People v. Marsh CA2/1

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Filed 6/12/25 P. v. Marsh CA2/1
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE, B334621

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. KA117372)
v.

JONATHAN SCOTT MARSH,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Victor D. Martinez, Judge. Affirmed.
Tracy J. Dressner, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Idan Ivri and Marc A. Kohm, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
____________________________
Defendant Jonathan Scott Marsh appeals from his
conviction for first degree murder. Defendant contends the trial
court improperly denied him the assistance of an advisory
attorney appointed by a prior judge during the pretrial period in
which defendant represented himself. He further contends a
medical examiner’s testimony that relied in part on an autopsy
report prepared by a different doctor constituted testimonial
hearsay in violation of defendant’s constitutional right to
confrontation.
We reject these arguments. The trial court’s statements
and rulings defendant contends denied him access to an advisory
attorney concerned his entitlement to a standby attorney, that is,
an attorney who does not assist a pro per defendant in preparing
his or her defense but stands ready to stand in should a self-
represented defendant choose to relinquish pro per status.
Defendant also fails to show that the trial court’s statements and
rulings concerning standby counsel had any impact on
defendant’s preparation for trial or his ultimate decision to accept
appointment of counsel.
Much of the medical examiner’s testimony was based on
photographs and was properly admitted. To the extent arguendo
any of the remaining testimony constituted testimonial hearsay,
its admission was harmless.
Accordingly, we affirm.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Defendant was accused of stabbing Matthew Musick to
death behind a grocery store in Pomona on January 25, 2018.

1. Prosecution evidence
The prosecution offered testimony from six eyewitnesses.

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W.S., a food company employee who was at the grocery store to
stock the shelves, heard someone yell, “ ‘Stop! Stop’ ” followed by
a second person screaming curse words. W.S. went to see what
was happening, and saw a man “getting up and looking down,
cursing.” She described him to the police as a white man in his
50’s. He looked angry. The man grabbed a bicycle and left. W.S.
then saw a second man near the dumpster. He had blood
covering his face and was trying to get up. W.S. saw several
people in scrubs, whom she identified as nurses, run over to help
the man on the ground.
V.W. was a grocery store employee. She heard cursing and
yelling, then saw a man, whom she identified at trial as
defendant, standing over another person who was sitting with his
back against the wall. Defendant’s fist was balled and he was
striking the victim’s face, while his other hand held the victim’s
shirt. The victim was not fighting back—rather, his eyes were
“rolling back” and his mouth was open, and his face was covered
with blood dripping down to his shirt. Defendant eventually
stopped striking the victim but continued cursing at him angrily
until defendant got on a bicycle and pedaled away.
L.H. was a nursing student who was on her lunch break
with several colleagues in a parking lot separated from the
grocery store by a wall. She heard screaming and arguing, and
looking over the wall saw a man holding a metal object in a
clenched fist raised over his head. She and some colleagues
climbed over the wall. The man with the raised fist grabbed a
backpack and rode off on a bicycle. L.H. saw a second man lying
on the ground bleeding from two puncture wounds on his torso.
L.H. and her colleagues attempted to perform CPR on the victim
but stopped because “blood was pouring out of the upper wound.”

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F.R. was another nursing student in the parking lot. He
heard someone yell to call the police and that someone was being
stabbed. He looked over the wall towards the grocery store and
saw three people. He identified one of the people as defendant.
Defendant was standing behind another man, holding the man
and thrusting his arm into the man’s chest. F.R. could see
something in defendant’s hand but could not identify it. F.R.
believed defendant was stabbing the man. The victim fell to the
ground, and defendant started rifling through the victim’s
pockets. F.R. screamed at defendant to stop and jumped over the
wall. Defendant got on a bicycle and left. The victim had holes
in his shirt and was bleeding from the center of his body. F.R.
felt no pulse, so he began performing CPR on the victim. As soon
as he started chest compressions, blood started coming out of a
wound in the middle of the victim’s body.1
G.D., another nursing student in the parking lot, heard a
commotion and looked over the wall towards the grocery store.
He saw two men arguing. One of the men pulled a silver object
out of his pocket and stabbed the other two times in the abdomen.
The victim fell to the ground, and the attacker stabbed him a
third time. G.D. saw blood on the victim’s shirt. The attacker
left on a bicycle.
I.J. was putting trash in a dumpster in the same parking
lot in which the nursing students were located.2 He heard

1 The witness did not testify further about the third person
he saw in addition to defendant and Musick, nor did the
prosecution or defense question him about the third person.
2 The trial court determined I.J. was unavailable for trial,
and allowed the jury to view a videotape and transcript of the
witness’s prior testimony.

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screaming and saw the nursing students gathered at the wall.
He looked over the wall and saw a man leaning over, looking like
he was “in agony.” Blood was soaking through the man’s shirt.
The man lay down on the ground. I.J. then saw another man
standing near the injured man—that man got on a bicycle and
left. I.J. knew the man on the bicycle because both that man and
I.J. were homeless and had visited food programs together. I.J.
knew him as “John,” and identified defendant in a photographic
lineup. When testifying, I.J., looking at defendant in the
courtroom, said defendant “[l]ooks like John” only “fatter.”
A medical examiner testified Musick was stabbed seven
times and cut once. His face had bruises consistent with being
punched. A toxicology report indicated Musick had three times
the legal limit of alcohol for driving, as well as marijuana in his
bloodstream.

2. Defendant’s police interview
The jury viewed a video of defendant’s police interview.
Defendant stated he was homeless and 54 years old. At first he
claimed not to be at the grocery store at the time of the stabbing,
and that he only heard about the stabbing later.
The police implied they had video footage of the incident.
Defendant then changed his story, stating a “fucking nut” came
across the parking lot towards him “babbling like crazy.” The
man went over to defendant’s “stuff” and “started looking things
over.” The man tried to take defendant’s backpack, and when
defendant moved to stop him, the man “shoved into” defendant.
Defendant had a knife in his hand that he used for recycling
cardboard, but he denied trying to stab the man with it. The man
backed away and “gurgled” but defendant saw nothing on his
knife. The man said “something like,” “ ‘[T]his is my time.’ ”

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Defendant tried to get away on his bicycle but the person grabbed
him, causing defendant to drop his knife. The person eventually
let go and defendant left.

