People v. Williams CA6

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Filed 6/4/25 P. v. Williams CA6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE, H051767
(Santa Clara County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. C1910682)

v.

ANTOINE WILLIAMS,

Defendant and Appellant.

This is defendant Antoine Williams’s second appeal from his 2019
conviction by a jury for aggravated sex trafficking of a minor (Pen. Code,1
§ 236.1, subd. (c)(2)) and other related crimes. This appeal arises from a
resentencing proceeding conducted on remand following an earlier direct
appeal.
In Williams’s first appeal, this court affirmed Williams’s convictions
but reversed the judgment, vacated Williams’s sentence, and “remanded to
the trial court solely for resentencing consistent with [our] opinion under
current law, including Penal Code section 654 as amended by Assembly Bill

1 All further unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.
No. 518 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.).” (People v. Williams (Dec. 29, 2022,
H048722) [nonpub. opn.] (Williams).2)
On remand, the trial court declined to consider Williams’s motion for
disclosure of information (discovery motion) under the California Racial
Justice Act of 2020 (Stats. 2020, ch. 317, § 3.5 [eff. Jan. 1, 2021]; § 745)
(hereafter, RJA or Act). The trial court resentenced Williams to a total term
of 15 years to life in prison.
In this second appeal, Williams contends his sentence should be
vacated and the matter remanded because the trial court erred in concluding
it lacked jurisdiction to consider his discovery motion. Williams also argues
his sentence of 15 years to life amounts to cruel and unusual punishment
under the United States and California Constitutions.
The Attorney General agrees that the trial court had jurisdiction to
entertain Williams’s discovery motion and that this matter should be
remanded for consideration of that motion. The Attorney General further
contends Williams’s sentence should be affirmed because it does not violate
the constitutional prohibitions against cruel and/or unusual punishment.
For the reasons explained below, we decide that the trial court erred in
failing to consider Williams’s RJA discovery motion. We thus conditionally
reverse the judgment and remand for further proceedings on that motion and
any further motion Williams may file under section 745, subdivision (b). We
reject Williams’s claim of cruel and unusual punishment and affirm his
sentence. In the event the trial court reinstates the judgment and sentence,

2 We considered Williams’s first appeal together with the direct appeal

of his codefendant Christopher Lyon Johnson (H048633) and issued a single
opinion addressing both appeals. (See Williams, supra, H048722.) This court
previously granted Williams’s request to take judicial notice of the record and
our opinion in H048722.
2
we direct the court to generate new abstracts of judgment to correct an error
in the extant abstract of judgment.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Trial
A description of the evidence presented at the joint trial of Williams
and his codefendant Johnson appears in the Williams opinion. We
incorporate into this opinion the description of the trial evidence set forth
therein. (Williams, supra, H048722.)
On November 26, 2019, a Santa Clara County jury convicted Williams
and Johnson of human trafficking by causing a minor victim to engage in a
commercial sex act and involving force, fear, coercion, duress or threat of
unlawful injury (§ 236.1, subd. (c)(2) (hereafter section 236.1(c)(2)); count 1);
pimping where the prostitute is a minor under the age of 16 (§ 266h, subd.
(b)(2); count 2); procuring a minor under the age of 16 for prostitution (§ 266i,
subd. (b)(2); count 3); pimping where the prostitute is an adult (§ 266h, subd.
(a); count 5); and procuring an adult for prostitution (§ 266i, subd. (a)(1);
count 6). (Williams, supra, H048722.) The jury also convicted Johnson of
committing a lewd or lascivious act on a child aged 14 or 15 (§ 288, subd.
(c)(1); count 4).3 (Ibid.)
In November 2020, the trial court sentenced Williams to 15 years to life
in prison on count 1, concurrent to a term of four years on count 5. The court
also imposed prison terms on counts 2, 3, and 6, all of which the court stayed
pursuant to section 654. (Williams, supra, H048722.)
B. Direct Appeal
In December 2022, this court rejected Williams’s challenges to his
convictions (including a claim of error under the RJA) but reversed the

