CourtListener 10601754•Northeast Securities Co. v. Que CA6
Texte intégral
Filed 6/10/25 Northeast Securities Co. v. Que CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been
certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
NORTHEAST SECURITIES CO., H051832
LTD., (Santa Clara County
Super. Ct. No. 22CV404456)
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
QUE WENBIN et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
Northeast Securities Co., Ltd. (Northeast) brought an action pursuant
to the Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act
(UFCMJRA) (Code Civ. Proc.,1 § 1713 et seq.). Northeast sought recognition
of a monetary judgment (civil verdict (2018) Ji Min Chu No. 18) entered by
the High People’s Court of Jilin Province in the People’s Republic of China
(the Jilin Court judgment) in favor of Northeast against Que Wenbin
(hereafter, Que) and He Xiaolan (hereafter, He). In connection with this
action, Northeast applied under the attachment law (§ 481.010 et seq.) for
right to attach orders recognizing its right to levy Que’s and He’s real and
1 All further unspecified statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.
personal property in California, including real property located in Palo Alto
and Atherton. The trial court issued orders granting Northeast’s
applications.
Que and He appeal the trial court’s orders on jurisdictional and service
grounds. In addition, they argue that the court erred in granting the
applications because Northeast failed to establish the probable validity of the
underlying claim and to meet its burden of demonstrating that the Jilin
Court judgment was final, conclusive, and enforceable.
For the reasons stated below, we affirm the challenged orders.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2
A. Facts
Northeast is a corporation organized under the laws of the People’s
Republic of China.3 Que and He are married, and Northeast understood
them to be citizens of the People’s Republic of China. However, He asserted
in a declaration that she is a Canadian citizen, resides in Hong Kong, and
has not been in the United States since 2019. Que asserted in his declaration
2 We take these facts from the parties’ filings submitted in the trial
court in connection with Northeast’s complaint and applications for right to
attach orders. We recite the essential relevant facts “in the light most
favorable to the prevailing party and indulge in all reasonable inferences in
support of the trial court’s order.” (Shoemaker v. County of Los Angeles
(1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 618, 625.)
3 Que and He request that this court take judicial notice of a “[c]ertified
translation of pertinent part of [Northeast’s] 2018 Annual Report” as
evidence that Northeast is “organized under laws of, and partially owned by
the [Peoples Republic of China].” Because Northeast attests to its
organization under the laws of the People’s Republic of China in its complaint
and because the purported partial ownership of Northeast by the People’s
Republic of China is not relevant to the issues on appeal, we deny Que’s and
He’s request for judicial notice. (People ex rel. Lockyer v. Shamrock Foods Co.
(2000) 24 Cal.4th 415, 422, fn. 2 (Lockyer).)
2
that he is a citizen and resident of Hong Kong and relinquished his assets,
including his real estate holdings, namely, the Byron Street, Channing
Avenue, and Atherton properties (defined post), in the United States in 2012
when he also relinquished his United States green card.4 Neither Que nor
He attached any proof of citizenship or residency to their respective
declarations nor does the record contain any other evidence of their asserted
citizenship or residency.
At the time Northeast filed its applications for right to attach orders,
the Xiaolan He Trust dated May 20, 2016 (Trust), a revocable inter vivos
trust for which Que and He are trustees, owned two properties in Palo Alto—
on Byron Street (the Byron Street property) and Channing Avenue (the
Channing Avenue property)—and one in Atherton on Atherton Avenue (the
Atherton property).5
4 It is not clear from the record if Que submitted to the United States
Consulate in Chengdu the statement on relinquishment of United States
property that he signed. An attorney at Sichuan Ming Ju law firm attested
to witnessing Que sign the statement for submission to the consulate but
does not attest to its submission. Nor does the record include any evidence of
submission to the consulate. In addition, the page of Que’s passport that
purports to contain evidence of his relinquishment of his green card is in
Chinese, and neither Que, He, nor their counsel has provided a translation of
the document.
5 In April 2023—four months after Northeast last attempted personal
service on Que and He at the Byron Street property, three months after Que
and He’s counsel, Van De Poel, contacted Northeast’s counsel to request
continuation of the hearing on Northeast’s application for right to attach
orders, and one month after Northeast asked the trial court to authorize
alternative service (discussed in greater detail post [pt. II.B.2.])—Que and the
Trust each filed papers conveying ownership of the Byron Street property.
On April 20, 2023, He recorded with the Santa Clara County Clerk-
Recorder’s office a trust transfer deed dated April 18, 2023, in which the
Trust transferred back to He the ownership of the property located at the
3
In 2016, Northeast and Que entered into two equity repurchase
agreements pursuant to which Que pledged equity in the form of shares of
Hengkang Medical Group Co., Ltd. (Hengkang Medical) to Northeast in
exchange for 500,000,000 Chinese Renminbi (RMB). Que is the controlling
shareholder and legal representative of Hengkang Medical. That year,
Northeast also executed a guaranty with He for the repayment of any
outstanding amounts owed by Que under the equity repurchase agreements.
