CourtListener 10601234•People v. Watkins CA5
Texte intégral
Filed 6/9/25 P. v. Watkins CA5
Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE,
F080436
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. F14909870)
v.
CHRISTOPHER WATKINS, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
THE COURT*
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Fresno County. Jonathan M.
Skiles, Judge.
Spolin Law, Aaron Spolin; James S. Thomson, Ethan H. Stone, Laura A. Douglas;
Law Office of Jennifer M. Sheetz, Jennifer M. Sheetz; Patricia L. Brisbois, under
appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General,
Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Eric L. Christoffersen, Kimberley A.
Donohue, Dina Petrushenko, Stephanie A. Mitchell, and Brook A. Bennigson, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
* Before Levy, Acting P. J., Smith, J. and Snauffer, J.
INTRODUCTION
This matter is before us on transfer from the Supreme Court for reconsideration in
light of People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730 (Lynch) and People v. Salazar (2023) 15
Cal.5th 416 (Salazar). (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.528(d).) Lynch and Salazar
settled a division among courts of appeal on the appropriate standard for assessing
prejudice in the context of noncompliance with the requirements of Penal Code1 section
1170, subdivision (b), as modified by Senate Bill No. 567 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate
Bill No. 567) (Stats. 2021, ch. 731, § 1.3) and clarified the circumstances under which
remand and resentencing are required. In accordance with the Supreme Court’s order, we
have vacated our earlier decision, and the parties have submitted supplemental briefing.
A jury convicted Christopher Watkins of rape by force (§ 261, subd. (a)(2);
count 1), criminal threats (§ 422; count 2), and dissuading a witness by force or threats
(§ 136.1, subd. (c)(1); count 3). The trial court sentenced Watkins to 11 years in state
prison.
On appeal, Watkins challenges the denial of his pretrial motion to sever, the
sufficiency of the evidence to support his rape conviction, the admissibility of an audio
recording in which he is identified by the victim, and the trial court’s ruling allowing the
victim’s husband to both serve as her support person and testify as a witness. We
conclude no error occurred, or that any error was harmless.
Watkins also claims the matter should be remanded for resentencing in light of
Senate Bill No. 567, which was enacted while the instant appeal was pending. In our
prior opinion, we concluded the trial court’s noncompliance with Senate Bill No. 567 was
harmless error. Following consideration of Lynch, Salazar, and the parties’ supplemental
briefs, we have concluded Watkins nonetheless is entitled to a remand and resentencing,
because the record does not “clearly indicate” the trial court would have imposed the
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
2.
same sentence had it been aware of Senate Bill No. 567’s presumption against the upper
term. (Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 743.) Accordingly, we vacate Watkins’s sentence
and remand the matter for resentencing. In all other respects, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
Watkins’s charges were based on the allegations of two victims in unrelated
incidents. One of the victims, the daughter of Watkins’s former girlfriend, was a minor at
the time of the alleged crime. As we explain below, after the minor testified, the trial
court granted the People’s motion to dismiss the associated charge for insufficient
evidence.
Watkins’s other victim was Jane Doe, an employee at Watkins’s appliance store.
She began working for Watkins in Spring 2014. Watkins’s wife was the only other
employee at the store.
On October 8, 2014, Doe was at work in the store when Watkins asked her to go
with him to the storage room to help him find something. Doe responded that she needed
to head home soon, but Watkins assured her it would be quick. She agreed and followed
him to the storage room, and Watkins closed the door behind them.
Once inside, Watkins told Doe she did not need to come into work next week,
explaining that his wife was in Las Vegas, and he was going to meet her there. He then
asked for a hug. Doe did not find this unusual, as she often gave Watkins and his wife a
hug when she left work for the day. However, this time when she hugged Watkins, he put
both hands around her waist and asked her to kiss him. He had never done that before.
Doe began to cry. She refused to kiss Watkins, pushed him away, and moved toward the
storage room door. Before she reached the door, Watkins grabbed her from behind, put
his hands over her mouth such that she could not scream and said “ ‘It’s okay. It’s
okay.’ ” He then put his forearm against her throat and used his other hand to reach into
her pants. Doe told Watkins, “ ‘No, please don’t’ ” and struggled to get away, but she
was unable to resist Watkins, who was six feet, two inches tall, and weighed 340 pounds.
3.
At some point during the struggle, Doe fell to the floor and ended up on her back.
