one year
into the case, the attorney moved to continue trial, averring he had not
completed investigating the defendant’s case because he had 10 other cases
set for trial around the same time. (Id. at pp. 241–242.) Six months later,
he again sought a continuance, stating he had been unable to focus on the
defendant’s case due to his schedule and caseload. (Id. at p. 242.) He was
relieved when the public defender’s office declared a conflict. (Ibid.)
After six months of inactivity while the criminal defense panel
attempted to arrange counsel for the defendant, a bar panel attorney was
appointed. (Williams, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 242.) Seven months into his
representation, the attorney admitted he had not been able to work on the
defendant’s case because he had been engaged in two other capital cases.
He represented the defendant four additional months before declaring a
33
conflict, during which time he made no significant progress. (Id. at pp. 242–
243.)
Another bar panel attorney then took over the case. (Williams, supra,
58 Cal.4th at p. 243.) He initially requested a continuance “because he had
‘about eight murder cases still set pending for next year.’ ” (Ibid.) Over the
next several months, the attorney made little progress on the case due to
issues securing an investigator. (Id. at pp. 243–244.) He later withdrew
based on a breakdown in his relationship with the defendant. (Id. at p. 244.)
The final appointed attorney told the court: “ ‘We basically started from
scratch; nothing had been done for the past six years essentially.’ ” (Ibid.)
On that record, the Williams court acknowledged “the chronic lack of
progress and repeated coming and going of defense counsel notwithstanding
defendant’s recurring complaints that nothing was being done to bring him to
trial.” (Williams, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 248.) The court further recognized
that “the apparent inability of multiple attorneys . . . to move defendant’s
case forward in a timely manner suggests more than the usual challenges
facing appointed counsel.” (Id. at pp. 244–245.) Nevertheless, on that record,
the Williams court was unable to conclude the delay resulted from a systemic
breakdown. (Id. at p. 241.) The court rejected the defendant’s contention
“that the ‘revolving door’ of appointed counsel over the lengthy pretrial period
qualifies as a ‘ “systemic breakdown in the public defender system” ’ within
the meaning of Brillon.” (Williams, at p. 248.) Although it was “possible”
that the “ ‘revolving door’ ” was “indicative of institutional problems,’ ” the
record contained no facts supporting that conclusion. (Ibid., italics added.)
The Williams court clarified, to show systemic breakdown in the public
defender system, there must be “evidence identifying systemic or institutional
problems and not just problems with individual attorneys.” (58 Cal.4th at
34
p. 249.) Given the appellate record in that case, the court could not
determine “whether the lack of progress was attributable to each attorney’s
own inability to properly manage or prioritize his or her caseload, or whether
the performance of individual attorneys was indicative of unreasonable
resource constraints, misallocated resources, inadequate monitoring or
supervision, or other systemic problems.” (Ibid.)
By contrast, the appellate court in Vasquez, supra, 27 Cal.App.5th 36
identified a systemic breakdown in the public defender system. (Id. at p. 41.)
In that case, the defendant was detained in state hospitals for more than 17
years “as a series of six appointed attorneys slowly moved his case toward
trial.” (Id. at p. 40.) During the first 11-and-a-half years of the pretrial
period, the defendant was represented by two public defenders who seemed
to make little progress on the case, other than filing a couple of motions. (Id.
at p. 70.) But because there was “no evidence that this delay resulted from a
breakdown in the public defender system,” the delay during this period was
charged to the defendant (save for a three-and-a-half month period when the
public defender’s office declared itself unavailable due to funding issues,
which was attributed to the state). (Id. at p. 70 & fn. 22.) During the
following two years, the defendant’s third public defender “made diligent
progress” on the case and the defendant expressly waived his speedy trial
right for at least 10 months of this period. (Id. at pp. 47–48, 70.) This two-
year period was attributed to the defendant as well. (Id. at p. 70.)
Fourteen years into the defendant’s pretrial confinement, however,
things took a turn. (Vasquez, supra, 27 Cal.App.5th at p. 41.) The public
defender’s officer suffered a 50 percent cut to its attorney staffing and the
loss of paralegals, which impaired his third public defender’s ability to
prepare for trial. (Id. at pp. 41, 71.) For about two years, she made
35
“sluggish progress” in preparing. (Id. at p. 72.) She repeatedly alerted the
trial court to the effects of the dramatic cuts, including her increased
workload, the loss of the paralegal assigned to the case, and the lack of time
to meet with experts and prepare motions. (Id. at pp. 48–50, 71.) Then, just
months before trial, the office transferred the attorney out of the SVP unit.
(Id. at p. 71.) She attempted to fight the transfer, alerting her supervisor
that it would be disruptive to her clients with trials set, to no avail. (Id. at
pp. 53, 72.) “After [the defendant’s] fifth attorney requested yet another
continuance to prepare for trial, [he] objected, declaring, ‘Enough is enough.’ ”
(Id. at p. 41.)
On that record, the Vasquez court concluded “the trial court did not err
in finding ‘[t]he dysfunctional manner in which the Public Defender’s Office
handled [the defendant’s] case was precisely the type of systemic or
institutional breakdown contemplated by Brillon and Williams. Accordingly,
the reason for the delay in bringing the case to trial should be attributed to
the state, and not to’ ” the defense. (Vasquez, supra, 27 Cal.App.5th at p. 73.)
Although the court recognized “that an individual public defender will at
times have a heavy caseload that hinders his or her ability to move a case
swiftly toward trial,” that situation was “a far cry from the dramatic budget
cuts in the public defender’s office that impeded [the attorney’s] preparation
for trial over a two-year period, then caused yet another year of delay after
she was transferred out of the SVP unit on the eve of trial.” (Ibid.)
The appellate court in DeCasas, supra, 54 Cal.App.5th 785 addressed a
claimed speedy trial violation involving “the same reduction of the SVP unit
staff and corresponding increase in attorney caseloads” at issue in Vasquez.
(DeCasas, at p. 809.) In DeCasas, it was undisputed that the first eight years
of pretrial delay, “most of which resulted from continuances that [defense]
36
counsel requested or stipulated to, are generally attributable to” the defense.
(Id. at p. 808.) The issue was whether “the SVP unit staff reductions in 2014
constitute[d] a systemic breakdown such that the resulting delays should be
attributable to the state.” (Ibid.) Since the public defender in DeCasas was
affected by the staffing cuts in virtually the same manner as in Vasquez, the
DeCasas court reached the same conclusion. (DeCasas, at p. 810.)
