CourtListener 10613075•People v. White CA1/4
Texte intégral
Filed 6/18/25 P. v. White CA1/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A170039, A170506
v. (Solano County
BOBBY LEE WHITE, JR., Super. Ct. Nos. F2300556,
Defendant and Appellant. FCR367586, FCR365196)
In these two appeals, Bobby Lee White seeks review of his four-year
prison term on multiple felony convictions. The sentence was imposed in a
consolidated sentencing proceeding on convictions in three cases, the first
two of which were resolved by plea, and the third by jury trial. The jury
trial occurred on charges that were filed against White after he had been
placed on probation for charges in the first case. Prior to the trial, the
prosecutor offered White a plea agreement calling for two years in prison
in the first two cases and an additional concurrent term on the charges in
the third case. White rejected the offer.
To ensure that White understood the potential consequences of his
decision to reject the prosecutor’s offer, the trial court indicated it had
already decided to impose a sentence of two years on the first and second
1
cases; whether he won or lost at trial, the court advised White, his sentence
would be two years, but the sentence would be longer than two years if he
lost. After the jury returned a conviction in the third case, the court
sentenced White to a four-year term, comprising 16 months on the charges
in the first two cases plus a consecutive term of two years eight months on
the charges in the third case. The record shows that, at sentencing, the
court weighed mitigating circumstances against aggravating circumstances
and chose the lower triad term of two years for the principal count in the
third case, but exercised its discretion to run some of the terms imposed in
the other cases consecutively to the term imposed in the third case.
In two consolidated appeals, White seeks review of the sentence. The
sole issue raised is a claim of retaliatory sentencing. White contends that,
in imposing a four-year prison sentence, the trial court violated his due
process rights by punishing him for electing to exercise his right to a jury
trial. We disagree and will affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
On August 30, 2022, the Solano County District Attorney filed a
complaint in case No. FCR365196 charging White with unlawful driving or
taking of a vehicle (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a), count 1); misdemeanor
driving under the influence (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (a), count 2); driving
while having 0.08 percent or higher blood alcohol (Veh. Code, § 23152,
subd. (b), count 3); misdemeanor driving without a license (Veh. Code,
§ 12500, subd. (a), count 4); and misdemeanor hit and run resulting in
property damage (Veh. Code, § 20002, subd. (a), count 5).
On September 8, 2022, White pleaded no contest to the first and
second counts. White was released on a Cruz waiver.1 The remaining
1 People v. Cruz (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1247 (Cruz).
2
counts were dismissed. On November 28, 2022, the court placed White on
probation for two years with various terms and conditions, including
abstaining from alcohol and illegal drugs.
On March 14, 2023, the Solano County District Attorney filed an
information in case No. FCR367586 charging White with receiving stolen
property (Pen. Code, § 496, subd. (a), count 1). White’s probation was
revoked following his arrest. The district attorney also alleged prior felony
convictions pursuant to Penal Code section 1203, subdivision (e)(4) and
various aggravating factors relating to White’s probation violations.
On April 27, 2023, White pleaded no contest to the charge in case
No. FCR367586. White also admitted violating the terms of his post
release community supervision in another case, No. FCR367587, and
violating his probation in No. FCR365196. The plea agreement
contemplated that, at sentencing, White would be placed on two years of
formal probation, and he was again released on a Cruz waiver. White
failed to appear for sentencing in case Nos. FCR367586 and FCR365196.
Before he could be sentenced, White was arrested and later charged
in case No. F2300556 with driving or taking a vehicle without consent
(Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a), count 1); receiving a motor vehicle as stolen
property (Pen. Code, § 496d, subd. (a), count 2); and evading an officer
(Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a), count 3). The district attorney also alleged
various prior felony convictions, including prior convictions for driving a
vehicle without consent (Pen. Code, § 666.5).
Before trial in case No. F2300556, White rejected a plea agreement
calling for him to spend two years in prison. In the following colloquy, the
trial court described the parameters of the plea bargain, as well as the
3
procedural posture of case No. FCR367586, before asking White if he
understood the consequences of proceeding to trial:
“THE COURT: . . . [¶] . . . [¶] Mr. White, before we get started, just
because of the unique nature of the posture of your case, I want to put on
the record the last offer made to you. And if you are interested in it, that’s
fine; if you’d like to proceed to trial, that’s your right as well. But it’s
important to me, given the unique nature of it, that you understand it.
“As it stands right now, you were pending judgment and sentence on
a case [No. FCR367586] for which there was a Cruz waiver. So on that
case, because of the Cruz waiver, I can and will be giving you two years in
the state prison on that case. I’ve already made up my mind in that
regard.