Que and He paid Northeast interest on the loan through December 27,
2017. As Que and He acknowledge in their briefing, they did not repay the
principal of RMB 500,000,000, nor pay any interest after December 27, 2017.
In 2018, Northeast filed suit in the High People’s Court of Jilin
Province of the People’s Republic of China (High Jilin Court) to recover the
principal amount and unpaid interest owed under the equity repurchase
agreements and the guaranty. Despite being subpoenaed, Que and He did
not submit a written reply or any evidence, and “refused to appear in court,”
including for cross-examination, “without justifiable reasons.” On November
16, 2018, the High Jilin Court entered a judgment for RMB 500,000,000, plus
interest and fees, in Northeast’s favor against Que and He. The Jilin Court
judgment gave Que and He 15 days to file a petition of appeal, but they did
not do so.
Byron Street address. That same day, Shixi Lin recorded in the San Mateo
County Assessor-County Clerk-Recorder’s office a deed of trust with
assignment of rents dated April 18, 2023, in which He, as trustor, granted
Lin, as trustee, the Byron Street, Channing Avenue, and Atherton properties.
On April 25, 2023, He recorded with the Santa Clara County Clerk-
Recorder’s office a quitclaim deed dated April 24, 2023, in which Que
conveyed the Byron Street property to He.
4
On December 2, 2018, the Jilin Court judgment became final.
Northeast sought to enforce the judgment and, in 2021, the Intermediate
People’s Court of Changchun City of Jilin Province (Intermediate Jilin Court)
issued an enforcement verdict ((2021) Ji 01 Zhi Hui No. 80). As part of the
enforcement proceedings, the Intermediate Jilin Court attempted to auction
the Hengkang Medical shares held by Northeast pursuant to the equity
repurchase agreements but received no bids. The Intermediate Jilin Court
valued the Hengkang Medical shares “at the first failed auction price,”
transferred ownership of those shares to Northeast, and offset the amount
owed Northeast pursuant to the final judgment by the value of those shares.
After offsetting the Hengkang Medical shares from the award set forth in the
Jilin Court judgment, the total amount Que and He owed Northeast was
RMB 294,836,133.74.
Que and He have not paid Northeast the amount due under the Jilin
Court judgment.
B. Procedural Background
1. Complaint and Applications for Right to Attach Orders
On September 13, 2022, Northeast filed a complaint in the Santa Clara
County Superior Court seeking recognition of the Jilin Court judgment under
California’s UFCMJRA. Northeast attached to the complaint notarized
copies of the Jilin Court judgment, the enforcement verdict, and their
certified English translations.6
6 The notarial certificates attached to the English and Chinese
language versions of the Jilin Court judgment and the enforcement verdict
were signed by a notary in a notary public office in Jilin Province in the
People’s Republic of China.
5
On November 2, 2022, Northeast filed separate applications for a right
to attach order and an order for issuance of writ of attachment against He
and Que. Northeast sought to attach He’s and Que’s property, including the
Byron Street, Channing Avenue,7 and Atherton properties. In support of the
applications, Northeast submitted the declaration of its counsel, Rongping
Wu, which described the proceedings in the High Jilin Court, the Jilin Court
judgment, and the enforcement verdict; set forth Que’s and He’s ownership of
property in California; and stated that the sole purpose for the applications
was to preserve Northeast’s ability to obtain relief and to recover on its claim
against Que and He. Wu attached to his declaration copies of the Jilin Court
judgment and the enforcement verdict in Chinese and in English, with
accompanying translator’s affidavits.8
On November 29, 2023, Que and He filed their opposition to
Northeast’s applications for right to attach orders. Que and He argued that
Northeast did not properly serve the documents on them because it was
required to comply with the Hague Service Convention but did not do so.
They also asserted that the trial court did not have personal jurisdiction over
them. In addition, without explicitly citing the UFCMJRA, they asserted
that one of the mandatory grounds and five discretionary grounds for
nonrecognition of a foreign judgment applied. They focused their arguments
7 The application in the record appears to refer to the street as
“Charming Ave.” The memorandum in support of the application refers to
the street as “Channing Ave.” We presume that the spelling in the
application is a typographical error and that Northeast intended to refer to
“Channing Ave.” in Palo Alto.
8 The translator’s affidavits, signed by I No Wu on April 27, 2022, in
New York, were notarized by a notary public who made handwritten changes
to the city and day of their signature. The handwritten changes appear to be
the same on both notary’s statements.
6
on purported “defects in the service process” in the proceedings before the
High Jilin Court but pointed to no evidence in the record or legal authority to
support their assertions. Que also maintained that he relinquished his assets
in the United States as well as his United States green card in 2012, and that
the real property in Northeast’s applications “simply does not belong to” him.
2. Service Attempts
Northeast acknowledged that Que and He maintained a residence on
Renmin South Road in Sichuan Province in the People’s Republic of China
but asserted that Que and He also maintained a residence in Palo Alto. The
Jilin Court judgment (issued in November 2018) listed the Renmin South
Road address for Que and He. Before Northeast filed the complaint in
September 2022, Northeast determined that Que and He “were domiciled at a
residential address” in Palo Alto—the Byron Street property—by reviewing
publicly available land records. Deeds for the Byron Street property listed
He as the owner of the property, directly and “indirect[ly] through a trust.”