Here, the record supports the trial court’s finding that there was no
evidence of systemic or institutional problems in the public defender’s office.
As the trial court noted, there is no evidence of budget cuts or dramatic
reductions in staffing of the SVP team in this case. To the contrary, O’Brien
testified that the SVP team had been “stable” since the middle of 2014, had
added two attorneys in 2018, and was supported by the office’s social
workers, investigators, and other staff.
It is indisputable that Mix had five attorneys in the almost-nine years
between the petition filing and the motion to dismiss (plus two attorneys who
made occasional special appearances). O’Brien acknowledged that the civil
commitments unit had “several transfers” in and out “for a time.” But as
Brillon and Williams make clear, the mere cycling of attorneys does not itself
establish systemic breakdown. And here, there is no evidence showing that
the reason attorneys were leaving Mix’s case, or the civil commitments unit
in general, was some systemic or institutional problem. Other than Pamela
King and Nazim Sial, the record is not clear what happened to the other
attorneys. By contrast, in Vasquez the record showed that the attorney was
transferred against her will in the course of a dramatic restructuring of the
SVP unit. (Vasquez, supra, 27 Cal.App.5th at pp. 50–51, 53.)
Comparing his case to DeCasas, Mix contends the caseloads of the
attorneys of the SVP team in this case evidenced a systemic problem.
37
In DeCasas, the 50 percent staffing cuts suddenly increased each attorney’s
caseload to about 12 cases. (54 Cal.App.5th at p. 795.) In response, the
supervisor of the SVP unit advised senior management that “ ‘no lawyer can
be competent with such an added workload in such a short period of time’ and
that ‘each attorney has had difficulty with their increased workload.’ ” (Ibid.)
The attorneys within the SVP unit wrote anonymous letters to the public
defender, the county board of supervisors, and the state bar, explaining how
the staffing cuts would devastate their ability to effectively represent their
clients. (Id. at p. 796.) The caseload of the defendant’s appointed counsel
doubled to 14 cases. (Id. at p. 798.) He felt “ ‘overworked’ ” and
“ ‘overwhelmed.’ ” (Id. at pp. 797–798.) The increased workload impaired his
ability to prepare for the defendant’s trial. (Ibid.)
Mix’s point is that, if an increased caseload of about 12 to 14 cases was
overwhelming in DeCasas, then surely the caseloads here prevented the
attorneys from affording their clients timely trials. In short, he posits the
SVP team in this case was “shamefully understaffed.”
To be sure, Sial testified that when he first joined the SVP team in
2013, each attorney had about 18 or 19 cases. His own caseload fluctuated
between 18 and 23 cases over the next several years, until it was reduced to
about 10 cases when the new attorneys joined the team. But he also testified
that, typically, only five or six cases were on the trial track at any given time,
and an attorney could reasonably try three or four cases each year. Although
Sial recognized that he had to prioritize his cases on the trial track based on
the age of the petition, whether the client had received a negative evaluation,
and other criteria—which sometimes meant that other cases were scheduled
to be tried ahead of Mix’s—Sial never expressed that he was overwhelmed to
the point of ineffectiveness, as in DeCasas.
38
Notably, both O’Brien and Sial testified that Sial never asked O’Brien
to reassign Mix’s case because he was overwhelmed. If he had, O’Brien
testified, someone on the SVP team was available to try the case. O’Brien
would have reassigned the case to whomever could bring it to trial the
soonest. This is supported by the fact that in 2015, when Sial had several
clients demanding to go to trial at the same time, two or three of his cases
were reassigned. And in 2018, when Mix unequivocally asserted his speedy
trial right, O’Brien promptly reassigned his case to Harry Gobrecht.
The record belies Mix’s assertion that his attorneys, including Sial, did
“basically nothing” to prepare his case for trial. While it is not clear how
much progress, if any, Chris Williams, Pamela King, and Dave McClave
made toward trial, Frank Loo retained a defense expert, interviewed one of
the DSH evaluators, and arranged for an investigator to interview witnesses
at Mix’s request. Sial filed a successful motion to quash, reviewed several
thousand pages of discovery, continued working with defense experts, and
engaged investigators and social workers to work on a release plan. Both Loo
and Sial affirmed they had regular contact with Mix, in person and over the
phone.
Lastly, relying on In re Butler (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 614 (Butler), Mix
argues “it would be fundamentally unfair to hold [him] responsible” for the
delays in his case. One month into the 13-year pretrial period in Butler, the
defendant wrote to the trial court stating that “he acted upon the advice of
his attorney to waive time and go into treatment” but if the court asked him
“ ‘if that was what [he] really wanted . . . truthfully, it’s not.’ ” (Id. at p. 629.)
Nevertheless, his trial was set one-and-a-half years later, with no evidence
that he was advised about his right to a timely trial or personally waived that
right. (Id. at pp. 629–630, 635.) Over the next several years, his attorney
39
repeatedly continued trial. (Id. at pp. 630–631.) At one point, the defendant
wrote to his attorney “ ‘requesting to be taken to trial as soon as possible’ ”
and reiterating that he had “ ‘never given the Public Defender[’]s Office
permission to waive time on my behalf in this legal matter.’ ” (Id. at p. 630.)
The attorney never informed the trial court about the letter or the
defendant’s assertion of his right. (Ibid.) This attorney, and subsequent
appointed counsel, continued to postpone trial. (Id. at pp. 630–633.) Twelve
years into the pretrial period, the defendant requested a Marsden hearing in
which he asserted “the public defender’s office had failed to represent him
competently by declining to bring his case to trial and that he had never
agreed to any continuances.” (Id. at p. 633.) The court denied the Marsden
motion, and the defendant filed a habeas corpus petition. (Butler, at p. 634.)
On that record, the Butler court discerned “abundant evidence to
support the habeas corpus court’s finding that [the defendant’s] public
defenders essentially ignored and disregarded his demands for a timely trial
and his express direction that counsel was not authorized to waive time on
his behalf.” (55 Cal.App.5th at p. 658.) In addition to the “office’s collective
failure to convey [the defendant’s] trial demands” and “its disregard of the
express wishes of the client,” the “relay race” of public defenders also failed to
demand a probable cause hearing, consult any defense experts, or “come close
to being ready for trial.” (Ibid.) They also engaged in “piecemeal litigation
seemingly without purpose other than to forestall trial.” (Ibid.) Under those
circumstances, the appellate court agreed with the superior court “that it
would be fundamentally unfair to hold [the defendant] personally and solely
accountable for the delays caused by his counsel,” regardless of whether there
was a systemic breakdown. (Ibid.)