“The district attorney has indicated that if you plead to one of the
felonies in the new case [No. F2300556], that he’ll run that concurrent with
that two years, so the maximum you’ll get is two years in the state prison
with your credits.
“If you go to trial and you win, you’ll still go to prison for two years.
If you go to trial and you lose, you will be sentenced on—whatever charge
you get, you’ll be sentenced on that, and that will be in addition to the two
years.
“So you’re going to get two years regardless. If you win, you still get
two years; if you lose, you get more. Do you understand that, sir?
“THE DEFENDANT: Yes.”
The court also confirmed White would have received credits for time
spent in jail in another case under the plea agreement.
4
On November 16, 2023, a jury convicted White of counts 1 and 3 in
case No. F2300556. On December 8, 2023, the court found true beyond a
reasonable doubt a prior conviction and certain aggravating factors.
At the sentencing hearing on March 11, 2024, which included all
three cases noted above, the prosecutor asked the court to impose the
upper term on the vehicle theft count, arguing White had evaded police
through a crowded parking lot in case No. F2300556, endangering multiple
people. The court noted:
“There are a couple things about this case that are unusual; Mr.
White had an opportunity to resolve this case for two years and through
the consultation of his counsel and chose not to do so. What would seem to
me inexplicable, but nonetheless, we gave him an opportunity for probation
and he failed to appear. But beyond failing to appear, he committed new
crimes and he committed new crimes of 2800.2. Probation had kept his
maybe his fifth or sixth 2800.2, so that, again, is a kind of an astronomical
number.
“I had been willing to give him an opportunity at rehabilitation, but
he did not avail himself of it. When he caught probation the second time,
he didn’t seem like he was wholehearted or completely sincere in his
efforts, seemed like he was trying to mitigate the time he might spend in
custody.
“In my analysis of this case, based on his record, which is something
the Court can consider separate and apart from a jury finding, the
aggravating circumstances—I think the aggravating circumstances
outweigh the mitigating circumstances. I do find the element of the
circumstances, but as a general principle, he’s been given numerous
5
opportunities to address those hardships and traumas that he’s suffered,
but he’s failed repeatedly to do so.
“Nonetheless, the Court is inclined to not impose the high term but
instead impose midterm across the board. I think that is a better sentence.
I think it is a safer analysis for purposes of the new sentencing rules and
when we get to the same number of years that People are asking for
because I think 4 years is appropriate. Four years may not solve the
concerns of Mr. White’s criminality, but it will keep the community safe
for, at least, some period of time.
“And if he is sincere about his desire to change the course of his life,
he’s free to take advantage of the programs in prison or programs upon his
release.
“So in F23-00556, as to Count 1, a violation of 10851(a) of the Vehicle
Code, I’m gonna impose the midterm of 2 years[2] as the base term, that
gives him a principal term of 2 years. I will impose all insubordinate [sic]
terms and enhancements.
“In F23-0056 [sic], as to Count 3, a violation of 2800.2, I’m gonna
select the midterm of 2 years, impose that consecutively at one-third the
midterm for 8 months consecutive.
“As to FCR-367586, Count 1, a violation of 496(a) of the Penal Code,
again, I’m gonna select the midterm of 2 years, impose that consecutively
at one-third the midterm of 8 months.
“In FCR-365196, as to Count 1, a violation of Vehicle Code
Section 10851(a) . . . , I’m selecting the midterm of 2 years. Again,
2 The court later clarified that, due to White’s prior vehicle theft
conviction (Veh. Code, § 10851), the two-year term the court selected for
this count was the low term under the applicable enhanced sentencing
triad (see Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (e); Pen. Code, § 666.5, subd. (a)).
6
imposing a consecutive one-third the midterm of 8 months, that gives him
a total consecutive subordinate terms and enhancements of 2 years, adding
up to a higher prison term of 4 years.
“And the Court is—the Court is selecting the midterm in each of
these cases, although I’ve indicated I think I could impose a high term. I’m
just choosing the midterm because there are some mitigating
circumstances. And I think that’s the appropriate term in the interest of
justice for each of these cases.”
Consistent with this explanation, the trial court sentenced White as
follows: case No. F2300556: the low term of two years for vehicle theft
(Veh. Code, § 10851), eight months consecutive (one-third the midterm) for
evading (Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a)); case No. FCR367586: eight
months consecutive (one-third the midterm) for possession of stolen
property (§ 496, subd. (a)); case No. FCR365196: eight months consecutive
(one-third the midterm) for vehicle theft (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)),
and a concurrent 180 days in county jail for driving under the influence
(Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (a)). The aggregate term was four years in state
prison.
