CourtListener 10592207•People v. Young CA1/4
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Filed 5/23/25 P. v. Young CA1/4
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A170232
v.
ARTHUR LEWIS YOUNG, JR., (Alameda County
Super. Ct. No. H44259A)
Defendant and Appellant.
Defendant Arthur Lewis Young, Jr. agreed to plead no contest in a
negotiated disposition with a specified 35-year sentence consisting of two
upper term sentences and a prison prior enhancement. After the Legislature
retroactively invalidated prison prior enhancements and conferred
resentencing authority under Penal Code section 1172.75,1 the People
petitioned the trial court to recall Young’s sentence and to resentence him.
The court granted the requested relief but determined it lacked discretion to
reduce the upper term sentence imposed as a specific part of Young’s plea
agreement. We reverse.
1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
BACKGROUND
I. The Original Sentencing Pursuant to Plea Agreement
In 2011, Young entered a no contest plea to crimes of voluntary
manslaughter (§ 192), possession of a firearm as a felon (former § 12021),
possession for sale of cocaine base (Health & Saf. Code, § 11351.5), and
unlawful possession of a controlled substance while in possession of a firearm
(Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.1, subd. (a)). He also entered a no contest plea
to factual allegations that he personally used a firearm in the commission of
the voluntary manslaughter and that the offense was connected to his
participation in a criminal street gang. (§§ 12022.5, subd. (a), 186.22,
subd. (b)). Young admitted one previous conviction for which he served a
prison term. (Former § 667.5, subd. (b).) The trial court found a factual basis
for each offense, and accepted Young’s no contest pleas to the charges. It also
found the sentence enhancement allegations were true.
In accordance with the terms specified in his plea agreement, the trial
court sentenced Young to 35 years in prison. The agreed upon sentence
consisted of the upper term of 11 years for voluntary manslaughter, the
upper term of 10 years for a firearm use enhancement, 10 years for a gang
enhancement, eight months for possession of a firearm as a felon, and one
year for the prior prison term, as well as two years and four months
consecutive terms for the Health and Safety Code violations.
II. Relevant Legal Developments
When Young was originally sentenced in 2011, in the absence of an
agreed upon disposition, trial courts had discretion to select any term within
a sentencing triad when imposing a determinate sentence. (Former § 1170,
subd. (b), Stats. 2011, ch. 361, § 6.) But when a plea agreement, like Young’s,
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provided for a specific term the court’s discretion was circumscribed to either
accepting or rejecting the deal. (§ 1192.5, subd. (b).)
The Legislature has since enacted several ameliorative changes to
criminal sentencing. Three laws affecting our consideration of Young’s
sentence took effect on January 1, 2022.
Senate Bill No. 567. Senate Bill No. 567 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.)
(Senate Bill 567) amended section 1170, subdivision (b) to limit trial courts’
discretion to impose upper term sentences. (Stats. 2021, ch. 731, § 1.3.)
Specifically, a “court may impose a sentence exceeding the middle term only
when there are circumstances in aggravation of the crime that justify the
imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle term and the
facts underlying those circumstances have been stipulated to by the
defendant or have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the
jury or by the judge in a court trial.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(2), italics added.)
Senate Bill No. 483. In 2019, the Legislature had amended section
667.5, subdivision (b), effective January 1, 2020, to eliminate sentence
enhancements for prison priors unless the prior term was for a sexually
violent offense. (People v. Coddington (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 562, 567
(Coddington); see Stats. 2019, ch. 590, § 1.) Two years later, in Senate Bill
No. 483 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 483), the Legislature made the
relief provided by the 2019 amendment to section 667.5 retroactive by
declaring that prior prison term enhancements imposed before 2020 (again,
other than for a sexually violent offense) were “legally invalid.” (Stats. 2021,
ch. 728, § 3; see former § 1171.1, renumbered § 1172.75 by Stats. 2022, ch. 58,
§ 12.)
Section 1172.75 requires the trial court to verify whether a judgment
includes an invalid prior prison term enhancement and, if so, to “recall the
3
sentence and resentence the defendant.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (c).) During
resentencing, “[t]he court shall apply the sentencing rules of the Judicial
Council and apply any other changes in law that reduce sentences or provide
for judicial discretion so as to eliminate disparity of sentences and to promote
uniformity of sentencing.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(2).) It also provides that
“[u]nless the court originally imposed the upper term, the court may not
impose a sentence exceeding the middle term unless there are circumstances
in aggravation that justify the imposition of a term of imprisonment
exceeding the middle term, and those facts have been stipulated to by the
defendant, or have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the
jury or by the judge in a court trial.” (Id., subd. (d)(4).)