3. Defendant’s testimony
Defendant testified at trial. He said he went to the
dumpsters behind the grocery store to get cardboard to make
signs for a yard sale, and had a knife with him for that purpose.
A man, whom defendant described as 5’ 7” in height, approached
him “rambling, babbling on.” The man grabbed defendant’s
backpack, and defendant snatched it back. The man “stomped”
on defendant’s foot, hurting him. Defendant yelled for help. The
man struck defendant in the throat, then “drove himself” into
defendant, knocking the wind out of defendant. Defendant was
gripping his knife such that only a small portion of the blade
extended past his hand. He put one of his fists on the man’s
chest and the other on his back and pushed him away.
The man at this point became “docile” and leaned against a
railing, saying, “ ‘I guess it’s not my bag after all.’ ” The man
“said . . . something about it’s my time.” He put his hand to his
chest and said, “ ‘I don’t know if I’m going to make it.’ ”
Defendant saw no tears to, or blood on the man’s clothing, and no
blood on his knife, which was still in defendant’s hand with only
an inch and a half of the blade exposed.
Defendant moved towards his bicycle to leave. The man
tackled him from behind. The man gripped defendant’s legs and
swung at him as defendant struggled to get the man off of him.
Defendant saw his knife lying on the ground and grabbed it “to
keep [the man] from getting it.” Defendant kicked the man,
knocking him off balance, and the man fell on top of defendant.

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The man bit him several times on the legs. Defendant finally
broke free and rode away on his bicycle.
Defendant admitted it was possible he struck Musick with
his knife while trying to push him away, but he did not
intentionally try to stab him. He denied punching Musick in the
face.
Defendant testified he was 6’ 2” in height.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A jury convicted defendant of first degree murder and
found true the allegation he used a deadly and dangerous
weapon. The trial court sentenced him to 26 years to life,
imposed fines and fees, and awarded credits. Defendant timely
appealed.

DISCUSSION

A. The Trial Court Did Not Deny Defendant Access to
Advisory Counsel
Defendant argues the trial court, Judge Rubiya Nur
presiding, denied him access to advisory counsel assigned by a
prior judge to assist defendant during the pretrial period in
which defendant represented himself. We reject defendant’s
characterization of the record, which indicates defendant never
raised the issue of advisory counsel with Judge Nur. Rather, he
inquired about standby counsel, that is, counsel that does not
assist in preparation of the defense but steps in should defendant
choose to relinquish pro per status. To the extent defendant
argues Judge Nur’s responses to his inquiries regarding standby
counsel were in error, he fails to show prejudice.

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1. Relevant law
Criminal defendants have a constitutional right to counsel,
but also a constitutional right to represent themselves should
they so choose. (People v. Moore (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1104, 1119–
1120 (Moore).) A trial court, at its discretion, may “ ‘appoint
advisory counsel to assist an indigent defendant who elects self-
representation. [Citation.]’ ” (People v. Morelos (2022) 13 Cal.5th
722, 738.) Advisory counsel “actively assists the defendant in
preparing the defense case by performing tasks and providing
advice pursuant to the defendant’s requests, but does not
participate on behalf of the defense in court proceedings.”
(Moore, at p. 1119, fn. 7.)
As an alternative to, or in addition to advisory counsel, a
court may appoint “standby counsel,” which “takes no active role
in the defense, but attends the proceedings so as to be familiar
with the case in the event that the defendant gives up or loses his
or her right to self-representation.” (Moore, supra, 51 Cal.4th at
p. 1119, fn. 7.) “The roles of advisory counsel and standby
counsel are distinct.” (People v. Trujeque (2015) 61 Cal.4th 227,
261, fn. 9.)
Although a court has the discretion to appoint “ ‘hybrid
representation’ ” for self-represented defendants, such as
advisory or standby counsel, a criminal defendant has no
constitutional right to such counsel. (Moore, supra, 51 Cal.4th at
p. 1119.)

2. Additional background
We recount in detail the proceedings concerning advisory
and standby counsel so the reader may understand defendant’s
arguments on appeal and why ultimately, defendant’s assertion

8
that he was denied access to advisory counsel is unfounded. The
issue is complicated by the absence of transcripts of some
relevant proceedings, as well as minute orders that appear to
contradict the available reporter’s transcripts, as we explain
further below.

a. Trial court appoints advisory counsel
Between May 13, 2019 and January 5, 2020, defendant
filed four motions before two judges under People v. Marsden
(1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 to replace his appointed counsel. The trial
court denied all four motions. Immediately following the fourth
Marsden hearing and denial, defendant’s counsel stated
defendant wished to proceed with his rights under Faretta v.
California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 to represent himself. The trial
court, Judge David C. Brougham presiding, stated, “I’ve given the
defendant an opportunity to express his concerns. And the
minute order will reflect that he has not made a request under
Faretta today. [¶] I’m not going to play games. If he wants to
make the motion at the next date, he can.”
At the next hearing on January 29, 2020, defendant made a
Faretta request and Judge Brougham granted it. Before granting
the request, the court advised defendant he did not “have an
automatic right to a stand-by attorney, advisory attorney or a co-
counsel or some other attorney who will sort of fill in the blanks
for you when you need legal advice.”
A March 3, 2020 minute order indicates defendant
appeared pro per, with no mention of advisory counsel. There is
no reporter’s transcript of the March 3 hearing.
On April 22, 2020, defendant filed a request for advisory
counsel “to assist the defendant in preparation and presentation
of defense case for trial.” (Capitalization omitted.) At a hearing