Northeast engaged first Janney & Janney Legal Support Service
(Janney) and, later, Nationwide Legal Services (Nationwide) to personally
serve Que and He with the summons and complaint at the Byron Street
property. Janney attempted service five times between October 17, 2022, and
November 1, 2022. Janney spoke with a house sitter at the Byron Street
property on October 17, 2022, and, on October 25, 2022, a neighbor across the
street, and both times confirmed that Que and He lived at the Byron Street
property but were “currently out of town.” Janney was unable to personally
serve Que and He with the summons and complaint.
After Northeast filed its applications for right to attach orders,
Nationwide attempted service of the summons, complaint, and the
applications at the Byron Street property on December 16, 17, and 21, 2022.
7
Nationwide observed that mail was being delivered to the Byron Street
address, the mailbox was full, and He’s and Que’s names were not on the
letters inside the mailbox.
On January 3, 2023, Que’s and He’s counsel, Hua Jiang at Van De Poel,
Levy, Thomas LLP (Van De Poel), e-mailed Northeast’s counsel, Brett
Ramsaur at Ramsaur Law (Ramsaur), requesting continuation of the
attachment hearing then scheduled for February 2023. On January 6, 2023,
Ramsaur inquired by e-mail whether Van De Poel would accept service of
process on behalf of Que and He. Van De Poel did not reply.
On January 9, 2023, the parties spoke by telephone and Ramsaur e-
mailed Van De Poel a copy of the complaint. Van De Poel did not reply.
On January 11, 2023, Ramsaur sent a follow-up e-mail to Van De Poel
asking if it would accept service on behalf of Que and He. Van De Poel did
not reply until January 17, 2023, when it informed Ramsaur that it did not
have permission to accept service on behalf of Que and He.
On January 13 and 15, 2023, Nationwide again attempted personal
service on Que and He at the Byron Street property but was unsuccessful.
Nationwide noted that, during the attempted service on January 13, 2023,
there was a vehicle in the driveway. No vehicles were present on the
driveway during the attempt on January 15, 2023.
On March 10, 2023, Northeast sought authorization from the trial court
to effectuate alternative service upon Que and He under section 413.30.9
9 On May 18, 2023, the trial court conducted a hearing on Northeast’s
applications for attachment orders, noted Que and He had not been served
yet with the complaint and summons and Northeast had requested service by
publication, and requested briefing on the court’s authority to allow service
by publication. The hearing was not reported. The record does not contain
8
Northeast detailed its attempts to personally serve Que and He as well as its
communications with Van De Poel. Northeast stated that it was “not
confident that [Que and He] can be physically located for purposes of
effectuating personal service.”
On August 17, 2023, the trial court granted Northeast’s motion and
authorized it to serve Que and He with the summons and complaint either
through certified mail at the Byron Street property or through mail to Van
De Poel as their known counsel in California. On August 25, 2023,
Northeast’s counsel in New York served Que and He by mail with the
summons, complaint, and applications for right to attach both at the Byron
Street property and through Van De Poel at their address in California, in
accordance with the trial court’s order. In addition, Northeast concurrently
served the documents via e-mail to Que and He through Van De Poel.10
any briefing submitted by the parties in response to the court’s request
during the May 18, 2023 hearing. Northeast does not contend that it served
the complaint, summons, and attachment by publication, and the record does
not contain any evidence of service by publication.
10 On September 29, 2023, Que and He moved to quash service of the
summons, complaint, and applications and to dismiss. They argued that
Northeast did not properly serve the documents on them because it was
required to comply with the Hague Service Convention but did not do so. In
addition, they asserted that the court did not have personal jurisdiction over
them. Northeast opposed Que’s and He’s motion. The register of actions in
the record indicates that the trial court conducted a hearing on the motion to
quash on January 25, 2024, but the record does not include a minute order or
order on Que’s and He’s motion to quash.
Que and He request that this court take judicial notice of a tentative
ruling, minute order, order taking the motion to quash off calendar, and
notice of transfer of the motion to quash as evidence of the lack of a
substantive ruling on their motion to quash. Because we decide that Que’s
and He’s motion to quash is not relevant to the issues on appeal, we deny
their request for judicial notice. (Lockyer, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 422, fn. 2.)
9
3. Hearing on the Applications for Right to Attach Orders; Orders;
Appeal
On December 6, 2023, the trial court conducted a hearing on
Northeast’s applications for right to attach orders and orders for issuance of
writ of attachment after hearing.11 On December 12, 2023, the court filed
orders granting Northeast’s applications for right to attach orders and orders
for issuance of writ of attachment after hearing against Que and He. The
Similarly, Northeast filed a request for judicial notice of Que’s and He’s
memorandum of points and authorities in support of their motion to quash in
a related case (case No. 23CV420300) before a different bench officer and that
court’s August 5, 2024 order on the motion as evidence that Que’s and He’s
arguments regarding service and jurisdiction in this case are “meritless.”