Watkins got on top of her and pulled off her pants and underwear. She screamed, but
Watkins put his hand over her mouth and told her to “shut up.” She tried to get up, but
Watkins pushed her back down. She told Watkins, “ ‘Please don’t do this to me,’ ” but he
did not respond. She felt “frozen” and could not fight back because she was scared
Watkins would hurt her. Watkins kissed her on the lips and put his tongue in her mouth.
She then felt his penis inside of her vagina. She continued to cry and told Watkins,
“ ‘Please, let me go,’ ” but he did not stop. Watkins ejaculated inside of her.
Once Doe was able to stand, she rushed to get dressed. Watkins approached Doe
and pushed her against a wall, put his hand on her throat and squeezed, and told her not to
tell anyone about what happened. He threatened to harm her husband and child, telling
her he knows where they live, and that she does not “ ‘want to see them get hurt.’ ” He
also told her she “ ‘better not tell the police because I know somebody there.’ ” He
squeezed her neck harder and told her to “ ‘[m]ake a promise,’ ” and Doe nodded her
head to indicate she would not say anything. Watkins then told Doe to bring her time
sheet with her to work the next day, which was her normal payday, and that he would
bring birth control for her.
Doe ran out of the building and to her car where she called her husband. She did
not call the police because she was scared Watkins would harm her family. She was so
distraught she could not talk and told her husband she would meet him at his office.
Doe’s husband testified that when she arrived, she was sobbing uncontrollably and
having a hard time walking. Two of Doe’s husband’s co-workers who were present at the
office when Doe arrived provided a similar description of her demeanor and mental state.
Doe also had difficulty talking but was eventually able to communicate that Watkins
raped her.
Doe’s husband took Doe to the hospital. On the way there, Doe continued to cry
and was “curled up into a little ball.” At the hospital, Doe was interviewed by a police
4.
officer, who described her demeanor as “extremely distraught” and “visibly disturbed.”
Doe also met with a nurse who performed a SART exam during which swabs were taken
from her person for DNA examination.
The swabs were examined by a criminalist from the California Department of
Justice, Bureau of Forensic Sciences. The criminalist testified he detected semen on the
swabs from Doe’s vagina and anus. He compared the DNA detected on each swab to a
reference sample from Watkins and opined that there was “extremely strong evidence”
that Watkins was the source of some of the DNA. He explained that the DNA profile
from the swabs was 40 quintillion times more likely to have originated from Watkins than
a random unrelated person in the African-American population.
Photographs of Doe’s body were taken by police officers and by Doe’s husband.
The photographs showed several minor injuries, including abrasions and bruising on her
arms, legs, and torso. She also experienced pain and bleeding from her vagina for several
days after the rape.
Doe testified that prior to the rape, Watkins had never been violent with her, and
their relationship was never sexual. The month before the assault, Watkins gave Doe a
cash bonus for doing a good job at work. He also took her to get her nails done as a
reward. She testified that she and her husband had been having money problems when
she worked for Watkins, but that she never asked Watkins for extra money.
DISCUSSION
I. Watkins abandoned his pretrial motion to sever and has forfeited the claim
on appeal. Any presumed error was harmless.
In addition to counts 1 through 3, which pertained to the rape of Doe, the People
charged Watkins with sexual penetration of a minor 14 years of age or older (§ 289, subd.
(a)(1)(C); count 4). As noted above, count 4 pertained to the alleged sexual assault of
Watkins’s former girlfriend’s daughter. The minor testified at trial, but after the People
5.
concluded their direct examination, the trial court granted the People’s motion to dismiss
count 4 for insufficient evidence and struck the minor’s testimony.
Watkins contends the trial court erred in failing to grant his pretrial motion to
sever count 4. He argues the minor’s testimony was inadmissible propensity evidence
involving such highly inflammatory allegations that the resulting prejudice could not be
cured by the trial court’s admonition not to consider the testimony.
A. Background
1. Watkins’s Motion to Sever
Watkins filed the motion to sever on March 7, 2016, approximately three and a
half years before his case proceeded to trial. When the motion was filed, Watkins was
represented by attorney Mark Broughton. At a March 10, 2016 settlement conference,
Watkins’s counsel informed the court the parties were “in a position … to settle at this
point.” The parties agreed to vacate a previously set jury trial date and continue the
matter for a further settlement conference on April 7, 2016. The court granted Watkins’s
request to continue the motion to sever to that date as well.