9
that same day, Judge Brougham informed defendant, “You do
have an advisory counsel and I’ll indicate that’s Mr. Daugherty,
and present throughout the proceedings is Mr. Bestard standing
in for him.” Defendant said he filed his request for advisory
counsel because he did not know he had one. The court said, “So
now you know that you have one.”
Although the trial court’s statements suggest it appointed
advisory counsel prior to April 22, 2020, there is nothing in the
record on appeal so indicating.
The reporter’s transcript for the April 22 hearing, when
listing the appearances, states, “Antonio Bestard, standing in for
David Daugherty, advisory counsel.” The minute order for the
hearing, however, does not mention Bestard, and further states,
contrary to the reporter’s transcript, “Defendant’s order granting
expert advisory counsel is denied.”
The next hearing took place July 21, 2020. The reporter’s
transcript does not mention an appearance by Daugherty,
Bestard, or any other advisory counsel, nor was advisory counsel
mentioned or discussed during the hearing. The minute order for
that hearing states, “Defendant is advised that he does not have
an advisory counsel,” although no such advisement appears in
the reporter’s transcript.

b. Defendant inquires about standby counsel
Between July 21, 2020 and October 6, 2022, defendant
appeared pro per at 12 hearings. None of the minute orders or, to
the extent they are available, reporter’s transcripts for these
hearings mentions advisory counsel or any form of hybrid
representation.
At a hearing on October 6, 2022, now with Judge Nur
presiding, the trial court stated that at defendant’s previous

10
appearance, defendant had indicated he understood he had
“stand-by counsel” assigned, Daugherty was that counsel, and if
defendant’s understanding was correct, he intended to relinquish
his pro per status and allow Daugherty to represent him. There
is no reporter’s transcript of the hearing immediately preceding
the October 6, 2022 hearing at which defendant apparently first
asked Judge Nur about standby counsel and Daugherty.
The trial court further stated that when, at the previous
hearing, defendant had raised the issue of standby counsel, the
court “told [defendant] that I will look into it because my policy is
always, there’s no stand-by counsel.” If a self-represented
defendant asks for help, “they don’t get somebody to consult
with.” The court stated, however, that if a self-represented
defendant “unequivocally” indicates the defendant wishes to
relinquish pro per status, the court would appoint representation
at that point.
The court then asked defendant whether he wished to
relinquish his pro per status and have the court appoint counsel.
Defendant said he was not ready to have counsel appointed, but
simply wanted to know if Daugherty was “still my stand-by.”
The court responded, “[Y]ou want to know, specifically, if
Mr. Daugherty was your stand-by counsel. But for me to answer
that question now is moot because you are not wanting to
relinquish your pro per status anyway because you want to
represent yourself and carry on working on some stuff. [¶] What
does it matter whether there is stand-by counsel or not? And if
Mr. Daugherty is stand-by counsel or not, that issue is moot.
You’re not saying: Judge, did you investigate—did you find out if
I have a stand-by counsel or not? . . . [A]nd if [I] do have a stand-
by counsel, is that Mr. Daugherty? You’re not asking that.

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You’re telling me that you wish to . . . continue to represent
yourself because you have some things that you need to work on.
So that question [about stand-by counsel] is no longer in effect,
right, if you understand what I’m saying?”
The court continued, “I mean, if you were saying:
Judge, . . . because you did tell me, Judge, that you will review
the file, did you find out if I have a standby counsel, Judge, and is
that Mr. Daugherty, because, Judge, if your answer is yes to both
questions, I am giving up my pro per status today. Judge, please
invite Mr. Daugherty and I want to sit down and talk to him. I
am already in court and Mr. Daugherty can discuss things with
me. You’re not saying that. [¶] So you need to be more clear.
Are you telling me that you are asking me if you have a standby
counsel? [¶] And, number two, are you asking if that’s
Mr. Daugherty? And are you telling me: Judge, if your answer to
both is yes, then I am going to relinquish my pro per status today
and I wish that attorney to be appointed? Are you telling me
that? What are you telling me or asking me?”
Defendant began, “Judge Brougham—” and the court
interrupted: “No. No. No. Let’s not go back to Judge Brougham.
Listen to my question because this is—” Defendant then
interrupted, “I’m trying to answer—” and the court said,
“Mr. Marsh, don’t talk over me. Listen to my question. You
brought this issue up [with] the last court. I clarified it. I
reviewed the file. [¶] So I am asking you, sir, is your question
today: Do I have a standby counsel, Judge, and is my counsel
Mr. Daugherty? Because if you say[ ] yes, Judge, then I am going
to relinquish my pro per status and I want Mr. Daugherty to
come and talk to me; are you saying that to me? Or are you
saying: Judge, it doesn’t matter because I need time because I—

12
like you advised me, I’m working on some things and I wish to do
some work on my case? What are you asking? Let’s talk about
that. Don’t talk to me about Judge Brougham or any other judge
in the past.”
The court repeated its question: “[A]re you asking me:
Judge, do I have a standby counsel who is Mr. Daugherty because
if it is so, Judge, I want to relinquish my pro per status and have
Mr. Daugherty appointed; are you telling me that?”
Defendant responded, “No. I am not telling you that.”
Defendant stated, “I want to know if [Daugherty] was still the
person in line. And there’s some things that I need to address
before I am ready and willing to go that route” and relinquish pro
per status. The court stated, “We don’t play those kind of games,”
and reiterated whether defendant had standby counsel and who
that counsel was mattered only if defendant wished to have
counsel appointed. The court stated defendant was not entitled
to information about standby counsel “just” because he “want[s]
to know the information for [his] personal whatever.”
The court went on to address other matters, including
defendant’s request that his experts each be paid for 10 hours to
consult with him in advance of trial. The prosecutor asked the
court to set a trial date, because by the time that date arrived,
defendant would have time to finish preparation with his experts.
The court stated it would set a trial date, and the “date will
be cemented.” The court warned defendant about coming back on
that date and asking for counsel to be appointed at that time:
“We don’t play those kind of games in my courtroom.” Defendant
stated, “I’m not playing games.”
The court stated, “I’m very clear with you today. . . . You
told me your understanding was that the previous judge told you

