CourtListener 10615402•Castaneda v. Alarcon CA2/7
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Filed 6/23/25 Castaneda v. Alarcon CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
ARACELI CASTANEDA, B339532
Petitioner and (Los Angeles County
Respondent, Super. Ct. No.
24CHRO00752)
v.
VIVIAN ALARCON,
Respondent and
Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Brett Johnston, Temporary Judge. Affirmed.
Vivian Alarcon, in pro. per., for Respondent and Appellant.
No appearance for Petitioner and Respondent.
_______________________________
Vivian Alarcon appeals from a civil harassment restraining
order protecting Araceli Castaneda (the girlfriend of Alarcon’s
estranged husband) and Castaneda’s children and requiring
Alarcon to stay 100 yards away from Castaneda and her children,
as well as their homes and workplaces. Castaneda requested the
civil harassment restraining order based on Alarcon’s alleged
conduct spanning more than three years, including frequent
telephone calls and emails to Castaneda’s home and office,
vandalism of Castaneda’s car, and texting sexually explicit
photographs of herself to Castaneda. Alarcon contends
Castaneda’s claims were previously litigated, and therefore they
are barred by res judicata (claim preclusion). She also argues
there was insufficient evidence to support a finding of civil
harassment pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6.1
We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On April 18, 2024 Castaneda filed a request for civil
harassment restraining order (request for restraining order)
against Alarcon prohibiting Alarcon from contacting or harassing
Castaneda, her boyfriend Jose Alarcon (Jose), her adult son, and
her two teenage daughters.2 In an attachment to her request,
Castaneda stated Alarcon “is constantly sending me emails to my
work and personal email, txt me nonstop no matter how many
times I tell her to stop. . . . She is constantly calling my
supervisors to complain about me to try to get me in trouble. I
1 Further statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.
2 On our own motion, we augment the record to include
Castaneda’s request for civil harassment restraining order filed
in the superior court on April 18, 2024 and the civil harassment
restraining order after hearing filed on June 26, 2024. (Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 8.155(a)(1)(A).)
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don’t have peace at home or at work. She harasses me day and
night. I can’t sleep and I don’t feel safe anywhere.” Castaneda
said she was forced to move three times and had to change her
email and phone number multiple times in an effort to avoid
Alarcon. Castaneda also stated Alarcon put a tracker on her car,
vandalized her car, sent police to her brother’s home while
Castaneda was visiting him, and texted sexually explicit
photographs of herself to Castaneda.
Castaneda attached to her request numerous emails, text
messages, photographs, and police reports allegedly supporting
her request, all but one of which appear to be from late 2022,
2023, or 2024.3 In one email dated October 9, 2022, Alarcon
admitted she had placed a tracker in Castaneda’s car but
asserted Jose asked her to do it because he did not trust
Castaneda. Alarcon also accused Castaneda of making false
allegations against her and ruining Alarcon and Jose’s marriage.4
The trial court held a hearing on Castaneda’s request for
restraining order on June 26, 2024.5 Castaneda and Alarcon
3 The only incident prior to September 2022 occurred on
June 6, 2022 when, according to Castaneda, Alarcon knocked on
her door “nonstop.” The request attached a photograph showing
a woman at Casteneda’s front door.
4 Although it is not clear from the sender’s email address
who sent the email, Castaneda stated in the attachment to her
request for restraining order that it was Alarcon. Further, in her
opening brief Alarcon acknowledges she testified at the hearing
that she helped Jose install a tracker on Castaneda’s car at his
request.
5 The docket reflects that Alarcon did not file a response to
Castaneda’s request for restraining order. A court reporter was
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testified. The court granted Castaneda’s request for restraining
order for a one-year period expiring on June 26, 2025. The civil
harassment restraining order protects Castaneda, her son, and
her two daughters and prevents Alarcon from coming within
100 yards of them, their home, and their workplaces. The order
also prohibits Alarcon from contacting Castaneda and her
children, including by telephone, email, and text message.
Alarcon timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. Governing Law and Standard of Review
Under section 527.6, subdivision (a)(1), “[a] person who has
suffered harassment . . . may seek a temporary restraining order
and an order after hearing prohibiting harassment as provided in
this section.” Harassment is defined as “unlawful violence, a
credible threat of violence, or a knowing and willful course of
conduct directed at a specific person that seriously alarms,
annoys, or harasses the person, and that serves no legitimate
purpose.” (§ 527.6, subd. (b)(3).) A “[c]ourse of conduct” is
defined as “a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over
a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of
purpose, including following or stalking an individual, making
harassing telephone calls to an individual, or sending harassing
correspondence to an individual by any means, including, but not
limited to, the use of public or private mails, interoffice mail,
present for the June 26, 2024 hearing, but Alarcon did not
designate the reporter’s transcript for inclusion in the record on
appeal, nor did she file a settled statement pursuant to California
Rules of Court, rule 8.120(b) setting forth what happened at the
hearing.
