CourtListener 10599233•Sehremelis v. Sehremelis CA4/3
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Filed 6/5/25 Sehremelis v. Sehremelis CA4/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
PETER SEHREMELIS et al.,
Plaintiffs and Appellants, G062738
v. (Super. Ct. No. 30-2016-00875465)
ANDREA SEHREMELIS et al., OPINION
Defendants and Respondents.
Appeal from orders of the Superior Court of Orange County,
David L. Belz, Judge. Affirmed.
Bunt & Shaver and David N. Shaver for Plaintiffs and
Appellants.
Klapach & Klapach and Joseph S. Klapach for Defendants and
Respondents.
Appellants Peter Sehremelis, John Sehremelis, and Froso
Sehremelis challenge the trial court’s orders approving accountings for their
father’s family trust. They contend the court erred by ordering that attorney
fees the trustees incurred in litigation be paid from the trust estate. And they
assert the court erred by authorizing certain trustee fees for a former trustee,
their brother Andrea Sehremelis (Andy), based on inadmissible evidence.1 As
discussed below, we find no error and therefore affirm.
FACTS
I.
THE TRUST
In 2014, George Sehremelis established a trust and transferred
all his property to it, including his substantial real estate holdings.2 The trust
provided for George’s living children to become beneficiaries upon his death.
It expressed George’s desire that his real estate holdings be maintained “for
the long term benefit of his children and [grandchildren].” The trust also
included a termination clause, which provided: “Notwithstanding the
foregoing provisions, upon the approval of a majority of [George’s] then living
children, the trust may be terminated . . . .”
Through a subsequent amendment, George named two successor
cotrustees, Andy and Joseph Ressler (George’s accountant).3 Among other
powers, the trust authorized the trustees to “commence or defend such
1 For clarity, we refer to all members of the family by their first
names. We refer to Andy in accord with the parties’ briefing.
2 George later executed a pour-over will, devising his entire estate
to the trust.
3 We refer to Andy and Ressler together as respondents.
2
litigation with respect to the trust or any property of the trust estate as the
trustee[s] may deem advisable, at the expense of the trust.” It further
authorized them to “defend, at the expense of the trust estate, any contest or
other attack of any nature on this trust or any of its provisions.”
II.
GEORGE’S DEATH AND ENSUING LITIGATION
George passed away in 2016. At the time of his death, he had four
living children: appellants and Andy. Shortly after, appellants sent
respondents’ attorneys a written demand to terminate the trust pursuant to
the termination clause. After respondents declined to terminate the trust,
appellants petitioned the trial court for an order terminating the trust.
Appearing as cotrustees of the trust, respondents opposed the petition and
argued, inter alia, that the termination clause’s language was merely
“precatory” and did not entitle appellants to terminate the trust.4
In 2019, following a bench trial, the trial court ordered the
termination of the trust and the liquidation of trust assets, concluding that
the termination clause allowed the majority of George’s surviving children to
terminate it. The court also decided, sua sponte, to remove respondents as
trustees and appoint Wells Fargo Bank as trustee to oversee the trust’s
liquidation. It ordered that Andy would continue to act as the trust’s “special
agent” in the closing of certain real estate transactions. Respondents
appealed these rulings.
4 Precatory words are “expressions of requests, desires, or
recommendations, as distinguished from commands.” (Black’s Law Dict.
(12th ed. 2024) p. 1424.)
3
In 2020, this court affirmed the trial court’s orders terminating
the trust and removing Andy as trustee.5 However, we reversed the removal
of Ressler as trustee and the appointment of Wells Fargo.
III.
ACCOUNTINGS
From 2017 to early 2021, respondents filed four accountings of
their management of the trust. In late 2021, Ressler alone filed a fifth
accounting. Among other things, these accounts reported and sought
approval for the payment of: (1) about $336,000 in attorney fees to Stevenson
Law Office for litigating the termination clause on behalf of respondents;
(2) about $104,000 in attorney fees to Klapach & Klapach for litigating the
related appeal; and (3) about $1.6 million in extraordinary trustee fees for
Andy, related to various real estate transactions (the trustee commissions).
Appellants objected to the payment of these attorney and trustee fees from
the trust estate. The parties stipulated to appoint a referee to hear and
determine the reasonableness and necessity of these payments, among other
issues.
IV.
TRIAL AND RULINGS
At the trial before the referee, Andy testified that after his
father’s death, he considered hiring Wells Fargo to serve as an institutional
trustee for the trust. According to Andy, he met with Wells Fargo personnel,
who provided him a fee schedule listing the bank’s fees for trustee work.
5 As to Andy’s removal, we stated that “the hostility and lack of
trust between [him] and his siblings would impair the administration of the
trust.” (Sehremelis v. Sehremelis (Nov. 20, 2020, G057541) [nonpub. opn.].)
4
Under the fee schedule, Wells Fargo would have charged an up-front fee of
$540,000 and, when managing real estate sales, an additional fee of up to 10
percent of gross sales. As to the listed flat fee, Andy confirmed in response to
questioning that “Wells Fargo [wa]s telling [him,] we are going to charge you
a flat fee of $540,000.” Andy was able to negotiate the additional fee to
between 3 and 5 percent, but ultimately did not hire Wells Fargo. The fee
schedule was admitted into evidence over appellants’ hearsay objection.