3 All the crimes occurred on or about May 26, 2019.

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judgment and vacated Williams’s sentence based on a postsentencing
amendment to section 654 (Stats. 2021, ch. 441, § 1 [Assem. Bill No. 518]).
(Williams, supra, H048722.)
In our opinion, we concluded the legislative changes to section 654
applied to this matter (as well as Johnson’s case) because the judgment was
not yet final. (Williams, supra, H048722.) We further concluded: “Because
the record contains no clear indication that the court would not consider
reconfigured lesser sentences under current section 654 for Williams and
Johnson, we will remand so the trial court may fully resentence each of them
anew under the new law. (See People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893.)
At resentencing the trial court will have the opportunity to exercise its
discretion to apply current section 654.” (Ibid.) Furthermore, because we
vacated Williams’s sentences entirely and remanded for a “full resentencing,”
we did not consider Williams’s additional claims that his 15-years-to-life
sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment or that a criminal justice
administration fee imposed at sentencing should be vacated. (Ibid.) We
stated that Williams could raise those issues at resentencing. (Ibid.)
As noted ante, in our disposition, we “remanded to the trial court solely
for resentencing consistent with this opinion under current law, including
Penal Code section 654 as amended by Assembly Bill No. 518.” (Williams,
supra, H048722.)
We issued our remittitur on April 3, 2023.
C. Proceedings on Remand
In a sentencing memorandum filed on remand, the district attorney
maintained that, given the aggravation and mitigation in this case,
sentencing Williams on a “lesser crime” would be inappropriate. The district

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attorney urged the trial court “to decline to resentence . . . Mr. Williams to
lesser terms in this case.”
On July 25, 2023, Williams filed a memorandum in which he requested
a full resentencing based on this court’s remittitur and sought disclosure,
under section 745, subdivision (d), of 10 years of data from the district
attorney regarding charged and uncharged cases involving certain
prostitution-related offenses. In his discovery motion, Williams asserted that
his “request for data is based on the theory that the prosecution of [him] is
violative of” section 745, subdivision (a)(3).4 He further asserted that publicly
available data from the California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation (CDCR) “shows the charging of Black individuals with human
trafficking and pimping/pandering related charges occurs at a rate
disproportionate to their non-BIPOC (Black, Indigenous, and people of color)
counterparts.”
Williams alleged that in 2022, 2.9 percent of Santa Clara County
residents identified as Black or African American, but the CDCR data
showed that in December 2021, Black males constituted 88 percent of the
inmates serving prison sentences based on Santa Clara County convictions
for sex trafficking, pimping, and pandering, and in 2023, Black males
constituted 81 percent of this same population. Williams further alleged that
“the requested data will establish that [B]lack defendants are
disproportionately arrested, charged, prosecuted, convicted, and sentenced to

4 Section 745, subdivision (a)(3) provides:“The defendant was charged
or convicted of a more serious offense than defendants of other races,
ethnicities, or national origins who have engaged in similar conduct and are
similarly situated, and the evidence establishes that the prosecution more
frequently sought or obtained convictions for more serious offenses against
people who share the defendant’s race, ethnicity, or national origin in the
county where the convictions were sought or obtained.”
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prison for violations of pimping, pandering, and human trafficking when
compared to other non-Black [d]efendants – especially when compared to
their population share within this county.”
The district attorney opposed Williams’s discovery motion, arguing that
the motion exceeded the scope of this court’s limited remand order. The
district attorney maintained this matter was “remanded for resentencing for
one specified purpose: to give the trial court an opportunity to consider
exercising its new discretion under amended Penal Code section 654.” The
district attorney contended the remand order “does not empower th[e] [trial
c]ourt to litigate a Racial Justice Act challenge to pretrial and presentence
prosecutorial decisions.” The district attorney further maintained that
instead of filing a discovery motion on remand, Williams could file a petition
for writ of habeas corpus after January 1, 2024, at which time the RJA would
apply to all cases “ ‘regardless of when the judgment or disposition became
final.’ ([] § 745, subd. (j)(3).)”
On September 19, 2023, the trial court held a hearing on the discovery
motion. Williams’s defense counsel asserted that “once the case was made
unfinal by the [C]ourt of [A]ppeal[], the [trial c]ourt has a duty to apply all
new ameliorative laws.” Counsel noted that the RJA had not been in effect at
the time of Williams’s 2019 trial and disagreed with the district attorney’s
position that the discovery request should be addressed after January 1,
2024, when the RJA would be “retroactive and any person serving time in
state prison or county jail can have their sentence looked at even if it is final.”
The trial court observed that “there really isn’t any question that the
Racial Justice Act is something that needs to be addressed as part of this case
and . . . really the only question before the [c]ourt [] is essentially the
procedure -- the procedural vehicle for that to be done.” The court continued:

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“On the one hand, it can be done before a resentencing as the [d]efense is
requesting, on the other hand there is a procedure going into effect very soon
which will allow for a habeas corpus proceeding which does lend itself to
further investigation and development of facts that are beyond the record.”
The trial court further commented, “I think that it is notable that the
[C]ourt of [A]ppeal[] was specific in its remand indicating to the [c]ourt what
it should consider or what areas it was remanding the [c]ourt to consider.
And I think that the [c]ourt is limited by the remand that the [C]ourt of
[A]ppeal[] made. I don’t want to read the opinion or the remand as being so
[broad] as to reopen issues that essentially go to the underlying conviction.”
The court reiterated that it “seems inappropriate” to allow discovery in the
context of the resentencing and a habeas corpus proceeding is “more of the
appropriate vehicle.”
The trial court ruled that it is “going to treat the remand as a limited
one to allow the [c]ourt to apply the law change as directed by the [C]ourt of
[A]ppeal[] and allow the process for the Racial Justice Act to move forward on
its own and allow obviously the [d]efense to bring that issue to the [c]ourt’s
attention whenever they feel they’ve established appropriate evidence and
reasons and that can be taken up in its due course.”
After the trial court denied the discovery motion, Williams filed a
resentencing memorandum and statement in mitigation (resentencing
memorandum). Williams asked the court to exercise its discretion under
section 1385 to strike the 15-years-to-life penalty set forth in section
236.1(c)(2), and claimed such a sentence would constitute cruel and unusual

7
punishment.5 Williams challenged the three aggravating factors stated in
the probation officer’s report prepared for his original sentencing proceeding
(see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(8) & (b)(4)–(5)) and provided the trial
court information regarding his personal background, limited criminal
history, reduced relative culpability in the instant crime as an aider and
abettor/coconspirator, community support, empathy and recognition that his
actions were wrongful, and exemplary record while incarcerated. Williams
attached several documents to his resentencing memorandum, including his
high school transcript (which showed he had graduated in June 1994) and
letters from relatives, friends, and a pastor.
On December 19, 2023, the trial court resentenced Williams. The court
said it had “spent a considerable amount of time considering” the appropriate
sentence and believed “the conduct in this case is extremely serious.” The
court acknowledged “there are differences” between Williams’s and Johnson’s
conduct in this case but concluded that both “were significantly involved in
this conduct.” The court also acknowledged the information Williams had
presented about his background and history but stated that it “cannot find
that it’s in the interest of justice to strike the additional [15-years-to-life]
punishment under [section] 236.1” and that “it is most appropriate to stay

5 Section 236.1 provides in relevant part: “(c) A person who causes,
induces, or persuades, or attempts to cause, induce, or persuade, a person
who is a minor at the time of commission of the offense to engage in a
commercial sex act, with the intent to effect or maintain a violation of
[s]ection 266, 266h, 266i, 266j, 267, 311.1, 311.2, 311.3, 311.4, 311.5, 311.6, or
518 is guilty of human trafficking. A violation of this subdivision is
punishable by imprisonment in the state prison as follows: [¶] . . . [¶] (2)
Fifteen years to life and a fine of not more than five hundred thousand
dollars ($500,000) when the offense involves force, fear, fraud, deceit,
coercion, violence, duress, menace, or threat of unlawful injury to the victim
or to another person.”
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. . . the lesser punishments” rather than the punishment under section
236.1(c)(2). The court imposed 15 years to life in prison on count 1,
concurrent to a midterm of four years on count 5. The court also imposed
midterms on counts 2, 3, and 6, all of which the court stayed pursuant to
section 654.
II. DISCUSSION
A. RJA Discovery Motion
Williams contends he made the requisite showing for discovery under
section 745, subdivision (d), and the trial court erred in concluding that it
lacked jurisdiction to entertain his discovery motion on remand. Relying on
section 745, subdivision (j)(1), Williams asserts that the RJA applies to his
nonfinal judgment. He additionally argues that because the RJA took effect
after his original sentence was imposed, he is entitled to seek discovery in
connection with his resentencing and the application of the RJA to this
matter on remand is consistent with the “ ‘full resentencing rule.’ ”
The Attorney General agrees that the trial court erred in concluding it
lacked jurisdiction to consider Williams’s RJA discovery motion.
Given the California Supreme Court’s recent decision in People v. Lopez
(2025) 17 Cal.5th 388 (Lopez)—issued after the trial court’s order in this
matter—we agree and decide the trial court should have considered
Williams’s RJA discovery motion on remand.
1. Relevant Provisions of the RJA
“The Legislature passed the RJA in 2020 with a stated aim ‘to
eliminate racial bias from California’s criminal justice system’ and ‘to ensure
that race plays no role at all in seeking or obtaining convictions or in
sentencing.’ [Citation.] To that end, the RJA prohibits the state from
seeking or obtaining a criminal conviction, or seeking, obtaining, or imposing