Assembly Bill No. 1540. In Assembly Bill No. 1540 (2021–2022 Reg.
Sess.) (Assembly Bill 1540), the Legislature amended and relocated the recall
and resentencing provisions of section 1170, subdivision (d) to newly created
section 1170.03 (Stats. 2021, ch. 719, §§ 1–7), which has since been
renumbered to section 1172.1, without substantive change. (Stats. 2022,
ch. 58, § 9.)
Under section 1172.1, prosecutors may petition the court to recall a
sentence and resentence the defendant “if the applicable sentencing laws at
the time of original sentencing are subsequently changed by new statutory
authority or case law.” (§ 1172.1, subd. (a)(1).) Echoing the language of
section 1172.75, section 1172.1 mandates that the court “shall apply the
sentencing rules of the Judicial Council and apply any changes in law that
reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to eliminate disparity
of sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing.” (Id., subd. (a)(2).)
Moreover, “[t]he resentencing court may, in the interest of justice and
regardless of whether the original sentence was imposed after a trial or plea
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agreement . . . [¶] [r]educe a defendant’s term of imprisonment by modifying
the sentence” or “[v]acate the defendant’s conviction and impose judgment on
any necessarily included lesser offense . . . .” (Id., subd. (a)(3).)2
III. Young’s Resentencing Pursuant to Sections 1172.75 and 1172.1
In 2024, the People petitioned to recall Young’s sentence. Though they
petitioned to recall his sentence under section 1172.75, the People cited
section 1172.1 as legal grounds to avoid resentencing if Young accepted a new
stipulated sentence. The People “offer[ed] a new sentence of 24 years
(striking the gang enhancement . . . and striking the [one]-year prison prior).”
Moreover, the People stated they would “not object” if the court exercised its
discretion to grant Young additional relief by striking the firearm
enhancement, suggesting “3, 4, or 10 years.” The People acknowledged that
Young “established a positive record of rehabilitation in satisfaction of the
considerations for recall and resentencing contemplated under Penal Code
section 1172.1.”
Young agreed his sentence should be recalled under sections 1172.75
and 1172.1, but he contended he was entitled “to a full resentencing hearing
where all new ameliorative laws apply.” In particular, Young said the court
should apply Senate Bill 567, which he argued invalidated the upper term
sentence for voluntary manslaughter which was part of his stipulated plea
2 Effective January 1, 2024, the court may recall a defendant’s sentence
on its own motion. (Stats. 2023, ch. 446, § 2; § 1172.1, subd. (a)(1).) If it does
so, and “if the conviction was a result of a plea bargain,” then “the court shall
not impose a judgment on any necessarily included lesser offense or lesser
related offense . . . without the concurrence of both the defendant and the
district attorney . . . or the Attorney General . . . .” (§ 1172.1, subd. (a)(4).)
The amendment also moved some language to newly created
subdivision (a)(5) and modified the language to provide the court “shall” — as
opposed to “may” — consider postconviction factors during resentencing.
(Stats. 2023, ch. 446, § 2.)
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bargain. Instead of full resentencing, Young offered to “waive any challenge
to the high-term for voluntary manslaughter” in exchange for a 19-year
sentence. His proposed sentence would require the court to strike the 10-year
gang enhancement and the one-year prison prior, and reduce the 10-year
firearm enhancement to four years. The balance of his original sentence
would remain in effect.
At the resentencing hearing, the trial court agreed that under Senate
Bill 483 the one-year prison prior was invalid and needed to be stricken. But
it further stated that the recall of Young’s sentence “open[ed] up the whole
sentence to a full resentencing hearing.” The court acknowledged that there
is a split in authority regarding whether its new sentence for the voluntary
manslaughter conviction could depart from the upper term that had been
imposed in accord with Young’s plea agreement. Although the cited
authorities did not pertain to resentencing under sections 1172.1 or 1172.75,
the court held it could not depart from the agreed upon upper term. The
court also ruled that the firearm use enhancement still warranted the 10-
year upper term. It otherwise agreed to strike the gang enhancement, and it
imposed concurrent terms on Young’s other offenses, resulting in a new
aggregate sentence of 21 years.