Andy proceeded to testify about his efforts to sell the trust’s real
properties, which yielded many millions of dollars for the trust, despite
significant challenges. For these transactions, Andy billed 2 to 3 percent of
each property’s sale value and 0.5 percent for loans he facilitated, in addition
to other trustee fees.
Following trial, the referee issued findings and recommendations
in which she commended respondents’ work and the financial outcomes they
had achieved for the trust. She recommended approving the requested
attorney fees for Stevenson Law Office and Klapach & Klapach. The referee
also recommended approving about $1.12 million in trustee commissions for
Andy. The trial court adopted the referee’s findings and recommendations as
its orders. Appellants filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
Appellants challenge the trial court’s approval of the attorney
fees and Andy’s trustee commissions. They contend that the termination-
clause litigation did not benefit the trust and thus that related attorney fees
should not be borne by the trust estate. As for the trustee fees, they claim the
court’s ruling rested on inadmissible hearsay evidence—the Wells Fargo fee
schedule.
5
As discussed below, we conclude the attorney fees were properly
charged to the trust estate based on the broad authority the trust gave
respondents to direct litigation concerning the trust.6 As for the fee schedule,
we conclude it was admissible for a nonhearsay purpose.7
I.
ATTORNEY FEES
A. Governing Law
“A trustee is entitled to the repayment out of trust property for
the following: [¶] (a) Expenditures that were properly incurred in the
administration of the trust. [¶] (b) To the extent that they benefited the trust,
expenditures that were not properly incurred in the administration of the
trust.” (Prob. Code, § 15684.) “‘[A]mong the ordinary powers and duties of a
trustee of a private trust are those of doing all acts necessary and expedient
to collect, conserve and protect the property of the trust, to maintain and
6 In their opening brief, appellants contended that attorney fees
relating to litigation of Andy’s removal as trustee should be charged to the
trust estate. But in their reply brief, they concede that fees expended on
“work performed opposing the trustees’ removal” are properly borne by the
trust. We therefore do not address the portion of the fees relating to Andy’s
removal. Additionally, given our conclusion on the merits that the trial court
did not err in approving the attorney fees, we need not address respondents’
contention that prior litigation barred appellants’ challenge under the law of
the case doctrine.
7 In appellants’ opening brief, appellants argued that if we agree
the fee schedule should have been excluded, “then there is no evidence to
support the approval of [Andy’s trustee commissions].” Because we conclude
the schedule was properly admitted, we do not address the sufficiency of the
evidence. In their reply brief, appellants assert that, regardless of the fee
schedule, Andy’s trustee commissions were excessive. By failing to raise this
contention in their opening brief, they have forfeited the argument. (People v.
Tully (2012) 54 Cal.4th 952, 1075.)
6
defend the integrity of the trust for the benefit of the beneficiaries and to
employ such assistants as may be necessary for said purposes.’ [Citation.]”
(Whittlesey v. Aiello (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1221, 1226 (Whittlesey).) In the
context of litigation concerning the trust, courts will allow payment of
attorney fees from the trust estate if the litigation was “‘a benefit and a
service to the trust.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 1230.) If the trustee intervenes in a
dispute between two beneficiaries to represent “the interests of one side of
the dispute over the other, [rather than] the interests of the trust or the
trustee” (id. at p. 1231), the trustee must generally bear his or her own costs
(id. at pp. 1230–1231).
The provisions of the trust instrument can modify the ordinary
powers of the trustee. (Prob. Code, § 16200.) This includes the trustee’s
authority to direct litigation at the trust’s expense. (Doolittle v. Exchange
Bank (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 529, 537–538 (Doolittle).) In Doolittle, an
amendment to the trust directed the trustee to defend, at the expense of the
trust estate, “any contest or other attack of any nature” on the trust, its
provisions, or its amendments. (Id. at p. 534.) A beneficiary later challenged
the validity of amendments that changed the disposition of the trust estate.
(Id. pp. 532, 535.) Although the contest involved only the disposition of trust
assets among beneficiaries, the court authorized the trustee to use trust
funds in defending against the challenge, concluding that the amendment’s
defense provision mandated this. (Id. at pp. 532, 537–538.)
If the trust instrument grants the trustee discretion to engage in
litigation at trust expense, the court will not interfere except to prevent the
trustee from abusing that discretion. (Hearst v. Ganzi (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th
1195, 1209 [“If discretion is conferred upon the trustee in the exercise of a
power, ‘the court will not interfere unless the trustee . . . acts dishonestly, or
7
with an improper . . . motive, . . . or acts beyond the bounds of a reasonable
judgment” (italics omitted)].) “We review the trial court’s order that attorney
fees may be payable from trust income under the abuse of discretion
standard. [Citation.]” (Terry v. Conlan (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1445, 1461
(Terry).)
