CourtListener 10596636•People v. Munoz CA4/3
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Filed 6/2/25 P. v. Munoz CA4/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, G063144
v. (Super. Ct. No. 17NF0391)
HERIBERTO HERNANDEZ OPINION
MUNOZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Kimberly Menninger, Judge. Affirmed.
Alex Coolman, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Steve
Oetting and Eric Tran, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
* * *
A homicide that would otherwise be murder may instead be
reduced to voluntary manslaughter if the defendant acted in imperfect
(unreasonable) self-defense, or the defendant was provoked by a “sudden
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quarrel or heat of passion.” (Pen. Code, § 192, subd. (a).)
In this case, defendant Heriberto Hernandez Munoz fought with
Javier Martinez. After Munoz knocked Martinez to the ground, Munoz hit
Martinez in the head with a large rock causing fatal injuries to his skull.
The People charged Munoz with murder. At trial, Munoz testified
that he thought Martinez was trying to kill him and he felt provoked. The
court instructed the jury on murder and voluntary manslaughter. The jury
found Munoz guilty of first degree murder (premeditated and deliberate).
Munoz claims the trial court erred by using the official jury
instructions for murder and voluntary manslaughter. Munoz also claims the
prosecutor misstated the law on voluntary manslaughter. But Munoz did not
raise these claims at trial, so they have been forfeited on appeal. In any
event, we find they are without merit. Thus, we affirm the judgment.
I.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Munoz and Martinez were fighting in an area similar to a flood
control channel. At one point, Martinez was lying face up in the shallow
water and was motionless. Munoz was on top of Martinez and repeatedly
punched him. Munoz grabbed a large, one-and-a-half foot rock, raised it to his
head, and threw it at Martinez’s head. Munoz then laughed loudly and
pointed at Martinez. During the encounter, a witness called the police.
1
Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
Police Investigation
When police arrived on the scene an officer saw Munoz standing
over Martinez’s lifeless body. Martinez had sustained multiple lacerations to
his forehead, eye area, nose, and upper lip. There was sand around his nose,
mouth, and eyes.
A later autopsy revealed that Martinez had sustained compound
fractures to his forehead, a broken jaw, broken cheek bones, a fracture to the
cartilage in his neck, and a fracture to his ribs. Martinez’s nose was almost
completely removed. Brain matter could be seen coming out of Martinez’s
skull. A coroner opined that based on the severity of Martinez’s injuries, they
were caused by a heavy object rather than by fists. The coroner opined
Martinez died of blunt force trauma to his head.
Munoz told an officer at the scene that Martinez said he had
killed Munoz’s former girlfriend (there was no evidence of this), and Martinez
“wanted to fight with me. He wanted to kill me.” Munoz told the officer: “Be
careful with him. ‘Cuz maybe he’s not dead.”
Munoz later told a homicide investigator that Martinez was
involved with witchcraft, and Martinez had told him that he had drowned
Munoz’s former girlfriend, whom he had not seen in over a year. Munoz said
Martinez had “made a little doll and he tied it up and put in underneath a
tree.” Munoz told the investigator that Martinez had been insulting him for
about three or four months. Munoz said he got angry with Martinez, and they
started fighting. Munoz said that after Martinez hit him with a tube, he
grabbed Martinez and hit him six or seven times with his fist: “I think I even
broke his head.” Munoz claimed that Martinez wanted to hit him with a rock,
and he was not sure whether he took the rock away from Martinez. Munoz
said that he put enough sand on Martinez’s face “so he didn’t breathe.”
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Court Proceedings
The People filed an information charging Munoz with one count
of murder. The court conducted an 11-day jury trial.
During the defense portion of the trial, Munoz testified he had
broken up with his girlfriend about a year prior to Martinez’s death. Munoz
said that he had met Martinez about two or three years prior to his death.
Munoz testified that Martinez had made fun of him for several months
because Munoz’s girlfriend had cheated on him and left him.
Munoz testified that on the day of the killing, Martinez hit him
with the tube, and after that they started fighting. Munoz said that Martinez
told him that he had killed Munoz’s former girlfriend, and he believed it.
Munoz testified he felt like Martinez “wanted to kill me.” Munoz said
Martinez bit him, and during the fight Martinez “was mocking” him. Munoz
testified he was angry and was fighting for his life. Munoz said that after
punching Martinez, he noticed that he had damaged Martinez’s face, and he
stopped because he was confused. Munoz testified that Martinez had grabbed
a rock, and he held Martinez’s hand. Munoz said that he started putting dirt
on Martinez because “I was afraid he would get up and hurt me.”