Young appealed.
DISCUSSION
Young argues that “[t]he trial court abused its discretion in imposing
the upper triad terms on the voluntary manslaughter and the gun
enhancement because it failed to exercise its judicial discretion conferred by
sections 1172.75, subdivision (d), 1172.1, subdivision (a), and 1170,
subdivision (b).” The People concede that Young was entitled to full
resentencing under sections 1172.75 and 1172.1 so the court could apply
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ameliorative sentencing laws. Nonetheless, the People argue that section
1170, subdivision (b), as amended by Senate Bill 567 to limit a sentencing
court’s discretion to impose an upper term sentence, is “inapplicable” here
because the trial court “cannot exercise triad discretion when sentencing a
defendant pursuant to a plea agreement that calls for a stipulated term of
imprisonment pursuant to section 1192.5.” Young has the better argument.
I. Standard of Review
We independently review issues of statutory construction. (People v.
Carter (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 960, 967 (Carter).) “Our fundamental task in
interpreting a statute is to ascertain the Legislature’s intent so as to
effectuate its purpose.” (Ibid.) If the statutory text is unambiguous in view
of the broader statutory framework, then it controls. (Ibid.) “ ‘We examine
that language, not in isolation, but in the context of the statutory framework
as a whole to discern its scope and purpose and to harmonize the various
parts of the enactment.’ ” (People v. Prudholme (2023) 14 Cal.5th 961, 975.)
II. Estoppel and Forfeiture
We can readily dispatch the People’s arguments regarding estoppel and
forfeiture. First, the People contend Young’s agreement to a specific term as
part of his plea bargain estops him from asserting error under section 1170,
subdivision (b). Not so.
The People rely on People v. Hester (2000) 22 Cal.4th 290 (Hester).
There, the defendant agreed to a specified sentence that facially violated
section 654 because he received concurrent terms for a burglary charge and
an assault charge which were committed pursuant to a single intent and
objective. (Id. at pp. 293–294.) The Supreme Court held the defendant could
not challenge this unauthorized sentence. (Id. at p. 295.) It explained:
“Where the defendants have pleaded guilty in return for a specified sentence,
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appellate courts will not find error even though the trial court acted in excess
of jurisdiction in reaching that figure, so long as the trial court did not lack
fundamental jurisdiction.” (Ibid.) In short, “defendants are estopped from
complaining of sentences to which they agreed.” (Ibid.)
Hester has no bearing here. Young does not challenge the validity of
his agreed upon sentence. Instead, he is seeking retroactive application of a
later enacted ameliorative sentencing law. (Cf. People v. Stamps (2020)
9 Cal.5th 685, 696 (Stamps) [holding that a certificate of probable cause was
not required because defendant was not challenging the validity of the plea
but was instead seeking application of a subsequently enacted sentencing
provision].) Thus, Young is not estopped from challenging his sentence.
The People’s contention that Young “forfeited any argument that the
superior court had discretion under section 1172.1 to deviate from the upper
term” fares no better.3 (Boldface omitted.) Young counters that the issue
was preserved for review by “counsel’s more general contentions that the trial
court had authority to depart from the original stipulated plea agreement,
and strike the gun enhancement.” Alternatively, Young asks that, if we
conclude the issue is forfeited, we should also conclude that trial counsel
rendered ineffective assistance of counsel.
In his brief to the resentencing court, Young did not argue that section
1172.1 granted the court authority to deviate from the plea agreement. The
only reference in his briefing to Assembly Bill 1540 or section 1172.1 merely
noted the Legislature’s uncodified finding “that lengthy sentences do not
3 The People do not dispute that Young preserved the ability to seek
resentencing relief under section 1172.75. Indeed, in his brief to the trial
court, Young expressly argued that “[s]ection 1172.75 requires recalling Mr.
Young, Jr.’s sentence in its entirety and to hold a full resentencing hearing
where all new laws are applied.” (Boldface omitted.)
8
promote public safety.” And at the resentencing hearing, Young’s counsel
made only an oblique reference to the trial court’s resentencing authority
under section 1172.1 “in the interest of justice.” Nonetheless, it was the
People, not Young, who petitioned for resentencing under sections 1172.75
and 1172.1.