40
This case is readily distinguishable. In each of his eight Litmon
waivers, Mix specifically acknowledged that he understood his due process
right to a speedy trial, and that by requesting postponement of his case, he
was waiving that right. The record indicates that Mix signed these waivers
after consulting with counsel. When Mix communicated his desire to go to
trial in 2013, Loo promptly alerted the trial court. And when he reasserted
that desire in October 2018, he was quickly given a Marsden hearing. There
is no evidence in this case that the trial court or Mix’s attorneys ignored him,
or that his attorneys waived his speedy trial right against his express wishes.
In short, the record in this case confirms that Mix had several public
defenders appointed to represent him, and at least some of them had hefty
caseloads. But that is not enough to prove systemic breakdown. And there is
otherwise no evidence identifying a systemic or institutional problem causing
the delay in this case. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
analyzing this factor.
ii. The Prosecution
“Because alleged SVPs have no duty to bring themselves to trial, the
government has a responsibility to ensure the case is moving forward in a
manner that is consistent with due process.” (Camacho, supra, 15 Cal.5th at
p. 388; see also Barker, supra, 407 U.S. at p. 527 [“A defendant has no duty to
bring himself to trial; the State has that duty as well as the duty of insuring
that the trial is consistent with due process” (fns. omitted).].)
The prosecution’s “due process obligation in an SVPA proceeding
cannot be defined with precision, as Barker recognized that a speedy trial
analysis entails a careful weighing of the different factors and the
circumstances of each case.” (Butler, supra, 55 Cal.App.5th at p. 655.) But
it is clear that due process requires the prosecution to “diligently prosecute
41
the case.” (Ibid.) “This may entail stating on the record that it is prepared
to go to trial, taking affirmative steps to set a trial date, promptly requesting
clinical evaluations and records, and securing the attendance of witnesses in
a timely manner.” (Ibid.) “When faced with unwarranted delays or repeated
continuances, ‘diligent prosecution of an SVP petition may necessitate
objecting to the delays, insisting upon trial deadlines, and making the trial
court aware of the length of time since the filing of the SVP petition or other
pertinent details from the record.’ ” (Camacho, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 388.)
Here, the record supports the trial court’s implicit finding that the
prosecution was not significantly responsible for the delays in this case,
particularly when compared to the defense. There was only one change in
prosecutors—from Maureen O’Connell to Daniel Ross—and apparently only
one instance when the prosecution requested a continuance—when Ross had
a personal matter arise in August 2016. Otherwise, the prosecution
requested updated evaluations throughout the proceedings, and announced
ready for trial in June 2019 when Mix pressed his right to a timely trial. Mix
does not dispute these points on appeal.
The focus of his argument is that the prosecution failed to push his case
forward. Although the prosecution could “have exhibited greater diligence in
ensuring [Mix] was timely brought to trial”—for instance, by objecting to the
defense’s requests to continue trial—the prosecution’s mere acquiescence in
the defense’s requests does not overcome the defense’s responsibility for the
delay. (Camacho, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 388.)
iii. The Trial Court
“When a defense attorney requests more time to prepare for trial,” the
trial court is placed “in a difficult position.” (Williams, supra, 58 Cal.4th at
p. 250.) It “must balance a defendant’s right to a speedy trial with his right
42
to competent counsel.” (Ibid.) Nevertheless, the court “ ‘ “has an affirmative
constitutional obligation to bring the defendant to trial in a timely manner.
And to that end, it is entirely appropriate for the court to set deadlines and to
hold the parties strictly to those deadlines unless a continuance is justified by
a concrete showing of good cause for the delay.[16] The trial judge is the
captain of the ship; and it goes without saying that the ship will go in circles
if the crew is running around the deck with no firm marching orders.” ’ ”
(Camacho, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 388–389, citations omitted.)
Here, there is no evidence that court congestion prevented the parties
from proceeding to trial. To the contrary, the record reflects that San
Bernardino Superior Court has a dedicated courtroom for SVP cases, and was
generally available for trial. Following the 2018 Marsden hearing, the court
made clear that it expected trial to begin as soon as possible. It appears
there were just two instances when the court delayed the proceedings due to
its availability—a mere 11 days before the probable cause hearing, and a two-
week period before the motion to dismiss. Again, Mix does not contend
otherwise.
Mix faults the trial court for allowing the parties to continue the
proceedings “with few, if any, formal findings of good cause for the delays.”
To be sure, the record shows that the parties generally agreed to continue
16 Effective January 1, 2020, the Legislature amended section 6603 to
require a party seeking to continue trial to file and serve a written motion
supported by “affidavits or declarations detailing specific facts showing that
a continuance is necessary.” (§ 6603, subd. (c), as amended by Stats. 2019,
ch. 606, § 1.) The court must hold a hearing to determine whether good cause
has been shown, and if so, it must state the facts justifying its finding on the
record. (§ 6603, subd. (c)(4).) The amended statute specifies that “ ‘good
cause’ includes, but is not limited to, those cases in which the attorney
assigned to the case has another trial or probable cause hearing in progress.”
(Id., subd. (c)(8).)
43
status conferences and trial dates, and the court acquiesced in their joint
requests without much inquiry. In that sense, the court probably could have
done more to assess the status of the case, encourage the parties to set trial
dates, and “carefully examine the propriety of continuing” trial dates once
they were set. (Camacho, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 389.) But again, a trial
court’s shortcomings in urging a case to trial do not overcome the defense’s
responsibility in delaying the proceedings. (Id. at p. 390 [“while the court
certainly could have done more to urge the case to trial and enforce deadlines,
the responsibility for the delay rests primarily with the defense”]; see also
Williams, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 251 [finding the trial court was not “directly
responsible for the delay in this case” in granting defense counsel’s requests
for continuances].) Accordingly, the trial court did not err in implicitly
finding it was not primarily responsible for the delays in this case.
c. Assertion of the Right to a Speedy Trial
A defendant who fails to demand a speedy trial does not forever waive
that right. (Barker, supra, 407 U.S. at p. 528.) The defendant’s assertion of,
or failure to assert, the right is just one of the factors to be considered in the
speedy trial analysis. (Ibid.) The defendant’s assertion of their speedy trial
right is entitled to “strong” evidentiary weight. (Id. at pp. 531–532.) On the
other hand, “the failure to assert the right will make it difficult for a
defendant to prove that [they were] denied a speedy trial.” (Id. at p. 532.)