II. DISCUSSION
Penalizing a defendant in sentencing for exercising his or her jury
trial right violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
(In re Lewallen (1979) 23 Cal.3d 274, 278 (Lewallen); People v. Collins
(2001) 26 Cal.4th 297, 306–307.) As our Supreme Court has explained, “ ‘a
court may not . . . treat a defendant more leniently because he foregoes his
right to trial or more harshly because he exercises that right.’ ” (People v.
Clancey (2013) 56 Cal.4th 562, 575.)
7
In Lewallen, the defendant refused to accept a negotiated sentence.
Following a jury trial, at sentencing, the defense attorney requested
informal rather than formal probation. (Lewallen, supra, 23 Cal.3d at
p. 276.) The trial court responded: “ ‘I think I want to emphasize there’s
no reason in having the District Attorney attempt to negotiate matters if
after the defendant refuses a negotiation he gets the same sentence as if he
had accepted the negotiation. It is just a waste of everybody’s time, and
what’s he got to lose. And as far as I’m concerned, if a defendant wants a
jury trial and he’s convicted, he’s not going to be penalized with that, but
on the other hand he’s not going to have the consideration he would have
had if there was a plea.’ ” (Id. at p. 277.) The Supreme Court remanded
the matter for resentencing, finding that the defendant had shown “that
the trial court’s exercise of its sentencing function was improperly
influenced by his refusal of the proffered plea bargain and insistence on his
right to trial.” (Ibid.)
In doing so, however, the Lewallen court emphasized “that a trial
court’s discretion in imposing sentence is in no way limited by the terms of
any negotiated pleas or sentences offered the defendant by the prosecution.
The imposition of sentence within the legislatively prescribed limits is
exclusively a judicial function.” (Lewallen, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 281.)
“Legitimate facts may come to the court’s attention either through the
personal observations of the judge during trial [citation], or through the
presentence report by the probation department, to induce the court to
impose a sentence in excess of any recommended by the prosecution.”
(Ibid.) “The mere fact . . . that following trial defendant received a more
severe sentence than he was offered during plea negotiations does not in
8
itself support the inference that he was penalized for exercising his
constitutional rights.” (People v. Szeto (1981) 29 Cal.3d 20, 35.)
We are unpersuaded that the sentence at issue here was based in
some respect on White’s refusal to accept an advantageous plea bargain.
The record reflects the court’s concern, prior to trial, that White understood
the consequences of not accepting the plea bargain offer in terms of the
potential for additional prison time, if convicted. This was no threat by the
court; White would have served a two-year sentence regardless of whether
he went to trial (and even if he was acquitted) because he was arrested
while out of custody on a Cruz waiver in case No. FCR367586. The court
had already determined it would sentence White to two years in that case
for that reason. White would get additional time if he lost at trial because
the plea offer from the district attorney, not a condition imposed by the
court, included a sentence to run concurrently with White’s sentence for
violating the Cruz waiver. The court indicated that a conviction would
result in serving more than two years because the plea offer would perforce
no longer be on the table: “If you go to trial and you lose, you will be
sentenced on . . . whatever charge you get . . . ,” the court explained.
This is not a Lewallen-type scenario in which the court told White
that, if he went to trial and lost, he was “ ‘not going to have the
consideration he would have had if there was a plea.’ ” (Lewallen, supra,
23 Cal.3d at p. 277.) At sentencing, the court’s comments demonstrate
that it considered appropriate sentencing factors. For example, the court
noted White had the opportunity to resolve the case before trial for a two-
year sentence. But White “failed to appear” and committed new crimes
that included “his fifth or sixth [Vehicle Code section] 2800.2” charge.
These violations were only the latest in a decade-plus pattern of criminal
9
behavior that also included repeated probation violations and terminated
probations.
White attempts to argue that his case is comparable to Lewallen,
supra, 23 Cal.3d 274. We disagree. In Lewallen, the defendant was
charged with drunk driving and various firearm charges. (Id. at p. 276.)
He rejected a plea offer and was ultimately acquitted of all but the drunk
driving charge. (Ibid.) At sentencing, the court made comments explicitly
tying the defendant’s sentence to his rejection of the plea offer. (Id. at
p. 277.) On appeal, the defendant argued his sentence “greatly exceed[ed]
those ordinarily imposed . . . for equivalent criminal conduct.” (Ibid.) Our
Supreme Court agreed, holding the trial judge’s language had “no rational
interpretation other than that he was basing petitioner’s sentence at least
in part on the fact that he” rejected the plea offer. (Id. at p. 280.)