13
that they have a standby counsel, and that it was Mr. Daugherty.
And I told you, I have no idea. I will have to look into it. I cannot
say yes or no. I have looked into it. And so I asked you, and I
am, again, asking you—discussing it for the hundredth time
today on the record. I have looked into it and my question to you
is if I tell you today, yes, you have a standby counsel and, yes,
you have Mr. Daugherty as the standby counsel, is your answer
going to be: Okay, Judge. I am giving up my pro per status and I
want that attorney appointed? You have told me, ‘No.’ I am not
prepared to do it today.”
The court told defendant to “[t]hink about it and let me
know again because, once I set that date, come rain, come shine,
that trial will go on that date, whether you are prepared or not or
whether you tell me ‘I need an attorney now because I can’t swim
any longer.’ [¶] So think about it. I’m going to give you a couple
of minutes. If your understanding is Mr. Daugherty is your
standby counsel, that may just happen today. But if you’re not
interested, then we are not going to discuss that. I am going to
set trial dates.”
Defendant began to speak about his expert reports, and the
court stated it was not interested in discussing expert reports,
but wanted to know if defendant wished to move forward pro per,
or “to make a different decision.” Defendant answered, “I am not
ready to give up my [pro per] status.”
The court set February 6, 2023 as the trial date, with a
readiness conference set for February 2.
Defendant asked if it would be possible for him to
relinquish his pro per status before the trial date. The court said,
“[Y]ou can always do whatever you want, give up your pro per
status. But, at that time, this case will move forward and you

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will have an attorney who will be told: Hello, counsel. Good
morning. Pick a jury because Judge Nur has 12 in the box. If
you want to put yourself in that position, that’s your life; it’s not
my life.” Defendant stated, “So I’m taking it Mr. Daugherty is no
longer my standby.” The court responded, “We are not talking
about Mr. Daugherty because you are not wanting Mr.
Daugherty.” Defendant agreed he did not want Daugherty
appointed “at this moment. I haven’t done all of my paperwork
yet.”
The court stated, “We’re not going to do these games.” The
court and defendant then engaged in another back and forth in
which the court reiterated its view that the issue of standby
counsel did not matter unless defendant was going to relinquish
pro per status, and defendant repeated he was not ready to
relinquish that status.
Defendant again asked if the court was saying he could not
relinquish pro per status after that point. The court said
defendant could relinquish his status even after a jury was
picked, “but you need to understand that, at that time, your
counsel is going to come in without having prepared this case
because counsel will be coming in running.” Defendant stated he
did not “understand why [the court was] dodging the question”
whether “Mr. Daugherty is my stand-by. He’s supposed to be up
to speed and ready to go when I give up my status.” The court
responded, “I see. I see. So your standby counsel is going to work
on your timeline?” The court said, “There is no such thing as
your standby counsel needs to be up and ready to go as soon as
you give up your pro per status.”
The court continued, “So I am telling you right now that
you do not have the right to ask me: Isn’t my standby counsel

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supposed to be all ready and ready to proceed as soon as I give up
my pro per status?” The court repeated, however, that defendant
could relinquish pro per status whenever he wished.

c. Court warns defendant it will grant no further
continuances to the extent he is unprepared to
represent himself at trial
Defendant did not appear at the readiness conference on
February 2, 2023 for excusable reasons.
On February 6, 2023, defendant filed a written request for
a continuance, contending the telephone lines in the jail had been
down so he had not been able to communicate with his
investigator or experts.
At a hearing that same day, at which defendant appeared,
the trial court began by summarizing the discussion of standby
counsel at the previous hearing. The court stated defendant “has
advised this court numerous times that he will not be going to
trial representing himself. He will be asking for counsel to
represent him at the trial stage. [¶] However, he also advised
the court that he is not going to give up his pro per status until
he feels the case is ready, and then he will ask for a court-
appointed attorney.” The court asked whether defendant still
wished to proceed pro per, and advised him that if he wished
counsel appointed, counsel would not be ready to proceed when
trial commenced in two days, the new date set for trial.
Defendant stated, as he had in his continuance motion,
that he had not been able to communicate with his experts or his
investigator for two months because of telephone problems at the
jail. The court asked if defendant had tried writing to his
investigator, and he said he had not. The court said it would
proceed to trial and would not give defendant more time. The

16
court stated, however, that if defendant relinquished pro per
status, the court would appoint counsel and grant a continuance
so counsel would have time to prepare.
Defendant stated he would not be ready for trial without
first consulting his experts. The court reiterated it was denying a
continuance based on defendant’s inability to consult his experts.
The prosecutor noted that defendant had five months since
the court set the trial date at the October 2022 hearing, and the
prosecutor spoke with defendant’s investigator, who said he
had not heard from defendant since October 2022. The
prosecutor further noted even if the jail phones had been down
for two months in December and January, that would not explain
why defendant had not contacted his investigator or experts in
October and November.
The court stated the investigator similarly had advised the
court’s judicial assistant he had not heard from defendant since
October.
Defendant argued that, besides the phone issues, he had
been unable to consult with his experts because the trial court
never signed orders for pretrial consultation, which defendant
had failed to present at the October 2022 hearing but now had for
the court to sign. The prosecutor noted defendant’s investigator
could have obtained the court’s signatures on the orders earlier,
yet defendant had not provided the orders to the investigator.
The court set a pretrial conference for February 9, 2023,
and stated it would sign the pretrial consultation orders. The
court also stated that if defendant were able to consult with his
experts by February 9 and be prepared to proceed to trial at that
time, he could continue pro per. If he was not ready, the court
would not grant any continuances if defendant wished to remain

17
pro per. The court would, however, appoint counsel if defendant
wished.

