CourtListener 10615400•People v. Bugarin CA2/7
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Filed 6/23/25 P. v. Bugarin CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
THE PEOPLE, B337425
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. PA044595)
v.
HECTOR BUGARIN,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Michael Terrell, Judge. Affirmed with
directions.
Jonathan E. Demson, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Kristin Inberg and Melanie Dorian,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
In 2006 Hector Bugarin pleaded no contest to two counts of
attempted murder and admitted he personally and intentionally
discharged a firearm. In 2022 Bugarin filed a petition for
resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6.1 The superior
court ruled Bugarin did not state a prima facie case for relief
because the plea hearing transcript showed Bugarin was the
actual shooter. The court denied the petition without issuing an
order to show cause.
Bugarin argues that his petition for resentencing satisfied
the requirements for a prima facie showing under section 1172.6,
that at the plea hearing Bugarin did not admit he was the actual
perpetrator, and that we should not rely on the preliminary
hearing transcript. While this appeal was pending, but before
Bugarin submitted his reply brief, the Supreme Court in People v.
Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549 (Patton) held the court can consider
the preliminary hearing transcript in determining whether the
petitioner has made a prima facie showing. (Id. at p. 560.) In his
reply brief Bugarin does not attempt to distinguish Patton, but he
requests that, if we are “inclined to affirm on the grounds that
[Bugarin’s] petition for resentencing as currently drafted does not
make a prima facie showing of eligibility for relief,” we give
Bugarin the opportunity to file an amended petition. As the
Supreme Court has stated is appropriate, we direct the superior
court to allow Bugarin, if he chooses, to file an amended petition.
Otherwise, we affirm.
1 Statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Bugarin Shoots Two Men, Pleads Guilty to Attempted
Murder, and Admits Certain Allegations
One afternoon in June 2003 Ernesto Flores was outside his
house when he saw a neighbor’s child throw a smoke bomb under
the car of Ernesto’s brother, Roberto.2 Ernesto told Roberto what
he had seen, and Roberto came outside and told Bugarin, who
was the child’s cousin, to tell the child to stop throwing smoke
bombs at his car. Bugarin became angry, told Roberto he “had
something for [Roberto] in the night,” and drove away. Roberto
and Ernesto also left.
That night Roberto and Ernesto returned to their house
with a friend, George Moreno, and parked their car in the
driveway. Roberto was in the driver’s seat, Moreno was in the
passenger seat, and Ernesto was in the back seat. Roberto saw
Bugarin standing outside his cousin’s house. Bugarin walked
toward Roberto’s car with a gun in his hand, reached through the
sunroof, and shot Roberto. Moreno jumped out of the car and
ran, and Bugarin shot Moreno three or four times. Bugarin got
in his car and drove away.
In December 2006 Bugarin pleaded no contest to two
counts of attempted murder. He also admitted allegations he
personally and intentionally discharged a firearm, within the
meaning of section 12022.53, subdivision (c). The trial court
sentenced Bugarin to an aggregate prison term of 38 years. On
2 The facts are from the testimony at the preliminary
hearing, which under Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th 549 the court can
consider in determining whether the petitioner has made a prima
facie showing for relief under section 1172.6. (Patton, at p. 564.)
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count 1 the court imposed the upper term of nine years, plus
20 years for the firearm enhancement. On count 2 the court
sentenced Bugarin to two years and four months (one-third the
middle term), plus six years and eight months (one-third the
middle term of 20 years) for the firearm enhancement.
B. The Superior Court Denies Bugarin’s Petition for
Resentencing Under Section 1172.6
In 2022 Bugarin filed a petition for resentencing under
section 1172.6, checking boxes on a form petition stating he was
eligible for relief and asking the court to appoint counsel to
represent him. The superior court appointed counsel, and the
People filed a response to the petition. The People argued
Bugarin was ineligible for relief because he was the “direct
perpetrator” and the “sole defendant.” The People attached the
complaint, the information, and the transcript of the plea
hearing. Citing the testimony at the plea hearing, the People
argued Bugarin admitted he “personally and intentionally
discharged a firearm when he committed the attempted murder
upon Roberto Flores and George Moreno.” In his reply brief,
Bugarin argued “the plea and admissions taken alone” did not
make him ineligible for relief.
The superior court ruled Bugarin was ineligible for relief as
a matter of law and denied the petition without issuing an order
to show cause. The court stated it had reviewed the pleadings
and the transcript of the plea hearing, but did not review the
police reports or the transcript of the preliminary hearing. The
court stated: “What is most significant is he admitted on the
change of plea transcript the personal use of a firearm for both
[attempted murder] charges.” The court also stated: “There were
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no codefendants, and there was never any theory involving the
situation where Mr. Bugarin was just an accomplice. Everything
says he is the actual perpetrator.” The court ruled: “There’s been
no prima facie showing, so there is no order to show cause that
will be issued. The court finds the defendant is not eligible given
the fact that he is the actual perpetrator, as reflected in the
transcript of the change of plea.” Bugarin timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
Effective 2019, the Legislature substantially modified the
law governing accomplice liability for murder by eliminating the
natural and probable consequences doctrine as a basis for finding
a defendant guilty of murder and significantly narrowing the
felony-murder exception to the malice requirement for murder.
(Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 558; People v. Arellano (2024)
16 Cal.5th 457, 467-468; People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433,
448-449; see People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 707-708
[felony murder]; People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842-843
[natural and probable consequences].) Section 188,
subdivision (a)(3), now prohibits imputing malice based solely on
a person’s participation in a crime and requires proof of malice to
convict a defendant of murder, except under the revised felony-
murder rule. (§§ 188, subd. (a)(3), 189, subd. (e); Patton, at
p. 558; Arellano, at pp. 467-468; Curiel, at p. 448.) Effective
2022, the Legislature amended section 1172.6 to apply to persons
convicted of “attempted murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a); see Patton, at p. 558;
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People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216, 223, fn. 3; People v.
Rodriguez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 451, 457.)
Section 1172.6 authorizes a person convicted of felony
murder, murder under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine, or attempted murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine to petition the superior court to vacate the
conviction and resentence the petitioner on any remaining counts
if he or she could not now be convicted of murder or attempted
murder because of the legislative changes to the definitions of
murder. (See People v. Arellano, supra, 16 Cal.5th at
pp. 468-469; People v. Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 449-450.)
If a section 1172.6 petition contains all the required information,
the court must appoint counsel to represent the petitioner if
requested. (§ 1172.6, subd. (b)(1)(A), (b)(3); Patton, supra,
17 Cal.5th at p. 563; People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952,
962-963.) The People must file a response to the petition, the
petitioner may file a reply, and the court must hold a hearing to
determine whether the petitioner has made a prima facie
showing he or she is entitled to relief. (§ 1172.6, subd. (c); Patton,
at p. 556.)
In deciding whether the petitioner has made a prima facie
showing for relief under section 1172.6, the court “looks beyond
the face of the petition.” (Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 563.)
The court may consider the record of conviction, including the
“preliminary hearing transcript preceding a guilty plea” (id. at
p. 568), which will “necessarily inform the trial court’s prima
facie inquiry under section [1172.6], allowing the court to
distinguish petitions with potential merit from those that are
clearly meritless.” (People v. Lewis, at p. 971; see Patton, at
p. 563; People v. Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 463-464.) “In
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reviewing any part of the record of conviction at this preliminary
juncture, a trial court should not engage in ‘factfinding involving
the weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion.’” (Lewis, at
p. 972; see Patton, at p. 563.) “At the prima facie stage, a court
must accept as true a petitioner’s allegation that he or she could
not currently be convicted of a homicide offense because of
changes to section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019,
unless the allegation is refuted by the record.” (Curiel, at p. 463.)
If “‘the defendant has made a prima facie showing of entitlement
to relief, “the court shall issue an order to show cause.”’” (People
v. Arellano, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 469.) “We apply de novo
review on appeal from the court’s denial of a petition for
resentencing at the prima facie stage, including its determination
that the record of conviction establishes the petitioner is not
entitled to resentencing as a matter of law.” (People v. Jackson
(2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 128, 146; see People v. Bodely (2023)
95 Cal.App.5th 1193, 1200.)
B. The Superior Court Did Not Err in Denying Bugarin’s
Petition, but Under Patton Bugarin May Have an
Opportunity To Amend His Petition
Where the record of conviction establishes a defendant
convicted of attempted murder was the actual perpetrator, the
defendant is ineligible for relief under section 1172.6 as a matter
of law. (People v. Muhammad (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 268, 282,
review granted Feb. 19, 2025, S288860; People v. Bodely, supra,
95 Cal.App.5th at p. 1201; People v. Hurtado (2023)
89 Cal.App.5th 887, 893.) Here, all the evidence at the
preliminary hearing pointed to Bugarin as the actual and only
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shooter.3 Roberto and Ernesto were familiar with Bugarin
because he visited his cousins, who were Roberto and Ernesto’s
neighbors. Roberto and Ernesto had a confrontation with
Bugarin earlier on the day of the shooting. Roberto and Ernesto
each identified Bugarin as the shooter, in a six-pack photographic
lineup and at the preliminary hearing.4
As was the case in Patton, Bugarin “proffered a declaration
with checkbox allegations of entitlement to relief” and relied
“solely on the same checkbox allegations . . . to also make a prima
facie showing.” (Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 556.) And as was
the case in Patton, Bugarin’s “plea to the section 12022.53,
subdivision (c) enhancement for intentional discharge of a
firearm in the commission of the attempted murder tended to
corroborate” the evidence at the preliminary hearing that
Bugarin was the “sole and direct perpetrator of the shooting.”
(Patton, at p. 563.) In these circumstances, to avoid summary
denial of the petition under section 1172.6 the petitioner must
allege “specific facts that identify someone else as the direct
perpetrator.” (Patton, at p. 567.) Bugarin did not allege any such
facts. However, Bugarin asks us to direct the superior court to
3 We granted Bugarin’s motion to augment the record with
the transcript of the preliminary hearing. Although the superior
court did not rely on that transcript, we independently review the
court’s determination the record of conviction established
Bugarin was not entitled to resentencing as a matter of law. (See
People v. Jackson, supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at p. 146.)
4 Moreno identified Bugarin in a photographic lineup and
told police he and Bugarin had been arguing for several weeks
before the shooting, but Moreno recanted his testimony at the
preliminary hearing.
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consider an amended petition, should he “seek to file one.” That
is what the Supreme Court in Patton, “out of an abundance of
caution” (id. at p. 569), stated is the appropriate disposition, and
what is the appropriate disposition here.
DISPOSITION
The superior court is directed to consider an amended
petition should Bugarin, within 30 days after this court issues its
remittitur, seek to file one. The order is otherwise affirmed.
SEGAL, J.
We concur:
MARTINEZ, P. J.
STONE, J.
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