CourtListener 10601794•People v. Garcia CA2/1
Texte intégral
Filed 6/10/25 P. v. Garcia CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
THE PEOPLE, B338707
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA138635)
v.
JOHN RAYMOND GARCIA,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Alison S. Matsumoto, Judge. Appeal
dismissed.
Nancy Gaynor, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Jonathan J. Kline and Melanie Dorian, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
____________________________
Defendant John Raymond Garcia appeals from the trial
court’s decision not to act on his petition to recall his sentence
and resentence him under Penal Code section 1172.1.1 We
conclude the trial court’s decision does not constitute an
appealable order. We thus dismiss the appeal.
BACKGROUND
The facts underlying defendant’s conviction are not at issue
in this appeal, and we do not summarize them.
An information filed on December 10, 1996 charged
defendant with two counts of attempted murder of a peace officer,
two counts of assault with a firearm upon a peace officer, and one
count each of possession of a firearm by a felon and possession for
sale of cocaine base. The information alleged firearm
enhancements to the attempted murder and assault counts. The
information further alleged a prior conviction subjecting
defendant to sentencing under the “Three Strikes” law.
Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant pleaded no
contest to one count of assault with a firearm upon a peace
officer, and admitted he was armed with a firearm during
commission of the offense. Defendant also admitted to three
prior convictions for robbery, two of which had firearm
enhancements imposed. The trial court sentenced defendant to
29 years to life on the assault count and dismissed the other
counts in the information.
1 Unspecified statutory citations are to the Penal Code.
2
On September 15, 2022, defendant filed a motion for a
hearing under People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261.2 The
trial court granted the request and appointed counsel.
On August 16, 2023, defendant’s appointed counsel filed a
petition for resentencing under former section 1170.95, now
numbered section 1172.6. On February 8, 2024, defendant’s
appointed counsel filed a request for recall of sentence and
resentencing under section 1172.1. The section 1172.1 request
listed changes in the law since defendant’s sentencing and
documented defendant’s rehabilitative efforts while incarcerated.
On April 26, 2024, the trial court held a hearing and
“brief[ly]” conferred off the record with defendant’s appointed
counsel and two deputy district attorneys, one representing the
People regarding the section 1172.1 request and one representing
the People regarding the section 1172.6 petition. Going back on
the record, the court stated, “So the court indicated as to the
1172.1 motion filed by the defense, the court doesn’t even really
need to respond to that motion because those motions need to be
initiated either by the court of its own accord or by the People,
and since neither of those conditions precedent [is] met, that
motion is moot, for lack of a better description.” The court
continued, “I’m not going to rule on it because I guess it is
improperly requested. [¶] So the 1172.1 motion is simply off
calendar . . . .”
2 A Franklin hearing provides a defendant with an
opportunity to place evidence on the record that may be relevant
to a future youth offender parole hearing. (People v. Benzler
(2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 743, 749.)
3
The trial court denied the section 1172.6 petition, finding
defendant was not convicted of a qualifying offense. The court set
the Franklin hearing for June 18, 2024.
Defendant timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Although defendant sought resentencing under both
section 1172.1 and section 1172.6, on appeal he raises arguments
only as to his section 1172.1 petition. We therefore do not
address the denial of his section 1172.6 petition.
Under section 1172.1, the “[trial] court may, on its own
motion, within 120 days of the date of commitment or at any time
if the applicable sentencing laws at the time of original
sentencing are subsequently changed by new statutory authority
or case law . . . recall the sentence and commitment previously
ordered and resentence the defendant in the same manner as if
they had not previously been sentenced.” (§ 1172.1, subd. (a)(1).)
The court may also act upon the recommendation of certain
government officials. (Ibid.)
“A defendant,” however, “is not entitled to file a petition
seeking relief from the court” under section 1172.1, and “[i]f a
defendant requests consideration for relief under [section 1172.1],
the court is not required to respond.” (§ 1172.1, subd. (c).) Courts
have read this language to mean “a defendant who chooses to file
an unauthorized request for resentencing has no right to a
ruling.” (People v. Hodge (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 985, 996
(Hodge), italics omitted; accord, People v. Roy (2025)
110 Cal.App.5th 991, 994 (Roy) [agreeing with Hodge’s
reasoning].)
Because a defendant has no right to a ruling when the
defendant files an unauthorized petition under section 1172.1,
4
courts have further held a trial court’s decision not to act on the
defendant’s petition does not affect the defendant’s substantial
rights, and therefore is not appealable. (Hodge, supra,
107 Cal.App.5th at p. 996; Roy, supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at p. 994;
People v. Faustinos (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 687, 692 (Faustinos).)