Because, as Northeast acknowledges, neither document was presented to the
trial court in this case, they are not appropriate for consideration on appeal.
(Glassman v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 1281, 1306–
1307 (Glassman); Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14
Cal.4th 434, 444, fn. 3 (Vons).) Moreover, Northeast does not assert in their
request that the order in case No. 23CV420300 is based on the same record
and facts presented to the trial court in the instant matter. We deny
Northeast’s request.
Que and He also request that we take judicial notice of—or, in the
alternative, augment the record with—a declaration Northeast’s counsel,
Rongping Wu, filed in support of an “ex parte application” for attachment.
Que and He assert that the subject declaration is substantively the same as
another declaration filed by Wu in support of Northeast’s applications, except
that it does not include paragraphs addressing He’s ownership of property.
Northeast opposes Que’s and He’s request on the grounds that it was
untimely and filed after Northeast had already filed its respondent’s brief but
does not assert any prejudice. We grant Que’s and He’s request to augment
the record with Wu’s declaration.
11 Although the orders and the register of actions indicate that the trial
court held a hearing on Northeast’s applications for right to attach, and the
register of actions indicates that the court issued a minute order, the record
before us does not contain a copy of any minute order for the hearing or a
reporter’s transcript of the hearing. It is not clear from the record if the
December 6, 2023 hearing was reported.
10
court made the following findings, among others: (1) “[t]he claim upon which
the application is based is one upon which an attachment may be issued”;
(2) Northeast “established the probable validity of [such] claim”; and (3) Que
and He failed to prove that the property described in Northeast’s application
is exempt from attachment. The court concluded that Northeast has the
right to attach He’s and Que’s property in the amount of $43,834,659.07. The
court ordered the clerk to issue a writ of attachment for He’s property,
including the Byron Street, Channing Avenue, and Atherton properties, and
Que’s property.
On January 31, 2024, Que and He filed a notice of appeal appealing the
right to attach orders pursuant to section 904.1, subdivision (a)(5).
II. DISCUSSION
Que and He argue that the trial court erred in granting the right to
attach orders because Northeast failed to carry its burden of demonstrating
(1) the probable validity of the judgment, and (2) that the judgment is final,
conclusive, and enforceable. They base this argument on their contentions
that (1) the translation certifications do not comply with California law
because they were neither properly sworn and “ ‘certified under oath’ ” nor
“certified or declared under penalty of perjury to be true translations”; and
(2) one of the discretionary nonrecognition grounds applies because Northeast
failed to properly serve Que and He with documents in the underlying action
in the High Jilin Court and, thus, did not provide them with “sufficient
time . . . to defend” against the action (§ 1716, subd. (c)(1)(A)).
In the alternative, Que and He assert that the trial court erred in
granting Northeast’s applications because Northeast did not properly serve
the summons, complaint, and applications on them. They argue that the
Hague Service Convention applies, and Northeast did not serve the
11
documents in compliance with the Convention. Que and He also maintain
that the court had no jurisdiction over them because they are not domiciled in
California, and Northeast’s claim does not arise out of or have substantial
contact with California.
Northeast asserts that Que and He forfeited their objections to the
translations of the documents by failing to raise the challenge in the trial
court and, alternatively, that any error in admitting the documents was
harmless as Que and He do not identify any errors in the translation. In
addition, Northeast argues that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
authorizing alternate service on Que and He because the Hague Service
Convention did not apply since Que and He have an address in California.
Northeast contends that the court had quasi in rem jurisdiction arising out of
its applications for right to attach orders and Que’s and He’s ownership of
property in California. Northeast maintains that substantial evidence in the
records supports the court’s finding that Northeast established the probable
validity of its claim for foreign judgment recognition.
A. Standards of Appellate Review
Well-established principles of appellate review guide our analysis. “[I]t
is a fundamental principle of appellate procedure that a trial court judgment
is ordinarily presumed to be correct and the burden is on an appellant to
demonstrate, on the basis of the record presented to the appellate court, that
the trial court committed an error that justifies reversal of the judgment.”
(Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608–609, citing Denham v. Superior
Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) As the appellants, Que and He bear the
burden of showing that the trial court committed an error that justifies
reversal of the orders. (Jameson, at p. 609.)
12
“To demonstrate error, appellant must present meaningful legal
analysis supported by citations to authority and citations to facts in the
record that support the claim of error.” (In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th
396, 408 (S.C.).) When an appellant asserts a point on appeal “ ‘but fails to
support it with reasoned argument and citations to authority’ ” (Nelson v.
Avondale Homeowners Assn. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 857, 862) or fails to
support it with appropriate record citations (In re Marriage of Fink (1979) 25
Cal.3d 877, 887 (Fink); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C) [requiring
parties to “[s]upport any reference to a matter in the record by a citation to
the volume and page number of the record where the matter appears”]), this
court may treat the point as forfeited. We are not required to search the
record for error ourselves (Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246),
and “[w]e are not bound to develop appellants’ arguments for them.” (In re
Marriage of Falcone & Fyke (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 814, 830.) In short,
“conclusory claims of error will fail.” (S.C., at p. 408.)