d. Defendant relinquishes pro per status
At the February 9, 2023 hearing, the trial court asked if
defendant was ready for trial. Defendant said no, the three days
the court gave him were insufficient to meet with his experts, and
the court was “pushing me into trial.” The defendant then made
an oral peremptory challenge to Judge Nur on this basis.
The trial court summarized the earlier discussions of
standby counsel, and noted again that defendant “not once, but
repeatedly, advised this court that he had no intention of going to
trial by himself, as in representing himself. He will be asking for
counsel.” The court stated, “[Defendant] then proceeded to advise
the court he had information that there is a counsel by the name
of . . . Dave Daugherty, who has been appointed as standby
counsel. [Defendant] has Googled, searched [for] the attorney,
and he has found out that he is a good attorney. The court did
get an impression at that time that [defendant] was trying to
delay the process.”
The court then summarized at length the proceedings
stemming back to defendant’s request to represent himself. This
included the minute orders from April and July 2020 erroneously
stating Judge Brougham had not appointed advisory counsel,
although Judge Nur did not note the error nor did defendant
raise it.
The court recounted the numerous experts requested by
defendant and approved by Judge Nur and prior judges, as well
as the many times the court had granted defendant pro per
funds. The court noted it had granted defendant a trial
continuance over the prosecutor’s objection in June 2021. The

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court further noted it had granted defendant’s medical request
for a private shower in jail.
The court reiterated defendant’s investigator had told the
court defendant had not contacted him since October. The
prosecutor said the investigator had said the same to her, but
also had confirmed the jail was having trouble with its telephones
in December and January, as defendant claimed. The prosecutor
noted this did not explain the lack of communication in October
and November.
The court stated its judicial assistant had contacted the
investigator the day before the February 9 hearing, and the
investigator said defendant had told him in October he was ready
and did not need the investigator to do anything further. When
the investigator heard from defendant more recently, defendant
told him he had been unable to contact him because he had run
out of money. The court noted this was not true because the
court had allotted pro per funds to defendant. Also, the
investigator told the court that his clients frequently called him
collect.
The court concluded defendant had made no effort between
October and February to prepare for trial, and was delaying the
process by requesting experts but “not coming to any sort of
result or ending the situation.”
The court asked if defendant wished appointment of
counsel. Defendant asked if the court was ignoring his
peremptory challenge. The court stated it would not be presiding
over the trial in any event. The prosecutor added that
defendant’s peremptory challenge was untimely. Defendant said
he did not understand why he could not bring his peremptory
challenge, “but if I’m going to be backed in this corner, then I

19
want counsel.” The court immediately appointed the bar panel
attorney on duty that day, and granted a trial continuance so the
attorney could prepare.
After the noon break, the bar panel attorney informed the
court he had contacted Daugherty and would pick up discovery
from him. The court made a record that when defendant first
raised the issue of standby counsel, the court reviewed the case
file and informed Daugherty he would be counsel if needed.
Daugherty, however, “called the court early on and advised the
court that he was having some medical issues and would not be
able to represent the defendant if he was appointed any time
soon.” The court had told Daugherty, “[T]hat’s fine.”
The bar panel attorney represented defendant throughout
the trial.

3. Analysis
Defendant argues that Judge Brougham appointed
Daugherty as his advisory counsel, but Judge Nur, in refusing to
answer defendant’s inquiries about Daugherty, denied defendant
the assistance of that advisory counsel. Defendant contends this
effectively nullified Judge Brougham’s order and prejudiced
defendant because he did not have Daugherty’s assistance in
preparing for trial, including readying defendant’s experts.
Defendant further argues Judge Nur’s refusal to answer his
questions about Daugherty, as well as what defendant
characterizes as Judge Nur’s misstatements about defendant’s
entitlement to advisory or standby counsel, “wore [defendant]
down to the point where [defendant] had no choice but to
abandon his self-representation.” Defendant contends this
violated his constitutional right to represent himself.

20
We disagree with defendant’s reading of the record, which
does not support either his contention that Judge Nur denied him
the assistance of advisory counsel or that defendant was forced to
relinquish his pro per status because of Judge Nur’s statements
about hybrid counsel. As we explain, defendant’s arguments
concerning advisory counsel are a red herring, because he never
raised the issue of advisory counsel with Judge Nur—rather, he
raised the issue of standby counsel, an entirely different concept.
Assuming arguendo Judge Nur’s responses to defendant’s
inquiries about standby counsel were in error, defendant fails to
show those errors caused him to relinquish pro per status.
It appears that as of the April 22, 2020 hearing, Judge
Brougham had appointed Daugherty as advisory counsel. To
recap, advisory counsel is intended to “actively assist[ ] the
defendant in preparing the defense case by performing tasks and
providing advice pursuant to the defendant’s requests.” (Moore,
supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 1119, fn. 7.) At no point after Judge Nur
took over the case, however, does the record indicate defendant
ever asked whether Daugherty was his advisory counsel, that is,
whether Daugherty was available to perform pretrial tasks or
provide advice. Nor did defendant ask Judge Nur to allow him to
consult with Daugherty.
Rather, defendant inquired about Daugherty only to
determine if Daugherty would step in and represent him should
defendant relinquish his pro per status. In so inquiring,
defendant was asking about Daugherty not as advisory counsel
but as standby counsel, that is, counsel who “takes no active role
in the defense, but attends the proceedings so as to be familiar
with the case in the event that the defendant gives up or loses his
or her right to self-representation.” (Moore, supra, 51 Cal.4th at

21
p. 1119, fn. 7.) Indeed, defendant expressly asked whether
Daugherty was “still [his] stand-by,” with no reference to
advisory counsel.
Defendant’s contention that Judge Nur denied him
Daugherty’s assistance or advice in preparing for trial therefore
is ill-founded, when the record does not indicate defendant ever
asked Judge Nur about Daugherty in this capacity or requested
Daugherty’s assistance or advice. Judge Nur did not contradict
or nullify Judge Brougham’s earlier order appointing advisory
counsel—Judge Brougham’s grant of advisory counsel simply
never came up.
Defendant argues that when he asked Judge Nur about
Daugherty as “standby” counsel, he in fact meant “advisory”
counsel, the only capacity in which the record reflects Judge
Brougham appointed Daugherty. Defendant states, “The record
does not show why Judge Nur repeatedly used the term standby
counsel instead of advisory counsel,” and had Judge Nur
examined the case file, she would have realized her mistake.
The record in fact makes entirely clear why Judge Nur
used the term “standby” rather than “advisory.” First, that was
the term defendant himself used. Second, defendant used that
term correctly, asking not whether Daugherty was available for
consultation and assistance, but instead, whether Daugherty was
ready to step in and represent him, which is the very definition of
standby counsel. As previously explained, advisory counsel
assists a defendant in preparing to represent him- or herself;
advisory counsel is not appointed to step in for the defendant at
trial.
We also reject defendant’s suggestion that Judge Nur
did not review the case file, and had she done so, she would have