Defendant concedes that had the trial court “chosen not to
respond” to his petition, defendant would have no right to appeal.
Defendant argues the trial court in this case did respond,
however, by holding a hearing, consulting with counsel, and
effectively denying the motion “because it believed there was no
condition precedent that allowed further consideration of it.”
Defendant argues this “is plainly not true,” because the trial
court had discretion to act upon defendant’s request on its own
motion, without any “condition precedent.” Defendant contends
he “was entitled to consideration by a court that was aware of its
discretion to either act upon his petition to conclusion, or decline
to act.” Defendant requests that we remand the matter for the
trial court to “exercise its informed discretion.”
We do not read the trial court’s comments as indicating a
misunderstanding of its discretion. The trial court correctly
stated that section 1172.1 proceedings may be initiated solely on
the court’s own motion or by request by government officials, not
by a defendant’s petition. The court further correctly stated
neither of those “conditions precedent” had occurred—the court
had not decided on its own motion to recall defendant’s sentence,
nor had the People so requested. The court then concluded, again
correctly, that it did not have to act on defendant’s petition,
which it took off calendar. This decision not to act on defendant’s
petition is not appealable. (Hodge, supra, 107 Cal.App.5th at
p. 996.)
5
Assuming arguendo, as defendant contends, the trial
court’s comments indicated a misunderstanding of the court’s
discretion to act on its own motion, we disagree that
misunderstanding rendered the court’s decision appealable.
Instructive is Faustinos.3 In that case, the trial court took no
action on a defendant’s section 1172.1 petition, stating it
“ ‘[did] not have jurisdiction to consider [the] motion.’ ”
(Faustinos, supra, 109 Cal.App.5th at p. 693.) On appeal, the
defendant argued, inter alia, “[T]he court erroneously believed
that it lacked the authority to act on its own motion, which
renders the order appealable.” (Id. at p. 697.)
The Court of Appeal disagreed the trial court’s statement
that it did not have jurisdiction “indicate[d] that it misunderstood
its own authority,” when the trial court simply could have meant,
correctly, that it lacked jurisdiction to act on a defendant’s
unauthorized motion, as opposed to the court’s own motion.
(Faustinos, supra, 109 Cal.App.5th at p. 698.) The appellate
court further concluded that, “even assuming the trial court
erroneously stated . . . that it lacks authority to act on its own
motion, we do not think that would convert a nonappealable
order to an appealable one.” (Ibid.) “ ‘[A]ppealability depends
upon the nature of the decision made, not the court’s justification
for its ruling.’ ” (Ibid., quoting People v. Gallardo (2000)
77 Cal.App.4th 971, 985.) “[W]e do not think that the [trial] court
can transform a nonappealable order (stating that it would not
act on an unauthorized motion) into an appealable one by
3 Although Faustinos was issued after defendant filed his
opening brief, the Attorney General discussed Faustinos in the
respondent’s brief, and defendant therefore had the opportunity
to address the decision in his reply. He chose not to file a reply.
6
addressing a matter that it needed not address (its jurisdiction to
act on its own), even if it was wrong about that matter.”
(Faustinos, at p. 698.)
We agree with Faustinos. Section 1172.1, subdivision (c)
expressly provides a defendant has no right to file a resentencing
petition under that statute, nor does the defendant have the right
to a ruling on that petition. (Hodge, supra, 107 Cal.App.5th at
p. 996.) Because the defendant has no right to a ruling, a court’s
decision not to rule on the petition does not deprive the defendant
of anything to which he otherwise might be entitled. The court’s
decision therefore does not affect the defendant’s substantial
rights, and is not appealable. (Ibid.; Faustinos, supra,
109 Cal.App.5th at p. 692.) This is so regardless of the basis for
the trial court’s decision not to act on the petition. (See
Faustinos, at p. 698.)
In arguing to the contrary, defendant cites an opinion that
has since been depublished following rehearing by the appellate
court that issued it, and is no longer citable authority. (See
People v. Chatman (Feb. 4, 2025, F087868), formerly reported at
108 Cal.App.5th 650, rehg. granted & vacated Mar. 3, 2025.)
Defendant also cites People v. Loper (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1155
and People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367 (Carmony) for the
proposition that a defendant has standing to appeal the denial of
sentencing relief even if the defendant himself cannot petition for
that relief. (See Loper, at p. 1158 [prisoner may appeal denial of
compassionate release request initiated by prison or parole
authorities]; Carmony, at p. 376 [“the defendant’s inability to
move to dismiss [a strike conviction] under section 1385 should
not . . . preclude him or her from raising the erroneous failure to
do so on appeal”].)