B. Jurisdiction
“[T]he jurisdiction of the court in a proceeding in attachment is wholly
independent of the jurisdiction acquired by the service or publication of the
summons.” (Root v. Superior Court (1962) 209 Cal.App.2d 242, 247 (Root).)
The attachment law states that “an attachment may be issued in any
action for the recovery of money brought against” (§ 492.010) “[a] natural
person who does not reside in this state.” (Id., subd. (a).) “Nonresident
attachment is designed to operate where personal jurisdiction of a defendant
cannot be obtained but quasi in rem jurisdiction can be obtained by seizure of
the nonresident’s property in the state.” (Nakasone v. Randall (1982) 129
Cal.App.3d 757, 760–761 (Nakasone); see also Root, supra, 209 Cal.App.2d at
p. 247.) As the United States Supreme Court noted, “when claims to the
13
property itself are the source of the underlying controversy between the
plaintiff and the defendant, it would be unusual for the State where the
property is located not to have jurisdiction. In such cases, the defendant’s
claim to property located in the State would normally indicate that he
expected to benefit from the State’s protection of his interest. The State’s
strong interests in assuring the marketability of property within its borders
and in providing a procedure for peaceful resolution of disputes about the
possession of that property would also support jurisdiction, as would the
likelihood that important records and witnesses will be found in the State.”
(Shaffer v. Heitner (1977) 433 U.S. 186, 207–208, fns. omitted.)
“[U]se of the nonresident statute[, section 492.010,] is limited to its
purpose, i.e., to obtain quasi in rem jurisdiction.” (Nakasone, supra, 129
Cal.App.3d at p. 761.) “If the defendant has filed a general appearance in the
action, the right to attach order shall be set aside unless the plaintiff shows
that his right to attach is authorized by a provision other than [s]ection
492.010.” (§ 492.050, subd. (c).)
Que and He assert that they are not residents of California. The
evidence in the record before us indicates that they own property in the
state,12 and He admits in appellate briefing to having an ownership interest
in at least the Byron Street property. As such, the trial court had quasi in
12 Que and He argue that the Byron Street, Channing Avenue, and
Atherton properties are not Que’s property, but He’s alone because they are
not subject to California’s community property laws, having married in China
and having not domiciled in California. Que and He do not cite to any
evidence in the record or to any legal authority to support their assertions.
We thus treat this argument as forfeited. (S.C., supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at
p. 408.)
14
rem jurisdiction over Que and He. (§ 492.010, subd. (a); Nakasone, supra,
129 Cal.App.3d at pp. 760–761.)
As Que and He themselves state in their motion to quash service of the
summons, complaint, and applications and their opposition to Northeast’s
applications for right to attach orders, they “specially appear[ed] to contest
service and jurisdiction” and did not make a general appearance. (See In re
Marriage of Obrecht (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 1, 8 [“A California defendant can
preserve objections to personal jurisdiction only by making a special
appearance, i.e., an appearance for the sole purpose of objecting to the court’s
jurisdiction. [Citation.] A special appearance does not confer jurisdiction on
the court for any purpose other than determining the question of jurisdiction
over the person.”]; see also Sunrise Financial, LLC v. Superior Court (2019)
32 Cal.App.5th 114, 125 [“ ‘[I]f an appearance is for any purpose other than to
question the jurisdiction of the court[,] it is general.’ ”].) Since Que and He
did not make a general appearance in the trial court, the court retained quasi
in rem jurisdiction over each of them pursuant to section 492.010.
C. Service
1. Legal Principles
The Hague Service Convention applies “ ‘where there is occasion to
transmit a judicial or extrajudicial document for service abroad.’ ” (Yamaha
Motor Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 264, 270, fn. 4,
citing Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial
Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, Nov. 15, 1965, art. 1, 20 U.S.T.
361, T.I.A.S. No. 6638 (eff. Feb. 10, 1969).) However, it “shall not apply
where the address of the person to be served with the document is not
known.” (Yamaha Motor Co., at p. 270, fn. 4; see also In re R.L. (2016) 4
Cal.App.5th 125, 147 (R.L.).)
15
Our courts have added a reasonable diligence requirement, holding
that “[t]he Hague Service Convention does not apply where the address of the
person to be served is not known and the plaintiff has exercised reasonable
diligence to ascertain that person’s whereabouts.” (R.L., supra, 4 Cal.App.5th
at pp. 147–148; Buchanan v. Soto (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 1353, 1366; People
v. Mendocino County Assessor’s Parcel No. 056-500-09 (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th
120, 125.) “ ‘A number of honest attempts to learn defendant’s whereabouts
or his address by inquiry of relatives, friends, and acquaintances, or of his
employer, and by investigation of appropriate city and telephone directories,
the voters’ register, and the real and personal property index in the assessor’s
office, near the defendant’s last known location, are generally sufficient.
