CourtListener 10606792•People v. Luamanzo CA2/6
Texte intégral
Filed 6/17/25 P. v. Luamanzo CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B333115
(Super. Ct. No. 22CR04819)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Santa Barbara County)
v.
JOSE LUIS LUAMANZO,
Defendant and Appellant.
Jose Luis LuaManzo appeals after he was convicted by jury
of forcible rape (Pen. Code, § 261, subd. (a)(2), count 1) and rape
of an unconscious or asleep person (Pen. Code, § 261, subd.
(a)(4)(A), count 2). He was sentenced to state prison for eight
years. At trial, appellant sought to impeach the victim’s
credibility by introducing evidence that she made prior false
accusations against two different people. The trial court excluded
the evidence pursuant to Evidence Code1 section 405 for failure to
1 All further statutory references are to the Evidence Code
unless otherwise indicated.
establish the preliminary fact that the accusations were false,
and pursuant to section 352.
Appellant contends he is entitled to reversal because the
admissibility of the evidence should have been governed pursuant
to section 403, which would have allowed the jury, rather than
the judge, to determine the veracity of the accusations. Appellant
also contends the trial court abused its discretion in excluding
the evidence pursuant to section 352. We conclude any error was
harmless and affirm.
Facts and Procedural Background
Prosecution Evidence
In 2021, appellant, his wife R. Mendoza, and her two
children, L.G. (victim) and Alex, lived together. The family slept
in a living room that had been converted into a bedroom. L.G.,
who was 19 years old at the time, slept in one bed while her
mother, appellant, and Alex slept in a different bed on the other
side of the room.
On the night of the incident, Mendoza was working and
was not at home. Around 2:00 or 3:00 a.m., L.G. awoke to a man
having sex with her. L.G. initially thought it was her boyfriend,
P. Gutierrez, and told him to stop. When she reached down and
touched the man’s hairline, L.G. realized it was not her
boyfriend.
The man stopped having sex with L.G., pulled her
underwear and pants back up, picked up Alex and carried him to
the other bed. L.G. grabbed her cellphone, turned on the
flashlight, and confirmed the man was appellant. She ran to the
restroom, locked the door, and called Gutierrez, crying
inconsolably.
2
L.G. drove to Gutierrez’s house where he checked her
vaginal area and found semen. L.G called her mother, father,
and the police and told them all that she had been raped by
appellant. Mendoza called appellant and asked what he had
done to L.G. Appellant said he had not touched L.G. and
everything she said was a lie. Mendoza eventually called 911.
Meanwhile, appellant called and texted L.G. He told her,
“‘I didn’t do anything,’” suggested she was dreaming, and said he
could get deported if she reported him. L.G. responded, “‘That’s
what you get for what you did to me.’”
A registered nurse conducted a sexual assault examination
and collected DNA swabs from various locations of L.G.’s body.
Forensic analysis provided “very strong support” that appellant’s
DNA was found on these swabs.
Defense Evidence
Appellant admitted to having sex with L.G., but said it was
consensual. He testified that when he returned from work and
attempted to remove Alex from L.G.’s bed as he usually did, L.G.
woke up, began caressing him and said, “‘I want to do it.’” They
began touching each other and had sex. Afterward, he felt
remorseful. He picked up Alex and carried him to the other bed.
L.G. calmly got up and walked to the bathroom. He heard her
leave in her car.
Approximately 30 to 40 minutes later, Mendoza called him
and told him that L.G. said appellant raped her. He realized L.G.
had not told her mother it was consensual sex and began to call
and text L.G. about possibly being deported.
Appellant believed L.G. falsely accused him of rape so that
Gutierrez would not have to repay appellant the money he
3
invested into a business venture importing exotic soda from Hong
Kong and China.
Exclusion of Evidence Prior to Trial
Appellant filed a written motion in limine seeking to admit
evidence that in 2014, L.G accused mother’s roommate, Fernando
Jimenez, of inappropriately touching her when she was nine years
old. Appellant attached a police report, which included L.G.’s
statements that Jimenez would touch her when he was alone with
her, as well as Mendoza’s statement that she never left L.G. alone
with Jimenez and that L.G.’s siblings were always with her. The
motion also included Jiminez’s statement denying that he ever
touched L.G. inappropriately. The District Attorney declined to
file charges due to a lack of evidence.
Appellant argued this evidence was relevant to
demonstrate that L.G. “made false allegations in the previous case
and then proceeded to make false allegations again in this case.”
The prosecutor filed a written response requesting a preliminary
fact determination hearing pursuant to section 405 for appellant
to establish the falsity of L.G.’s prior allegations of molestation.