Analysis of this factor “does not hinge on ‘ “the number of times the
accused acquiesced or objected; rather, the focus is on the surrounding
circumstances, such as the timeliness, persistence, and sincerity of the
objections, the reasons for the acquiescence, whether the accused was
represented by counsel, the accused’s pretrial conduct (as that conduct
bears on the speedy trial right), and so forth. The totality of the accused’s
44
responses to the delay is indicative of whether he or she actually wanted a
speedy trial.” ’ ” (Camacho, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 390, citations omitted.)
Here, Mix contends the trial court erred in failing to recognize that he
“formally asserted his right to a speedy trial” when Loo filed the “trial memo”
on October 4, 2013, and that he maintained his desire to go to trial “from
when Sial first began to represent him through July 2017,” even when he was
signing Litmon waivers. He further faults the court for failing to give more
weight to his assertion in the 2018 Marsden hearing.
For the reasons discussed above, the trial court’s decision to give effect
to Mix’s Litmon waivers was reasonable and supported by the record. It goes
without saying that during the periods of time in which Mix expressly waived
his speedy trial right via Litmon waivers, he was not asserting that right.
Focusing on the trial court’s construction of the intervening, nonwaived
periods, Loo’s “trial memo” fell within the April 17, 2013 to November 17,
2013 nonwaived period. In declining to recognize the trial memo as a break
in the nonwaived period, we presume the court impliedly found the assertion
to be equivocal or halfhearted. Such an implied finding is supported by
substantial evidence. Loo filed the trial memo on October 4, 2013, and the
minute order of the next status conference on November 8, 2013 states that
“counsel for [Mix] informs [the] court that respondent is requesting trial.” It
further states, however, that Loo requested a continuance “to further discuss
[the] matter with [his] client.” The reason noted was “possible Litmon to be
filed.” At the next status conference on January 3, 2014, jury trial was set for
November 10, 2014.17 A few weeks after that conference, Mix requested a
Marsden hearing, during which he admittedly did not demand a speedy trial.
Immediately after the Marsden hearing, Mix signed a one-year Litmon
17 There are no reporter’s transcripts for these hearings.
45
waiver to continue treatment. Given these circumstances—where Mix’s
request for a “quick trial date” was seemingly abandoned and resulted in
another one-year Litmon waiver—we do not fault the trial court for giving
this assertion little weight. (Cf. People v. Bradley (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 32,
43 [“although defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial, he did not do so
with great frequency or force”].)
The next nonwaived period lasted from June 4, 2016 until November
23, 2016. During this time, Mix was represented by Sial, and trial was
initially set for July 2016. But by June 2016, the parties were still waiting
for updated evaluations, and Ross had personal matters to attend to in
August, so counsel agreed to continue trial to October 2016. In the
meantime, counsel litigated the motion to quash Ross’s overbroad request for
Mix’s hospital records, and the new allegations of sexual abuse against Mix
came to light. Accordingly, in October 2016, trial was pushed to April 2017.
Mix admits he did not demand a speedy trial in court—via letter,
phone, Marsden hearing, or otherwise—during this time. Relying again on
Butler, supra, 55 Cal.App.5th 614, he argues instead that he communicated
to Sial that he wanted to go to trial, and this was enough to meaningfully
assert his right. But insofar as Mix was asking Sial to go to trial during this
time, Sial was acting upon that request. He was actively setting trial dates,
anticipating updated evaluations, litigating discovery issues, and confronting
newly discovered evidence. That sets this case apart from Butler, where
there was “ample evidence that [the defendant] asserted his right repeatedly
throughout [the pretrial] period and was unequivocal that his public
defenders were not authorized to waive time on his behalf, and yet his
appointed counsel requested or acceded to over 50 continuances.” (Id. at
p. 650.) Unlike appointed counsel in Butler, Sial was not ignoring Mix.
46
In this context, it was reasonable for the trial court to construe Mix’s silence
during this period as acquiescence in Sial’s work.
That leaves the final nonwaived period, October 15, 2018 to the time
the court ruled on the motion to dismiss. As noted, the trial court recognized
that Mix “asserted his speedy trial right when he requested a Marsden
motion in October of 2018.” (Italics added.) It observed, however, that Mix
agreed to postpone trial at the conclusion of the Marsden hearing. He
initially agreed to wait to set trial dates until he completed his release plan,
and when he decided not to complete that plan, he agreed to a June 2019 trial
date. From then on, the delay was attributable to the speedy trial litigation.
(Cf. United States v. Loud Hawk (1986) 474 U.S. 302, 316 [“In that limited
class of cases where a pretrial appeal by the defendant is appropriate
[citation], delays from such an appeal ordinarily will not weigh in favor of a
defendant’s speedy trial claims”].) The court properly considered the
circumstances surrounding Mix’s assertion of his speedy trial right in October
2018 and, in our view, reasonably determined the assertion did not merit
strong weight.
d. Prejudice to the Defendant
The final Barker factor is the prejudice to the defendant caused by the
pretrial delay. In this context, prejudice “should be assessed in the light of
the interests of defendants which the speedy trial right was designed to
protect.” (Barker, supra, 407 U.S. at p. 532.) The high court has identified
“three such interests: (i) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (ii) to
minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and (iii) to limit the possibility
that the defense will be impaired.” (Ibid., fn. omitted.) “Of these, the most
serious is the last, because the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare
his case skews the fairness of the entire system.” (Ibid.)
47
“In the SVP context, we consider the same interests, but acknowledge
differences in how the interests arise.” (Camacho, supra, 15 Cal.5th at
p. 391.) With respect to the first two interests, it is clear that “[b]eing held in
anticipation of an SVP trial, like pretrial detention in a jail, unquestionably
entails a severe and oppressive restriction on liberty that may give rise to
feelings of anxiety and concern.” (Id. at p. 392.) Unlike pretrial criminal
detention, however, alleged SVPs are confined in a state hospital where they
can receive mental health treatment while they await trial. (Id. at p. 393.)
Indeed, pretrial treatment can lead to the accused’s pretrial release. (Ibid.)