A defense expert testified that some people believe that spells can
ruin their lives. Another defense expert testified that a person in fight or
flight mode may experience a human alarm reaction, and “the presence of a
weapon increases the arousal and intensity of this response.”
After the conclusion of evidence, the trial court instructed the
jury on murder and voluntary manslaughter (heat of passion and imperfect
self-defense). The jury found Munoz guilty of murder in the first degree
(premeditation and deliberation). The trial court imposed a sentence of 25
years to life in state prison.
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II.
DISCUSSION
Munoz claims: A) the trial court committed instructional error;
and B) the prosecutor committed error during closing arguments.
A. Instructional Error Claims
Munoz argues that the trial court committed instructional error
by using the official jury instructions for murder (CALCRIM No. 520) and
voluntary manslaughter (CALCRIM Nos. 570, 571). We disagree.
Instructional error claims are analyzed under an independent (de
novo) standard of review. (People v. Posey (2004) 32 Cal.4th 193, 218.)
In this part of the discussion, we will: 1) review relevant legal
principles regarding instructional errors; 2) summarize the trial court
proceedings; and 3) analyze the facts as applied to the law.
1. Legal Principles
“Failure to object to instructional error forfeits the issue on
appeal unless the error affects defendant’s substantial rights.” (People v.
Anderson (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 919, 927; People v. Andersen (1994) 26
Cal.App.4th 1241, 1249 [“Ascertaining whether claimed instructional error
affected the substantial rights of the defendant necessarily requires an
examination of the merits of the claim”].)
An appellate court determines whether the trial court fully and
fairly instructed the jury on the applicable law. (People v. Ramos (2008) 163
Cal.App.4th 1082, 1088.) When making this determination, we consider the
instructions taken as a whole, and we presume jurors are intelligent people
capable of understanding and correlating all of the instructions they were
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given. (People v. Hajek and Vo (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1144, 1220, overruled on
other grounds by People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192, 1216.)
“‘Instructions should be interpreted, if possible, so as to support
the judgment rather than defeat it if they are reasonably susceptible to such
interpretation.’” (People v. Ramos, supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at p. 1088.) The
ultimate question is whether there is a reasonable likelihood the jury applied
the instructions that were objected to in an impermissible manner. (People v.
Hajek and Vo, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 1220.)
It is well established that “the Bench Notes and the CALCRIM
jury instructions are not themselves legal authority.” (People v. Johnson
(2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 1247, 1269; see also People v. Mojica (2006) 139
Cal.App.4th 1197, 1204, fn. 4 [“pattern jury instructions are prepared by
distinguished legal scholars and provide a valuable service to the courts, [but]
they are not the law and are not binding”].) However, the Judicial Council’s
pattern jury instructions are “the official instructions for use in the state of
California.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.1050(a).)
“Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being, or a fetus, with
malice aforethought.” (§ 187, subd. (a).) The required “malice may be express
or implied.” (§ 188, subd. (a).)
“Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being without
malice.” (§ 192.) “A defendant commits voluntary manslaughter when a
homicide that is committed either with intent to kill [express malice] or with
conscious disregard for life [implied malice]—and therefore would normally
constitute murder—is nevertheless reduced or mitigated to manslaughter.”
(People v. Bryant (2013) 56 Cal.4th 959, 968; § 189.)
The voluntary manslaughter statute refers to a killing “upon a
sudden quarrel or heat of passion.” (§ 192, subd. (a).) Additionally, according
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to “the doctrine of imperfect self-defense, when the trier of fact finds that a
defendant killed another person because the defendant actually but
unreasonably, believed he was in imminent danger of death or great bodily
injury, the defendant is deemed to have acted without malice and thus can be
convicted of no crime greater than voluntary manslaughter.” (In re Christian
S. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 768, 771.)
A trial court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on voluntary
manslaughter as a lesser included offense of murder where there is evidence
from which a reasonable jury could conclude that sufficient provocation was
present. (People v. Thomas (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 630, 643.) When a
defendant puts provocation at issue by making a sufficient showing to raise a
reasonable doubt, the prosecution must “prove malice beyond a reasonable
doubt by proving that sufficient provocation was lacking.” (Ibid.)