9
a sentence, on the basis of race, ethnicity, or national origin.” (People v.
Wilson (2024) 16 Cal.5th 874, 944–945 (Wilson).)
Section 745 specifies four categories of conduct that may serve as the
basis for a violation of the Act. (§ 745, subd. (a)(1)–(4).) As relevant here,
section 745, subdivision (a) provides that “defendants may establish a
violation of the Act by showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that they
were charged or convicted of a more serious offense than defendants of other
races who are similarly situated, or that they received a longer or more
severe sentence by nature of their race, or the race of their victim. (Id., subd.
(a)(3), (4).) A defendant may request disclosure of evidence relevant to these
claims, and the trial court shall order disclosure upon a showing of good
cause. (Id., subd. (d).)”6 (Wilson, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 945; see also Young
v. Superior Court (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 138, 159 (Young) [concluding that
“good cause” for discovery under the RJA requires only “a plausible factual
foundation, based on specific facts, that a violation of the [RJA] ‘could or
might have occurred’ in [the] case”].)
“When it was first passed, the RJA applied only prospectively, to cases
in which judgment had not yet been entered as of the Act’s effective date of
January 1, 2021. [Citation.] But in 2022, the Legislature extended the Act to
additional categories of cases, effective at various points over the next several
years. [Citation.] As relevant here, the 2022 amendments made the Act
immediately applicable to all cases in which judgment is not final (§ 745,

6 Section 745, subdivision (d) provides in pertinent part: “A defendant
may file a motion requesting disclosure to the defense of all evidence relevant
to a potential violation of subdivision (a) in the possession or control of the
state. A motion filed under this section shall describe the type of records or
information the defendant seeks. Upon a showing of good cause, the court
shall order the records to be released.”
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subd. (j)(1)).” (Wilson, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 946.) Further, as of “January
1, 2024, the Act applies to all cases in which the petitioner is currently
serving a sentence for felony or juvenile offenses ‘regardless of when the
judgment or disposition became final’ (§ 745, subd. (j)(3)).” (Id., at p. 946, fn.
13.) Such petitioners may file a petition for writ of habeas corpus raising a
claim under section 745. (§§ 745, subd. (j)(3), 1473, subd. (e).)
“In 2023, the Legislature further amended the RJA to provide
additional guidance about how an RJA claim may be raised. As originally
enacted, section 745, subdivision (b) provided that a ‘defendant may file a
motion in the trial court or, if judgment has been imposed, may file a petition
for writ of habeas corpus or a motion under [s]ection 1473.7 in a court of
competent jurisdiction, alleging a violation of subdivision (a).’ As amended by
Assembly Bill No. 1118 (2023–2024 Reg. Sess.) . . ., which became effective on
January 1, 2024, the statute now specifies that a defendant ‘may file a motion
pursuant to this section, or a petition for writ of habeas corpus or a motion
under [s]ection 1473.7, in a court of competent jurisdiction, alleging a
violation of subdivision (a). For claims based on the trial record, a defendant
may raise a claim alleging a violation of subdivision (a) on direct appeal from
the conviction or sentence. The defendant may also move to stay the appeal
and request remand to the superior court to file a motion pursuant to this
section.’ (§ 745, subd. (b).)” (Wilson, supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 946–947, fn.
omitted.)
“[I]f ‘a motion is filed in the trial court and the defendant makes a
prima facie showing of a violation of subdivision (a), the trial court shall hold
a hearing.’ (§ 745, subd. (c).) If, after a hearing, the court finds a violation of
section 745, subdivision (a) by a preponderance of the evidence, the court
‘shall impose a remedy specific to the violation.’ (Id., subd. (e).) ‘Before a

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judgment has been entered,’ a court may remedy a violation of the Act by
declaring a mistrial, empaneling a new jury, dismissing enhancements or
special circumstances or allegations, or reducing one or more charges. (Id.,
subd. (e)(1)(A), (B), (C).) ‘After a judgment has been entered,’ the remedies
depend on the nature of the violation but include vacating the sentence and
conviction and ordering further proceedings. (Id., subd. (e)(2)(A), (B).)”
(Wilson, supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 945–946; see also § 745, subd. (k) [allowing
the state to prove “beyond a reasonable doubt that the violation did not
contribute to the judgment” “[f]or petitions that are filed in cases for which
judgment was entered before January 1, 2021, and only in those cases, if the
petition is based on a violation of paragraph (1) or (2) of subdivision (a)”].)
2. Principles Governing Remand Orders
“Ordinarily, an appellate court has, among others, the power to remand
a cause to the trial court ‘for such further proceedings as may be just under
the circumstances.’ ” (People v. Flores (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1059, 1065; see also
§ 1260; Wilson, supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 948–949.) “It is well-established that
‘[t]he order of the reviewing court is contained in its remittitur, which defines
the scope of the jurisdiction of the court to which the matter is returned.’
[Citations.] In short, when an appellate court remands a matter with
directions governing the proceedings on remand, ‘ “those directions are
binding on the trial court and must be followed. Any material variance from
the directions is unauthorized and void.” ’ ” (People v. Ramirez (2019) 35
Cal.App.5th 55, 64, italics omitted; see also People v. Lewis (2004) 33 Cal.4th
214, 228.) “[T]he dispositional language of the opinion . . . constitutes the
remittitur directions.” (Frankel v. Four Star International, Inc. (1980) 104
Cal.App.3d 897, 902.)

