People v. Avalos CA2/4

CourtListener 10593981Calctapp28 mai 2025

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Filed 5/28/25 P. v. Avalos CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE, B336604

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. A449063)
v.

RICHARD PETER AVALOS

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Maria A. Davalos, Judge. Affirmed.
Eric R. Larson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Heidi Salerno, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
In 1981, Richard Peter Avalos was convicted of first degree
murder following a robbery attempt in which law enforcement
shot and killed a victim Avalos was using as a human shield. A
provocative act theory of murder was the only theory presented
at trial. In 2022, Avalos moved for resentencing under Penal
Code section 1172.6.1 The trial court denied Avalos’s petition at
the prima facie stage. Avalos argues on appeal that his jury
could have relied on a traditional felony murder theory to convict
him. However, the record and the law make clear that a
provocative act theory was the only available theory under the
circumstances of this case. Avalos therefore has not
demonstrated error, so we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Conviction and direct appeal
As stated in Avalos’s direct appeal,2 “The offenses charged
all arose out of an [April 1980] attempt by defendant to rob a
donut shop. In the course of that event, defendant attempted to
rob Jose Luis Trevino (the victim named in count I), his mother
and his sister. During the attempted robbery, he compelled the

1 All undesignated section references are to the Penal Code.

2 People v. Avalos (Feb. 19, 1985) Cr. 41017, opn. ordered
nonpub. Nov. 4, 1985 (Avalos). The Court of Appeal initially
issued a decision in 1982, the Supreme Court granted review and
remanded the case for reconsideration (Nov. 26, 1984, Cr. 22819),
and the 1985 opinion was issued after remand. The recitation of
the facts from the prior appellate opinion is included here solely
for the purpose of efficiently summarizing the background of this
case. We do not rely on these facts in resolving the issue raised
in this appeal.

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victim and the mother, at gun point, to leave the mother’s car and
approach the store. The sister succeeded in going into a back
room and alerting the sheriff’s offices. The deputies arrived
before defendant had actually taken any money into his
possession. On the deputies’ arrival, a confrontation began,
during which defendant, using the victim as a shield, moved
several feet. The defendant opened fire, an exchange of shots
ensued, and Trevino was killed by a bullet fired by one of the
deputies.” (Avalos, supra.)
“Defendant was charged with: (count I) the murder of Jose
Luis Trevino, in violation of section 187 of the Penal Code; (count
II) kidnapping Trevino for the purpose of robbery, in violation of
section 209 of the Penal Code; (count III) attempted robbery of
the mother, in violation of sections 664 and 211 of the Penal
Code; (count IV) attempted robbery of the sister, in violation of
sections 664 and 211 of the Penal Code; (count V) attempted
robbery of Trevino; (count VI) assault with a deadly weapon on
deputy Finley; (count VII) assault with a deadly weapon on
deputy Flaget; and (count VIII) unlawful possession of a firearm
by an ex-felon. Use of a firearm was alleged as to the first seven
counts. In connection with count I (murder) two special
circumstances were alleged: (1) that the murder was committed
during or in flight after a robbery; and (2) that the murder was
committed in connection with a kidnapping. After a trial by jury
[in 1981], defendant was found guilty on counts I, II, III, IV, V,
and VIII: he was found not guilty on count VII and the jury was
deadlocked on count VI, which ultimately was dismissed. On the
murder count, the jury found true the two special circumstances
alleged. At the penalty phase, the jury fixed the penalty as life
without possibility of parole. Defendant was sentenced to state