7
As Hodge explained, Loper is inapposite because it involved
a properly initiated request by prison officials, whereas a
defendant’s petition for relief under section 1172.1 is, by
definition, improper under subdivision (c) of that statute.
(Hodge, supra, 107 Cal.App.5th at p. 997.) Thus, whereas in
Loper the trial court was statutorily obligated to rule on the
prison officials’ request, no such obligation exists to respond to a
prisoner’s petition under section 1172.1. (Hodge, at p. 997;
§ 1172.1, subd. (c).)
Hodge further explained that Carmony is inapposite
because the statute at issue in that case, section 1385, places
“constraints on a trial court’s discretion.” (Hodge, supra,
107 Cal.App.5th at p. 997, citing Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at
p. 375.) Specifically, when a defendant invites a court to exercise
its discretion under section 1385, “ ‘ “the court must consider
evidence offered by the defendant in support of its assertion that
the dismissal would be in furtherance of justice.” ’ ” (Hodge, at
p. 997, quoting Carmony, at p. 375.) “Moreover, ‘ “[w]hen the
balance falls clearly in favor of the defendant, a trial court not
only may but should exercise the powers granted to [it] by the
Legislature and grant a dismissal in the interests of justice.” ’ ”
(Hodge, at p. 997, quoting Carmony, at p. 375.) Unlike
section 1385, however, “section 1172.1 places no constraints on
the trial court’s decision declining to initiate reconsideration of a
sentence on its own motion.” (Hodge, at p. 997.)
Faustinos further distinguished Carmony because the
latter concerned a direct appeal from a conviction, over which the
appellate court clearly had jurisdiction, and therefore Carmony
did not consider whether a trial court’s refusal to act on a
discretionary post-conviction petition was appealable. (Faustinos,
8
supra, 109 Cal.App.5th at p. 699.) We agree with Hodge and
Faustinos that Loper and Carmony do not control here.
Defendant cites numerous cases for the proposition that
“[t]he failure to exercise conferred discretion constitutes a denial
of a fair hearing and deprivation of fundamental procedural
rights and requires reversal.” This proposition presupposes
defendant had a right to a ruling on his unauthorized petition,
which, as we have explained, he did not.
Defendant argues the trial court did not “disregard the
request,” as it was entitled to do under section 1172.1,
subdivision (c), but rather “placed [the request] on calendar,
engaged and consulted an opposing attorney off the record, and
only after that consultation issued its order refusing to take any
further action . . . .”
To the extent defendant suggests the trial court’s course of
action converted its decision not to rule on his request into an
appealable order, we reject the suggestion. Again,
“ ‘appealability depends upon the nature of the decision made,
not the court’s justification for its ruling.’ [Citation.]” (Faustinos,
supra, 109 Cal.App.5th at p. 698.) What matters for our purposes
is the trial court declined to act on the petition, as it was entitled
to do under section 1172.1, subdivision (c). Whether it reached
that decision on its own or after consultation with counsel is
irrelevant, because it is the “ ‘nature of the decision made’ ” that
determines appealability. (Faustinos, at p. 698.) Nor would we
wish to discourage trial courts from consulting with counsel and
giving a defendant’s section 1172.1 petition due consideration for
fear that doing so would convert a nonappealable order into an
appealable one.
9
Although a trial court’s decision not to act on a defendant’s
section 1172.1 petition is not appealable, “a defendant has a
remedy if a trial court wrongly declares that it lacks jurisdiction
to act on its own motion under section 1172.1. That remedy is to
petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the trial court.” (Faustinos,
supra, 109 Cal.App.5th at pp. 698–699.) “In such a petition, the
defendant would set forth the circumstances that ‘would support
setting the matter for a new sentencing hearing,’ and if the trial
court concludes the petition may have merit, it can act on it.
[Citation.] In the unlikely event that the trial court wrongly
insists it has no authority to act even when told that changes in
law create discretionary section 1172.1 jurisdiction, the
defendant could petition for a writ of habeas corpus in our court.”
(Faustinos, at p. 699.) Should defendant file a writ petition in the
trial court, we express no opinion how the trial court should rule.
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
BENDIX, Acting P. J.
We concur:
WEINGART, J. M. KIM, J.
10
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