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Notwithstanding these well-established principles, our Supreme Court
recently made clear that “[t]he scope of the superior court’s jurisdiction as
defined by a remittitur does not prevent the retroactive application of
ameliorative laws.” (Lopez, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 396.) “[A] criminal case in
which the sentence is not yet final, including one in which an appellate court
has affirmed the conviction and remanded for reconsideration of sentencing-
related issues, is not final for purposes of [In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d
740], and the benefits of supervening ameliorative legislation apply
retroactively.” (Id. at pp. 392–393; see also id. at p. 397 [“ ‘there is no
“judgment of conviction” without a sentence’ ”].)
3. Standard of Review
Generally, an appellate court reviews a trial court’s ruling on a
defendant’s discovery motion for an abuse of discretion. (People v. Prince
(2007) 40 Cal.4th 1179, 1232.) We review de novo the trial court’s
interpretation of a remittitur. (See Ruegg & Ellsworth v. City of Berkeley
(2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 258, 264; Ayyad v. Sprint Spectrum, L.P. (2012) 210
Cal.App.4th 851, 859.) “We look to the wording of our directions, read in
conjunction with the opinion as a whole.” (Ruegg & Ellsworth, at p. 264.)
Likewise, “[t]he interpretation of a statute and the determination of the
scope of a trial court’s authority under relevant statutes are questions of law
that we review de novo.” (People v. Rogers (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 340, 354
(Rogers).) “ ‘It is well settled that the proper goal of statutory construction “is
to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent, giving the words of the statute
their usual and ordinary meaning. When the statutory language is clear, we
need go no further.” ’ [Citation.] We consider the language in the context of
the entire statute and the statutory scheme of which it is a part [citation],

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harmonizing provisions relating to the same subject matter, to the extent
possible.” (Satele v. Superior Court (2019) 7 Cal.5th 852, 858–859.)
4. Analysis
Section 745 expressly applies “[t]o all cases in which judgment is not
final.” (Id., subd. (j)(1).) The judgment in this case was not final when
Williams filed his discovery motion on remand. (See People v. Padilla (2022)
13 Cal.5th 152, 162–163.) Under the plain terms of section 745, subdivision
(j)(1), section 745 applied to this nonfinal case during the remand
proceedings. (See People v. Garcia (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 290, 297–298
(Garcia).)
Nothing in section 745, subdivision (d), limits when during a criminal
action the defendant may file a motion requesting information relevant to a
potential RJA violation. In the absence of such a limitation and given the
Legislature’s intent “to ensure that individuals have access to all relevant
evidence . . . regarding potential discrimination in seeking or obtaining
convictions or imposing sentences” (Stats. 2020, ch. 317, § 2(j)), we construe
section 745, subdivision (d) to permit discovery during a remand proceeding
that encompasses a full resentencing. (See People v. Serrano (2024) 106
Cal.App.5th 276, 287, review granted Jan. 15, 2025, S288202 [“Although the
statute is not explicit about the scope of its application, the plain language of
subdivision (d) does not limit the availability of discovery to pretrial
proceedings and habeas corpus proceedings.”]; Young, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th
at p. 169 [observing that “where a court is inclined to deny a motion
presented so close to the date of trial that the discovery process itself
threatens to interfere with the court’s obligation to provide a speedy trial,
such a motion should be denied without prejudice to its renewal posttrial or
even postjudgment”].)

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As detailed ante (see pt. I.B.), our remittitur affirmed Williams’s
convictions but reversed the judgment, vacated Williams’s sentence, and
remanded “solely for resentencing consistent with [our] opinion under current
law,” including section 654. (Williams, supra, H048722.) In the body of our
opinion, we explained that our remand encompassed a full resentencing.
(Ibid.; see Rogers, supra, 108 Cal.App.5th at p. 358 [“ ‘the full resentencing
rule allows a court to revisit all prior sentencing decisions when resentencing
a defendant’ ”].)
Given that section 745 expressly applied to this matter on remand and
authorized Williams’s discovery motion pending resentencing, section 745 is a
“current law” applicable to Williams’s full resentencing. (See Garcia, supra,
85 Cal.App.5th at p. 298; see also Dix v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 442,
460 [“[I]t is well settled that when a case is remanded for resentencing after
an appeal, the defendant is entitled to ‘all the normal rights and procedures
available at his original sentencing’ [citations], including consideration of any
pertinent circumstances which have arisen since the prior sentence was
imposed.”]; Lopez, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 396.) We thus conclude the trial
court should have considered Williams’s discovery motion under section 745,
subdivision (d) on remand.
Regarding the remedy for this error, Williams asks us to reverse his
sentence and remand the matter for further proceedings under section 745,
subdivision (d). By contrast, the Attorney General asserts that we should
affirm Williams’s sentence (rejecting his cruel and unusual punishment
claim) and remand “for the limited purpose of conducting proceedings related
to [Williams]’s RJA discovery motion.”
Given our conclusion post that Williams’s current sentence does not
amount to cruel and/or unusual punishment, we will conditionally reverse the