2. Court Proceedings
In this case, the trial court used CALCRIM No. 570, the official
instruction for the crime of murder. In part, the instruction stated:
“The defendant is charged with murder in violation of Penal Code
section 187. To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People
must prove that: [¶] 1. The defendant committed an act that caused the death
of another person; [¶] 2. When the defendant acted, he had a state of mind
called malice aforethought; AND [¶] 3. He killed without lawful justification.
“There are two kinds of malice aforethought, express malice and
implied malice. Proof of either is sufficient to establish the state of mind
required for murder.” (CALCRIM No. 520.)
The court also used CALCRIM No. 570, the official instruction for
the crime of voluntary manslaughter (heat of passion). In part, the
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instruction stated:
“Heat of passion does not require anger, rage, or any specific
emotion. It can be any violent or intense emotion that causes a person to act
without due deliberation and reflection.
“In order for heat of passion to reduce murder to voluntary
manslaughter, the defendant must have acted under the direct and
immediate influence of the provocation as I have defined it. While no specific
type of provocation is required, slight or remote provocation is not sufficient.
Sufficient provocation may occur over a short or a long period of time.
“It is not enough that the defendant was simply provoked. The
defendant is not allowed to set up his own standard of conduct. In deciding
whether the provocation was sufficient, consider whether a person of average
disposition, in the same situation and knowing the same facts, would have
reacted from passion rather than from judgment.
“If enough time passed between the provocation and the killing
for an ordinary person of average disposition to ‘cool off’ and regain his or her
clear reasoning and judgment, then the killing is not reduced to voluntary
manslaughter on this basis.
“The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant did not kill as a result of a sudden quarrel or in the
heat of passion. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the
defendant not guilty of murder.” (CALCRIM No. 570.)
The court also used CALCRIM No. 571, the official instruction for
the crime of voluntary manslaughter (imperfect self-defense). In part, the
instruction stated:
“The defendant acted in imperfect self-defense if: [¶] 1. The
defendant actually believed that he was in imminent danger of being killed or
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suffering great bodily injury; AND [¶] 2. The defendant actually believed that
the immediate use of deadly force was necessary to defend against the
danger; BUT [¶] 3. At least one of those beliefs was unreasonable.
“Belief in future harm is not sufficient, no matter how great or
how likely the harm is believed to be. In evaluating the defendant’s beliefs,
consider all these circumstances as they were known and appeared to the
defendant. [¶] A danger is imminent if, when the fatal wound occurred, the
danger actually existed or the defendant believed it existed. The danger must
seem immediate and present, so that it must be instantly dealt with. It may
not be merely prospective or in the near future.
“If you find that [Martinez] threatened or harmed the defendant
or others in the past, you may consider that information in evaluating the
defendant’s beliefs. [¶] If you find that the defendant knew that [Martinez]
had threatened or harmed others in the past, you may consider that
information in evaluating the defendant’s beliefs. [¶] . . . [¶]
“The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant was not acting in imperfect self-defense. If the
People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of
murder.” (CALCRIM No. 571.)
3. Application and Analysis
The California Supreme Court has generally held that CALCRIM
No. 520 and its predecessor CALJIC No. 8.11 correctly state the law as to the
crime of murder. (See, e.g., People v. Collins (2025) 17 Cal.5th 293, 306, fn. 3;
People v. Chiu (2014) 59 Cal.4th 155, 160, superseded by statute on other
grounds, as noted in People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 848–849; People
v. Mil (2012) 53 Cal.4th 400, 413; People v. Howard (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1000,
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1025; People v. Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139, 152.)
The California Supreme Court has also generally held that
CALCRIM Nos. 570 and 571 correctly state the law as to the crime of
voluntary manslaughter (heat of passion and imperfect self-defense). (See
e.g., People v. Schuller (2023) 15 Cal.5th 237, 254 (Schuller); People v. Elmore
(2014) 59 Cal.4th 121, 131–132; People v. Beltran (2013) 56 Cal.4th 935, 954,
fn. 14; People v. Gonzalez (2012) 54 Cal.4th 643, 660, superseded by statute
on other grounds, as noted in People v. Wilson (2023) 14 Cal.5th 839, 868;
People v. Moore (2011) 51 Cal.4th 386, 412, fn. 8.)