Regarding the most serious interest—the possibility that the defense
will be impaired—there is a presumption of trial prejudice that applies in
criminal cases, but not SVP cases. (Camacho, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 391–
392.) Specifically, “in the criminal context, ‘ “affirmative proof of
particularized prejudice” ’ ” is not required. (Id. at p. 392.) Because “defense
witnesses may die, disappear, or lose their memory of the relevant events,”
and “ ‘time’s erosion of exculpatory evidence and testimony “can rarely be
shown,” ’ ” the courts recognize that lengthy pretrial delay in criminal cases
“ ‘presumptively compromises the reliability of a trial in ways that neither
party can prove or, for that matter, identify.’ ” (Id. at pp. 391–392.)
“There is little reason, however, to apply a presumption of trial
prejudice in the SVP context. As previously noted, trial on a petition for
commitment under the SVP Act aims to establish whether a person meets the
definition of an SVP at the time of trial. This inquiry is categorically different
from that of a criminal trial, where the issue is whether the defendant’s past
conduct constitutes guilt of a particular offense. In the SVP context, then,
time ordinarily will not erase critical evidence for the defense, since the jury
relies on recent expert evaluations to evaluate whether the individual
48
qualifies as an SVP at the time of trial.” (Camacho, supra, 15 Cal.5th at
p. 392.) “Severe prejudice to the alleged SVP’s defense is less likely to result
purely as a function of the passage of time; as a result, no presumption of
prejudice applies in this context.” (Ibid.)
Here, Mix made no attempt, in the trial court or on appeal, to explain
how the delay impaired his ability to defend himself at trial. Nor is any such
prejudice obvious. By the time of the motion to dismiss, both DSH evaluators
maintained that he met the criteria for SVP commitment, but the defense
expert, Dr. Fisher, had the opposite opinion. At trial, only one expert opined
that Mix met the criteria, and two gave the opposite opinion. In that respect,
his defense became stronger with the passage of time. There is no indication
from Mix or the record that his trial would have been more favorable had it
occurred earlier.
Mix’s only argument on appeal is this: “A person who has not yet been
committed as an SVP, cannot be released from custody. A person who has
been committed as an SVP is potentially eligible for conditional release or for
the opportunity to be released based upon a favorable annual report. The
incentive to participate in treatment strengthens after commitment because
there is no longer the concern that the statements made during the course of
treatment will be used against the person in the initial commitment trial.
Instead, active participation in treatment is the only way to be released other
than by getting older, sicker, and/or dying. [¶] For these reasons, [Mix]
contends the prejudice factor weighed slightly in his favor.”
This argument, in the Attorney General’s words, “puts the proverbial
cart before the horse and is speculative.” Mix fails to recognize, as the
Camacho court did, that “[p]retrial treatment of the underlying mental
disorder that caused the state to seek commitment in the first place may
49
ultimately facilitate the individual’s release before trial.” (Camacho, supra,
15 Cal.5th at p. 393.) Moreover, Mix makes no claim or citation to the record
that he, in fact, refrained from fully participating in treatment out of fear
that his words would be used against him. His argument also assumes his
eventual commitment; at the time of the motion to dismiss, that was not a
given. In failing to demonstrate prejudice, especially the “most serious” form
thereof, Mix fails to show the trial court erred in assessing this factor.
B. Mix Failed to Preserve Any Claim That The Trial Court Should
Have Recused Itself From Hearing Mix’s Motion to Dismiss
Mix relatedly contends that his right to due process was violated
because Judge Balderrama did not recuse himself from hearing the motion to
dismiss. He argues that the judge could not be an impartial decisionmaker
insofar as the motion alleged that the trial court bore some responsibility for
the pretrial delay in this case.
Mix has forfeited this argument by failing to raise it below. “We have
allowed a defendant who objected to a judge’s participation in the proceedings
and merely failed to pursue the statutory appellate remedy under Code of
Civil Procedure section 170.3, to raise on appeal a narrow due process claim.
But a defendant who never objected to the judge may not do so.” (People v.
Johnson (2015) 60 Cal.4th 966, 979 (Johnson), citations omitted.)
Anticipating forfeiture, Mix alternatively claims that appointed counsel
Victor Marshall rendered ineffective assistance in failing to object to Judge
Balderrama hearing the motion to dismiss. “When challenging a conviction
on grounds of ineffective assistance, the defendant must demonstrate
counsel’s inadequacy. To satisfy this burden, the defendant must first show
counsel’s performance was deficient, in that it fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms. Second, the
defendant must show resulting prejudice, i.e., a reasonable probability that,
50
but for counsel’s deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding would
have been different.” (People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1009 (Mai).)
“When examining an ineffective assistance claim, a reviewing court
defers to counsel’s reasonable tactical decisions, and there is a presumption
counsel acted within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. . . .
On direct appeal, a conviction will be reversed for ineffective assistance only
if (1) the record affirmatively discloses counsel had no rational tactical
purpose for the challenged act or omission, (2) counsel was asked for a reason
and failed to provide one, or (3) there simply could be no satisfactory
explanation. All other claims of ineffective assistance are more appropriately
resolved in a habeas corpus proceeding.” (Mai, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 1009.)
“Deciding whether to object to a judge is inherently tactical. ‘ “There
are, no doubt, an infinite number of reasons why counsel would not avail
themselves of the opportunity to disqualify a judge. The failure to do so is
within the competence of counsel, and does not show ineffective counsel.” ’ ”
(Johnson, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 980.) Indeed, the record in this case offers
multiple reasons why Marshall might have been comfortable with Judge
Balderrama deciding the motion. For instance, the motion required the
decisionmaker to understand the entire procedural history of the case, and
familiarity with SVP proceedings was surely helpful in understanding and
contextualizing that history. The record makes clear that San Bernardino
has one courtroom dedicated to SVP cases, and Judge Balderrama had been
assigned to that courtroom—and to this case—since 2014. Accordingly,
Marshall could have very reasonably decided that Judge Balderrama was
best suited to decide the motion. Moreover, as the person most familiar with
the motion and someone with extensive experience in that courtroom,
51
Marshall could have been satisfied that Judge Balderrama would be fair.
We have no basis to second-guess his judgment. (Ibid.)
Finally, for the reasons explained above, even if it could be argued that
the trial court bore some responsibility for the pretrial delay, it was not
primarily responsible. Accordingly, we discern no reasonable probability that
the motion to dismiss would have been granted had it been heard by another
judge.