15
judgment but affirm the sentence and remand solely for the trial court to
conduct proceedings on Williams’s discovery motion, as well as any further
RJA motion Williams may choose to file under section 745, subdivision (b).
(See People v. Howard (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 625, 663 [conditionally
reversing the judgment and remanding for further proceedings on
defendant’s RJA motion but otherwise affirming defendant’s conviction and
sentence]; see also People v. Gaines (2009) 46 Cal.4th 172, 180 [“[T]he proper
remedy when a trial court has erroneously rejected a showing of good cause
for Pitchess discovery and has not reviewed the requested records in camera
is not outright reversal, but a conditional reversal with directions to review
the requested documents in chambers on remand.”]; Id., at p. 181, fn. 3;
People v. Moore (2006) 39 Cal.4th 168, 176–177.)
We express no opinion on the merits of Williams’s discovery motion or
the remedy that should be imposed if Williams were to file a motion under
section 745, subdivision (b), and the trial court were to find that Williams has
proved a violation of the Act.
B. Cruel and Unusual Punishment Claim
Williams acknowledges that his 15-years-to-life sentence for “coerc[ing]
a minor into human trafficking might be appropriate in the abstract.”
Nevertheless, he contends his role in the offense was “relatively minor” and
he was “much less culpable” than codefendant Johnson, who received the
same sentence. Williams points to his background, minimal criminal history,
and “ ‘below average risk’ ” for committing another sexual offense as reasons
why a “life sentence is disproportionate to a need to protect the public.” He
cites his substantial familial and community support, as well as his positive
behavior while incarcerated. He asserts that his sentence is equivalent to
that imposed for the incomparable crime of second degree murder and so

16
disproportionate to his culpability as to constitute cruel and unusual
punishment under the federal and state constitutions.
1. Applicable Law
The United States Constitution prohibits “ ‘ “cruel and unusual”
punishment,’ ” while the California Constitution prohibits “ ‘ “[c]ruel or
unusual” punishment.’ ” (People v. Baker (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 711, 723
(Baker).) “ ‘As a result, we construe the state constitutional provision
“separately from its counterpart in the federal Constitution.” ’ ” (Ibid.; see
also People v. Haller (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1080, 1092 [“California affords
greater protection to criminal defendants by prohibiting cruel ‘or’ unusual
punishment.”].)
“The Eighth Amendment contains a ‘ “narrow proportionality principle”
that “applies to noncapital sentences.” ’ [Citation.] ‘This right protects
persons from excessive punishment, so that a sanction for criminal behavior
is graduated and proportional to the severity of the offense.’ [Citation.]
However, ‘[t]he Eighth Amendment does not require strict proportionality
between crime and sentence. Rather, it forbids only extreme sentences that
are “grossly disproportionate” to the crime.’ [Citation.] Consequently,
‘[s]uccessful challenges based on proportionality are extremely rare.’ ”
(People v. Guenther (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 483, 532 (Guenther).)
“Article I, section 17 of the California Constitution ‘ “separately and
independently lays down the same prohibition” ’ against ‘ “the imposition of a
penalty that is disproportionate to the defendant’s ‘personal responsibility
and moral guilt.’ ” ’ [Citation.] Under the California Constitution, a sentence
may violate the prohibition against cruel or unusual punishment if ‘ “it is so
disproportionate to the crime for which it is inflicted that it shocks the
conscience and offends fundamental notions of human dignity.” ’ [Citation.]