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facsimile, or email.” (Id., subd. (b)(1).) “If the judge finds by clear
and convincing evidence that unlawful harassment exists, an
order shall issue prohibiting the harassment.” (Id., subd. (i).)
“The statute does not require the court to make a specific
finding on the record that harassment exists, nor does it require
specific findings of the statutory elements of harassment as
defined in subdivision (b).” (Ensworth v. Mullvain (1990)
224 Cal.App.3d 1105, 1112, disapproved on other grounds in
Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal. 5th 989, 1003, fn. 4, 1010,
fn. 7 (O.B.); accord, Cooper v. Bettinger (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th
77, 92.) “[T]he trial court’s decision granting the initial
restraining order ‘necessarily implies that the trial court found
that [the respondent] knowingly and willfully engaged in a course
of conduct that seriously alarmed, annoyed or harassed [the
petitioner], and that [the petitioner] actually suffered substantial
emotional distress.’” (Cooper, at p. 92; accord, Ensworth, at
p. 1112.)
“We review issuance of a protective order [under section
527.6] for abuse of discretion, and the factual findings necessary
to support the protective order are reviewed for substantial
evidence.” (Parisi v. Mazzaferro (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 1219, 1226,
disapproved on other grounds in O.B., supra, 9 Cal. 5th at
pp. 1003, fn. 4, 1010, fn. 7.) “[W]hen presented with a challenge
to the sufficiency of the evidence associated with a finding
requiring clear and convincing evidence, the court must
determine whether the record, viewed as a whole, contains
substantial evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could
have made the finding of high probability demanded by this
standard of proof.” (O.B., at p. 1005.) “When reviewing a finding
that a fact has been proved by clear and convincing evidence, the
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question before the appellate court is whether the record as a
whole contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact
finder could have found it highly probable that the fact was true.
In conducting its review, the court must view the record in the
light most favorable to the prevailing party below and give
appropriate deference to how the trier of fact may have evaluated
the credibility of witnesses, resolved conflicts in the evidence, and
drawn reasonable inferences from the evidence.” (Id. at pp. 1011-
1012; see Harris v. Stampolis (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 484, 499
[affirming grant of civil harassment restraining order, explaining
that on review the court “‘resolve[s] all factual conflicts and
questions of credibility in favor of the prevailing party and
indulge[s] in all legitimate and reasonable inferences to uphold
the finding of the trial court if it is supported by substantial
evidence which is reasonable, credible and of solid value’”].)
“‘But whether the facts, when construed most favorably in
[petitioner’s] favor, are legally sufficient to constitute civil
harassment under section 527.6’” is a question of law we review
de novo. (Harris v. Stampolis, supra, 248 Cal.App.4th at p. 497;
accord, R.D. v. P.M. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 181, 188.)
B. Alarcon Has Failed To Show the Trial Court Erred in
Granting the Restraining Order
Alarcon’s first contention is that Castaneda’s request for
restraining order was barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion
because Castaneda had previously sought restraining orders “by
submitting the same evidence with alleged manufactured and
altered evidence.” Alarcon lists four Los Angeles Superior Court
case numbers that she claims “involve[] the same parties, the
same claims, and the same underlying factual issues.” Alarcon
has not provided any analysis or citation to authority supporting
6
her contention that the prior actions preclude the claim in this
case. Nor has she cited to evidence in the record showing that
Castaneda relied on the same incidents and evidence in the prior
cases. A review of the dockets in the cases Alarcon cites shows
that two of the cases were dismissed for failure to prosecute
(Super. Ct. L.A. County nos. 23VERO01035 and 23VERO01199)
and the other two cases were closed after the requests for
restraining orders were denied after hearings in March and
July 2022 (Super. Ct. L.A. County nos. 22CHRO00264 and
22CHRO01040).
The doctrine of claim preclusion “prevents relitigation of
entire causes of action. [Citations.] Claim preclusion applies
only when ‘a second suit involves (1) the same cause of action
(2) between the same parties [or their privies] (3) after a final
judgment on the merits in the first suit.’” (Samara v. Matar
(2018) 5 Cal.5th 322, 326-327.) Claim preclusion does not apply
here because two of the actions Alarcon cites were dismissed on
procedural grounds, and therefore they were not decided on the
merits. The other two actions concluded in March and July 2022,
whereas all but one of the events alleged in this request for
restraining order occurred in late 2022, 2023, and early 2024.