These are likely sources of information, and consequently must be searched
before resorting to service by publication.’ ” (Kott v. Superior Court (1996) 45
Cal.App.4th 1126, 1137.) “However, the showing of diligence in a given case
must rest on its own facts and ‘[n]o single formula nor mode of search can be
said to constitute due diligence in every case.’ ” (Id. at pp. 1137–1138; Lebel
v. Mai (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1154, 1162 [noting there is “[n]o bright-line
rule or singular test [for] . . . identifying or quantifying what good faith
efforts would amount to a proper showing of reasonable diligence”].) The
“determination of reasonable diligence is ‘a factual inquiry appropriately left
to resolution in the trial court.’ ” (R.L., supra, 4 Cal.App.5th at p. 147.)
2. Analysis
We may infer from the trial court’s order granting Northeast the right
to serve the summons, complaint, and applications on Que and He by
alternative service that it found Northeast had been reasonably diligent in its
efforts to locate Que and He for purposes of service. Because the
determination of Northeast’s (1) knowledge of Que’s and He’s address and (2)
16
reasonable diligence in ascertaining their address, are both factual questions,
we review the record for substantial evidence to support the court’s implied
finding that Northeast’s service of the applications for attachment was
proper.
The Jilin Court judgment issued in 2018, indicated that Que and He
were domiciled at an address on Renmin South Road in Sichuan Province.
However, the judgment also noted that Que and He failed to appear in court
or submit a written reply to Northeast’s complaint, failed to submit evidence
or appear in court for cross-examination, and failed to appear at the public
hearing in response to a subpoena.
Four years later, in 2022, when Northeast was prepared to file the
complaint seeking recognition of the Jilin Court judgment, Northeast’s
counsel, Wu, reviewed publicly available land records13 and determined that
He owned the Byron Street, Channing Avenue, and Atherton properties.
Northeast’s first process server, Janney, attempted personal service of the
summons and complaint at the Byron Street property starting on October 17,
2022. During this first attempt, the process server spoke with a house sitter
at the Byron Street property, who confirmed that Que and He lived there but
were “currently out of town.” During another attempt in October, a neighbor
confirmed that Que and He lived at the Byron Street property. Janney
attempted service at the Byron Street property four more times without
success.
13 It is not clear from the record whether Northeast’s search of publicly
available land records included Hong Kong, where Que and He allege they
reside. Que and He do not challenge on appeal the scope of Northeast’s land
records search. The record does not contain any evidence that a search of
publicly available land records would have included among its results Que’s
and He’s purported Hong Kong residence.
17
After Northeast filed its applications, its second process server,
Nationwide, attempted service of the summons, complaint, and applications
on Que and He at the Byron Street property five times, but observed that the
mailbox at the property was full, and He’s and Que’s names were not on the
letters inside.
When Van De Poel identified itself as counsel for Que and He,
Northeast’s counsel, Ramsaur, asked Van De Poel twice whether it would be
willing to accept service on its clients’ behalf before Van De Poel informed
Ramsaur that it did not have permission from Que and He to accept service
on their behalf.
After these efforts failed, Northeast sought authorization from the trial
court for alternative service on Que and He, stating that it was “not
confident” that it could “physically locate[]” them “for purposes of effectuating
personal service.”
Although Que and He assert that they both reside in Hong Kong and
Northeast is aware of the location of their residence there, they do not cite to
any evidence in the record to support either assertion.
Northeast’s counsel investigated publicly available land records,
Northeast’s process servers spoke with a house sitter and a neighbor but
were unsuccessful in their multiple service attempts, and Northeast sought—
also unsuccessfully—to effect service through Que’s and He’s counsel. It was
only after these efforts over the course of several months that Northeast
sought authorization for alternative service, acknowledging that it did not
know where it could physically locate Que and He for purposes of service.
We decide substantial evidence supports the trial court’s implied
finding that Northeast could not ascertain Que’s and He’s address for service
of process despite reasonable diligence. We will not disturb the court’s
18
finding, which in turn leads to the conclusion that the Hague Service
Convention (which governs service abroad) did not apply. (See R.L., supra, 4
Cal.App.5th at pp. 147–148 [“The Hague Service Convention does not apply
where the address of the person to be served is not known and the plaintiff
has exercised reasonable diligence to ascertain that person’s whereabouts.”].)
Appellants have not demonstrated error in the trial court’s conclusion that
Que and He were properly served with the summons, complaint, and
applications for right to attach orders.
D. Attachment
1. Applicable Law
a. The Attachment Law
“ ‘ “ ‘Attachment is an ancillary or provisional remedy to aid in the
collection of a money demand by seizure of property in advance of trial and
judgment.’ ” ’ ” (Rreef America Reit II Corp, YYYY v. Samsara Inc. (2023) 91
Cal.App.5th 609, 616–617 (Rreef); Royals v. Lu (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 328,
345 (Royals).) Under the attachment law, a plaintiff may, “[u]pon the filing
of the complaint or at any time thereafter . . . apply . . . for a right to attach
order and a writ of attachment by filing an application for the order and writ
with the court in which the action is brought.” (§ 484.010.) An application
for a right to attach order must “be supported by an affidavit showing that
the plaintiff on the facts presented would be entitled to a judgment on the
claim upon which the attachment is based.” (§ 484.030.) Such affidavit must
state facts with particularity. (§ 482.040.)
