CourtListener 10596770•People v. Kahn CA3
Texte intégral
Filed 6/2/25 P. v. Kahn CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
----
THE PEOPLE, C101308
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 96F07764)
v.
MUSTAQ ALI KAHN,
Defendant and Appellant.
Defendant Mustaq Ali Kahn appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for an
evidence preserving proceeding pursuant to People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261.
The trial court denied defendant’s motion following our Supreme Court’s decision in
People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834 (Hardin II). Defendant contends an exception to
the holding of Hardin II was stated in People v. Briscoe (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th
479 (Briscoe), which was decided after the court’s denial of his motion, and he asks us to
reverse the court’s order in light of Briscoe. We agree and reverse the court’s order. We
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remand with directions to allow defendant the opportunity to demonstrate his eligibility
for a Franklin hearing.
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
Factual Background
The following facts are taken from the probation report, which is the only source
of the facts in the record on appeal. “On September 27, 1996, the 24 year old victim did
not appear at his job or contact his employer. When his brother, also his roommate,
returned home that evening he found the victim’s vehicle was gone from its parking spot
at their apartment complex. Earlier in the day, the victim’s family had become alarmed
and telephoned the victim’s brother when the victim had been reported absent from work.
The victim’s brother called the police to file a missing person’s report.
“When officers arrived, the victim’s brother and officers began checking the
apartment for the victim’s personal belongings. The victim’s brother opened a closet
door in the victim’s bedroom where he saw a blanket spread out on the floor. When he
pulled the blanket back, the victim’s brother found the nude body of the victim, face
down with his hands tied behind his back with a necktie. Another necktie was tightly
wrapped around the victim’s neck . . . . The victim’s ankles were tied together with a
long-sleeved T-shirt.
“On September 27, 1996, the defendant was stopped by the San Leandro Police
Department for a vehicle code violation. The defendant, who had no driver’s license, was
recognized as being wanted for the charges of kidnap, assault with intent to commit rape,
false imprisonment and sexual battery . . . . He was transported to the Hayward Jail,
where he was found to be in possession of the victim’s VISA and Master Card charge
cards. A check with the credit card companies revealed they had not been reported stolen
at that time. The defendant indicated ‘a friend let me use those’ . . . . The vehicle the
defendant was driving, which he stated a friend had given him to use, was subsequently
discovered to be the victim’s.
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“On September 28, 1996, the defendant was transported to the Sacramento County
Jail where, during an initial interview, he stated he had met a ‘black fellow’ at the
7[-]Eleven and that subject had taken him to Fairfield, gotten out of the car and left the
car with the defendant. The defendant stated he had found the victim’s credit cards in the
car and put them in his pocket. Eventually, the defendant admitted to the offense. He
had been living in the same apartment complex as the victim, where he had been
attempting to get someone to drive him to San Leandro to see his wife. He went to the
victim’s apartment where, after being allowed entry, he asked the victim for a ride to
Oakland. When the victim declined to give him a ride, the defendant committed the
offense. During the preliminary hearing, the defendant recanted, stating he had been
tortured and coerced into making the confession.”
Procedural History
A jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a))1
and robbery (§ 211) and found true the special circumstance allegation that the murder
occurred while defendant was engaged in the commission of robbery (§ 190.2,
subd. (a)(17)). The trial court sentenced defendant to life in prison without parole
(LWOP) for murder, and four years for robbery, stayed pursuant to section 654.
Defendant appealed his original conviction, and a different panel of this court affirmed,
as relevant here, the murder conviction and special circumstance finding.2 (People v.
Kahn (Feb. 19, 1999, C027590) [nonpub. opn.].)
In 2023, defendant filed a motion for a Franklin hearing to preserve mitigating
evidence tied to his youth under the authority of People v. Hardin (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th
1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 The Attorney General notes that he was unable to locate a copy of this court’s opinion
in defendant’s direct appeal and requests that we take judicial notice of that opinion.
However, like the Attorney General, we have not been able to locate a copy of the
opinion.
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273 (Hardin I), reversed in 2024 by Hardin II. At the time, Hardin I allowed youth
offenders who were sentenced to LWOP to preserve evidence that may be used for a later
youth offender parole hearing pursuant to section 3051. (Hardin I, at pp. 290-291.)
Defendant’s motion alleged that he was between the ages of 18 and 25 when he
committed the underlying offense, and the denial of youthful parole consideration for
those who committed such crimes between those ages and received an LWOP sentence,
while those who received a de facto LWOP during the same age range were considered
for youthful parole, violated equal protection.