Over the next eight months, the motion to sever was continued eight times. At a
settlement conference on December 1, 2016, when the parties agreed to continue a
previously set trial date in light of new discovery, the trial court told Watkins, “[t]he
motion is just going to trail at this point,” and Watkins’s counsel agreed.
There is no further mention of the motion to sever in the record. In November
2017, attorney Scott Kinney substituted in for attorney Broughton. Watkins’s motions in
limine, filed August 29, 2019, included no reference to the motion to sever.
2. Minor’s Testimony
The minor was 20 years old when she testified at trial. When she was younger,
Watkins and her mother were in a dating relationship, and Watkins lived at their house.
The minor testified Watkins engaged in sexual conduct with her more than a dozen
times between fourth grade and her sophomore year in high school. When the minor was
6.
around 11 years old, Watkins asked her to pull up her shirt and expose her body to him,
and she did. When she was 12 or 13 years old, Watkins took photographs of her bare
chest, then told her to masturbate him, which she did. When she was a freshman in high
school, Watkins touched her vagina. After these incidents, Watkins would tell her that
she should not tell anyone because she would get in trouble and gave her money so she
would not say anything.
The last incident occurred when the minor was 13 or 14 years old. Watkins came
into her room around 3:00 a.m., laid on top of her, put his hand over her mouth and told
her to be quiet. He told her someone had broken into the house, then took her cell phone.
He led her to her mother’s bedroom, locked the door behind him, and pushed her onto the
bed. She started crying and asking for her mother and for her cell phone, but Watkins
told her to stop crying and to be quiet. He pulled his pants down and directed her to
orally copulate him, and she complied. He then went to the bathroom and retrieved a
white vibrator. He put the vibrator “on” her vagina, but she specified it did not go inside
of her vagina. At this point, the minor’s younger sister, who was asleep in the crib in the
bedroom, woke up. Watkins pulled up his pants and the minor returned to her room.
The minor told her mother about the abuse after the last incident, but her mother
did not contact law enforcement and told her not to say anything. Several months later,
the minor told her grandmother about the abuse, and the grandmother reported it to law
enforcement.
The minor acknowledged she told two “investigators” who came to her school that
Watkins put his finger in her vagina but testified that Watkins never committed that
specific act. The minor testified she was not truthful about this with the investigators
because she “just wanted to keep it short in reference to what I guess actually happened.”
She confirmed that she had no recollection of an incident where Watkins put his finger in
her vagina.
7.
Following direct examination, the People moved to dismiss count 4 for insufficient
evidence because there was no evidence of penetration. The trial court granted the
motion. The trial court explained that the minor’s testimony involved “a denial of the
conduct that was documented [in] the reports, and then bringing forward new conduct
that was not included in the report,” and that the “oral copulation allegations came as a
surprise to both the People and defense.” However, it ruled that the minor’s testimony
was inadmissible as propensity evidence under Evidence Code section 1108 for lack of
adequate notice. It also ruled the testimony was inadmissible under Evidence Code
section 352. Accordingly, it ordered the minor’s testimony stricken.
Upon resumption of the trial, the trial court admonished the jury as follows:
“And before we begin, a couple things. At this point [c]ount 4, which
was the sexual penetration by force of a minor, that count is no longer
going to be something that you’re going to be required to deliberate on and
return a verdict for. Please don’t speculate as to why. It is just a count that
you’re no longer going to have to consider. And because of that, the [c]ourt
is striking the testimony that was given on Monday of [the minor] since that
is the count that relates to [the minor].”
B. Watkins abandoned the motion to sever, forfeiting appellate review.
As a threshold matter, respondent contends Watkins’s failure to press for a ruling
for over three and a half years on his motion to sever forfeits his claim on appeal. We
agree. The “failure to press for a ruling waives the issue on appeal.” (People v.
Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 984; see People v. Valdez (2012) 55 Cal.4th 82, 142-
143 [“Thus, because defendant failed to press the trial court for a ruling on [the
unavailability of a witness], he may not raise the issue on appeal.”]; People v. Lewis
(2008) 43 Cal.4th 415, 481 [“Failure to press for a ruling on a motion to exclude evidence
forfeits appellate review of the claim because such failure deprives the trial court of the
opportunity to correct potential error in the first instance.”].)
8.
Appellant asks that we reach the merits of his claim, relying on People v.