Given the circumstances, we decline to find forfeiture. (See
Coddington, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at pp. 567–568 [declining to find forfeiture
of resentencing claim under section 1172.75 where defendant’s trial counsel
sought to remove only prison-prior enhancement]; People v. Monroe (2022) 85
Cal.App.5th 393, 400 (Monroe) [appellate court has authority to consider
issue not preserved for review].) Accordingly, there is no reason for us to
address Young’s ineffective assistance claim.
III. Resentencing Provisions Under Sections 1172.1 and 1172.75
Apply to Specified Sentences Pursuant to a Plea Bargain
The question before us is whether the trial court abused its discretion
in Young’s resentencing pursuant to sections 1172.1 and 1172.75, when it
refused to consider whether Senate Bill 567’s limitations on imposing an
upper term should apply in his case. We conclude it did.
Where a defendant sentenced before 2020 is “currently serving a term
for a judgment that includes” a prior prison term enhancement (§ 1172.75,
subds. (a), (b)), Senate Bill 483 directs the trial court to “recall the sentence
and resentence the defendant.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (c).) Assembly Bill 1540
likewise calls for the court, upon the request of the district attorney, to “recall
the sentence . . . and resentence the defendant in the same manner as if they
had not previously been sentenced.” (§ 1172.1, subd. (a)(1).) At resentencing,
each statute directs the court to “apply the sentencing rules of the Judicial
Council and apply any other changes in law that reduce sentences or provide
9
for judicial discretion so as to eliminate disparity of sentences and to promote
uniformity of sentencing.” (§§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(2), 1172.1, subd. (a)(2).)
Senate Bill 567 is intended to do just that. It ameliorates sentencing
and seeks to promote uniformity by limiting trial courts’ ability to impose
upper term sentences absent a stipulation by the defendant or a finding of
aggravating circumstances at trial. (§ 1170, subd (b).)
Young did not need to be independently eligible for relief under Senate
Bill 567 to possibly receive its benefit. (Monroe, supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at
p. 401.) Monroe is instructive. There, the trial court struck the defendant’s
one-year prison prior under Senate Bill 483 but did not strike a firearm
enhancement under Senate Bill No. 620 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill
620) (Stats. 2017, ch. 682, §§ 1, 2,) nor did it consider striking a five-year
serious felony conviction under Senate Bill No. 1393 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.)
(Senate Bill 1393) (Stats. 2018, ch. 1013, §§ 1–2). (Monroe, at pp. 398–399.)
Although neither Senate Bill 620 nor Senate Bill 1393 apply to final
judgments by their own terms, defendant appealed. (Monroe, at pp. 398,
400–401.) On appeal, the Attorney General conceded that the trial court
could reconsider the firearm enhancement under Senate Bill 620 because it
expressly applies “ ‘to any resentencing that may occur pursuant to any other
law.’ ” (Monroe, at p. 401.) But the Attorney General argued that Senate Bill
1393 did not apply to a final judgment because it lacked a similar directive.
(Monroe, at pp. 400–401.) Division Two of this court rejected this argument.
Even though the defendant “was not independently eligible for the benefits of
Senate Bill No. 1393 because his conviction was already final,” Monroe holds
that relief under Senate Bill 1393 is nonetheless available during a
resentencing under section 1172.75 because section 1172.75,
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subdivision (d)(2) requires the trial court to apply “ ‘any other changes in law
that reduce sentences.’ ” (Monroe, at pp. 401–402.)
Section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(2) has the same effect here. Despite
the focus on Senate Bill 567 during the resentencing hearing and in the
People’s briefing, we do not need to decide whether Senate Bill 567 entitled
Young to a remand. Young was brought back for resentencing under section
1172.75, and section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(2) gives him the benefit of “any
other changes in law that reduce sentences.” For this reason, we need not
address the question currently pending before Supreme Court, over whether
a defendant who received an upper term sentence under a plea agreement for
a stipulated sentence is entitled to a remand under Senate Bill 567.
(Compare People v. Todd (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 373, 376, review granted Apr.
26, 2023, S279154 [defendant entitled to remand “for resentencing in light of
recent amendments to section 1170, subdivision (b) by Senate Bill No. 567”];
People v. Fox (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 826, 830 [“Fox is independently entitled
to a remand for resentencing under Senate Bill No. 567”]; and People v. De La
Rosa Burgara (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 1054, 1056, review granted Feb. 21,
2024, S283452 [same] with People v. Mitchell (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 1051,
1057–1059, review granted Dec. 14, 2022, S277314 [defendant not entitled to
remand where challenge to her sentence was based on Senate Bill No. 567];
People v. Sallee (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 330, 334, review granted Apr. 26, 2023,
S278690 [same].)