Read in isolation, the judge’s pretrial comments here may be read to
convey the impression that, if White proceeded to trial in the third case
and suffered a conviction, his sentence would be more severe than the deal
in front of him because he exercised his rights to go to trial. But Lewallen
instructs us to look at the record “as a whole.” (Lewallen, supra, 23 Cal.3d
at p. 280.) As noted above, White had already been convicted in two cases
and, due to his probation revocation and his Cruz waiver, he was facing
sentencing on those two cases no matter what happened at trial. As we
read the record, prior to trial on the third case the judge was simply
informing White that, due to his first two convictions, there would
inevitably be adverse sentencing consequences in the third case if he was
convicted.
We do not view this as retaliation for White’s prospective conduct
(i.e., going to trial in the third case). The judge was simply giving White
10
information about sentencing exposure flowing from something that had
happened in the past (i.e., from two pending convictions on which sentence
had yet to be imposed and poor performance on probation). To put the
circumstances here in the terms the case law does, this is not a situation in
which the court “ ‘ “treat[ed] a defendant . . . more harshly” ’ ” than the
terms of a pending offer “ ‘ “because he exercise[d]” ’ ” his right to go to
trial. (People v. Ghebretensae (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 741, 761–762, italics
added, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Bryant (2021) 11 Cal.5th
976, 986, fn. 5.) Rather, it treated him “ ‘ “more harshly” ’ ” than the
pending offer “ ‘ “because” ’ ” of his yet-to-be-imposed sentence on prior
convictions and his poor probation record. (People v. Ghebretensae, at
p. 762, italics added.)
Though it would have been preferable for the court to state clearly
that it was merely providing an “indicated sentence” prior to trial, the
court had enough information about White from the first two cases to
provide an informed indication of how it would exercise its power to choose
between consecutive and concurrent sentences in a joint sentencing on all
three cases. (Cf. People v. Clancey, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 576 [“a trial
court that intends to offer an indicated sentence should not only identify it
as such, but should also ensure that the record makes clear the indicated
sentence represents the court’s best judgment as to the appropriate
punishment for this defendant and this offense, regardless of whether guilt
is established by plea or at trial”].)
Nothing on this record suggests that, prior to trial, the court
arbitrarily committed itself to a discretionary sentencing choice that can
only be explained by an intent to punish White for going to trial. We
specifically reject the argument that the court’s comment at sentencing
11
about White’s passing up the opportunity to resolve all three cases based
on the People’s offer of two years demonstrates that it was penalizing him
for exercising his right to defend himself at trial. It is hardly surprising
that, at sentencing, the court commented on the unsuccessful gamble
White took in turning down a generous pretrial offer from the People that
he had been warned did not bind the court.
The most salient aspect of the sentencing record is that, as noted, the
court took into account appropriate sentencing considerations. The court
considered evidence of White’s danger to the community in the form of his
extensive criminal history and repeated failure to satisfactorily complete
probation. Against that, it balanced various challenges White faced
throughout his life. Such a measured assessment is not consistent with
the court allegedly punishing White for exercising a constitutional right.
(See People v. Ghebretensae, supra, 222 Cal.App.4th at p. 763 [“Nothing in
the foregoing indicates to this court that the sentence imposed was
punishment for appellant’s exercise of his jury trial right. . . . The court
based its decision on appellant’s extensive criminal history, which was
detailed in the probation officer’s report”].)
Notably, unlike the situation in Lewallen where the comments the
trial court made at sentencing were consistent with “no rational
interpretation other than” that it held the defendant’s decision to go to trial
against him (Lewallen, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 280), in this case the court
refrained from throwing the proverbial book at White. For the principal
term, the court selected the low term of two years, despite the prosecutor
having advocated for the aggravated term. And while the court selected
some of the terms to run consecutively, that choice was within the court’s
discretion given the potential harm to multiple victims (see, e.g., People v.
12
Shaw (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 453, 458; People v. Oates (2004) 32 Cal.4th
1048, 1063). Although the court noted White had an opportunity to resolve
the charges against him before trial, it only did so in the context of noting
White’s overall pattern of repeatedly committing new crimes and violating
the terms of his probation.
III. DISPOSITION
Affirmed.
STREETER, J.
WE CONCUR:
BROWN, P. J.
GOLDMAN, J.
13
Vous vous demandez comment ce texte s’applique à votre situation ?
Consultation gratuite, sans engagement
Décrivez votre situation. Notre équipe vous recontactera par e-mail pour votre consultation.
Poursuivez vos recherches dans ChatGPT ou Claude
Connectez Omnilex pour rechercher dans le corpus juridique depuis votre assistant IA.