Champion (1995) 9 Cal.4th 879. There, our high court exercised its discretion to reach
the merits of the defendants’ claim the trial court should have granted their motion to
limit the scope of voir dire in a capital case, and “[a]ssum[ed] for the sake of argument
that defendants have preserved their right to raise the issue.” (Id. at p. 908.) In a
footnote, the court explained it was declining to address the “close and difficult” question
of forfeiture, noting that it was unclear from the record whether one defendant had
abandoned the motion, and whether the other defendant had joined in it. (Id at p. 908,
fn. 6.)
Here, we do not find the question of forfeiture to be close or difficult. Watkins had
ample opportunity to press the trial court for a ruling and failed to do so. The motion to
sever was continued numerous times at Watkins’s request. The last reference to the
motion to sever in the record is in December 2016, when Watkins agreed the motion
would “trail.” No effort was made to revive the motion despite the People filing two
amended informations and Watkins filing a motion to set aside parts of the information
(§ 995). Although Watkins’s initial trial counsel substituted out of the case, he did so
over a year after he filed the severance motion. Watkins’s new trial counsel represented
him for almost two years before trial and failed to address the severance motion at any
point, including in his motions in limine. Given this record, the only reasonable
conclusion is that Watkins abandoned his motion to sever, and therefore has not preserved
the claim on appeal.
C. Any presumed error was harmless.
Even if Watkins had not forfeited his claim, we would conclude, without reaching
the merits of the severance motion, that any presumed error was harmless. The erroneous
denial of a motion to sever warrants reversal “ ‘ “only upon a showing that, to a
reasonable probability, the defendant would have received a more favorable result in a
separate trial.” ’ ” (People v. Flinner (2020) 10 Cal.5th 686, 713; People v. Pinholster
9.
(1992) 1 Cal.4th 865, 931-932, disapproved on another ground in People v. Williams
(2010) 49 Cal.4th 405, 459.)
Watkins has not made such a showing. We agree with Watkins that allegations of
child sexual assault are inherently inflammatory. However, the evidence establishing
Watkins’s guilt of the charges pertaining to Doe was overwhelming. (See People v.
Thompson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1043, 1091 [“Moreover, even were we to conclude the trial
court abused its discretion in denying severance, the evidence of defendant’s guilt was
overwhelming…. Consequently, those rulings did not prejudice defendant or otherwise
result in an unfair trial.”].) The DNA evidence conclusively established that Watkins had
sexual intercourse with Doe. Doe’s testimony that Watkins raped her was clear, logical,
internally consistent, and corroborated by her physical injuries. The testimony of Doe’s
husband, his two coworkers, and the officer who interviewed her, credibly established
that Doe was emotionally distraught, consistent with her having just been sexually
assaulted. Moreover, Doe had no reason to falsely accuse Watkins of rape. While
Watkins’s counsel suggested Doe and her husband were trying to extort Watkins for
money, there was no evidence to support this claim.
To the extent the minor’s testimony prejudiced Watkins, it was mitigated by the
actions of the court and counsel. After the trial court dismissed count 4, it ordered the
minor’s testimony stricken in front of the jury and admonished them not to speculate why
the count had been dismissed. Thereafter, no further evidence was presented regarding
count 4. Counsel did not address the minor’s testimony in their closing argument, and the
court did not instruct the jury on evidence of uncharged sex offenses. (See CALCRIM
No. 1191A.)
Considering the limited prejudice in conjunction with the overwhelming evidence
of guilt, we conclude there is no reason to attribute the jury’s guilty verdict to the minor’s
testimony. Therefore, we find there is no reasonable possibility Watkins would have
received a more favorable result in a separate trial, and any presumed error was harmless.
10.
II. Watkins’s rape conviction was supported by substantial evidence.
During the rape, Doe suffered several bruises and small abrasions to her legs,
arms, and torso. Watkins contends that the lack of more significant physical injuries
makes her testimony “inherently improbable,” and therefore the rape conviction was not
supported by sufficient evidence. He argues that because he is a large man and the rape
occurred on carpet, she should have received extensive carpet burns on her back and
elbows. He also claims that if Watkins choked her on several occasions, she should have
had marks on her neck.
“To determine the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we review
the entire record in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether it
contains [substantial] evidence that is reasonable, credible and of solid value, from which
a rational trier of fact could find that the elements of the crime were established beyond a
reasonable doubt.” (People v. Tripp (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 951, 955 (Tripp).) We
“presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably
deduce from the evidence.” (People v. Redmond (1969) 71 Cal.2d 745, 755.) “We need
not be convinced of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; we merely ask
whether ‘ “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt.” ’ ” (Tripp, supra, at p. 955, italics omitted.)