C. The Trial Court Reasonably Denied Mix’s Marsden Motions
Mix lastly argues the trial court abused its discretion in denying four
of his Marsden motions to replace appointed counsel: his March 2014 motion
to replace DPD Frank Loo, as well as his January, February, and April 2023
motions to replace his final bar panel attorney Mustafa Abdul-Rahman.
The thrust of Mix’s argument with respect to all four motions is that the
trial court inadequately followed up on his complaints.
1. Marsden Motions Generally
Individuals facing SVP petitions have a statutory right to effective
assistance of counsel (see § 6603, subd. (a)) and a due process right to a
Marsden hearing. (People v. Carter (2024) 15 Cal.5th 1092, 1099 (Carter).)
“When a defendant seeks new counsel on the basis that his appointed
counsel is providing inadequate representation—i.e., makes what is
commonly called a Marsden motion [(Marsden, supra, (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118)]—
the trial court must permit the defendant to explain the basis of his
contention and to relate specific instances of inadequate performance. A
defendant is entitled to relief if the record clearly shows that the appointed
counsel is not providing adequate representation or that defendant and
counsel have become embroiled in such an irreconcilable conflict that
ineffective representation is likely to result. Substitution of counsel lies
52
within the court’s discretion. The court does not abuse its discretion in
denying the motion unless the defendant has shown that a failure to replace
counsel would substantially impair the defendant’s right to assistance of
counsel.” (People v. Smith (2003) 30 Cal.4th 581, 604 (Smith).)
2. Frank Loo
a. Additional Background
As discussed in detail above, the fourth attorney appointed to represent
Mix (excluding those who occasionally made special appearances on his
behalf) was DPD Frank Loo. Loo was appointed sometime in the Fall of
2013. In January 2014, Mix sent a written request for a Marsden hearing to
the trial court. He specifically asked for an attorney from the bar panel, as
opposed to the public defender’s office.
The motion was heard in March 2014. In the closed courtroom, the
court encouraged Mix to speak freely. Mix expressed concern that Loo was
new to SVP cases, that he would not call certain witnesses Mix believed
should testify in his defense, and that he was his “fifth lawyer in less than
three years” which meant he had to “start all over again.” Upon confirming
Mix had no other complaints, the court invited Loo to respond.
Loo said that although he had only been handling SVP cases since Fall
2013, he had significant experience in civil and criminal cases, including
experience with other forms of civil commitment proceedings. Loo also
recounted the work he had done on Mix’s case to date. He had visited Mix
three times, phoned him six times, had an investigator interview the
witnesses Mix was interested in, briefly spoke with a DSH evaluator in this
case, and retained a defense expert who had already visited Mix. As to the
witnesses, Loo determined their testimony was not “particularly helpful” to
the defense because they could not say that Mix did not meet the SVP
53
criteria. The court asked whether Mix had any further comments, and he did
not.
The trial court denied the Marsden motion, finding that Loo had
“properly represented” Mix, noting that he “followed up on [his] request
regarding those witnesses” and reasonably determined “[t]hey may not be
exactly good expert witnesses as far as addressing your diagnosis.” The court
believed that Loo would “continue to properly represent” Mix.
b. No Abuse of Discretion
Mix argues the trial court erred in conducting his Marsden hearing
because it “made no inquiries with respect to the high rate of attorney
turnover and made relatively useless inquiries about Loo’s competency and
inexperience as an SVP attorney.” At the same time, he recognizes that “Loo
probably was not the right person to address [his] concern about the high rate
of turnover” and “that all attorneys who represent SVPs have to do so for the
first time at some point.”
In our view, the trial court properly executed its duties in a Marsden
hearing. The record shows the court “gave [Mix] full opportunity to air all of
his complaints, and counsel to respond to them.” (Smith, supra, 30 Cal.4th at
p. 606; see also People v. Abilez (2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 488 (Abilez) [defendant
“fails to establish that the trial court’s inquiry into his complaint was
deficient” where the “record demonstrates the court allowed defendant to
explain the reasons for his dissatisfaction with counsel and permitted counsel
to respond”].) As Mix seems to realize, his complaints that Loo was “his fifth
attorney in less than three years” and that Loo was new to SVP cases were
not issues that Loo could remedy. They were merely observations about the
state of the proceedings.
54
In the end, Mix appears to contend the trial court should have divined
from his complaints that he was alleging a systemic breakdown in the public
defender system and taken the initiative to “obtain input” from the
supervisor of the SVP team. We do not fault the trial court for failing to
interpret the tea leaves in this manner. Carter, supra, 15 Cal.5th 1092, on
which Mix relies, is distinguishable from this case.
In Carter, after waiting 12 years to go to trial on an SVP petition, the
defendant sought to enforce his due process right to a timely trial by filing a
pro se motion to dismiss. (Carter, supra,15 Cal.5th at pp. 1095–1096.) At the
same time, he filed a Marsden motion to replace the public defender’s office
and his deputy public defender as his counsel “because he believed the office
would be disqualified from litigating the motion to dismiss on his behalf.”
(Id. at p. 1095.) In a hearing, the defendant elaborated that there had been
multiple delays not at his request, and that he had rarely heard from his
previous attorney. At the same time, he acknowledged that his current
attorney communicated well and was doing everything she could to prepare
for trial. (Id. at p. 1096.) In response, that attorney explained they had an
unusually difficult time receiving updated evaluations, but they were now
ready for trial. (Ibid.) She also expressed that she did not think she could
pursue the motion to dismiss, insofar as she would have to argue she
breached her ethical duties to her client in failing to pursue a timely trial,
which she felt was not true. (Id. at p. 1097.) The trial court ultimately
denied the Marsden motion, finding counsel was diligently trying to push the
case forward, and did not rule on the motion to dismiss. (Ibid.) Instead, the
court instructed the defendant to continue litigating the motion to dismiss in
pro se, if he chose to do so. (Ibid.)
55
On review, the Supreme Court held that “the trial court conducted an
insufficient Marsden inquiry and erred in instructing [the defendant] to file
his motion to dismiss pro se.” (Carter, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 1095.) More
specifically, the Supreme Court held the trial court should have inquired into
whether the defendant’s current attorney “had any conflict that would have
prevented her from litigating” the motion to dismiss. (Id. at p. 1102.) As the
Carter court reasoned, the defendant raised several points that could support
dismissal and that have nothing to do with current counsel’s performance,
including delays caused by previous counsel, problems with the hospital, and
the trial court’s shortcomings in moving the case along. (Ibid.) In other
words, “[h]aving both motions before it, the trial court should have considered
[the] Marsden motion in the context of [the] proposed motion to dismiss.” (Id.
at p. 1101.) The Carter court issued a limited remand for the trial court to
conduct another Marsden hearing to determine whether a conflict of interest
would prevent the public defender’s office from litigating the motion to
dismiss, and in turn, whether the public defender’s office or alternate counsel
should evaluate and litigate the motion to dismiss. (Id. at p. 1104.)