17
Three factors in ascertaining if a punishment is cruel or unusual are (1) the
nature of the offense and the nature of the offender with regard to the degree
of danger both present to society, (2) a comparison of the punishment with
the punishments prescribed for more serious crimes in the jurisdiction, and
(3) a comparison of the punishment with punishments for the same offense in
other jurisdictions.” (Guenther, supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at pp. 532–533.)
“We independently decide as a question of law whether a punishment is
cruel or unusual, viewing any underlying disputed facts in the light most
favorable to the judgment.” (Guenther, supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at p. 533.)
2. Analysis
Beginning with the factors relevant to our state constitutional
prohibition against cruel or unusual punishment, the first factor regarding
the nature of the offense and the offender does not favor Williams. As
detailed in our prior opinion (Williams, supra, H048722), Williams was 43
years old when he committed the charged crimes in 2019. He met the 14-
year-old victim, A. Doe (hereafter A.), at a hotel in Gary, Indiana, after she
had had sex with a man in a hotel room. Williams asked A. what was going
on and if she needed anything. A. told Williams she had gotten into a fight
and had nowhere to go. He invited her to his room, gave her ecstasy, and
asked if she wanted to go to California to make money. A. thought Williams
was referring to drug dealing and agreed. Williams transported A. to
California in coordination with his cousin Johnson. After Williams and A.
arrived in California, Williams hit A. and kicked and stomped on her face,
causing a broken blood vessel in her eye and leaving a shoe-shaped mark on
her. Williams accompanied Johnson and A. (among others) in a prostitution
circuit around California and booked hotel rooms for the enterprise.
Williams’s cell phone included A.’s cell phone number, which was listed under

18
the name “ ‘ “Bitch.” ’ ” (Ibid.) In a text message to A., Williams wrote
“ ‘ “You fuck my cuz,” ’ ” threatened that A. “ ‘ “better have some money,” ’ ”
and referred to her “ ‘ “wet ass.” ’ ” (Ibid.) Other text messages appeared to
show Williams communicating with customers responding to prostitution
advertisements. When the police responded to A.’s text message to a crisis
hotline sent from a Motel 6 in San Jose, Williams told them the “ ‘ “girl is in
the room” ’ ” and gave them the key to A.’s room. (Ibid.)
Regarding Williams’s background, at the time of the crimes, Williams
was on formal probation (granted in Missouri in June 2018) following a
conviction for possession of a controlled substance. In addition, Williams had
previously been convicted of misdemeanors in Georgia for driving with a
suspended or revoked license and criminal trespass. He had an outstanding
misdemeanor warrant from Georgia (issued in 2016) for violating probation
on his criminal trespass conviction. He also had an outstanding felony
warrant from Placer County (issued in 2017) for unauthorized use of personal
identifying information (§ 530.5, subd. (a)), burglary (§ 459), and grand theft
(§ 487, subd. (a)).
Although Williams’s criminal history was relatively minor and his score
on the Static-99R (a risk assessment instrument) indicated that he presents a
below average risk for sexual offense recidivism, these facts are negligible in
comparison to his weeks-long participation (while on probation) in an ongoing
criminal enterprise involving a vulnerable minor who was coerced into
repeated acts of prostitution. (See Baker, supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 725
[explaining the defendant’s “ ‘insignificant criminal record’ ” and lack of prior
history of sex crimes are favorable to him but “do not outweigh the other
factors”].) We acknowledge Williams’s positive conduct (including his
caregiving for sick family members, efforts to rebuild his relationships with

19
family and friends, and commendable behavior while in custody) and the
hardships and tragedies Williams has endured in his life (as described in his
resentencing memorandum). Even considering these positive and mitigating
circumstances, the totality of Williams’s behavior surrounding the charged
offenses evinces his willingness to act with callousness toward a vulnerable
minor and weighs against him under the first factor.
Turning to the second factor, “[t]he human trafficking statute (§ 236.1)
was modified in 2012 by Proposition 35, the Californians Against Sexual
Exploitation Act (CASE Act). (Prop. 35, § 6, as approved by voters, Gen. Elec.
(Nov. 6, 2012), eff. Nov. 7, 2012.) The measure added subdivision (c)” (People
v. Moses (2020) 10 Cal.5th 893, 901 (Moses)), which provides for a
punishment of 15 years to life under certain circumstances. (§ 236.1(c)(2).)
“The ballot materials make clear that a primary goal of Proposition 35
was to stop the exploitation of children by online predators.” (Moses, supra,
10 Cal.5th at p. 910.) “The following findings, among others, are included in
the CASE Act: ‘The people of the State of California find and declare: [¶]
1. Protecting every person in our state, particularly our children, from all
forms of sexual exploitation is of paramount importance. [¶] 2. Human
trafficking is a crime against human dignity and a grievous violation of basic
human and civil rights. Human trafficking is modern slavery, manifested
through the exploitation of another’s vulnerabilities. [¶] 3. Upwards of
300,000 American children are at risk of commercial sexual exploitation,
according to a United States Department of Justice study. Most are enticed
into the sex trade at the age of 12 to 14 years old, but some are trafficked as
young as four years old. Because minors are legally incapable of consenting
to sexual activity, these minors are victims of human trafficking whether or
not force is used.’ ” (In re M.D. (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 993, 998–999.)