We conclude the rape conviction was supported by substantial evidence. The
verdict demonstrates the jury found Doe credible, and as we explain above, that finding
was supported by overwhelming evidence. We also find Doe’s relatively minor physical
injuries consistent with her description of the assault. Doe struggled initially when
Watkins grabbed her from behind, but she stopped resisting soon after she fell to the floor
out of fear that he would harm her further. Based on her description of Watkins’s
conduct, we would not expect her to have received more than minor abrasions and
bruising on her arms, legs, and torso. Nor would we expect her to have necessarily
received injuries to her neck area from Watkins grabbing her by the throat. Accordingly,
11.
considering the totality of the evidence, any rational trier of fact could have found
Watkins guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and this claim lacks merit.
III. The trial court did not err in admitting the audio recording of Doe
identifying Watkins.
The trial court admitted a brief audio recording of Doe identifying Watkins to law
enforcement as the person who raped her earlier that day. Watkins contends the trial
court should have excluded the recording under Evidence Code section 352.
A. Background
The audio recording is of a conversation over the phone between Doe and an
investigating officer on the day of the rape. After officers detained Watkins, they
contacted Doe to confirm they had detained the right person. An officer sent a
photograph of Watkins to Doe’s husband via text message, then spoke with Doe over the
phone and asked Doe’s husband to show her the photograph. Doe then identified Watkins
as the person who raped her. Doe was emotional throughout the entire call and broke
down crying several times.
The People moved in limine to admit the audio recording as a prior identification
pursuant to Evidence Code section 1238. The People also noted that during the recording
Doe is “still very emotional and distraught, especially upon seeing the photo of
[Watkins].” Watkins objected, arguing that identification was not at issue, so the only
relevance of the call was to show that Doe was emotional. The trial court ruled the
recording could be admitted, reasoning that identification is relevant, and “unless there is
something more than just emotion, the court doesn’t believe the prejudicial impact
outweighs the probative value.”
B. Standard of Review
Evidence Code section 352 allows a trial court to “exclude evidence if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a)
necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue
12.
prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.” “The prejudice which
exclusion of evidence under Evidence Code section 352 is designed to avoid is not the
prejudice or damage to a defense that naturally flows from relevant, highly probative
evidence.” (People v. Karis (1988) 46 Cal.3d 612, 638.) “ ‘The “prejudice” referred to in
Evidence Code section 352 applies to evidence which uniquely tends to evoke an
emotional bias against the defendant as an individual and which has very little effect on
the issues. In applying section 352, “prejudicial” is not synonymous with
“damaging.” ’ ” (Ibid.) The trial court’s exercise of discretion under Evidence Code
section 352 will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion. (Id. at p.
637.)
C. Evidence Code section 352 did not require exclusion.
Watkins does not dispute that the recording was properly admitted as a prior
identification (Evid. Code, § 1238), but claims it was prejudicial because it showed Doe’s
level of emotional distress. We disagree. Doe’s demeanor and mental state while
speaking to the officer were highly relevant to her credibility, particularly given that she
was assaulted earlier that day. Moreover, Watkins’s defense was that he had consensual
sex with Doe and her testimony that he raped her was a lie, so any evidence allowing the
jury to further assess Doe’s credibility is highly probative. Like the testimony of Doe’s
husband’s co-workers, who described Doe as being emotionally distraught upon her
arrival to the office, the recording was relevant to show that Doe’s emotional response
was not contrived, but rather was a genuine reaction to having suffered a violent sexual
assault. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the recording
over Watkins’s Evidence Code section 352 objection.
IV. The trial court erred in allowing Doe’s husband to serve as her support
person before testifying, but the error was harmless.
The trial court allowed Doe’s husband to serve as her support person during her
testimony. Watkins contends the trial court erred by allowing Doe’s husband to testify
13.
after watching Doe testify, and that it failed to properly admonish Doe’s husband not to
communicate with Doe during her testimony. Respondent concedes the trial court erred,
but contends any presumed error was harmless.
A. Background
The People moved in limine to allow Doe’s husband to serve as her support person
during her testimony. At the hearing on the motion, the People argued that Doe is still
very emotional and has relied heavily on her husband for support. The trial court
expressed concern that Doe’s husband testified before Doe, he may have to be recalled
later in trial. As an alternative to Doe’s husband serving as a support person, the trial
court suggested he wait outside the courtroom during her testimony, and that she could
take breaks to talk to him as needed.