Accordingly, other than the incident when Alarcon allegedly came
to Castaneda’s door in June 2022, this request could not have
been based on the same underlying facts as the prior requests.
With respect to the June 2022 incident, Alarcon does not assert
Castaneda raised that incident in the prior proceedings, and thus
Alarcon has not met her burden to show claim preclusion applies.
(See Vella v. Hudgins (1977) 20 Cal.3d 251, 257 [“burden of
proving that the requirements for application of res judicata have
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been met is upon the party seeking to assert it as a bar or
estoppel”].)
Alarcon’s second contention is that the order granting the
restraining order is not supported by substantial evidence. She
argues the evidence presented was fabricated or constituted
hearsay, and she did not intend to harass Castaneda. Alarcon
has not met her burden on appeal.
As discussed, the granting of a restraining order implies a
finding that harassing conduct occurred. (Cooper v. Bettinger,
supra, 242 Cal.App.4th at p. 92; Ensworth v. Mullvain, supra,
224 Cal.App.3d at p. 1112.) Further, we must review the record
in the light most favorable to the prevailing party and defer to
the trial court’s credibility findings. (O.B., supra, at p. 1011-
1012.) “[T]he burden is on an appellant to demonstrate, on the
basis of the record presented to the appellate court, that the trial
court committed an error that justifies reversal of the judgment.”
(Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608-609; accord, Denham
v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) “‘This is not only a
general principle of appellate practice but an ingredient of the
constitutional doctrine of reversible error.’ [Citations.] ‘In the
absence of a contrary showing in the record, all presumptions in
favor of the trial court’s action will be made by the appellate
court. “[I]f any matters could have been presented to the court
below which would have authorized the order complained of, it
will be presumed that such matters were presented.”’” (Jameson,
at p. 609; accord, Argueta v. Worldwide Flight Services, Inc.
(2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 822, 833.)
Moreover, to overcome the presumption that the trial
court’s order is correct, the appellant “must affirmatively
establish prejudicial error by providing an adequate record, citing
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to the record, and presenting a persuasive argument with
citations to supportive legal authorities.” (LNSU#1, LLC v. Alta
Del Mar Coastal Collection Community Assn. (2023)
94 Cal.App.5th 1050, 1070; accord, Lee v. Kim (2019)
41 Cal.App.5th 705, 721 [appellant’s “burden on appeal ‘includes
the obligation to present argument and legal authority on each
point raised’”].)
Alarcon has failed to provide a sufficient record on which
we can assess her claim that the restraining order is not
supported by substantial evidence. The record does not contain
the reporter’s transcript of the hearing or settled statement, and
we therefore do not know what evidence was presented at the
hearing or what arguments were made.6 Nor has Alarcon
identified the evidence she claims was fabricated or otherwise
improperly admitted. Accordingly, Alarcon has not overcome the
presumption of validity favoring the trial court’s order. (See
Maria P. v. Riles (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1281, 1295-1296 [appeal
resolved against appellants where failure to include settled
statement of proceeding “make[s] it impossible for us to
determine” whether trial court erred]; Shenefield v. Shenefield
(2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 619, 633, fn. 12 [“[w]hen there is no
6 In her opening brief Alarcon argues Castaneda harassed
Alarcon’s daughter and filed false police reports against Alarcon
to keep her away from Jose, even though Alarcon and Jose were
continuing to have a sexual relationship. Alarcon also describes
the hearing testimony of the parties, asserting that Castaneda
testified to the harassment by Alarcon, but Alarcon testified in
response as to why the claimed conduct was not harassment. In
the absence of a reporter’s transcript or settled statement,
however, Alarcon’s summary of the testimony is not evidence of
the testimony at the hearing.
9
reporter’s transcript and no error is evident from the face of the
appellate record, we presume that the unreported trial testimony
would demonstrate absence of error”]; 569 East County Boulevard
LLC v. Backcountry Against the Dump, Inc. (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th
426, 434, fn. 9 [“if the record on appeal does not contain all of the
documents or other evidence considered by the trial court, a
reviewing court will ‘decline to find error on a silent record, and
thus infer that substantial evidence’ supports the trial court’s
findings”].)
DISPOSITION
The order granting Castaneda’s request for a civil
harassment restraining order is affirmed. Alarcon is to bear her
own costs on appeal.
FEUER, J.
We concur:
MARTINEZ, P. J.
SEGAL, J.
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