Hagele v. Kahn CA1/1

CourtListener 10594902Calctapp29 mai 2025

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Filed 5/29/25 Hagele v. Kahn CA1/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

MICHAEL HAGELE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A171477
v.
MATHEW KAHN et al., (San Francisco County
Super. Ct. No. CGC-24-614474)
Defendants and Appellants,

Defendants Mathew Kahn and Neil Rideout appeal from a trial court
order denying their anti-SLAPP1 motion seeking to strike plaintiff Michael
Hagele’s complaint. We reverse because Hagele has failed to demonstrate a
probability that he will prevail on his complaint.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND
Hagele is an attorney. According to his complaint, the three parties in
this action all held or acquired ownership interests in a company doing
business as the Cigar Bar and Grill in San Francisco. The complaint alleged

1 “SLAPP is an acronym for ‘strategic lawsuit against public

participation.’ ” (Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. LaMarche (2003) 31 Cal.4th 728,
732, fn. 1.) The anti-SLAPP motion was brought under Code of Civil
Procedure section 425.16 (the “anti-SLAPP statute”). All undesignated
statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.

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that the parties used company credit cards for personal expenses and treated
them as membership distributions, although the complaint acknowledged
that Hagele’s personal expenditures were “historically greater than Kahn or
Rideout’s.” The complaint stated that the parties agreed to an arrangement
for equalizing payments to account for their personal-expenditure debts.
In 2019, a purported agreement was allegedly entered under which
Kahn would accept a 10 percent increase in the membership interest to be
“funded by Hagele deducting $115,000 from Kahn’s share of the equalizing
payments.” The complaint stated that by January 2020, Kahn’s increased
membership interest “was fully funded by Hagele deducting the $115,000
from Kahn’s share of the equalizing payments.” According to the complaint,
however, “Kahn repudiated the agreement” in June 2020.
In October 2020, an attorney hired by Kahn and Rideout sent Hagele
an email, which stated as follows: “Hi Michael. We represent Matt Kahn. I
left you a couple of voicemail messages advising that [Kahn] disputes that he
purchased an additional 10% of the [company] from you for approximately
$115,000. We agree with [Kahn’s] position. [Kahn] has also raised additional
issues regarding your use of the company credit card. I suggested in my
voicemail messages that you and I try to resolve the outstanding issues
between you and [Kahn] and the business. I again respectfully request that
you, or your attorney, if you prefer, give me a call at either of my below listed
numbers or otherwise contact me. If we do not hear back from you, it will
leave us no option but to move forward with litigation. Thank you for your
anticipated cooperation. Joe.” (Paragraph breaks omitted.)
The parties failed to resolve the dispute, and in March 2021, Kahn sent
Hagele an email, which stated as follows: “Mike, Please see attached. We
are still open to mediation. Please email . . . us [with] comments or

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resolutions. [Rideout and Kahn].” (Paragraph breaks omitted.) Attached to
the email was a draft complaint. This draft complaint was attached to
Hagele’s complaint in this action, and it is the principal source of Hagele’s
contention that he was menaced.
The draft complaint sought a declaration that any purported agreement
regarding the increase of Kahn’s membership interest was not legally
binding, and it alternatively sought a declaration of the parties’ respective
membership interests and voting rights. In his appellate briefing, Hagele
acknowledges that the validity of the agreement regarding the 10 percent
membership interest was a “good faith” dispute between the parties.
The draft complaint contained some allegations that are central to the
issues in this appeal. These allegations were that Hagele used “[c]ompany
funds for personal expenditures . . . without making payments” and that
“Hagele recorded such personal expenditures as business expenses.” In his
complaint in this action, Hagele alleged that the draft complaint’s allegations
were known to be false and made in bad faith. He characterized them as
“accus[ing him] of unethical and criminal conduct that would be injurious to
[his] character and subject him to possible criminal and California State Bar
investigations.” Also according to Hagele, defendants’ attorney told him “it
would not look good for someone in Hagele’s position as an attorney to have
[the] allegations in the proposed Complaint.” He alleged that in order to
prevent the filing of the draft complaint, in May 2021 he agreed to sell his
interest in the company “for much less than it was worth.” The sale took the
form of a “Settlement Agreement and General Mutual Releases and a
Membership Interests Purchase and Option Agreement.”
Three years later, in May 2024, Hagele brought this suit against Kahn
and Rideout to rescind the settlement agreement. His complaint alleged a