On March 4, 2024, our Supreme Court decided Hardin II, supra, 15 Cal.5th at
page 834. The court in Hardin II concluded, “[w]ithout foreclosing the possibility of
other as-applied challenges to the statute,” that section 3051’s exclusion of youth LWOP
offenders does not violate equal protection, “either on its face or as applied to [those]
serving [LWOP] sentences for special circumstance murder” generally. (Hardin II, at p.
839.)
On May 7, 2024, the trial court denied defendant’s motion on the basis that his
requested relief was foreclosed by Hardin II. No facts were presented in the motion, and
the court did not cite any facts when denying the motion.
Defendant timely filed a notice of appeal. The case was fully briefed in March
2025 and was assigned to the current panel later that month.
DISCUSSION
“[S]ection 3051 grants certain youth offenders convicted of a controlling offense
committed before the age of 26 an opportunity to seek parole. The statute excludes those
sentenced to life without parole who were over 18 when they offended. (§ 3051, subd.
(h).)” (Briscoe, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 484, fn. omitted.) The purpose of a
Franklin hearing is to provide defendants eligible for a youth offender parole hearing an
opportunity to put on the record closer in time to the offense “ ‘the kinds of information
that sections 3051 and 4801 deem relevant at a youth offender parole hearing.’ ” (In re
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Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439, 446.) Accordingly, a defendant’s entitlement to a Franklin
hearing depends on their entitlement to a youth offender parole hearing under section
3051. Here, defendant requests that we remand the matter to the trial court for the
purpose of providing him with the opportunity to demonstrate that he is entitled to a
Franklin hearing. As we will explain, because the record does not conclusively
demonstrate that defendant is not entitled to a Franklin hearing, we will remand for the
trial court to provide defendant with the opportunity to establish his eligibility for such a
hearing.
I
Special Circumstance Felony-Murder
We begin with a brief overview of special circumstance felony-murder. Under the
felony-murder doctrine in effect at the time of defendant’s trial, a defendant could be
found guilty of murder without any showing of an intent to kill or implied malice if the
defendant or an accomplice killed someone during the commission, or attempted
commission, of an inherently dangerous felony. (People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698,
704.) Murder occurring during certain serious or violent felonies were of the first degree,
while others were of the second degree. (Ibid.) A defendant convicted of first degree
murder could be sentenced to LWOP if the jury found that the murder’s commission
involved one of several statutorily defined special circumstances, including, as relevant
here, felony murder. (Ibid.; § 190.2, subd. (a)(17).) The felony-murder special
circumstance applied to murders committed in the course of robbery, among other serious
felonies. (Strong, at p. 704; § 190.2, subd. (a)(17).) “Like the other special
circumstances, the felony-murder special circumstance applies to defendants who
actually killed ([§ 190.2], subd. (b)) or who abetted a murder with the intent to kill (id.,
subd. (c)). But unlike the other special circumstances, the felony-murder special
circumstance also applies to some convicted murderers who neither killed nor intended to
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kill, namely, ‘major participant[s]’ in the underlying felony who acted ‘with reckless
indifference to human life.’ (Id., subd. (d).)” (Strong, at p. 704.)
In People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 and People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th
522, our Supreme Court “clarified the meaning of the special circumstances statute.” (In
re Scoggins (2020) 9 Cal.5th 667, 671.) Banks held that a “major participant” in a
robbery is someone whose “personal involvement” is “substantial” and “greater than the
actions of an ordinary aider and abettor” (Banks, at pp. 800-801), and Clark clarified that
“ ‘reckless indifference,’ . . . encompasses a willingness to kill (or to assist another in
killing) to achieve a distinct aim, even if the defendant does not specifically desire that
death as the outcome of his actions” (Clark, at p. 617).
II
Hardin I and II
In Hardin I, the appellate court concluded section 3051 violated equal protection
because it allowed youthful offenders who were not sentenced to LWOP to seek youthful
parole but prohibited those sentenced to LWOP from seeking that relief. (Hardin I,
supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 291.)
In Hardin II, our Supreme Court reversed Hardin I and held: “Without foreclosing
the possibility of other as-applied challenges to the statute, we conclude that [the
defendant] has not demonstrated that . . . section 3051’s exclusion of young adult
offenders sentenced to [LWOP] is constitutionally invalid under a rational basis standard,
either on its face or as applied to [the defendant] and other individuals who are serving
[LWOP] sentences for special circumstance murder. Under California law, special
circumstance murder is a uniquely serious offense, punishable only by death or [LWOP].
When it was considering whether to expand the youth offender parole system to include
not only juvenile offenders but also certain young adults, the Legislature could rationally
balance the seriousness of the offender’s crimes against the capacity of all young adults
for growth, and determine that young adults who have committed certain very serious
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crimes should remain ineligible for release from prison. [The defendant] has not
demonstrated that the Legislature acted irrationally in declining to grant the possibility of
parole to young adult offenders convicted of special circumstance murder, even as it has
granted youth offender hearings to young adults convicted of other offenses.” (Hardin II,
supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 839.)