Section 483.010, subdivision (a) states that, “[e]xcept as otherwise
provided by statute, an attachment may be issued only in an action on a
claim or claims for money, each of which is based upon a contract, express or
implied, where the total amount of the claim or claims is a fixed or readily
19
ascertainable amount not less than five hundred dollars ($500) exclusive of
costs, interest, and attorney’s fees.” (See also Goldstein v. Barak
Construction (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 845, 853 (Goldstein).) “If the action is
against a defendant who is a natural person, an attachment may be issued
only on a claim which arises out of the conduct by the defendant of a trade,
business, or profession.” (§ 483.010, subd. (c).)
Section 484.090, subdivision (a) provides that the trial court “shall
issue a right to attach order . . . if it finds all of the following: [¶] (1) The
claim upon which the attachment is based is one upon which an attachment
may be issued. [¶] (2) The plaintiff has established the probable validity of
the claim upon which the attachment is based. [¶] (3) The attachment is not
sought for a purpose other than the recovery on the claim upon which the
attachment is based. [¶] (4) The amount to be secured by the attachment is
greater than zero.” (See also Loeb & Loeb v. Beverly Glen Music, Inc. (1985)
166 Cal.App.3d 1110, 1118 (Loeb).) In addition, if “the court finds that the
defendant has failed to prove that all the property sought to be attached is
exempt from attachment, it shall order a writ of attachment to be issued
upon the filing of an undertaking.” (§ 484.090, subd. (b).)
“A claim has ‘probable validity’ where it is more likely than not that the
plaintiff will obtain a judgment against the defendant on that claim.”
(§ 481.190; Royals, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 345; Loeb, supra, 166
Cal.App.3d at p. 1118.) “The plaintiff has the burden of establishing the
probable validity of the claim upon which the attachment is based.” (Rreef,
supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at p. 617; Bank of America v. Salinas Nissan, Inc.
(1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 260, 271 (Salinas Nissan).) If the defendant contests
the application, “the court must consider the relative merits of the positions
of the respective parties and make a determination of the probable outcome
20
of the litigation.” (Loeb, at p. 1120.) The trial court’s findings “shall be made
upon the basis of the pleadings and other papers in the record.” (§ 484.090,
subd. (d); Salinas Nissan, at p. 273.)
b. Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act
Northeast brought its applications for right to attach orders in reliance
on its claim under the UFCMJRA. The act “applies to a foreign-country
judgment to the extent that the judgment both: [¶] (1) Grants or denies
recovery of a sum of money. [¶] (2) Under the law of the foreign country
where rendered, is final, conclusive, and enforceable.”14 (§ 1715, subd. (a).)
The party seeking recognition of a foreign judgment bears the burden of
proving that the judgment satisfies the requirements for recognition.
(§ 1715, subd. (c).) If the party seeking such recognition meets its burden, the
burden shifts to the party opposing recognition to establish that one of the
mandatory grounds for nonrecognition enumerated in section 1716,
subdivision (b), or one of the discretionary grounds for nonrecognition in
section 1716, subdivision (c), applies. (§ 1716, subd. (e); see also Naoko Ohno
v. Yuko Yasuma (9th Cir. 2013) 723 F.3d 984, 991 [“Once coverage under the
[] Act is established, the presumption in favor of enforcement applies, and the
14 “The official comment [for this provision] states: ‘In order to come
within the scope of this Act, a foreign-country judgment must be final,
conclusive, and enforceable under the law of the foreign country in which it
was rendered. This requirement contains three distinct, although inter-
related concepts. A judgment is final when it is not subject to additional
proceedings in the rendering court other than execution. A judgment is
conclusive when it is given effect between the parties as a determination of
their legal rights and obligations. A judgment is enforceable when the legal
procedures of the state to ensure that the judgment debtor complies with the
judgment are available to the judgment creditor to assist in collection of the
judgment.’ ” (Manco Contracting Co. (W.L.L.) v. Bezdikian (2008) 45 Cal.4th
192, 214, italics omitted (conc. & dis. opn. of Kennard, J.).)
21
party resisting recognition of a foreign-country judgment ‘has the burden of
establishing that a ground for nonrecognition . . . exists.’ ”].)
“Notwithstanding an applicable ground for nonrecognition under paragraph
[(c)](1), the court may nonetheless recognize a foreign-country judgment if the
party seeking recognition of the judgment demonstrates good reason to
recognize the judgment that outweighs the ground for nonrecognition.”
(§ 1716, subd. (c)(2).)
2. Standard of Review
“A trial court’s factual findings in an attachment proceeding, including
its probable validity finding, are subject to our substantial evidence standard
of review. [Citations.] ‘We review the evidence on appeal in favor of the
prevailing party, resolving conflicts and drawing reasonable inferences in
support of the judgment.’ [Citations.] ‘[W]e cannot substitute our inferences
for those of the trial court reasonably grounded on substantial evidence.’ ”
(Pech v. Morgan (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 841, 855; Salinas Nissan, supra, 207
Cal.App.3d at p. 273; Chino Commercial Bank, N.A. v. Peters (2010) 190
Cal.App.4th 1163, 1169–1170 (Peters).)