In consideration of binding precedent, we hold that the trial court
did not commit instructional error by utilizing the official jury instructions
for murder (CALCRIM No. 520), and voluntary manslaughter (CALCRIM
Nos. 570, 571). (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d
450, 455 [courts exercising inferior jurisdiction must accept the law as
declared by courts exercising superior jurisdiction].)
Munoz argues CALCRIM No. 520, the pattern jury instruction on
the crime of murder, is “defective when used in cases involving evidence of
manslaughter because it both lacks any reference to the manslaughter-
related considerations that are ‘necessary” to the determination of malice and
contains no indication that the jury should consult any other instruction
before returning a ‘murder’ conviction.” We disagree.
Munoz provides no legal authority for the proposition that a trial
court must instruct the jurors on the elements of two crimes (murder and
manslaughter) within the same jury instruction. Indeed, we think this type of
approach to instructing a jury would be entirely unworkable.
In this case, the trial court further instructed the jury: “Pay
careful attention to all of these instructions and consider them together.”
10
(CALCRIM No. 200, italics added.) The court then separately instructed the
jury on the elements of murder (CALCRIM No. 520), and the elements of
voluntary manslaughter (CALCRIM Nos. 570, 571.)
We presume the jurors followed the court’s instructions and
considered both the murder and voluntary manslaughter instructions
together; Munoz has not provided us with a reason to overcome that
presumption. (People v. Sanchez (2001) 26 Cal.4th 834, 852 [“ Jurors are
presumed able to understand and correlate instructions and are further
presumed to have followed the court’s instructions”].)
Munoz also argues that the California Supreme Court’s opinion
in Schuller, supra, 15 Cal.5th 237, compels a different result. We disagree.
In Schuller, the Supreme Court summarized California’s murder
and manslaughter laws. (Schuller, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 252–257.) As
relevant here, the Court said as to voluntary manslaughter that “California
law recognizes two circumstances where ‘a finding of malice may be
precluded, and the offense limited to manslaughter, even when an unlawful
homicide was committed with intent to kill’ [citation]: (1) when a person kills
‘“‘in a “sudden quarrel or heat of passion” [citation], or . . . [(2) when a person]
kills in “unreasonable self-defense” — the unreasonable but good faith belief
in having to act in self-defense [citations].’”’ [Citation.] ‘These mitigating
circumstances reduce an intentional, unlawful killing from murder to
voluntary manslaughter “by negating the element of malice that otherwise
inheres in such a homicide.”’” (Id. at p. 252, italics added.)
In Schuller, the Court explained that “given how California has
chosen to structure its homicide laws, when imperfect self-defense [or sudden
quarrel/heat of passion] is at issue in a murder case, the People must prove
the absence of that circumstance ‘beyond a reasonable doubt . . . in order to
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establish the . . . element of malice.’” (Schuller, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 253,
257 [“it is well established that when imperfect self-defense is at issue, the
prosecution cannot establish malice without proving the absence of that
circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt”].) The Court noted: “California’s
standard jury instructions on voluntary manslaughter include this
requirement. (CALCRIM Nos. 570 [sudden quarrel/heat of passion], 571
[imperfect self-defense].)” (Id. at p. 254.)
Munoz argues CALCRIM Nos. 570 (heat of passion) and 571
(imperfect self-defense) are at odds with the Court’s holding in Schuller,
because they begin “with the presumption that a killing is ‘otherwise murder’
and telling the jury how it may ‘reduce’ that murder to ‘voluntary
manslaughter’ by finding the killing to have occurred in the heat of passion or
imperfect self-defense.” (Italics added.) We disagree.
In fact, the pattern instructions on voluntary manslaughter
essentially follow the same “reduce” language as used by the Supreme Court
in Schuller. (See Schuller, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 252 [“‘These mitigating
circumstances reduce an intentional, unlawful killing from murder to
voluntary manslaughter’”], italics added.) And the Schuller court explicitly
approved of the language used in CALCRIM No. 570 (heat of passion) and
CALCRIM No. 571 (imperfect self-defense). (See Schuller, supra, 15 Cal.5th
at p. 254 [“California’s standard jury instructions on voluntary manslaughter
include this requirement”].)
To reiterate, we find Munoz’s claims of instructional error have
been forfeited on appeal, and in any event, they are not supported by the
record on appeal and/or any cited case law.
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B. Prosecutorial Misconduct Claims
Munoz claims the prosecutor erred by misstating the law on
voluntary manslaughter during closing arguments. We disagree.