But our inquiry does not end just because Young was properly before
the court on resentencing for all purposes. We still must consider whether
the resentencing provisions of Senate Bill 483 and Assembly Bill 1540 apply
to all sentences, including sentences agreed upon as part of a plea. We
conclude they do.
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Not every retroactive resentencing law applies to convictions imposed
pursuant to a stipulated sentence. (See People v. Brooks (2020) 58
Cal.App.5th 1099, 1107 (Brooks) [“Nothing in the statute suggests an intent
to overturn, sub silentio, long-standing plea-bargaining law binding courts to
the agreements they approve”], superseded by statute as stated in People v.
Harrell (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 161, 166.) Whether a law does so turns on
legislative intent. (People v. Prudholme, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 975.) It is
well established that “the Legislature, for the public good and in furtherance
of public policy, and subject to the limitations imposed by the federal and
state Constitutions, has the authority to modify or invalidate the terms of an
agreement.” (Doe v. Harris (2013) 57 Cal.4th 64, 70; § 1016.8 [“That the
parties enter into a plea agreement does not have the effect of insulating
them from changes in the law that the Legislature has intended to apply to
them”].)
Assembly Bill 1540 unambiguously reflects legislative permission for
resentencing courts to unilaterally modify a plea agreement. Under section
1172.1 the resentencing court may “Reduce a defendant’s term of
imprisonment by modifying the sentence” “regardless of whether the original
sentence was imposed after a trial or plea agreement.” (§ 1172.1,
subd. (a)(3)(A).) This sufficiently demonstrates legislative intent to allow
resentencing courts to modify an agreed-upon term originally imposed as part
of a plea. (Cf. Brooks, supra, 58 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1107–1108 [where
statutory language unambiguously “contemplates the change will apply to all
convictions, final or nonfinal, whether suffered by trial or plea, resentencing
eligibility will follow”].)
Senate Bill 483, on the other hand, does not contain any language that
addresses whether its resentencing procedure applies to defendants whose
12
sentence was imposed as part of a plea agreement. Thus, “the application of
section 1172.75 to plea bargain cases creates a statutory ambiguity when
considered in conjunction with section 1192.5.” (Carter, supra, 97
Cal.App.5th at p. 971.) Nonetheless, every court that has reviewed the issue
has concluded that “a defendant eligible for removal of a prison prior under
section 1172.75 must be provided an opportunity for full resentencing to
argue for further relief under any other ameliorative changes in law that
reduce sentences, regardless of whether their sentence resulted from a plea
agreement.” (Id. at p. 972; Coddington, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 568;
People v. Hernandez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 981, 990 (Hernandez).) Based on
the broader statutory framework, we agree.
The People tacitly conceded in their petition to recall Young’s sentence
that, even though the prison prior enhancement was imposed in accord with
his plea, it is legally invalid and must be struck under section 1172.75,
subdivision (a). Yet the People fail to offer any reason why the resentencing
guidelines under subdivisions (c) and (d) are limited to convictions following a
trial, and not a plea. (Accord Carter, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 975, fn. 5;
Hernandez, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at pp. 992–993.)
As we have previously explained, a retroactive resentencing law which
“eliminat[es] the legal basis for the conviction” suggests legislative intent
that it applies to resentencing in cases where convictions resulted from plea
agreements. (See Brooks, supra, 58 Cal.App.5th at p. 1107.) Section 1172.75
operates this way. It requires recall and resentencing “[i]f the court
determines that the current judgment includes an enhancement described in
subdivision (a).” (§ 1172.75, subd. (c); see Hernandez, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th
at p. 990 [“By its plain terms, section 1172.75 requires a trial court to do
13
more than merely strike the newly ‘invalid’ enhancements”]; Monroe, supra,
85 Cal.App.5th at p. 402 [same].)
The People’s reliance on our reasoning in Brooks is misplaced. Brooks
involved an attempt to recall a sentence under section 1170.91, which
requires consideration of trauma resulting from military service as a
mitigating factor for a court considering a determinate sentencing triad.