At the hearing, the trial court began by stating: “[T]he
Court determines the preliminary fact under Evidence Code 405,
the burden of proof is by a preponderance of the evidence, and . . .
that burden is on the defense.” Appellant called two witnesses,
Mendoza and Jimenez.
Mendoza testified that Jimenez watched the children
“many times” over a period of approximately two years while she
was at work. She denied telling the police that she never left the
children alone with Jimenez.
Jimenez testified that he “ha[d] nothing to do with this.”
He never saw a police report and was not aware of the specifics of
4
the allegations. He hired an attorney and was later told the
charges against him had been dropped. When asked whether he
believed the allegation made by L.G. that he touched her
inappropriately was false, he asserted his Fifth Amendment right
to remain silent and refused to answer any further questions.
Defense counsel argued that appellant met his burden of
producing sufficient evidence to show that L.G. made false
allegations against Jimenez and whether the allegations were
actually false was for the jury to decide. The prosecutor argued
appellant had not met his burden to show that the allegations
were false, and even if he had, the evidence should be excluded
pursuant to section 352.
After hearing argument and considering the evidence, the
trial court found that the defense had not met its burden to
establish the prior allegations were false. The trial court also
ruled that even if it had found the evidence admissible pursuant
to section 405, it would still have excluded the evidence pursuant
to section 352.
Exclusion of Evidence During Trial
L.G. testified that when she was 12 or 13 years old, her
relationship with her mother had deteriorated. Defense counsel
asked L.G. if she had ever retaliated against her mother by calling
the police. The prosecutor objected and the trial court sustained
the objection. During a sidebar discussion, defense counsel
explained that appellant would testify that “years ago” L.G. called
the police to report that her mother was beating her and her little
brother. Counsel argued this was relevant to show that L.G.
“knows how to manipulate the system” and “made a false
allegation against her mother.”
5
The trial court ruled the evidence was inadmissible because
there was no preliminary determination of the falsity of the
allegations, and pursuant to section 352, “we would turn it into a
trial about what happened at another occasion rather than
testimony about what occurred here.”
Evidence Code Sections 403 and 405
Only relevant evidence is admissible. (§ 350; People v.
Lucas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 415, 466 (Lucas).) Sometimes the
relevance of evidence depends on the existence of a preliminary
fact. (Lucas, at p. 466.)
“Sections 400 through 405 of the Evidence Code define the
terms and set forth the procedures to be utilized where the
admissibility of evidence is dependent upon the existence of a
preliminary fact. As used in these sections, a ‘“preliminary fact”
means a fact upon the existence or nonexistence of which depends
the admissibility or inadmissibility of the evidence.’ (Evid. Code,
§ 400).” (People v. Herrera (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 46, 60
(Herrera); see People v. Cottone (2013) 57 Cal.4th 269, 283-284.)
Section 403 provides: “The proponent of the proffered
evidence has the burden of producing evidence as to the existence
of the preliminary fact, and the proffered evidence is inadmissible
unless the court finds that there is evidence sufficient to sustain
a finding of the existence of the preliminary fact, when: [¶] (1)
The relevance of the proffered evidence depends on the existence
of the preliminary fact; . . . or [¶] (4) The proffered evidence is of a
statement or other conduct of a particular person and the
preliminary fact is whether that person made the statement or so
conducted himself.” (Id., subds. (a)(1), (4).)
Section 405 provides, “With respect to preliminary fact
determinations not governed by Section 403 . . . [¶] (a) . . . The
6
court shall determine the existence or nonexistence of the
preliminary fact and shall admit or exclude the proffered
evidence as required by the rule of law under which the question
arises.” (Id., subd. (a).)
“The critical difference between the two statutes is that
under . . . section 403, the court makes a preliminary
determination regarding sufficiency whereas under . . . section
405, the court makes a final determination regarding existence of
the preliminary fact.” (Herrera, supra, 83 Cal.App.4th at p. 63.)
Appellant contends the trial court should have applied
section 403 because the “relevance of the proffered evidence
depend[ed] on the existence of the preliminary fact.” The People
agree but contend any error in excluding the evidence was
harmless. As we shall explain, we agree with the People.
Here, the preliminary fact to be determined by the trial
court was whether L.G.’s prior accusations against Jimenez and
her mother were in fact false. If the allegations were true, then
the proffered evidence would have no evidentiary value to
impeach L.G.’s credibility. Because the relevance of the proffered
evidence was dependent on the existence of the preliminary fact,
section 403 applies. But even if the trial court had considered the
preliminary fact pursuant to this section, the evidence still would
have been excluded.