Generally, “an appellate court reviews a trial court’s ruling on
prosecutorial misconduct for abuse of discretion.” (People v. Alvarez (1996) 14
Cal.4th 155, 213.) “The abuse of discretion standard is not a unified standard;
the deference it calls for varies according to the aspect of a trial court’s ruling
under review. The trial court’s findings of fact are reviewed for substantial
evidence, its conclusions of law are reviewed de novo, and its application of
the law to the facts is reversible only if arbitrary and capricious.” (Haraguchi
v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 706, 711–712, fns. omitted.)
In this part of the discussion, we will: 1) review relevant legal
principles regarding prosecutorial error; 2) summarize the trial court
proceedings; and 3) analyze the law as applied to the facts.
1. Relevant Legal Principles
“A prosecutor’s conduct violates the Fourteenth Amendment to
the federal Constitution when it infects the trial with such unfairness as to
make the conviction a denial of due process. Conduct by a prosecutor that
does not render a criminal trial fundamentally unfair is prosecutorial
misconduct under state law only if it involves the use of deceptive or
reprehensible methods to attempt to persuade either the trial court or the
jury.” (People v. Morales (2001) 25 Cal.4th 34, 44.)
Ordinarily, in order to raise an alleged error on appeal, the issue
must first be raised in the trial court. (In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287,
1293, fn. 2.) Specifically, a defendant forfeits a prosecutorial misconduct
claim on appeal unless the defendant objected to the alleged misconduct
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when it occurred at trial, and further asked the court to admonish the jury.
(See People v. Ervine (2009) 47 Cal.4th 745, 806.)
“‘A prosecutor is held to a standard higher than that imposed on
other attorneys because of the unique function he or she performs in
representing the interests, and in exercising the sovereign power, of the
state.’” (People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 819-820.) However, “‘the term
prosecutorial “misconduct” is somewhat of a misnomer to the extent that it
suggests a prosecutor must act with a culpable state of mind. A more apt
description of the transgression is prosecutorial error.’” (People v. Centeno
(2014) 60 Cal.4th 659, 666–667.)
In reviewing a prosecutor’s comments to the jury, “we must view
the statements in the context of the argument as a whole.” (People v. Cole
(2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1203.) Generally, a prosecutor has “‘wide latitude to
discuss and draw inferences from the evidence at trial,’ and whether ‘the
inferences the prosecutor draws are reasonable is for the jury to decide.’”
(Ibid.) The relevant question is “‘whether there is a reasonable likelihood that
the jury construed or applied any of the complained-of remarks in an
objectionable fashion.’” (Id. at pp. 1202–1203.)
A homicide may be reduced to voluntary manslaughter “if the
killer’s reason was actually obscured as the result of a strong passion aroused
by a ‘provocation’ sufficient to cause an ‘“ordinary [person] of average
disposition . . . to act rashly or without due deliberation and reflection, and
from this passion rather than from judgment.”’” (People v. Breverman (1998)
19 Cal.4th 142, 163, italics added, disapproved on other grounds in Schuller,
supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 260, fn. 7.)
Therefore, voluntary manslaughter (heat of passion) has both
subjective and objective elements: the defendant actually killed in the heat of
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passion (the subjective element); and the circumstances giving rise to the
heat of passion—the provocation—would arouse passion in the mind of an
ordinarily reasonable person in similar circumstances (the objective element).
(People v. Steele (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1230, 1253.) In other words, under the
objective element, the “defendant is not permitted to set up his own standard
of conduct.” (Id. at p. 1254.)
2. Trial Court Proceedings
Prior to closing arguments, the trial court verbally instructed the
jury using standard CALCRIM instructions, in relevant part, as follows: “You
must follow the law as I explain it to you even if you disagree with it. If you
believe that the attorneys’ comments on the law conflict with my instructions,
you must follow my instructions.” (CALCRIM No. 200.)
During closing arguments, the prosecutor discussed both the heat
of passion and imperfect self-defense aspects of voluntary manslaughter.
As far as heat of passion is concerned, the prosecutor said during
the lengthy closing argument, in relevant part:
“Heat of passion. You have to show the defendant was provoked.
As a result, he acted rashly and under the influence of intense emotion.