Here, there was no basis to trigger a conflict of interest inquiry. Mix
did not file a motion to dismiss along with his request for a Marsden hearing.
And he admittedly did not raise the speedy trial issue in the hearing.
Although he complained about the number of attorneys that had been
appointed to represent him, as discussed above, this is insufficient to
establish a systemic breakdown in the public defender system. Considering
the context of the hearing as a whole, the trial court fairly understood Mix to
be expressing concern about the lack of progress in the case and Loo’s ability
to prepare for trial. In light of Loo’s recitation of the work he had completed
56
to date—which, despite his newness to SVP cases, was more than previous
counsel had achieved—the court was reasonably satisfied in his effectiveness.
3. Mustafa Abdul-Rahman
a. Additional Background
Several months after the trial court denied the motion to dismiss, and
while the writ petition was pending, Victor Marshall withdrew as counsel due
to medical reasons. The court then appointed James Crawford. Crawford
represented Mix for about one year until the court relieved him, apparently
due to irreconcilable differences and a breakdown in the attorney-client
relationship. The court then appointed Early Hawkins, who similarly
represented Mix for about one year until he requested to be relieved as
counsel due to a conflict with Mix. In March 2022, the court appointed
Mustafa Abdul-Rahman, who ultimately took Mix’s case to trial.
On January 4, 2023, the parties appeared for a status conference and
Abdul-Rahman requested to continue trial from February 6 to February 27,
2023. He also requested that Mix be transported to local custody so they
could prepare for trial. Mix, who was present via phone, requested a
Marsden hearing.
In the closed courtroom, Mix said that he had not heard from Abdul-
Rahman since August. He was concerned that Abdul-Rahman had not
interviewed certain witnesses or investigated the “severe hearsay issues” and
“delay issues” in his case. Mix felt these things needed to be done before
trial. The trial court (Judge Kawika Smith) asked if there was anything else
Mix wanted to say. He said, “I really don’t believe we’re ready to go to trial.”
The court then invited Abdul-Rahman to respond.
Abdul-Rahman explained that he offered to visit Mix in person, but Mix
preferred to talk over the phone. They spoke about his case several times in
57
depth. He left Mix a message in December and never heard back. He had
contacted a defense expert that Mix was interested in, and recently followed
up with them after the holidays. He researched the hearsay issues and was
prepared to raise them at trial. As to the delay issues, he explained to Mix
that “those issues happened prior to” his appointment and were preserved for
appeal. He agreed they were not quite ready for trial; that is why he sought
the continuance and Mix’s transfer to local custody.
The court asked again whether there was anything else Mix wanted to
add. Mix responded that he did not receive the December message and did
not want to be transported to county jail.
The court then denied the Marsden motion, discerning no breakdown in
the attorney-client relationship. The court found that Abdul-Rahman had
been “diligent in preparing this case to the best of his ability, given his other
trial schedule,” that he anticipated being ready for trial in February, and that
he would continue to communicate with Mix.
On February 14, 2023, Abdul-Rahman asked to begin jury selection on
March 13 and then resume trial on April 5 in order to accommodate his trial
schedule. Mix then requested another Marsden hearing so he could read a
letter he wrote into the record.
In the closed courtroom, Mix enumerated several topics he brought to
Abdul-Rahman’s attention that had not been addressed. First, he recounted
that his probable cause hearing was postponed for five months “without [his]
knowledge” and without any time waivers which, in his view, warranted
dismissal of his case. Second, he noted that the DSH evaluators’ reports were
“filled with hearsay.” Third, he emphasized that he had “been screaming to
go to trial ever since” the case began and he never wanted to waive time but
his attorneys “asked [him] to waive.” Mix believed he had “a new Vasquez
58
hearing based on” the fact that he had not “waived time since 2018, and here
it is 2023.” Fourth, he asked Abdul-Rahman “to speak to people concerning
this case,” including two experts and several professionals involved in his
mental health treatment. Fifth, he believed he had “a Butler motion” which
he described as a “motion to dismiss based on [the prosecution’s] inability to
move this case forward.”
Abdul-Rahman responded that he had advised Mix “about his rights
with respect to the delay of probable cause hearing, as well as the Vasquez
timeliness issue.” He had spoken to some of the individuals that Mix had
suggested, but not all of them yet. Abdul-Rahman pointed out that although
the case was more than 10 years old, he had only been involved for about one
year. He understood that Mix wanted to go to trial right away. But given the
age of the case, it was taking some time to review all the records in the case.
And given the high stakes, he wanted to make sure he was prepared for trial.
Abdul-Rahman affirmed that “all of Mr. Mix’s issues shall be addressed” and
he would be ready for trial by March 13, 2023, as requested.
The court asked whether there was anything else Mix wanted to tell
the court. He reiterated he wanted “these things addressed before trial” or
else he would not “have an appeal on these things.”
The court denied the motion, finding Abdul-Rahman was providing Mix
with appropriate representation. The court was sure he would “file whatever
motions he sees as necessary and legally appropriate.”
Jury selection began on March 13, 2023 as planned and concluded on
March 17. Trial resumed on April 11, 2023. Testimony was scheduled to
begin that day, but there were issues transporting Mix from Coalinga to the
courthouse, including a medical issue. The court read the jurors preliminary
59
instructions, and then ordered them to return on April 17. On that date,
opening statements and testimony began.
In the meantime, Mix filed a civil lawsuit against Abdul-Rahman,
essentially alleging that he rendered ineffective assistance of counsel and
violated professional ethics and state bar rules in refusing to file motions,
retain experts, consult his treatment team, or otherwise “plan a defense
strategy” for Mix. The lawsuit prompted yet another Marsden hearing on
April 18, 2023.