Doe began her testimony without her husband present in court. When Doe’s
testimony reached the point where she was asked to describe specific details of the rape,
she asked for a break. During the break and outside of the presence of the jury, the trial
court ruled Doe’s husband could serve as her support person, stating:
“What I’m putting on the record will be over the objection of the defense,
but given the nature of the testimony so far, the need for breaks due to some
– I’m not questioning being understandable, but emotions, I’m going to be
changing my ruling allowing this witness’s husband to be in the courtroom
for her testimony, even though he is also going to be called later as a
witness. I am making an order that neither the witness nor her husband is
to discuss the facts and circumstances of the case itself with each other, but
he can certainly be in here as a support person, and that is over the
objection of the defense.”
Watkins’s counsel requested the trial court admonish Doe and her husband that they were
“not to look at, or no hand signals or any communication between the two, verbal or
otherwise.” The trial court replied that if it “[saw] something that, [it] would intervene.”
It is unclear from the record if Doe or her husband were present in court for the trial
court’s ruling or the request for an admonition.
14.
Doe’s husband remained in court for the remainder of Doe’s testimony. Doe’s
husband was then called by the People as their next witness.
B. The trial court violated section 868.5.
Section 868.5, subdivision (a), states that a “prosecuting witness” in a case
involving certain enumerated offenses, including rape, is entitled to a support person
during his or her testimony. Subdivision (c) specifies that if the support person is also a
witness, the testimony of the support person “shall be presented before the testimony of
the prosecting witness.” Additionally, subdivision (b) mandates that “[i]n all cases, the
judge shall admonish the support person … to not prompt, sway, or influence the witness
in any way.”
We agree with the parties that the trial court violated section 868.5, subdivision (c)
by allowing Doe’s husband to serve as her support person and then testify as a witness.
While it appears the trial court was moved to change its ruling by the traumatic nature of
Doe’s testimony, Doe was already on the stand, so there was no way Doe’s husband
would be able to testify before her. We also agree the trial court failed to properly
admonish Doe and her husband in accordance with subdivision (b). The trial court
indicated it would not allow Doe and her husband to communicate during Doe’s
testimony, but it was unclear if Doe and her husband were present when it made that
statement, and even so, the language of the statement fell short of the admonition
required by the statute.
C. The error was harmless.
Respondent contends the trial court’s errors pertaining to Doe’s husband’s role as a
support person were harmless. We agree.
Depending upon the basis of the claimed error, it is reviewed under either
Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 (Chapman), or People v. Watson (1956) 46
Cal.2d 818, 836 (Watson). Under the more stringent Chapman standard, which applies to
errors of constitutional dimension, reversal is required unless the reviewing court can
15.
conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict.
(Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24.) Under the alternative Watson standard, which
applies to errors of state law, reversal is not required unless it is reasonably probable the
defendant would have obtained a more favorable result had the error not occurred.
(Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836.)
We need not decide whether the Chapman or Watson standard for prejudicial error
applies here because the error was harmless under either standard. “The requirement that
the support person testify before and out of the presence of the victim is intended to guard
against the possibility that the support person will tailor his or her testimony to match that
of the complaining witness.” (People v. Redondo (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 647, 654.)
Nothing in the record suggests that Doe’s husband altered his testimony based on the
testimony of his wife, or that appellant’s ability to cross-examine Doe or her husband was
undermined. The jurors were aware that Doe’s husband was present for Doe’s testimony
and were able to take that into consideration when assessing his credibility. The jurors
were also able to consider that Doe and Doe’s husband are married. Moreover, Doe’s
husband’s testimony was limited to Doe’s demeanor and mental state following the rape
and was corroborated by the testimony of his co-worker and members of law
enforcement.
The trial court’s failure to properly admonish Doe and her husband was similarly
harmless. The trial court expressed that it would not allow Doe and her husband to
communicate while testifying, suggesting it would be watching for such conduct.
However, the trial court did not intervene at any point, and Watkins does not claim Doe’s
husband did anything to influence her testimony.
Considering the overwhelming evidence of Watkins’s guilt and Watkins’s failure
to show he was prejudiced by the trial court’s failure to comply with section 868.5, we
find beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict, and thus
was harmless.
16.
V. Cumulative Error
Watkins raises a claim of cumulative error. He contends that, based on the totality
of some of the errors identified above, he suffered a fundamentally unfair trial. We
disagree.