“You say well, okay, Mr. [Prosecutor]. You know, even if he was
provoked by these beliefs in sin, I’m with you so far. Maybe he deserves a
manslaughter. There’s a problem. The provocation would have caused a
person of average disposition to act rashly, without due deliberation, the
person of average disposition.
“And so what is this about? What is this instruction about? What
kind of cases can you imagine? This is an awful scenario, but I think it
invokes a situation where you can understand. A parent walks in and sees a
15
coach putting on his pants, sees a kid with his pants not on. The kid is crying,
and the parent just gets that rage, and the law says look, you can’t do what
you did, you can’t kill like that, but we understand. We could see how a
person of average disposition under those circumstances could do that.”
“It’s not enough that the defendant was simply provoked, okay?
He can’t set up his own standard of conduct. It’s an objective standard.
“Slight or remote provocation isn’t sufficient. There’s enough time
if he cools off. There’s no reason for you to believe the defendant anyway. His
statements are all self-serving. He tries to sit and switch the subject
immediately in the [police] interview. It’s not until the end of the interview
that he actually starts talking about the actual incident, itself. But even if
you do believe him, is this how a person of average disposition would have
reacted from passion rather than judgment? Absolutely not. This is an
inappropriate defense in this case.”
“A person of average disposition would not be enraged about a
killing that [Martinez], a person [who] claimed they killed somebody that the
defendant had broken up with a year before, who said well . . . I don’t care
about her. You don’t care about somebody, and some random homeless guy
says, oh, yeah. I killed that person that day. Ahhh. It’s not going to happen.
Not a person of average disposition. He can’t set his own standards.”
“An average disposition. So heat of passion in this case would
require you to believe that a person of average disposition would believe and
do all of the crazy things that the defendant claims that he did or thought.
That’s off the table. I’m not going to spend any more time on it. . . . [b]ecause
it’s an objective standard. It should be rejected, heat of passion.”
And as far imperfect self-defense is concerned, the prosecutor
said in relevant part:
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“The defendant acted in imperfect self-defense if he actually
believed he was in imminent danger. He must actually have that subjective
belief in his own head that he’s about to be killed. He believed that deadly
force was necessary at that time. [¶] But it’s unreasonable. So this is what
separates it. Imperfect self-defense. We’re saying, look, maybe you were
wrong about something. It was an unreasonable choice, but you’re still guilty
of something; voluntary manslaughter. And in some case[s], this is
appropriate. Not in this case, and I’ll show you why.
“Future harm is not sufficient no matter how great the, likely the
harm is to be. The fact that [Martinez] has these Voodoo powers, if you
actually believe the defendant believed that, which is a stretch of the
imagination to begin with, but even if you really believe that, it’s in the
future. [¶] He didn’t believe he was in imminent danger though. That’s the
problem here.”
3. Application and Analysis
Munoz claims that the prosecutor committed misconduct by
misstating the law on voluntary manslaughter. But Munoz did not object on
these grounds at any time during the trial, and he did not request the court
to admonish the jury, so these claims have been forfeited on appeal. (See
People v. Santana (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 773, 785 [a “‘contrary rule would
deprive the People of the opportunity to cure the defect at trial and would
“permit the defendant to gamble on an acquittal at his trial secure in the
knowledge that a conviction would be reversed on appeal”’”].)
In any event, we find Munoz’s claims to be unsupported by the
record. Based on our review, it appears that the prosecutor discussed the
elements of voluntary manslaughter during his closing arguments in a
17
manner that the prosecutor presumably thought would be persuasive to the
jurors. In reviewing the entire transcript (about 62 pages), we find that the
prosecutor’s explanations of the legal concepts regarding voluntary
manslaughter were largely reiterations and restatements of the court’s
pattern jury instructions. (See CALCRIM Nos. 570, 571.)
For instance, at one point during closing argument the prosecutor
said: “It’s not enough that the defendant was simply provoked, okay? He can’t
set up his own standard of conduct. It’s an objective standard.” This tracks
closely with the pattern jury instruction, which stated: “It is not enough that
the defendant was simply provoked the defendant is not allowed to set up his
own standard of conduct. In deciding whether the provocation was sufficient,
consider whether a person of average disposition in the same situation and
knowing the same facts, would have reacted from passion rather than from
judgment.” (CALCRIM No. 570.)