20
“The stated purpose of the law was to ‘ensure just and effective
punishment of people who promote or engage in the crime of human
trafficking.’ [Citation.] To that end, the measure increased the punishment
for human trafficking of minors from four, six, or eight years in prison
[citation], to five, eight, or 12 years for nonforcible trafficking, and 15 years to
life when the offense involves force, fear, fraud, or other enumerated factors.”
(Moses, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 910.)
Generally, “we must defer to the Legislature and the people of
California . . . in adoption of a penological theory and in determination of the
length of sentences.” (People v. Mantanez (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 354, 364; see
also People v. Martinez (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 489, 494; Baker, supra, 20
Cal.App.5th at p. 727.) In comparing the 15-years-to-life sentence prescribed
by section 236.1(c)(2), with punishments prescribed for other crimes, given
the grave harm and trauma caused by human trafficking, the electorate’s
decision to punish aggravated sex trafficking of a minor commensurate with
second degree murder (§ 190, subd. (a)) “does not suggest this is that ‘rarest
of cases’ in which ‘the length of a sentence mandated by the Legislature [or
electorate] is unconstitutionally excessive.’ ” (Baker, at p. 730.) In fact, the
Legislature has prescribed a sentence of 15 years to life in prison for several
aggravated sex offenses. (See, e.g., §§ 269, subd. (b) [punishing aggravated
sexual assault of a child by imprisonment for 15 years to life], 667.61, subd.
(b) [California’s One Strike law requiring a sentence of 15 years to life for
certain sexual offenses under aggravating circumstances].) The Legislature
and electorate have clearly evinced their intent to strictly punish those who
commit aggravated sexual offenses (especially those perpetrated on minors),
and we defer to “ ‘legislation designed to protect children, who all too
frequently are helpless victims of sexual offenses.’ ” (Baker, at p. 729.)

21
Because Williams in his appellate briefing does not address the third
factor (i.e., to compare his sentence with punishments in other states for the
same offense), we consider this “a concession that his sentence withstands a
constitutional challenge” under that factor of the state constitutional
analysis. (People v. Retanan (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 1219, 1231.)
Considering the relevant factors in context, we conclude that Williams’s
sentence does not violate the California Constitution’s prohibition against
cruel or unusual punishment because his term of 15 years to life in prison is
not so disproportionate to his crime that it shocks the conscience and offends
fundamental notions of human dignity. Likewise, we conclude under the
Eighth Amendment that Williams fails to show this is “ ‘the rare case in
which a threshold comparison of the crime committed and the sentence
imposed leads to an inference of gross disproportionality.’ ” (Ewing v.
California (2003) 538 U.S. 11, 30 [holding that a sentence of 25 years to life,
imposed for the offense of felony grand theft under the Three Strikes law, is
not grossly disproportionate]; see also United States v. Alaboudi (8th Cir.
2015) 786 F.3d 1136, 1146; United States v. Flanders (11th Cir. 2014) 752
F.3d 1317, 1343.)
C. Correction to the Abstract of Judgment
Although not raised by either Williams or the Attorney General, the
abstract of judgment (dated December 28, 2023) is incomplete. Although
Williams was sentenced to both indeterminate and determinate terms, the
trial court clerk completed only a single abstract of judgment designed for an
indeterminate commitment (Judicial Council form CR-292) and listed the
determinate-term counts (counts 2, 3, 5 & 6) on that abstract (without stating
the sentences imposed by the court on those determinate-term counts in the
abstract of judgment). The determinate terms imposed by the trial court

22
should have been listed on a separate abstract of judgment applicable to
determinate terms. (See Judicial Council form CR-290.)
If the trial court does not conduct a new resentencing proceeding on
remand, we direct the trial court to prepare separate abstracts of judgment
for the indeterminate term (on count 1) and the determinate terms (on counts
2, 3, 5 & 6) of Williams’s present sentence and transmit those abstracts to the
CDCR.
III. DISPOSITION

The judgment is conditionally reversed, and the matter is remanded for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion on Williams’s motion for
discovery under Penal Code section 745, subdivision (d), and any further
motion Williams may file under section 745, subdivision (b). We otherwise
affirm Williams’s sentence. If the trial court denies Williams relief under
section 745 on remand, the judgment will be reinstated. If the trial court
grants Williams relief under section 745 on remand, the trial court shall
conduct any further proceedings as necessary.
If the trial court reinstates the judgment and does not conduct a new
sentencing proceeding on remand, the trial court is directed to prepare
separate abstracts of judgment for the indeterminate term (on count 1) and
the determinate terms (on counts 2, 3, 5 & 6) of Williams’s present sentence.
The trial court clerk is directed to forward a copy of those abstracts of
judgment to the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.

23
______________________________________
Danner, J.

WE CONCUR:

____________________________________
Greenwood, P. J.

____________________________________
Lie, J.

H051767
The People v. Williams

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