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single cause of action, for “rescission based upon menace.” (Capitalization
omitted.) Hagele claimed that Kahn and Rideout engaged in legal menace by
threatening litigation to induce him into signing the settlement agreement.
In response to Hagele’s complaint in this action, Kahn and Rideout
filed their anti-SLAPP motion, arguing that Hagele’s claim arose from their
protected speech and that Hagele could not show that he was reasonably
likely to prevail on his claim, both because he had failed to show they
engaged in menace and for the independent reason that the complaint was
barred by the litigation privilege. Hagele opposed the motion, arguing that
he had submitted sufficient facts to establish a prima facie case, and he
contended that the litigation privilege did not apply since the privilege does
not apply to claims such as his that sound in contract.
The trial court denied the motion, finding that Hagele had
demonstrated both that his claim was legally sufficient and that there was
sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case on the claim. And the court
further found that defendants failed to show that the litigation privilege
barred the action since there was a factual question over whether litigation
was seriously proposed and contemplated in good faith as a means to
resolving the parties’ dispute.
II.
DISCUSSION
A. General Legal Standards
“The anti-SLAPP statute allows a defendant to move to dismiss ‘certain
unmeritorious claims that are brought to thwart constitutionally protected
speech or petitioning activity.’ [Citation.] The heart of the statute states: ‘A
cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person in
furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech under the United
States Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a public

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issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless the court
determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that
the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.’ (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).)
“In deciding whether to grant a defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion, courts
engage in a two-step, burden-shifting analysis. [Citation.] Under the first
step, a court considers whether the defendant has made ‘a prima facie
showing that the plaintiff’s “cause of action . . . aris[es] from” an act by the
defendant “in furtherance of the [defendant’s] right of petition or free
speech . . . in connection with a public issue.” ’ [Citation.] To make such a
showing, the defendant need not demonstrate that its actions were protected
as a matter of law, but need only establish a prima facie case that the actions
fell into one of the categories listed in section 425.16, subdivision (e).
[Citation.] If the defendant cannot make such a showing, the anti-SLAPP
motion must be denied, and the plaintiff is entitled to continue to litigate the
cause of action. [Citations.]
“But if the defendant can make such a showing, the analysis proceeds
to the second step where the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate
‘that there is a probability that [it] will prevail on the [cause of action].’
(§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) To meet this burden, ‘ “the plaintiff ‘must
demonstrate that the [cause of action] is both legally sufficient and supported
by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if
the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited.’ ” ’ [Citation.] If the
plaintiff meets this burden, the anti-SLAPP motion must be denied, and the
plaintiff is entitled to continue to litigate the cause of action.” (Golden Gate
Land Holdings, LLC v. Direct Action Everywhere (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 82,
88–89 (Golden Gate).)

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When, as here, a defendant relies on an affirmative defense—such as
the litigation privilege—in arguing that the cause of action is legally
insufficient and not supported by sufficient facts, courts have diverged on
which party bears the burden. “Some courts state a defendant bears the
burden of proof on an affirmative defense. [Citations.] Others state the
burden ultimately remains on the plaintiff to demonstrate [the] defense is
‘ “ ‘not applicable to the case as a matter of law or by a prima facie showing of
facts which, if accepted by the trier of fact, would negate such defenses.’ ” ’ ”
(Bently Reserve LP v. Papaliolios (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 418, 434, fn. 7.) In
either event, when “evaluating an affirmative defense in connection with the
second prong of the analysis of an anti-SLAPP motion, the court . . . generally
should consider whether the defendant’s evidence in support of an affirmative
defense is sufficient, and if so, whether the plaintiff has introduced contrary
evidence, which, if accepted, would negate the defense.” (Id. at p. 434.)
In sum, “an anti-SLAPP motion may be granted only if the defendant
first shows that its conduct was constitutionally protected and the plaintiff
then fails to ‘demonstrate its claims have at least “minimal merit.” ’
[Citation.] Stated another way, a trial court may grant an anti-SLAPP
motion—i.e., strike a claim—only if it finds, after applying both steps of the
analysis, that the claim is based on protected activity and lacks minimal
merit. But a trial court must deny an anti-SLAPP motion—i.e., allow the
claim to proceed—if it finds, after applying either step of the analysis, that
the claim is not based on protected activity or has at least minimal merit. We
review de novo the denial of an anti-SLAPP motion.” (Golden Gate, supra,
81 Cal.App.5th at p. 89.)