“We will not disturb a determination upon controverted facts unless no
substantial evidence supports the court’s determination.” (Goldstein, supra,
164 Cal.App.4th at p. 853; see also Park v. NMSI, Inc. (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th
346, 354 (Park); Peters, supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at p. 1169 [“ ‘If the trial court
resolved disputed factual issues, the reviewing court should not substitute its
judgment for the trial court’s express or implied findings supported by
substantial evidence.’ ”].) “ ‘However, where there are no contested issues of
fact, the issue becomes one of law subject to de novo review.’ ” (Park, at
p. 354; Series AGI West Linn of Appian Group Investors DE, LLC v. Eves
(2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 156, 163.)
22
3. Analysis
He and Que challenge on two grounds the trial court’s finding that
Northeast established the probable validity of its claim for recognition of the
Jilin Court judgment: (1) the translation certifications were neither properly
sworn and certified nor declared to be “true translations”; and (2) improper
service in the High Jilin Court action left Que and He without “sufficient
time . . . to defend” against the action (§ 1716, subd. (c)(1)(A)).
Que and He forfeited their argument based on the translation
certificates by failing to raise it in the trial court. (See Park, supra, 96
Cal.App.5th at pp. 358–359 [concluding that an argument in an attachment
proceeding could not be considered on appeal where it was not raised in the
trial court]; see also Swain v. LaserAway Medical Group, Inc. (2020) 57
Cal.App.5th 59, 68; Araiza v. Younkin (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1120, 1127.)
We therefore do not consider it further.
As to their second argument, Que and He request that this court take
judicial notice of an English version of civil procedure code sections from the
People’s Republic of China and the certified translation of “relevant records”
from the High Jilin Court in connection with the Jilin Court judgment,
because they support Que’s and He’s argument that they were not properly
served in the underlying High Jilin Court action. There is no indication in
the record that these documents were before the trial court when it issued the
right to attach orders. Because the civil procedure code sections and High
Jilin Court records included in Que’s and He’s request for judicial notice were
not presented to the trial court, they generally may not be considered on
appeal. (Glassman, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1306–1307; Vons, supra, 14
Cal.4th at p. 444, fn. 3.) Que and He have not presented any exceptional
23
circumstances here that would justify deviation from that general principle.
(Vons, at p. 444, fn. 3.)
We acknowledge that foreign law is “arguably . . . subject to permissive
judicial notice under Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (f).”
(Mireskandari v. Gallagher (2020) 59 Cal.App.5th 346, 359.) However,
foreign law is “of no assistance to us without ‘the advice of persons learned in
the subject matter’ ” and Que and He have not presented any expert opinion
on the proffered procedural law of the People’s Republic of China. (Ibid.,
citing Evid. Code, § 454, subd. (a)(1); see also Evid. Code, § 454, subd. (b)
[“Where the subject of judicial notice is the law of . . . a foreign nation . . . and
the court resorts to the advice of persons learned in the subject matter, such
advice, if not received in open court, shall be in writing.”]; compare In re
Eng’s Estate (1964) 228 Cal.App.2d 160, 167–168 [declining to take judicial
notice of foreign law where the proffered law had not been authenticated]
with In re Marriage of V.S. & V.K. (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 219, 223 [taking
judicial notice of Indian law where the parties presented expert testimony
“from attorneys licensed in India who had experience litigating” issues
arising under the proffered law].)
For the foregoing reasons, we deny Que’s and He’s request for judicial
notice of these documents. Because Que and He rely exclusively on these
documents as evidence supporting their assertion that documents in the High
Jilin Court action were not properly served on them and fail to support their
argument with citations to admitted evidence in the record, we decide that
their argument is forfeited. (S.C., supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 408; Fink,
supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 887.)
Moreover, substantial evidence in the record supports the trial court’s
finding that Northeast established the probable validity of its claim upon
24
which the attachment is based, namely, the request for recognition of the
Jilin Court judgment. The Jilin Court judgment granted Northeast a
recovery of a sum of money owed it by Que and He, was rendered final when
Que and He did not appeal it within 15 days, took legal effect and thus was
rendered conclusive, and was enforceable in accordance with the enforcement
verdict entered by the Intermediate Jilin Court. Que and He do not dispute
the contents of the Jilin Court judgment or the enforcement order. Indeed,
they acknowledge in their appellate briefing that the Jilin Court issued a
final judgment on November 16, 2018, for money damages in the amount of
RMB 506,765,350, and the Intermediate People’s Court issued an
enforcement verdict on August 23, 2021.
Substantial evidence thus supports the trial court’s finding of probable
validity because the Jilin Court judgment granted recovery of a sum of money
and was final, conclusive, and enforceable. (§ 1715, subd. (a).) We conclude
that the trial court did not err in granting Northeast’s applications for right
to attach orders.
III. DISPOSITION
The December 12, 2023 right to attach orders are affirmed.
Respondent is awarded costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1),
(2).)
25
______________________________________
Danner, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
____________________________________
Lie, J.
____________________________________
Wilson, J.
H051832
Northeast Securities Co Ltd v. Que et al.
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