CourtListener 10605340•In re T.A. CA2/6
Texte intégral
Filed 6/16/25 In re T.A. CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
In re T.A., a Person Coming 2d Juv. No. B335305
Under the Juvenile Court Law. (Cons. w/ B338571)
(Super. Ct. No. SJ0215A)
(Los Angeles County)
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
T.A.,
Defendant and Appellant.
T.A. appeals the juvenile court’s order and judgment
requiring her to pay restitution pursuant to Welfare and
Institutions Code1 section 730.6. Appellant contends the court
1 Unmarked statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
erred by adding interest to the restitution amount at an annual
rate of 10 percent from the date of loss. We will affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Appellant damaged the door of the victim’s car during an
altercation in April of 2023. She was charged with misdemeanor
vandalism in a section 602 petition. (Pen. Code, § 594, subd. (a).)
The juvenile court placed her on informal supervision pursuant to
section 654.2 and scheduled a restitution hearing.
The victim testified at the restitution hearing that she
spent $249.28 to replace her car window. She produced an
estimate of $2,042.10 to repair several dents on the outer door
shell. The juvenile court found appellant responsible for the
damage and ordered her to pay these amounts as “part of the 654
grant.” It told her any amount not paid when she completed
informal supervision would be converted to a civil judgment.
The court held a progress hearing on April 16, 2024. It
found appellant completed the terms of supervision but had not
yet paid any restitution. It proposed dismissing the case and
entering a civil judgment for the amount owed. Appellant’s
counsel responded, “That is our desire as well.” The court
entered judgment in the amount of $2,336.38. It ordered
appellant to pay annual interest of 10 percent from the date of
loss.
DISCUSSION
Appellant does not challenge the amount of the original
restitution award, i.e., $2,336.38. She concedes she is estopped
from challenging the award’s conversion into a civil judgment
because she expressly consented to the action at hearing. (See In
re K.C. (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 465, 472-473 [minor may consent
to acts in excess of jurisdiction when beneficial to the parties and
consistent with public policy].) She contends only that the
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juvenile court exceeded its authority when it ordered her to pay
interest from the date of loss. “‘[W]here the specific issue is
whether a court has the authority to issue restitution, we review
that question of law independently.’” (In re S.E. (2020) 46
Cal.App.5th 795, 803, quoting In re S.O. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th
1094, 1098.) “‘No court has discretion to make an order not
authorized by law.’” (S.E., at p. 804, quoting In re K.F. (2009) 173
Cal.App.4th 655, 661.)
Section 730.6 provides for mandatory victim restitution “in
cases where a minor is adjudicated a ward of the court pursuant
to section 602.” (In re M.W. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 1, 4.)
“Section 730.6 parallels Penal Code section 1202.4, which governs
adult restitution.” (Ibid.) Section 730.6 does not, like Penal Code
section 1202.4, list interest as a compensable economic loss.
(Pen. Code, § 1202.4, subd. (f)(3).) The juvenile court may
nevertheless impose interest under this section to compensate
victims for lost use of their money. (See In re S.E., supra, 46
Cal.App.5th at p. 810 quoting In re Imran Q. (2008) 158
Cal.App.4th 1316, 1320-1321 [“On this issue, ‘[w]e see no reason
to distinguish between an adult’s and a juvenile’s duty to provide
full restitution to their victims. [Citation.]’”].)
Appellant contends section 730.6 does not apply because
she was never “adjudicated a ward of the court.” She
acknowledges the juvenile court was authorized to order her to
pay restitution and perform other “constructive assignments” as
part of section 654 supervision. (See § 654.6 [juvenile court may
require a minor “to repair damaged property or to make other
appropriate restitution” as part of their supervision program].)
Appellant notes, however, that section 654 does not incorporate
section 730.6 or include language authorizing the court to impose
interest on a restitution award. She also contrasts section 654
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with section 794. The latter requires courts awarding restitution
in deferred entry of judgment cases to do so “pursuant to the
provisions of this code.” (§ 794.) The absence of similar language
in the statutes governing informal supervision, she argues,
means the court lacked authority to award interest.
In re S.E. rejected a similar assertion. The juvenile court
adjudged the appellant a ward of the court and awarded
restitution to the victim, plus interest. The appellant challenged
the award because section 730.6, unlike Penal Code section
1202.4, did not list interest as a compensable loss. The Court of
Appeal declined to interpret the statute so narrowly. “[D]espite
the brevity of section 730.6, subdivision (h)(1) when compared to
Penal Code section 1202.4, subdivision (f)(3),” it stated, “courts
have taken an expansive view in terms of permitting an award of
restitution in juvenile cases to those defined as victims in, and for
losses expressly covered by, the latter statute but not the former.
[Citations.] No reason appears why the same approach and
conclusion should not be reached with regard to the imposition of
interest.” (In re S.E., supra, 46 Cal.App.5th at p. 809.)
We see no reason to take a narrower view of restitution
when a minor charged under section 602 avoids a judgment of
wardship through informal supervision. The Welfare and
Institutions Code gives the juvenile court considerable latitude to
craft an appropriate program of supervision. This may include
ordering the minor “to make other appropriate restitution” to the
victim as a condition of diversion and dismissal under section
654. (§ 654.6.) We interpret this language as granting the court
discretion to decide whether to impose restitution under section
730.6, and if so, to add interest and specify the accrual date.
Holding otherwise would allow the minor to benefit from informal
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supervision while depriving his or her victim of full compensation
for financial losses caused by the offense.
Appellant also contends the juvenile court deprived her of
an opportunity to oppose the addition of interest because it did
not notify her that it intended to do so. We disagree. While the
court did not discuss the issue at hearing, it referred expressly to
section 730.6 at the restitution hearing and made clear it was
awarding restitution as “part of the 654 grant for the vandalism.”
The hearing occurred almost four years after In re S.E. was
decided. Appellant did not object to the award or raise the issue
with the trial court. Nor does she assert she would have declined
informal supervision initially rather than pay interest to the
victim.
DISPOSITION
The judgment (restitution order) is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
CODY, J.
We concur:
GILBERT, P. J.
BALTODANO, J.
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David Yaroslavsky, Judge
Superior Court County of Los Angeles
______________________________
Mary Bernstein, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, and Daniel C. Chang, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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