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B. Hagele’s Complaint Lacks Merit Because Defendants’ Allegations
in the Draft Complaint Were Insufficient as a Matter of Law to
Establish Menace and Were Protected by the Litigation Privilege
There is no dispute that Kahn and Rideout satisfied their initial burden
of showing that the complaint in this action was based on protected activity,
as Hagele acknowledged in his opposition below that his claim arose from
protected activity. Accordingly, the issue in this appeal centers on the second
step of the anti-SLAPP analysis, specifically whether the trial court erred in
finding that Hagele satisfied his burden of showing that the complaint has
minimal merit. The court found that Hagele satisfied this burden because
there are disputed factual issues as to whether Kahn and Rideout knowingly
made false allegations in their draft complaint and as to the application of
the litigation privilege. We conclude to the contrary that the complaint must
be stricken because defendants’ allegations in the draft complaint were
insufficient as a matter of law to establish menace or to negate the
application of the litigation privilege.
To determine whether the plaintiff has shown at the second stage that
the complaint has minimal merit “the plaintiff ‘must demonstrate that the
complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie
showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by
the plaintiff is credited.’ ” (Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif (2006)
39 Cal.4th 260, 291.) “The plaintiff must do so with admissible evidence.
[Citation.] ‘We decide this step of the analysis “on consideration of ‘the
pleadings and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon
which the liability or defense is based.’ (§ 425.16, subd. (b).) Looking at those
affidavits, ‘[w]e do not weigh credibility, nor do we evaluate the weight of the
evidence. Instead, we accept as true all evidence favorable to the
plaintiff.’ ” ’ ” (Optional Capital, Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss, Hauer & Feld

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LLP (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 95, 112–113.) “This second step has been
described as a ‘ “summary-judgment-like procedure.” ’ [Citation.] A court’s
second step ‘inquiry is limited to whether the [opposing party] has stated a
legally sufficient claim and made a prima facie factual showing sufficient to
sustain a favorable judgment. [The court] . . . evaluates the defendant’s
showing only to determine if it defeats the plaintiff’s claim as a matter of
law.’ ” (Id. at p. 113.)
Hagele’s complaint seeks recission of the parties’ prior settlement
agreement on the theory that Kahn and Rideout menaced him into entering
the agreement. “[I]n California menace is technically a threat of duress or a
threat of injury to the person, property, or character of another.” (Odorizzi v.
Bloomfield Sch. Dist. (1966) 246 Cal.App.2d 123, 128.) “ ‘[T]he action or
threat in duress or menace must be unlawful, and a threat to take legal
action is not unlawful unless the party making the threat knows the falsity of
the claim.’ ” (Ibid.) A complaint alleging menace is sufficient if, stripped of
its conclusions, it sets forth sufficient facts to justify legal relief. (Id. at
p. 127.)
We are unconvinced that the allegations in the draft complaint—
stripped of the characterizations and conclusions Hagele ascribes to them—
amounted to menace. In his appellate briefing, Hagele acknowledges that the
validity of the purported deal for him to transfer a 10 percent membership
interest to Kahn in exchange for an offset of his personal debt was a “good
faith dispute between the parties.” Thus, his argument on appeal rests on
allegations about two themes in the draft complaint that he contends were
separate from that good-faith dispute. The first theme was an allegation that
“Hagele recorded his personal uses of Company funds as business expenses.”

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The second theme was a set of allegations that Hagele used company “funds
for personal uses without making equalizing payments.”
We recognize that the parties dispute some of the circumstances
surrounding these themes, but the allegations related to them cannot be
considered to constitute menace as a matter of law under the facts that are
undisputed. The undeveloped allegation in the draft complaint that Hagele
“recorded” his expenditures as business expenses is too vague and uncertain
on its face to be sufficiently menacing. No allegations describe the purpose of
the recording or where it occurred. We cannot agree with Hagele that the
allegation should or must be interpreted as alleging “criminal conduct,” i.e.,
“tax evasion.” And even less menacing were the set of allegations that
Hagele used company funds for personal uses without making equalizing
payments. The first part of those allegations—that Hagele used a company
asset—i.e., a credit card—to pay personal expenses is undisputed. And the
second part—that Hagele did not pay for those expenses—is directly
connected to the acknowledged good-faith dispute. If the deal for Hagele to
pay off his personal credit-card obligations by transferring a 10 percent
interest in the company to Kahn was invalid, as alleged in the draft
complaint, then it would be necessarily true that Hagele had not paid for his
personal expenditures that were part of that deal.
Even if we could construe the allegations in the draft complaint to be
sufficiently menacing, Hagele’s complaint still lacked minimal merit because