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prison for life without possibility of parole; sentences on the other
counts were ordered to run concurrently with the sentence on
count I.” (Avalos, supra.)
In Avalos’s direct appeal, the court observed that “[b]oth
the prosecution and the defense admitted that [Avalos] was not
the actual killer, but that the victim had been killed by a bullet
fired by one of the deputies.” (Avalos, supra.) The court found
that the evidence did not support the kidnapping finding. The
court therefore reversed the conviction on count II and modified
the judgment on count I to delete all references to kidnapping.
(Ibid.)
Avalos also argued in his direct appeal “(1) that he cannot
be sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole
under Penal Code section 190.2(a)(17) as the jury was not
instructed that before it could find the special circumstance to be
true, it must find that the defendant intended the killing; and, (2)
that there is insufficient evidence to support such a finding even
if made.” (Avalos, supra.) The appellate court rejected these
arguments. It stated that “the jury was specifically instructed
that before it could find the special circumstance to be true, it
must find that defendant had the intent to kill.” (Ibid.) The
court observed, “Both the prosecution and the defense admitted
that the defendant was not the actual killer, but that the victim
had been killed by a bullet fired by one of the deputies.
Therefore, before finding the special circumstance to be true the
jury must necessarily have found that the defendant intended to
kill or aid in the killing. The instruction given clearly placed the
issue of intent before the jury . . . .” (Ibid.)
The court also rejected Avalos’s contention that there was
insufficient evidence to support the intent-to-kill finding, stating

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that “[c]onsiderable evidence indicates that the defendant knew
his hostage would be killed in a shoot-out with the police. . . . We
do not hold, therefore, that the jury was without substantial
evidence in rendering its verdict.” (Avalos, supra.)
B. Petition for resentencing
In March 2022, Avalos filed a petition for resentencing
under former section 1170.95.3 The court appointed counsel for
Avalos and requested a response from the People. The People
argued that Avalos was not eligible for resentencing as a matter
of law because he had not been convicted under any theory of
murder in which malice was imputed to him.
The People submitted the appellate decision from Avalos’s
direct appeal and the jury instructions given at Avalos’s trial.
The jury was instructed with CALJIC No. 8.12, which stated that
when “intentional conduct is sufficiently provocative that a peace
officer kills another person in a reasonable response to such
intentional conduct, the killing is considered in law to be the act
of the perpetrator.” The jury was also instructed with CALJIC
No. 8.80, relating to special circumstances, which stated, “If the
defendant[ ] was not the actual killer, it must be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt that he intentionally aided, abetted, counseled,
commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or assisted the actual
killer in the commission of the murder in the first degree before
you are permitted to find the alleged special circumstance of that
first degree murder to be true as to the defendant.” In addition,
the jury was instructed with CALJIC No. 8.21, first degree felony
murder.

3 Effective June 30, 2022, former section 1170.95 was
renumbered to section 1172.6 with no change in text. (Stats.
2022, ch. 58, § 10.)

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Avalos, through counsel, filed a reply brief. He argued in
part that the jury was instructed on felony murder, which
allowed the jury to impute malice to Avalos.
At a hearing on January 11, 2024, the trial court discussed
the jury instructions with counsel. The court noted that the jury
instructions and appellate analysis made clear that Avalos was
the “sole perpetrator of the crime” and a police officer was the
shooter. The trial court stated that the jury “necessarily had to
have found that [Avalos] acted with the intent to kill even though
he was not the actual killer, because the actual killer was a police
officer.” The court therefore held that the record contradicted
Avalos’s contention that he could not be convicted under a viable
theory of murder, and denied his petition.
Avalos timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Avalos acknowledges that the provocative act theory of
liability “has generally been held to remain a valid theory of
murder liability subsequent to the changes to the law” relevant to
section 1172.6. He argues, however, that his jury “was instructed
on an alternative felony murder theory of liability for first degree
murder,” and therefore “the record of conviction does not
establish upon which of the two alternative theories the jury
relied upon” to convict him. We are not persuaded.
Section 1172.6 applies to a “person convicted of felony
murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine or other theory under which malice is imputed to a
person based solely on that person's participation in a crime.”
(§ 1172.6, subd. (a).) To obtain relief, a petitioner must show, in
part, that the “petitioner could not presently be convicted of
murder or attempted murder because of changes to Section 188