B. Analysis
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in authorizing the
payment of the challenged attorney fees from the trust estate. The terms of
the trust authorized the trustees to “commence or defend such litigation with
respect to the trust” as the trustees deemed advisable, “at the expense of the
trust.” Pursuant to this grant of authority, respondents chose to intervene in
the litigation initiated by appellants, whose ultimate goal was to terminate
the trust. Given the trust’s declaration of George’s intent that the trust’s real
estate holdings be administered by the trustees “for the long term benefit of
his children and [grandchildren],” the respondents’ decision was not
unreasonable.8 Accordingly, the trial court properly approved the payment of
the challenged fees from the trust estate. (Doolittle, supra, 241 Cal.App.4th
at pp. 537–538; Hearst v. Ganzi, supra, 145 Cal.App.4th at p. 1209.)
8 We do not evaluate the merits of respondents’ position in the
underlying litigation. Neither the trial court nor this court found that their
arguments were frivolous or made in bad faith. Even in their opening brief in
this appeal, appellants do not contend that respondents’ position was so
unreasonable as to preclude fees for related work. In their reply brief,
appellants conclusorily assert that respondents “pursued their own interests
of controlling the trust” and that “[t]heir actions were not objectively
reasonable.” By failing to develop the argument and to include it in their
opening brief, appellants have forfeited any contention in this regard. (People
v. Tully, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 1075; Sviridov v. City of San Diego (2017)
14 Cal.App.5th 514, 521.)
8
In support of their position that respondents were not entitled to
use trust funds to conduct the litigation, appellants cite three cases:
Whittlesey, supra, 104 Cal.App.4th 1221, Terry, supra, 131 Cal.App.4th 1445,
and Zahnleuter v. Mueller (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 1294. These cases are
unhelpful to appellants’ position because none of them involved a trust
provision granting the trustee broad authority to conduct litigation at trust
expense. (Whittlesey, at pp. 1224–1225 [no special authorization]; Terry, at
pp. 1449–1453 [no special authorization]; Zahnleuter, at pp. 1298, 1309
[authorization to conduct litigation expressly excluded litigation at issue].)
Appellants contend their petition did not contest or attack the trust. But the
trust’s terms did not restrict the trustees to defending against a contest or
other attack. Instead, they authorized them to commence or defend litigation
they “deemed advisable.” Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in authorizing the payment of attorney fees from the trust estate.
II.
ADMISSION OF FEE SCHEDULE
Appellants argue that the trial court’s approval of the payment of
trustee commissions for Andy rested on inadmissible evidence. They contend
Wells Fargo’s fee schedule should have been excluded as inadmissible
hearsay. “We review a trial court’s ruling on a hearsay objection for an abuse
of discretion. [Citations.] However, to the extent a hearsay ruling turns on a
question of law, . . . we review the question de novo. [Citations.]” (People v.
Portillo (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 577, 588–589 (Portillo).)
We conclude the fee schedule was not hearsay. “‘Hearsay
evidence’ is evidence of a statement that was made other than by a witness
while testifying at the hearing and that is offered to prove the truth of the
matter stated.” (Evid. Code, § 1200, subd. (a).) “In other words, ‘a hearsay
9
statement is one in which a person makes a factual assertion out of court and
the proponent seeks to rely on the statement to prove that assertion is true.’
[Citation.]” (Doe v. SoftwareONE Inc. (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 98, 108.)
The fee schedule was not admitted for the truth of the matter
asserted—that this was what Wells Fargo generally charged. Instead, Andy
relied on the schedule to prove an offer by Wells Fargo to provide trustee
services for the trust at the listed prices. Indeed, in reference to the bank’s
flat fee under the schedule, Andy confirmed at trial that “Wells Fargo [wa]s
telling [him,] we are going to charge you a flat fee of $540,000.” Evidence of a
merchant’s offer to sell a product or provide a service for a certain price is
admissible as circumstantial evidence of the fair market price of the product
or service. (Portillo, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at pp. 605–607 (conc. opn. of
Segal, J.) [evidence of retailer’s price listings was admissible nonhearsay
when used to prove fair market price].)9
Appellants assert that Portillo is distinguishable because it
concerned the fair market value of stolen goods “and did not concern a bank’s
trustee fee schedule for the sale of real property, as evidence of what a
trustee can charge for trustee fees.” We see no meaningful distinction. As in
Portillo, evidence of the merchant’s offer here was relevant to establish the
fair market price of the product or service at issue. And the fair market price
of trustee services in facilitating the sale of real property was relevant to
9 In Portillo, the majority opinion concluded that evidence of price
listings or price tags was admissible nonhearsay for other reasons. (Portillo,
supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at pp. 592–593.) Because we agree with the analysis in
Justice Segal’s concurrence, we need not consider the Portillo majority’s
alternative analysis.
10
establish whether Andy’s fees were reasonable and appropriate.10
Accordingly, we find no error in the admission of the fee schedule.
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s orders are affirmed. Respondents are awarded
their costs on appeal.
O’LEARY, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
SANCHEZ, J.
MOTOIKE, J.
10 Presumably, this is why appellants impliedly conceded that the
fee schedule—if admissible—was sufficient to support the approval of Andy’s
fees.
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