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the allegations were protected by the litigation privilege.2
“ ‘[C]ommunications preparatory to or in anticipation of the bringing of an
action or other official proceeding are within the protection of the litigation
privilege of Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b) [citation],[3] [and] such
statements are equally entitled to the benefits of section 425.16.’ ” (Briggs v.
Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106, 1115.) “ ‘ “ ‘A
plaintiff cannot establish a probability of prevailing if the litigation privilege
precludes a defendant’s liability on the claims.’ ” ’ ” (Osborne v. Pleasanton
Automotive Co., LP (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 361, 382; see also Flatley v.
Mauro (2006) 39 Cal.4th 299, 323 [litigation privilege relevant to second step
of anti-SLAPP analysis where it presents substantive defense].)
“ ‘The principal purpose of [the litigation privilege] is to afford litigants
and witnesses [citation] the utmost freedom of access to the courts without
fear of being harassed subsequently by derivative tort actions.’ ” (Action
Apartment Assn., Inc. v. City of Santa Monica (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1232, 1241
(Action Apartment).) Indeed, the privilege “ ‘has been referred to as “the
backbone to an effective and smoothly operating judicial system.” ’ ” (Id. at
pp. 1247–1248.) To achieve its broad purposes, our courts “have given the
litigation privilege a broad interpretation.” (Id. at p. 1241.) “To be protected

2 We reject Hagele’s contention that the litigation privilege is

inapplicable to his request for recission on the ground that it is related to a
contract. The privilege applies to contract claims when it furthers the
privilege’s underlying policies. (See, e.g., McNair v. City and County of San
Francisco (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 1154, 1169–1170.) A rule rejecting the
application of the privilege to requests to rescind a settlement agreement
would contravene these policies by impeding open settlement discussions and
discouraging settlements. (See, e.g., Flickinger v. Finwall (2022)
85 Cal.App.5th 822, 838.)
3 Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b), provides that a privileged

publication is one that is made in any judicial proceeding.

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by the litigation privilege, a communication must be ‘in furtherance of the
objects of the litigation.’ [Citation.] This is ‘part of the requirement that the
communication be connected with, or have some logical relation to, the
action, i.e., that it not be extraneous to the action.’ ” (Id. at p. 1251.)
The privilege protects “communications with ‘ “some relation” to an
anticipated lawsuit.’ ” (Osborne v. Pleasanton Automotive Co., LP, supra,
106 Cal.App.5th at p. 382.) “A party resisting the assertion of the litigation
privilege . . . must do more than simply ‘assert[ ] that litigation to which the
statement is related is without merit, and therefore the proponent of the
litigation could not in good faith have believed it had a legally viable claim.
To adopt such an interpretation would virtually eradicate the litigation
privilege for all but the most clearly meritorious claims.’ ” (Bailey v. Brewer
(2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 781, 790.)
The allegations in the draft complaint about the two themes discussed
above were protected by the litigation privilege. As we have said, the
allegation that Hagele “recorded” his expenditures as business expenses is
vague and does not necessarily allege unlawfulness on Hagele’s part. And
the set of allegations that Hagele used company funds for personal uses
without making equalizing payments were directly connected to the draft
complaint’s “good-faith” dispute regarding the validity of the purported deal
to increase Kahn’s membership interest by 10 percent. In short, Hagele has
pointed to insufficient evidence that, even if accepted, would negate the
application of the litigation privilege.
We are required to interpret broadly both the anti-SLAPP statute and
the litigation privilege. (See § 425.16, subd. (a); Action Apartment, supra,
41 Cal.4th at p. 1241.) In doing so, we must conclude that Hagele failed to

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demonstrate a probability that he will prevail on his complaint and that the
trial court was therefore mistaken in denying the anti-SLAPP motion.
III.
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order denying appellants’ anti-SLAPP motion is
reversed. The case is remanded with directions to the trial court to enter a
new and different order granting the motion. Appellants are awarded their
costs on appeal.

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_________________________
Humes, P. J.

We concur:

_________________________
Banke, J.

_________________________
Smiley, J.

Kahn, et al. v. Hagele (A171477)

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