“Under the ‘cumulative error’ doctrine, errors that are individually harmless may
nevertheless have a cumulative effect that is prejudicial.” (In re Avena (1996) 12 Cal.4th
694, 772, fn. 32.) A claim of cumulative error is essentially a due process claim. (People
v. Rivas (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1410, 1436.) The test is whether the defendant received
a fair trial. (Ibid.)
We reject Watkins’s claim of cumulative error because we have denied all of his
individual claims. (People v. Bradford (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1005, 1057 [cumulative
prejudice argument rejected because each individual contention lacked merit or did not
result in prejudice].) Taking all of appellant’s claims into account, we are satisfied that he
received a fair adjudication regarding his guilt for the rape of Doe.
VI. Watkins is entitled to a remand and resentencing because the record does not
clearly indicate the trial court would have imposed the same sentence had it
been aware of its more limited discretion under Senate Bill No. 567.
While the instant appeal was pending, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 567,
which amended section 1170 such that a sentencing court may only impose the upper
term where factors in aggravation have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt by the
jury or the court or stipulated to by the defendant. The parties agree Senate Bill No. 567
applies retroactively to Watkins’s case, as it is not final on appeal. (See Lynch, supra, 16
Cal.5th at p. 749.)
Watkins contends he must be remanded for resentencing because the record does
not clearly indicate the trial court would have imposed the same sentence had it been
aware of Senate Bill No. 567’s presumption against the upper term. We agree.
17.
A. Background
The trial court sentenced Watkins to 11 years in state prison as follows. On
count 1, it imposed the upper term of eight years. On count 2, it concluded sentence must
be stayed pursuant to section 654, ruling that it “could be viewed as part of either” count
1 or count 3. On count 3, it imposed a consecutive full middle term of three years
pursuant to section 1170.15. This was the maximum possible sentence authorized by law.
The trial court elected to impose the upper term on count 1 based on the
aggravating circumstance that Watkins “took advantage of a position of trust or
confidence to commit the offense.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(11).) The court
explained its reasoning as follows:
“Well, basically, when it comes to balancing the factors, on the one
hand, there is the lack of criminal history, but on the other hand, there was
the abuse of a position of trust. This was not something where it was a
random stranger or something that occurred on a date. Not minimizing
either of those two circumstances, this was somebody who was going to
work in a place, where she had an expectation and a right to feel safe, and
then, in turn, was raped by her employer. So the court does believe that
aggravating factor outweighs the mitigating factor of a lack of criminal
history.”
Because Watkins was sentenced in 2019, over two years before Senate Bill No. 567 went
into effect, he was not afforded a jury trial on the truth of this aggravating circumstance,
as is now required by section 1170, subdivision (b)(2).
B. Watkins is entitled to a remand and resentencing.
When Watkins was sentenced in 2020, former section 1170 gave the trial court
“broad discretion to select among three terms and impose a sentence that in its judgment
served the interests of justice.” (Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 773.) Effective January 1,
2022, Senate Bill No. 567 placed limits on the discretion to impose the upper term.
(§ 1170, subd. (b)(1) & (b)(2).) Section 1170, subdivision (b)(2) now specifies that a
sentencing court may impose the upper term “only when there are circumstances in
18.
aggravation of the crime that justify the imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding
the middle term and the facts underlying those circumstances have been stipulated to by
the defendant or have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by
the judge in a court trial.” Thus, Senate Bill No. 567 narrowed the trial court’s discretion
“by creating a presumption against the upper term, which may be overcome only if the
required facts are properly proven, and the court concludes that term is justified.”
(Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 773.)
Lynch holds that where a sentencing court imposed the upper term under a former
version of section 1170, subdivision (b), the sentence must be vacated and the matter
remanded for resentencing unless the record “clearly indicate[s] that the court would have
found an upper term justified had it been aware of its more limited discretion.” (Lynch,
supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 743.) More precisely, the record must “clearly indicate” that the
court “would have found aggravating circumstances sufficiently weighty to ‘justify’ an
upward departure from the legislative mandate for no more than a middle term sentence.”
(Id. at p. 777.)