22
realized Judge Brougham had appointed Daugherty as advisory
counsel. As noted in the additional background provided in our
Discussion, part A.2, ante, the minute orders in this case
erroneously stated Judge Brougham had denied the request for
advisory counsel. Judge Nur was aware of those minute orders,
because she summarized them when recounting the proceedings
in the case at the February 9, 2023 hearing. Although defendant
argues the reporter’s transcript prevails over the minute orders,
Judge Nur had no reason to doubt the minute orders, when
defendant never raised the issue of advisory counsel with her or
called her attention to the errors in the minute orders. Judge
Nur therefore had no reason, based either on the case file or
defendant’s questions, to think defendant was inquiring about
Daugherty as advisory, as opposed to standby, counsel.
The record further reflects that defendant relinquished
pro per status not over any confusion regarding advisory or
standby counsel, but because he was unprepared for trial and
Judge Nur denied further continuances. At the February 9, 2023
hearing, defendant stated he was not ready for trial because he
had not had time to consult with his experts, and if Judge Nur
insisted on moving forward with trial he would seek to remove
her through a peremptory challenge. Judge Nur made clear she
would not consider the peremptory challenge, nor would she
grant further continuances. Defendant then said, “[I]f I’m going
to be backed in this corner, then I want counsel.” In the context
of the hearing, the “corner” to which defendant was referring was
the impending trial date for which he claimed he was
unprepared. Defendant’s unpreparedness had nothing to do with
whether he had standby counsel or who that counsel was,
because, again, standby counsel does not assist a pro per

23
defendant in preparing for trial. Nor can defendant claim he was
unprepared because Judge Nur denied him access to advisory
counsel when, as we have explained, he never raised that issue
with Judge Nur.
Defendant argues Judge Nur misrepresented the law when
explaining defendant’s entitlement to hybrid representation.
Judge Nur indicated her policy was not to appoint standby
counsel, which defendant contends “is impermissible because the
appointment of hybrid counsel is a discretionary act” not subject
to a “blanket policy” of denial. Judge Nur also said there was “no
such thing as your standby counsel need[ing] to be ready to go as
soon as you give up your pro per status,” but defendant argues,
“[T]hat is exactly the purpose of having standby counsel.”
Assuming arguendo either of these statements were
erroneous, defendant fails to demonstrate they had any impact on
defendant’s decision whether or not to proceed pro per.3
Defendant does not explain on appeal how he would have
proceeded differently had Judge Nur assured him he was entitled
to standby counsel and Daugherty was that counsel. The record
in fact suggests defendant would not have done anything
differently at all: Judge Nur repeatedly asked defendant
whether, if she told him Daugherty was his standby counsel
ready to step in, defendant would then request Daugherty’s
appointment, and defendant repeatedly said no.
For the same reason, defendant has not shown prejudice
from Judge Nur’s decision not to inform defendant until after

3 Although we conclude Judge Nur’s statements were not
prejudicial, we caution that a trial court should avoid declaring
blanket policies that may suggest the court misunderstands its
authority to exercise its discretion on a case-by-case basis.

24
defendant had relinquished pro per status that Daugherty had,
in fact, been appointed his standby counsel, but later withdrew
from the assignment because of medical reasons. By defendant’s
own admission, he intended to remain pro per as long as possible
regardless of whether Daugherty was his standby counsel, so the
court’s reticence was irrelevant to that decision. Defendant also
was not prejudiced by Daugherty’s unavailability to step in
immediately as standby counsel, because the court granted the
bar attorney appointed as Daugherty’s replacement a
continuance to prepare for trial. Defendant does not argue
otherwise on appeal.
Defendant contends he cannot be faulted for not asking to
consult with an advisory attorney when Judge Nur repeatedly
refused to answer his questions about Daugherty. As discussed,
at no point did defendant indicate to Judge Nur he was asking
about Daugherty because he wished to consult with Daugherty as
his advisory attorney. Again, defendant asked only if Daugherty
was “still my stand-by” and ready to step in when and if
defendant chose to relinquish pro per status. To the extent Judge
Nur declined to answer questions about Daugherty as standby
attorney, this did not constitute a denial of access to an advisory
attorney, something defendant never requested from Judge Nur.
Further, as set forth above, the lack of information regarding
standby counsel had no impact on defendant’s decisionmaking,
when defendant himself stated he was not ready to relinquish pro
per status even if the trial court confirmed Daugherty was his
standby counsel.
We acknowledge Judge Nur stated at the October 6, 2022
hearing that her policy was to deny self-represented defendants
“somebody to consult with,” although they could request

25
appointment of counsel at any time. We do not interpret
Judge Nur’s articulation of her own general policy as a rejection
of Judge Brougham’s appointment of advisory counsel for
defendant, an appointment of which Judge Nur was unaware
because defendant never raised the issue of the appointment with
her, and the record erroneously indicated Judge Brougham never
appointed advisory counsel. Nor does defendant argue he would
have requested access to advisory counsel had Judge Nur not
made this statement.
Defendant does not contend the trial court erred in denying
him a trial continuance or declining to rule on his peremptory
challenge. His only argument concerning pretrial matters is the
court interfered with access to his advisory attorney and his
constitutional right to self-representation. As set forth above,
that argument is a smokescreen for the true reason defendant
relinquished pro per status, namely his self-inflicted failure to
prepare for trial.

B. Any Admission of Testimonial Hearsay Was Harmless
Defendant contends the medical examiner’s testimony,
which relied on an autopsy report prepared by a different doctor,
constituted testimonial hearsay in violation of defendant’s
constitutional right to confront witnesses against him, as well as
inadmissible hearsay under the Evidence Code. Defendant
concedes his trial counsel did not object to the testimony, but
claims this demonstrates counsel was constitutionally ineffective.
We conclude the most important aspects of the medical
examiner’s testimony were based on photographs and therefore
properly admitted. Assuming arguendo the remainder of the
testimony was hearsay, testimonial or otherwise, its admission
was harmless.