In that closed hearing, the court asked Mix to elaborate on the
allegations in his complaint. Mix explained that he asked Abdul-Rahman to
speak with his treatment team and call them to testify at trial. There were
“several motions that could have been heard” but which Abdul-Rahman did
not file, including with respect to the hearsay and delay issues. Mix conceded
Abdul-Rahman was going to call an expert on his behalf. As to his allegation
that Abdul-Rahman did not have a defense strategy, Mix asserted “this [was]
his first SVP case” and “his reasoning for not wanting to call the people at the
hospital, just doesn’t make sense to me.” On the latter point, he reiterated
that “there’s a long list of people” on his treatment team “who would come
and testify on [his] behalf.”
The court then invited Abdul-Rahman to respond to these points. He
acknowledged that he did not plan to call Mix’s treatment team to testify at
trial. He made “a judgment call” to not call them because he was concerned
that they would be “unpredictable on the stand.” Instead, his “strategy was
to rely on the treatment notes as well as the” defense expert witnesses “to
opine on how well” Mix was doing in treatment.
Abdul-Rahman also conceded he had not filed any motions in the case
yet. He explained that Mix asked him to file a motion challenging hearsay
60
testimony elicited at his probable cause hearing based on People v. Sanchez
(2016) 63 Cal.4th 665. He did not think that Sanchez applied retroactively to
the probable cause hearing, although he was open to researching the issue
further. He also declined to file a motion to dismiss based on delay because
“that issue had already been litigated.”
Upon further questioning by the court, Mix admitted that despite how
long he had been at Coalinga, he had not yet completed the sex offender
treatment program, which tended to substantiate Abdul-Rahman’s concern
that the treatment team would give unhelpful testimony at trial. Mix added
that even though the delay issue was litigated before, he had “new delay
issues that should be addressed.”
Abdul-Rahman then advised the court that he did not think he could
continue to represent Mix in light of the civil suit. As a practical matter, his
attention would be divided between the SVP trial and defending himself in
the civil suit. Speaking candidly, he admitted he was “not particularly happy
about” the allegations against him and he “had a hard time concentrating on”
the SVP case knowing that Mix was suing him.
Back in open court, the court denied the Marsden motion. Relying on
People v. Horton (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1068 and other authorities, the court
determined that it did not need to relieve Abdul-Rahman because there was
no actual conflict of interest. As the court reasoned, the only potential
conflict was the civil lawsuit, but it did not create a true conflict because the
issues raised were “essentially the same issues that we have dealt with in”
earlier Marsden hearings. In any event, the court exercised its discretion
under Code of Civil Procedure section 187 to dismiss Mix’s civil lawsuit
without prejudice, on grounds that the issues raised “may be premature,”
but even if they were ripe, they served “as a distraction to the conduct of”
61
the SVP trial. The court also found Abdul-Rahman’s explanations for his
strategic choices in this case to be acceptable, and that he had been zealously
representing Mix.
b. No Abuse of Discretion
Mix similarly claims that the trial court “did not make the necessary
full inquiries or require Abdul-Rahman to address all of [his] complaints.”
For example, he argues the court should have “nailed down” every time
Abdul-Rahman contacted him, “made detailed inquiries about Abdul-
Rahman’s investigation and contacts with perspective witnesses,” and asked
which records he had reviewed and which he had not. But the court’s duty
in a Marsden hearing is not so tedious and invasive. As noted above, the
court satisfies its duty by giving the defendant a “full opportunity to air all
of his complaints,” and counsel an opportunity to respond. (Smith, supra,
30 Cal.4th at p. 606; see also Abilez, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 488.) The court
fully satisfied its duty in each of the Marsden hearings at issue here.
Mix further contends the court abused its discretion in denying the
Marsden motions because Abdul-Rahman’s responses revealed he did not
adequately investigate the defense. He specifically argues counsel failed to:
interview the witnesses he wanted to testify at trial; evaluate the possibility
of moving for a new probable hearing based on hearsay issues; consider filing
a renewed motion to dismiss based on a violation of his speedy trial rights;
and review his records in a timely fashion. We disagree.
Deciding which witnesses to call at trial is a matter of tactics, and
tactical disagreements, by themselves, are “insufficient to compel discharge of
appointed counsel.” (People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1192.) Moreover,
since Mix had not completed the sex offender treatment program in all of his
years at Atascadero and Coalinga, Abdul-Rahman soundly decided to rely on
62
a combination of the hospitals’ treatment notes and testimony from
experienced expert witnesses, rather than the unpredictable testimony of
the treatment team.
With respect to the hearsay issue, Abdul-Rahman explained that he
was not sure the law would support a viable motion for a new probable cause
hearing based on alleged Sanchez error, but he was prepared to argue for the
exclusion of inadmissible hearsay evidence at trial. Even assuming the law
supported such a motion,18 the decision whether to file a motion is tactical,
and it seems reasonable for counsel forgo the motion for a new probable cause
hearing in order to focus on trial. As Mix concedes in his brief, “it is difficult
to determine whether a new probable cause hearing would have benefitted
[Mix] or simply unnecessarily delayed his case further.”
As to the delay issue, Abdul-Rahman repeatedly confirmed that he
investigated the matter and determined that the issue had already been
litigated. He discussed the issue with Mix and advised him about his rights,
including his appellate rights. Implicit in Abdul-Rahman’s comments is that
he discerned no new grounds to file a renewed motion to dismiss. Again, the
decision whether to file a pretrial motion is tactical, and disagreements over
tactical decisions do not compel the replacement of counsel. Mix urges us to
draw a contrary inference. He suggests that James Crawford and Early
Hawkins were relieved from their appointments because they were unable
to give Mix a timely trial. But the record more vaguely reflects that these
attorneys were relieved due to irreconcilable differences with Mix.
18 In Walker v. Superior Court (2021) 12 Cal.5th 177, the Supreme Court
held that hearsay concerning nonpredicate offenses in evaluation reports was
inadmissible in SVPA probable cause hearings. (Id. at p. 209.)
63
To the extent Mix complains that Abdul-Rahman had not completed
reviewing his records by February 2023, the trial court accepted counsel’s
assurance that he would be prepared for trial by March 2023. Mix points
to nothing in the record suggesting Abdul-Rahman did not, in fact, finish
reviewing the necessary materials before testimony began in April.
Finally, Mix faults the trial court for keeping Abdul-Rahman on the
case after he “made it clear he was not able to devote proper effort to [his]
case given the existence of the” civil lawsuit. But Mix makes no attempt to
explain how that concern was not resolved when the trial court exercised its
discretion to dismiss the civil lawsuit.
DISPOSITION
The commitment order is affirmed.
DATO, J.
WE CONCUR:
IRION, Acting P. J.
BUCHANAN, J.
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