III
Briscoe
After the trial court denied defendant’s motion based on Hardin II, the First
Appellate District issued Briscoe, in which the defendant raised an equal protection
challenge to section 3051’s inclusion of youth offenders convicted of first degree felony
murder under section 189, subdivision (e)(3) while excluding those sentenced for felony-
murder special circumstance murder under section 190.2, subdivision (d). (Briscoe,
supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at pp. 489-490.) The appellate court agreed with the challenge.
As we set forth ante, section 190.2, subdivision (d) provides that a jury may find a
special circumstance true (resulting in an LWOP sentence) where a defendant is not the
actual killer but who “with reckless indifference to human life and as a major participant,
aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces, solicits, requests, or assists in the commission
of” one of the felonies enumerated in section 190.2, subdivision (a). Under section 189,
subdivision (e)(3), an accomplice to a felony murder is guilty of murder if he was “a
major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human
life, as described in subdivision (d) of [s]ection 190.2.” The court in Briscoe observed
that both sections 190.2, subdivision (d) and 189, subdivision (e)(3) “now require a
person who is not the actual killer or did not have the intent to kill to be a major
participant in the underlying felony and act with reckless indifference to human life.”
(Briscoe, at p. 489.) The court concluded that because section 190.2, subdivision (d)
“describes the exact same circumstances and conduct that is now necessary to support a
conviction for first degree felony murder under section 189, subdivision (e)(3),” the
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disparate treatment of offenders who committed murder per these identical provisions
during the same underlying felonies cannot reflect any difference in culpability. (Briscoe,
at p. 492.) Accordingly, excluding accomplices who did not actually kill the victim from
youth offender parole hearings because they have a section 190.2 special circumstance
finding, while allowing defendants who have a conviction solely under section 189,
subdivision (e)(3) to seek that relief, violates equal protection on an as-applied basis.
(Briscoe, at p. 494.)
The Briscoe court acknowledged that a felony-murder conviction and special
circumstances felony-murder conviction for the actual killer presented a different
question of culpability. The Attorney General had argued that there was a rational basis
for the distinction the defendant challenged in that case because felony-murder special
circumstance requires “ ‘an independent or concurrent felonious purpose distinct from
any intent to kill.’ ” (Briscoe, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 494.) The court observed:
“The felony-murder offense ‘is established merely upon a showing that the defendant
killed during the commission or attempted commission of the felony.’ [Citation.] With
respect to the felony-murder special circumstance, courts have fashioned the independent
felonious purpose rule so that the special circumstance ‘applies “when the murder occurs
during the commission of the felony, not when the felony occurs during the commission
of a murder.” ’ [Citation.] In other words, ‘[i]f the defendant committed the felony for
the sole purpose of effectuating the killing,’ the special circumstance does not apply.”
(Ibid.) The court concluded that rule had no application in that case, where the defendant
was neither the actual killer nor acted with an intent to kill. (Ibid.)
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IV
Analysis
The Attorney General argues that remand is not required because Briscoe is
distinguishable on the basis that the special circumstance finding in Briscoe was made
under section 190.2, subdivision (d), whereas here the finding was made under section
190.2, subdivision (a)(17)(A), which he contends required the jury to find that defendant
was either the actual killer or an accomplice. We disagree. As we have discussed, a
special circumstance finding under section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17) can be made on the
basis that the defendant was the actual perpetrator (id., subd. (b)), an aider and abettor
(id., subd. (c)), or a major participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life
(id., subd. (d)). Thus, we cannot conclude that defendant was the actual killer or that he
acted with intent to kill solely on the basis that the jury found the special circumstance
true under section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17).
The Attorney General further argues that the probation report, upon which both
parties rely to provide the facts of the case, demonstrates that defendant was the sole
perpetrator. We decline to deprive defendant of the opportunity to present evidence at a
hearing on remand purely on the basis of the probation report, which “ ‘ordinarily is not
part of the record of conviction.’ ” (People v. Soto (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 813, 816, fn.
2.) While the probation report does not indicate that anyone else was involved in
defendant’s crime, the report does not foreclose such a possibility. Accordingly, we will
remand the matter to allow defendant to present evidence that he is entitled to a Franklin
hearing. We express no opinion as to what the trial court’s decision should ultimately be
in that regard.
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DISPOSITION
The order denying defendant’s request for a Franklin hearing is reversed, and the
matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
/s/
Duarte, J.
We concur:
/s/
Hull, Acting P. J.
/s/
Robie, J.
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