26
1. Additional background
Dr. Timothy Dutra conducted Musick’s autopsy and
prepared a report. Dutra did not testify at trial. Instead, Dr.
Kevin Young, a deputy medical examiner, testified. Young was
not present for the autopsy. Young testified he reviewed Dutra’s
report, diagrams, and photographs from the autopsy. Asked if he
was able to review these materials “to make [his] own
conclusions,” Young said yes.
Young stated that Dutra’s report indicated Musick’s height
and weight, and Young provided those numbers to the jury. He
testified to the results of a toxicology report indicating Musick
had a significant amount of alcohol in his bloodstream—three
times the legal limit for driving—as well as some marijuana.
Young stated Dutra’s report noted eight injuries inflicted
by something sharp, specifically seven stab wounds and one cut.
The prosecutor then presented autopsy photographs of the
injuries to the jury, and Young explained what the photos showed
and how they corresponded to the autopsy diagrams. For each
wound, Young identified the location, the length and depth,
whether the wound was a stab or a cut, and the direction of the
wound, such as “backwards and down.” The wounds were on
Musick’s face, chest, underarm area, and back. Young identified
the fourth wound as the fatal injury, noting its depth and
direction and that it struck the pulmonary artery, which would
have killed the victim within minutes. Young identified two
other wounds as potentially fatal, and another wound that
fractured Musick’s rib.
Young testified other photographs showed abrasions on
Musick’s face and body. Young said the facial abrasions were
consistent with Musick having been punched.

27
Young explained one cannot determine from the direction
of the wound how the victim or attacker were positioned. The
direction of a wound is determined by sight and feel, including by
putting a finger into the wound. Young acknowledged he could
not determine whether Musick suffered the abrasions during the
attack as opposed to some earlier time.
In closing argument, the prosecutor reiterated Young’s
testimony that Musick had been stabbed eight times, and had
suffered abrasions consistent with being punched. The
prosecutor also reiterated Young’s testimony regarding the size
and direction of the eight wounds, noting, inter alia, that one of
the stabbing wounds was fatal and another fractured a rib.
The defense in closing argued Marsh had acted in self-
defense. The defense noted the autopsy report described Musick
as muscular and well-nourished, as well as intoxicated.
In rebuttal, the prosecution showed the photos again and
referenced Musick’s height and weight, arguing he was not
muscular. The prosecution argued the evidence of eight stab
wounds was not consistent with defendant’s testimony suggesting
the stabbing was accidental. The prosecution further argued the
depth and direction of the wounds was inconsistent with
defendant’s testimony that he was gripping the knife such that
only a small portion of the blade extended past his hand.

2. Relevant law
The Sixth Amendment of the federal Constitution
“guarantees criminal defendants the right to confront adverse
witnesses.” (People v. Nadey (2024) 16 Cal.5th 102, 162 (Nadey).)
The United States Supreme Court has held “that the admission
of ‘testimonial’ hearsay against a criminal defendant violates the
Sixth Amendment right to confrontation unless the declarant is

28
unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-
examination.” (Id., citing Crawford v. Washington (2004)
541 U.S. 36, 53–54.)
The United States Supreme Court has not provided “a
comprehensive definition of ‘testimonial’ [citation],” but
“[g]enerally speaking, a declarant’s hearsay statement is
testimonial if made ‘with a primary purpose of creating an out-of-
court substitute for trial testimony.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Fayed
(2020) 9 Cal.5th 147, 168.) Erroneous admission of testimonial
hearsay requires reversal unless the error “would have been
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Garton (2018)
4 Cal.5th 485, 507, citing Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S.
18, 24.)
Our Supreme Court has further held that, “regardless of
any testimonial character,” “out-of-court statements offered to
prove case-specific facts are hearsay” (People v. Valencia (2021)
11 Cal.5th 818, 833, fn. 14), and therefore cannot be admitted
without an applicable hearsay exception under the Evidence
Code (People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665, 684–685).
Erroneous admission of hearsay that is not testimonial is
reviewed for harmless error under the test set forth in People v.
Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, which “inquires whether ‘it is
reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing
party would have been reached in the absence of the error.’
[Citation].” (Valencia, at p. 840.)
In the specific context of medical examiner testimony based
on an autopsy performed by someone else, our Supreme Court
has defined particular categories of evidence, some of which
present hearsay problems and some of which do not. An expert

29
may testify based on autopsy photographs because photographs
are not hearsay. (Nadey, supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 162–163.)
It is also permissible for an expert “to testify about his own
independently conceived opinions, even if those opinions were
based on inadmissible hearsay.” (Nadey, supra, 16 Cal.5th at
p. 163.) “ ‘Any expert may still rely on hearsay in forming an
opinion, and may tell the jury in general terms that he did so.
Because the jury must independently evaluate the probative
value of an expert’s testimony, Evidence Code section 802
properly allows an expert to relate generally the kind and source
of the “matter” upon which his opinion rests.’ [Citations.]”
(Nadey, at p. 163.)
“A ‘hearsay problem arises,’ ” however, “ ‘when an expert
simply recites portions of a report prepared by someone else, or
when such a report is itself admitted into evidence. In that case,
out-of-court statements in the report are being offered for their
truth.’ [Citation.]” (Nadey, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 163.)
Although recitation of a report prepared by someone else is
hearsay, it is not always testimonial hearsay in violation of the
Sixth Amendment. Our high court has held that a pathologist’s
“anatomical and physiological observations about the condition of
the body” are “objective facts” that are not “so formal and solemn
as to be considered testimonial for purposes of the Sixth
Amendment’s confrontation right.” (People v. Dungo (2012)
55 Cal.4th 608, 619, 621.)
As defendant notes, in subsequent cases our Supreme
Court has declined to rely on Dungo, instead deciding the
question on harmless error grounds. (See People v. Perez (2018)
4 Cal.5th 421, 454, 456 [“We need not address Dungo’s continued
viability here because any federal constitutional error arising