(Brooks, supra, 58 Cal.App.5th at p. 1104.) There we held that the
Legislature’s mere addition of a discretionary factor for consideration in
sentencing did not suggest an intent to vest the trial court with discretion to
reconsider a sentence in a way that would modify a plea bargain. (Id. at
p. 1107.) But we distinguished the situation in Brooks from “scenarios in
which resentencing courts were asked to reject stipulated plea agreements
categorically under retroactively conferred resentencing authority.” (Brooks,
at p. 1107.)
Sections 1172.1 and 1172.75 entitled Young to seek relief under “any”
ameliorative changes in the law despite his stipulated sentence. Accordingly,
the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to consider whether the upper
term imposed for voluntary manslaughter pursuant to Young’s plea could be
imposed under section 1170, subdivision (b) as amended by Senate Bill 567.
(People v. Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139, 156.)
IV. The Appropriate Remedy Is Remand for a Full Resentencing
The record does not disclose whether or how the court would have ruled
if it had not been persuaded by inapposite case law that it lacked discretion
to address the upper term sentence imposed pursuant to Young’s plea
bargain. Remand for resentencing is therefore the appropriate remedy. (See
People v. Gamble (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 891, 901.) We are unpersuaded that
remand will be an idle act merely because the court already substantially
14
reduced Young’s sentence, or because Young’s probation report reflected
unmitigated circumstances in aggravation.
Young argues that any remand should be “limited” for the trial court to
consider exercising its discretion under section 1170, subdivision (b). The
People contend that, should we determine there was error, we should remand
for a full resentencing. Here, the People are on stronger ground.
Sections 1172.1 and 1172.75 each state the resentencing court “shall”
apply “any” ameliorative changes in the law. (§§ 1172.1, subd. (a)(2),
1172.75, subd. (d)(2).) One of the few limits on resentencing is that it may
not result in a longer sentence. (§ 1172.1, subd. (a)(1) [“resentence the
defendant in the same manner as if they had not previously been sentenced
. . . provided the new sentence, if any, is no greater than the initial
sentence”]; § 1172.75, subd. (d)(1) [“Resentencing pursuant to this section
shall result in a lesser sentence than the one originally imposed as a result of
the elimination of the repealed enhancement, unless the court finds by clear
and convincing evidence that imposing a lesser sentence would endanger
public safety. Resentencing pursuant to this section shall not result in a
longer sentence than the one originally imposed”].)4 Thus, a full resentencing
is proper.
Finally, Young asserts that should this case be remanded for further
resentencing, “[t]he prosecution is not permitted to renegotiate the plea
agreement in the event that the trial court exercises its discretion to impose a
lower term on count one and/or the gun enhancement.” But he concedes the
issue may not be ripe. The People agree the issue is not ripe, and they
4 Section 1172.1, subdivision (a)(4), which limits the court’s ability to
impose an alternative remedy “[i]f the court has recalled the sentence on its
own motion” and “if the conviction was a result of a plea bargain,” is
inapplicable in the instant case.
15
correctly observe that resentencing will be governed by newly enacted section
1171, effective January 1, 2025. (Assem. Bill No. 2483 (2023–2024 Reg.
Sess.) § 2.) Section 1171 provides direction to courts considering resentencing
under the recent ameliorative statutes affecting sentencing. We agree the
issue is not properly before us. For the benefit of the trial court, however, we
observe there is a split of authority whether the prosecution may withdraw
from the plea agreement under section 1172.75 if the court is inclined on
remand to further reduce a defendant’s sentence. (Compare Coddington,
supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 572 [holding that, if defendant sought a further
sentence reduction beyond the striking of a prison prior and the trial court
agreed, then the prosecution would be entitled to withdraw from the plea
agreement] with Carter, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 973 [“In our view, the
Legislature’s clear directive is that any reduction of the defendant’s sentence
on resentencing shall not be a basis for the prosecutor or the court to
withdraw from a plea agreement”] and Hernandez, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at
p. 992 [siding with Carter].)
DISPOSITION
The matter is remanded to the trial court to conduct a full resentencing
pursuant to sections 1172.1 and 1172.75, and in view of any further changes
pursuant to section 1171.
SIGGINS, J.*
WE CONCUR:
STREETER, ACTING P.J.
GOLDMAN, J.
People v. Young (A170232)
* Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, First Appellate
District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.
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