6
or 189 made effective January 1, 2019.” (Id., subd. (a)(3).) Avalos
has not made this showing.
Avalos was convicted under a provocative act theory of
murder. The phrase “provocative act murder” is “merely
shorthand used ‘for that category of intervening-act causation
cases in which, during commission of a crime, the intermediary
(i.e., a police officer or crime victim) is provoked by the
defendant’s conduct into [a response that results] in someone's
death.’” (People v. Concha (2009) 47 Cal.4th 653, 663.) “The
classic provocative act scenario occurs when a perpetrator of the
underlying crime instigates a gun battle . . . and a police officer . .
. responds with privileged lethal force by returning fire and kills .
. . an innocent bystander.” (People v. Mejia (2012) 211
Cal.App.4th 586, 602-603.)
Since at least 1965, the Supreme Court has held that the
traditional felony-murder rule “cannot be used to impose murder
liability on a felon when, like here, a killing is committed by the
crime victim or a police officer in an effort to thwart the
commission of a listed felony.” (People v. Antonelli (2025) 17
Cal.5th 719, 727,4 citing People v. Washington (1965) 62 Cal.2d
777, 781.) Moreover, case law from the same year “established
that provocative act murder, unlike felony murder, requires proof
of malice aforethought,” specifically that “the provocateur him- or
herself—the perpetrator who initiates the gun battle, for

4 The Supreme Court in People v. Antonelli, supra, held that
under previous precedent, a jury could have imputed malice to a
“nonprovocateur defendant,” so such a defendant is not
necessarily ineligible for section 1172.6 relief. (See People v.
Antonelli, supra, at p. 731.) Avalos was the only perpetrator
here, so the reasoning in Antonelli does not apply.

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example—acts with that mental state.” (People v. Lee (2023) 95
Cal.App.5th 1164, 1177, citing People v. Gilbert (1965) 63 Cal.2d
690, 705.) The provocative act theory “is the only murder theory
available when someone other than the defendant or an
accomplice kills during the commission or attempted commission
of a crime.” (People v. Flores (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 1164, 1168 fn.
1 (Flores).)5
The record does not support Avalos’s contention that it
cannot be “conclusively” determined that the “jury necessarily
convicted [Avalos] under the provocative act theory of liability,”
or that the court impermissibly engaged in judicial “factfinding”6
by determining that Avalos was convicted under a provocative act
theory. The record makes clear that provocative act was the only
theory presented at his trial. As noted in the opinion from his
direct appeal, Avalos was the sole assailant and provocateur, and
“[b]oth the prosecution and the defense admitted that [Avalos]
was not the actual killer, but that the victim had been killed by a
bullet fired by one of the deputies.” (Avalos, supra.) Because

5 Avalos suggests in his opening brief that “felony murder
instructions should not have been given in this case,” but he
clarifies in his reply brief that he is not arguing instructional
error. Indeed, a claim of instructional error cannot be addressed
in an appeal of a ruling under section 1172.6. (See, e.g., Flores,
supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 1173; People v. Burns (2023) 95
Cal.App.5th 862, 867-868.)

6 At the prima facie stage under section 1172.6, “a trial court
should not engage in ‘factfinding involving the weighing of
evidence or the exercise of discretion.’” (People v. Lewis (2021) 11
Cal.5th 952, 972.)

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Avalos was the sole perpetrator, no other person’s malice could
have been imputed to Avalos.
Nor was malice imputed to Avalos based solely on his
participation in the crime. (§§ 188 subd. (a)(3), 1172.6, subd. (a).)
Rather, as the court found in Avalos’s direct appeal, “the jury
must necessarily have found that [Avalos] intended to kill or aid
in the killing. The instruction given clearly placed the issue of
intent before the jury.” (Avalos, supra.) A provocative act
murder conviction that includes a finding that the defendant
personally harbored malice “is fully consistent with the 2019
amendments to section 188.” (Flores, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p.
1173.)
Because provocative act murder was the only theory
presented to the jury, and the provocative act theory remains a
valid theory of murder under the circumstances of this case,
Avalos has not demonstrated that the trial court erred in denying
his section 1172.6 petition at the prima facie stage.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

COLLINS, J.

We concur:

ZUKIN, ACTING P. J. MORI, J.

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