30
from the admission of [a pathologist’s statements derived from
another pathologist’s autopsy report] was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.”) Out of an abundance of caution, we follow
the same course here, and assume arguendo that any hearsay
was testimonial and therefore subject to the stricter
constitutional standard for harmless error.
A defendant forfeits an appellate challenge based on
confrontation principles or statutory hearsay prohibitions absent
objection below. (People v. Redd (2010) 48 Cal.4th 691, 730;
People v. Perez (2020) 9 Cal.5th 1, 7.) Acknowledging this,
defendant argues his trial counsel was ineffective for not
objecting to Young’s testimony. To establish ineffective
assistance of counsel, “a defendant must show that their counsel’s
performance was deficient, and that this deficient performance
prejudiced the defense.” (In re Tellez (2024) 17 Cal.5th 77, 88.)
“A reviewing court can begin an ineffective assistance of counsel
inquiry with either element and need not address both elements
if one is not satisfied.” (Ibid.) “Indeed, it is often preferable for a
court to dismiss an ineffective assistance of counsel claim solely
for lack of prejudice.” (Ibid.)

3. Analysis
Defendant concedes he is not challenging Young’s
testimony to the extent it was based on autopsy photographs or
Young’s independent opinions not based on specific facts in the
autopsy report. Defendant contends some of Young’s testimony,
however, “simply repeated information that Dutra reported and
for which Young had no independent knowledge.” Defendant
identifies the following evidence as impermissible hearsay:
Musick’s height and weight, Dutra’s observation of seven stab
wounds and one cut, the descriptions of the length and depth of

31
the wounds, whether the wounds were stab wound or incised
wounds, the direction and orientation of the wounds, and the
internal damage caused by the wounds.
Young could and did rely on the autopsy photographs when
he testified regarding the number of wounds and their location,
and we therefore disagree that testimony conveyed hearsay
evidence.
It appears from the record Young relied entirely on the
autopsy report when testifying to Musick’s height and weight. It
is not clear from the record whether he relied on the photographs,
as opposed to the autopsy report and diagrams, when testifying
as to the length, depth, direction, and internal damage caused by
the wounds, and whether they were from stabbing or cutting—
the photographs are not in the record before us, and neither the
prosecutor nor the defense sought clarification on the specific
source of each item of information relayed by Young.
We need not determine whether Young relied on hearsay
when testifying about the dimensions, direction, and damage
caused by each wound, and whether they were stabs or cuts.
Assuming arguendo he did, and further assuming arguendo the
hearsay was testimonial, the admission of his testimony was
harmless, even under the constitutional “reasonable doubt”
standard for harmless error.
The jury heard evidence from six eyewitnesses who, despite
some differences in their recounting, all testified to an altercation
between defendant and Musick that left Musick lying on the
ground covered in blood. Several of the witnesses observed
defendant strike Musick with a knife or silver object. The
nursing students, who tried to help Musick, testified that he was
unresponsive and had blood pouring from his wounds. Young,

32
relying on autopsy photographs, offered admissible testimony
that Musick had suffered eight injuries consistent with a knife on
his face, chest, side, and back.
The combination of eyewitness testimony and Young’s
admissible testimony regarding the number and location of the
wounds contradicted defendant’s testimony that, to the extent he
stabbed Musick, it was unintentional. Beyond a reasonable
doubt, the jury would have convicted defendant on this evidence
alone.
To the extent Young’s other testimony relied on hearsay, it
was duplicative or of marginal importance given the properly
admitted evidence. The testimony regarding the size of the
wounds and the damage they caused spoke to the severity of the
injuries, but given the testimony of multiple eyewitnesses that
Musick was unresponsive with blood pouring out of him, the
severity of the wounds was not reasonably in question. Young
himself testified the direction of the wounds indicated nothing as
far as the position of the attacker or victim, so there were no
conclusions the jury could draw from that information. We see no
relevance to whether the injuries were caused by stabbing or
cutting. However Musick was injured admissible evidence
indicated the injuries were multiple and severe. Defendant
does not argue on appeal that admission of Musick’s height and
weight was prejudicial, nor can we discern how it would have
been prejudicial given inter alia defendant’s own trial testimony
indicating he was significantly taller than Musick.
Defendant argues the prosecutor in closing relied on
Young’s testimony regarding the depth and direction of the
wounds to dispute defendant’s testimony as to how he was
gripping the knife and how he was positioned when he

33
accidentally stabbed Musick. We conclude the prosecutor’s
reliance on this evidence during closing could not have affected
the verdict. The argument was a small portion of the prosecutor’s
closing, and defendant’s version of events was dramatically
undermined by the eyewitness testimony and photographic
evidence indicating defendant stabbed or cut Musick multiple
times all over his body.
Defendant argues Young’s testimony “was especially
important because the witnesses who saw parts of what took
place between [defendant] and Musick provided inconsistent
testimony about who did what.” We agree Young’s admissible
testimony regarding the number and location of the knife wounds
was helpful to the prosecution given the witnesses’ varying
accounts of whether and how defendant struck Musick and
whether he used a knife. As discussed, however, the arguably
inadmissible testimony regarding the depth and lethality of the
wounds was far less important, when all witnesses consistently
testified that after the attack Musick was lying on the ground
covered with blood.
Defendant notes that in addition to Young’s testimony, the
prosecutor introduced three pages of autopsy diagrams into
evidence. These diagrams are not in the record before us, and
defendant does not argue they provided information beyond that
to which Young testified—rather, he argues the diagrams
“bolstered” Young’s “detailed testimonial hearsay about the
nature of Musick’s wounds.” Admission of the diagrams therefore
was harmless for the same reasons Young’s testimony based on
those diagrams was harmless.

34
Because any admission of hearsay was harmless, defendant
has failed to demonstrate prejudice as required for an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim.

DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

BENDIX, Acting P. J.

We concur:

WEINGART, J.

M. KIM, J.

35

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