Moreover, even were we to find that the prosecutor misstated the
law in some minor respects, we would then also presume the jury followed
the court’s specific instruction to “follow the law as I explain it to you, even if
you disagree with it. If you believe that the attorneys’ comments on the law
conflict with my instructions, you must follow my instructions.” (CALCRIM
No. 200; People v. Chhoun (2021) 11 Cal.5th 1, 30 [appellate courts presume
the jurors followed the trial court’s instructions].)
In sum, we find that Munoz’s claims of prosecutorial error have
been forfeited on appeal, and in any event, they are not meritorious.
Martinez argues that the prosecutor “explicitly asserted that the
‘objective’ standard for heat-of-passion manslaughter could only be satisfied if
the average person would ‘kill like that,’ ‘behave exactly as he would’ and ‘do
all the crazy things that the defendant claims that he did.’”
18
We disagree. When taken in context, the prosecutor appeared to
be arguing that the evidence regarding Munoz’s alleged provocation did not
support either the subjective and/or the objective elements of voluntary
manslaughter under either a heat of passion or imperfect self-defense theory.
The jurors were free, of course, to make up their own minds. Once again, the
prosecutor did not appear to misstate the law regarding voluntary
manslaughter during closing arguments and there were no objections. (See
People v. Cole, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 1202–1203 [the relevant question is
“‘whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury construed or applied
any of the complained-of-remarks in an objectionable fashion’”]; People v.
Morales, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 44 [“Conduct by a prosecutor that does not
render a criminal trial fundamentally unfair is prosecutorial misconduct
under state law only if it involves the use of deceptive or reprehensible
methods to attempt to persuade either the trial court or the jury”].)
Munoz argues that People v. Najera (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 212
(Najera), compels a different result. We disagree.
In Najera, “the prosecutor described voluntary manslaughter as a
‘legal fiction.’” (Najera, supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 220.) The prosecutor also
informed the jury that a determination of heat of passion should be based on
the defendant’s conduct in response to the provocation rather than whether
the provocation itself was such that it would cause an ordinary person of
average disposition to act rashly. (Id. at p. 223.) The Court of Appeal
explained that in a voluntary manslaughter (heat of passion) defense: “The
focus is on the provocation—the surrounding circumstances—and whether it
was sufficient to cause a reasonable person to act rashly. How the killer
responded to the provocation and the reasonableness of the response is not
relevant to sudden quarrel or heat of passion.” (Id. at p. 223.)
19
Unlike Najera, the prosecutor in this case did not describe the
crime of voluntary manslaughter as a legal fiction. Rather, the prosecutor
appeared to argue that Munoz’s testimony regarding the purported
provocation by Martinez (e.g., “Voodoo powers”) was not to be believed (the
subjective element) and it was unreasonable (the objective element). That is,
the prosecutor appeared to be arguing that Munoz’s testimony did not meet
either the subjective and/or objective elements for reasonable provocation
(whereas the hypothetical scenario about catching a child molester in the act
of molesting a child would arguably provide reasonable provocation). Thus,
we find that Munoz’s comparison with Najera is not persuasive.
It is true that similar to Najera, there were some point during the
prosecutor’s closing argument that he appeared to focus more on Munoz’s
response to the provocation rather than the reasonableness of the provocation
itself. (See Najera, supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 223.) However, we note that
the jury’s guilty verdict in Najera was ultimately affirmed on appeal because
the appellate court determined that the trial court had, in fact, correctly
instructed the jury on the relevant legal concepts regarding voluntary
manslaughter. (Najera, supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 224.) [“The trial court
correctly instructed the jury to follow the court’s instructions, not the
attorneys’ description of the law, to the extent there was a conflict. We
presume the jury followed that instruction”].)
Here, similar to Najera, and as we found in the earlier portion of
this discussion, the trial court also correctly instructed Munoz’s jury on the
relevant legal concepts regarding voluntary manslaughter.
To reiterate and conclude, we find Munoz’s allegations of
instructional error and prosecutorial misconduct have been forfeited on
20
2
appeal, and in any event, they are not supported by the record.
III.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
MOORE, ACTING P. J.
WE CONCUR:
SANCHEZ, J.
DELANEY, J.
2
In the alternative, Munoz also claims ineffective assistance of
counsel (IAC) because trial counsel failed to object both to the challenged jury
instructions and to the prosecutor’s closing arguments. However, because we
find that the substantive claims of instructional error and prosecutorial
misconduct fail on their merits, we need not address Munoz’s alternative IAC
claims. (See Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 697.)
21
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