“[T]he correct standard of proof for a preliminary fact under
. . . section 403 is evidence sufficient to support a finding by a
preponderance of the evidence. [Citations.]” (Herrera, supra, 83
Cal.App.4th at p. 61.) In other words, there must be “sufficient
evidence to enable a reasonable jury to conclude that it is more
probable that the fact exists than that it does not.” (Ibid.)
Whether the foundational evidence is sufficiently substantial is a
7
matter within the trial court’s discretion. (Lucas, supra, 12
Cal.4th at p. 466.) “The court should exclude the proffered
evidence only if the ‘showing of preliminary facts is too weak to
support a favorable determination by the jury.’” (Ibid.)
Here, the evidence presented by appellant fell far short of
the requisite standard. Although Jimenez testified briefly, he
refused to answer any questions related to the allegations of
abuse. Mendoza’s testimony established, at the very least, that
Jimenez had “substantial access” to L.G. Nothing in the record
demonstrates, by a preponderance of the evidence, that L.G. lied
about being inappropriately touched by Jimenez.
Thus, any error in excluding the evidence pursuant to
section 405 was harmless because it was too weak to support a
favorable decision by the jury and would have been excluded
pursuant to section 403. (See People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d
818, 836 [error is harmless unless it is “reasonably probable that
a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been
reached in the absence of the error”].)
Appellant contends his federal constitutional rights were
violated and Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 applies.
We disagree. Appellant did not raise an objection on federal
constitutional grounds (People v. Blacksher (2011) 52 Cal.4th 769,
842) and the alleged error did not render his trial fundamentally
unfair. (See People v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 427-428
[attempt to “inflate garden-variety evidentiary questions into
constitutional ones is unpersuasive”]; People v. Earp (1999) 20
Cal.4th 826, 878.) In any event, the evidence was properly
excluded pursuant to section 352, which is subject to the Watson
harmless error test. (See People v. Mullens (2004) 119
Cal.App.4th 648, 659 [“Error in the admission or exclusion of
8
evidence following an exercise of discretion under section 352 is
tested for prejudice under the Watson harmless error test”].)
Evidence Code Section 352
Evidence that a sexual assault victim has made a prior
report of molestation or rape is relevant to the victim’s
credibility, but only if the prior allegation is “proven to be false.”
(People v. Miranda (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1424; accord,
People v. Bittaker (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1046, 1097, disapproved on
another ground in People v. Black (2014) 58 Cal.4th 912, 919.)
The trial court retains discretion to exclude such evidence “if the
proof of the falsity of the prior complaint ‘would consume
considerable time, and divert the attention of the jury from the
case at hand.’” (Miranda, at p. 1424.)
“‘A trial court’s exercise of discretion in admitting or
excluding evidence . . . will not be disturbed except on a showing
the trial court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious,
or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest
miscarriage of justice. . . .’” (People v. Celis (2006) 141
Cal.App.4th 466, 476; see People v. Wheeler (1992) 4 Cal.4th 284,
296 [trial court has discretion to control presentation of proposed
impeachment evidence “to prevent criminal trials from
degenerating into nitpicking wars of attrition over collateral
credibility issues”]; People v. Lightsey (2012) 54 Cal.4th 668, 714;
accord, People v. Clark (2011) 52 Cal.4th 856, 931-932.)
Appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion in
excluding the prior allegation evidence because it was “central” to
his defense and “highly probative” to impeach L.G.’s credibility.
But the trial court found this was “the definition of [section] 352.”
We agree. The proposed impeachment evidence had minimal
probative value and would have required a time-consuming
9
digression into matters that occurred years ago. On these facts,
there was no abuse of discretion.
In sum, appellant had the opportunity to present his
defense, that he had consensual sex with L.G. Given the
overwhelming evidence of his guilt, the jury did not believe him.
There was no miscarriage of justice here and no reversal is
required.
Disposition
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
YEGAN, Acting P. J.
We concur:
BALTODANO, J.
CODY, J.
10
John F. McGregor, Judge
Superior Court County of Santa Barbara
_____________________________
Adrian Dresel-Velasquez, under appointment by the Court
of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Wyatt E. Bloomfield, Supervising
Deputy Attorney General, and William H. Shin, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Vous vous demandez comment ce texte s’applique à votre situation ?
Consultation gratuite, sans engagement
Décrivez votre situation. Notre équipe vous recontactera par e-mail pour votre consultation.
Poursuivez vos recherches dans ChatGPT ou Claude
Connectez Omnilex pour rechercher dans le corpus juridique depuis votre assistant IA.