Our high court has cautioned that in applying the “clearly indicates” standard, “ ‘it
is almost always speculative for a reviewing court to say what the sentencing court would
have done if it had known the scope of its discretionary powers at the time of
sentencing.’ ” (Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 776, quoting Salazar, supra, 15 Cal.5th at
p. 425.) “Mere reliance on the length of the original sentence and attendant decisions,
such as imposing consecutive sentences, imposing middle or upper term sentences, or
declining to strike enhancements, is not sufficient to provide a clear indication of what a
sentencing court might do on remand if it had been fully aware of the scope of its
discretionary powers.” (Salazar, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 431.) Accordingly, remand for
resentencing is generally required unless the sentencing court clearly stated that “it would
not impose a lesser sentence under any circumstances” (Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p.
777), or “announce[d] that it is aware of forthcoming legislation and then explain[ed]
19.
how it would exercise its discretion under that legislation” (Salazar, supra, 15 Cal.5th at
p. 431).
Here, the trial court made no such definitive statements. Rather, it elected to
impose the upper term based on its conclusion the aggravating circumstance that Watkins
“took advantage of a position of trust or confidence to commit the offense” (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 4.421(a)(11)) outweighed the mitigating circumstance that Watkins had “no
prior [criminal] record” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.423(b)(1)). This does not provide a
clear indication that the trial court would have imposed the upper term had it been aware
of its more limited discretion under section 1170 as amended by Senate Bill No. 567.
While respondent notes the trial court also exercised its discretion to impose a
consecutive term on count 3, Lynch and Salazar make clear that such sentencing
decisions are insufficient to determine how the trial court would have exercised its
discretion under current law. (Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 776-777; Salazar, supra, 15
Cal.5th at p. 431.) Accordingly, we conclude the record does not clearly indicate the trial
court would have elected to impose the upper term “under the weight of the presumptive
middle term maximum sentence that currently exists,” and Watkins is entitled to a
remand and resentencing.2 (Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 777.)
To assist the court and parties on remand, we offer the following guidance from
Lynch. The People may elect to try the truth of the aggravating circumstance that
2 Watkins also contends that remand and resentencing are required because the
record does not support the conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury would have
found true the aggravating circumstance that Watkins “took advantage of a position of
trust or confidence to commit the offense.” (See Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 768.) We
need not consider this claim because we determine the matter must be remanded for
resentencing on another ground.
We emphasize, however, that Watkins was not afforded a jury trial on the truth of
this aggravating circumstance. Accordingly, upon remand, the trial court may not rely
upon this aggravating circumstance to justify an upper term unless it is properly proven in
accordance with section 1170, subdivision (b).
20.
Watkins “took advantage of a position of trust or confidence to commit the offense” (Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(11)), and/or other aggravating circumstances set forth in the
California Rules of Court. (See Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 777.) If one or more of the
aggravating circumstances is properly proven in accordance with section 1170,
subdivision (b), the trial court “retains its discretion to impose an upper term sentence if it
concludes that one or more … circumstances justify such a sentence.” (Lynch, supra, 16
Cal.5th at p. 778.) If the court “cannot so conclude, it may impose no more than a middle
term for each of the counts on which [Watkins] stands convicted.” (Ibid.)
VII. On remand, Watkins may address the applicability of Assembly Bill No. 518
and Senate Bill No. 567.
Watkins also contends remand and resentencing are required pursuant to two other
legislative enactments that became effective while the instant appeal was pending:
Assembly Bill No. 518 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill No. 518) (Stats. 2021, ch.
441, § 1), and Assembly Bill No. 124 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill No. 124)
(Stats. 2021, ch. 695, § 5). Assembly Bill No. 518 amended section 654, subdivision (a)
to permit an act or omission punishable under two or more provisions of law to “be
punished under either of such provisions.” Assembly Bill No. 124 amended section 1170
to create a presumption in favor of the lower term if, inter alia, the defendant “has
experienced psychological, physical, or childhood trauma, including, but not limited to,
abuse, neglect, exploitation, or sexual violence.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(6)(A).)
We need not address whether remand is required based on these enactments
because we have already determined remand and resentencing are necessary. Because
Watkins is entitled to a full resentencing, he may raise the applicability of these
enactments below when he is resentenced. (See People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857,
893; People v. Valenzuela (2019) 7 Cal.5th 415, 424-425 [“[T]he full resentencing rule
allows a court to revisit all prior sentencing decisions when resentencing a defendant”].)
21.
We take no position on how the trial court should exercise its sentencing discretion when
it resentences Watkins.
DISPOSITION
Watkins’s sentence is vacated and the matter is remanded for a full resentencing in
conformity with section 1170, subdivision (b). The People may elect to try aggravating
factors on remand or proceed to resentencing. In all other respects, the judgment is
affirmed.
22.
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