CourtListener 10592051•PS Advanced Engineering v. Skinclinical Technologies CA2/2
PS Advanced Engineering v. Skinclinical Technologies CA2/2
CourtListener 10592051Calctapp23 mai 2025
Texte intégral
Filed 5/23/25 PS Advanced Engineering v. Skinclinical Technologies CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
PS ADVANCED ENGINEERING et al., B328473
Plaintiffs, Cross-defendants and (Los Angeles County
Appellants, Super. Ct. No. BC659295)
v.
SKINCLINICAL TECHNOLOGIES,
LLC et al.,
Defendants, Cross-complainants
and Respondents.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County. David Sotelo, Judge. Modified and affirmed.
Wen Winny Yang, in pro. per., and for Plaintiffs, Cross-
defendants and Appellants.
No appearance for Defendants, Cross-complainants and
Respondents.
________________________________
PS Advanced Engineering (PSAE), as well as its principals, C.
Don Feak III and Wen Winny Yang, appeal from a judgment in favor of
respondents Skinclinical Technologies, LLC (SCT), Skinclinical LLC
(Skinclinical), Thibiant Beverly Hills, LLC (Thibiant), and True North
Equity, LLC (True North). Appellants became involved with
respondents in a joint venture formed to promote and sell a light-based
device for the treatment of facial wrinkles. The relationship quickly
soured and legal proceedings commenced. Following a bench trial, the
trial court entered judgment, including monetary damages, in favor of
respondents.
Appellants appeal from the judgment. The bulk of their briefing
fails to adequately or accurately summarize the relevant record with
corresponding record citations, and relies on conclusory legal
arguments without reasoned application to the facts. Appellants thus
fail to demonstrate reversible error as to most of their claims.
Appellants do establish material error in one aspect of the trial court’s
calculation of damages, however, and we accordingly modify the
judgment to reflect a correct damages award.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This matter was filed in April 2017. PSAE’s operative third
amended complaint, filed in March 2020, alleged 10 causes of action,
including fraud, misappropriation of trade secrets, and breach of
contract, and named as defendants six entities, including respondents.
Respondents’ operative amended cross-complaint, filed in September
2019, pleaded 19 causes of action, including breach of fiduciary duty,
breach of contract, and fraudulent misrepresentation. It named
appellants as cross-defendants, as well as two legal entities affiliated
with appellants.
The matter went to a bench trial in the spring of 2022. Evidence
was presented over the course of seven days. After issuing a proposed
statement of decision, to which appellants objected at a subsequent
2
hearing, the trial court issued its final statement of decision in
November 2022.
Statement of Decision
The statement of decision sets forth the facts found by the trial
court and the court’s reasoning, in pertinent part, as follows: Feak has
been an electrical engineer for many years. His wife, Yang, is an
attorney. Feak developed a cosmetic device—referred to alternatively
as the “Reverse Device,” “SL-8813,” and “Starlite-OM” (generally, the
device or Reverse Device)— for the treatment of facial wrinkles. In
2014, he met Dr. Harry Glassman, a reconstructive surgeon involved in
the skincare industry. Feak and Glassman, as well as Thibiant, a
company associated with Glassman, discussed the possibility of
refining the device and marketing it through a joint venture. Thibiant
paid $80,000 for a study supporting the efficacy of the device, which
was deemed necessary to explore selling the device on the television
shopping channel QVC. After completion of the study, Thibiant
transferred ownership of the study results to Skinclinical, a company
associated with Thibiant.
In 2015, PSAE continued discussions regarding the possible
formation of a new joint venture. As part of these discussions, Niv
Carmi, another principal of Thibiant, sent e-mails to Feak and Yang
discussing how PSAE would “contribute” ownership of the device to the
new company. Neither Feak nor Yang disagreed with this proposition.
Eventually, Skinclinical and PSAE formed the joint venture SCT
by negotiating and entering into an August 2015 Operating Agreement.
Carmi became the manager and chief operating officer of SCT.
Pursuant to the Operating Agreement, PSAE and Skinclinical each
received an initial 50 percent interest in SCT. Skinclinical agreed to
contribute $20,000 and the study to SCT, and PSAE agreed to
“contribute” and assign to SCT the device. An additional term of the
agreement provided that members of SCT, including PSAE, agreed to
assign any rights, including intellectual property, in defined
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“Inventions” to SCT. At trial, Feak and Yang testified that the Reverse
Device was subject to this assignment requirement.
Shortly after entering into the Operating Agreement, in
September 2015 PSAE was requested to sign a separate Subscription
Agreement. This agreement called for PSAE to contribute ownership of
the Reverse Device along with all intellectual property and related
rights in exchange for PSAE’s ownership interest in SCT. Yang signed
the Subscription Agreement on behalf of PSAE in consultation with
Feak.
Also in September 2015, SCT entered into a Consulting
Agreement with Feak. The agreement called for Feak to receive
$12,500 per month for three years in exchange for providing technical
support for the Reverse Device and developing new devices. The
agreement had a provision allowing for early termination, after written
notice of default, upon the substantial failure by a party to perform
under the agreement.
Around November 2015, when SCT was preparing to market,
manufacture, and sell the device, it determined that it needed
additional capital. Carmi and Herminio Llevat, the two representative
managers of SCT designated by Skinclinical, discussed with Yang (one
of two representative managers designated by PSAE, along with Feak)
the capital needs. As a result of these discussions, and upon written
consent of SCT’s members, Thibiant was added as a member of SCT for
a contribution of $150,000 in exchange for a 2.44 percent interest.
PSAE’s interest accordingly dropped below 50 percent. The written
consent also authorized the issuance of additional membership
interests for a potential contribution of up to $1.5 million. Later, in
April 2016, True North was added as a member of SCT in exchange for
a pledge of collateral in the amount of $1.5 million, which pledge (along
with a concurrent pledge from Skinclinical) secured a loan amount of
$1.5 million from a company called Gemini. In return, True North
received a 20 percent interest in SCT.
4
After an evaluation process in which Feak participated, SCT
engaged a company with a factory in Thailand, Qual-Pro Corporation
(Qual-Pro) to manufacture the Reverse Device. SCT also retained a
separate company to assist with logistics and supply chain
management.
However, notwithstanding the terms of the Operating Agreement
and Subscription Agreement, PSAE refused to give the intellectual
property and design history files of the device to SCT, and, later, PSAE
refused to sign a Bill of Sale and Assignment document formally
transferring the device and associated intellectual property rights to
SCT. Yang testified that PSAE never intended to “sell” the intellectual
property rights. Feak testified that he defined the word “contribute,”
as used in the Operating Agreement, as “allowing access” or “providing
access.” He admitted in testimony that his definition of “contribute”
was different from the dictionary definition. He did not intend to
transfer ownership of the Device or the related intellectual property to
SCT, regardless of the term “contribute.” Skinclinical, as well as
Thibiant and True North, presented evidence that they never would
have agreed to the terms of the joint venture if they knew that PSAE
did not intend to contribute the intellectual property for the device.
By way of a letter dated March 10, 2016, SCT demanded that
PSAE immediately deliver and assign the Reverse Device and all
related intellectual properly pursuant to the Operating Agreement and
related agreements. PSAE, Feak, and Yang continued to refuse to
contribute and assign the device and corresponding intellectual
property to SCT.
Further, in early April 2016, SCT sent to Feak a notice of default
on the Consulting Agreement due to “ ‘substantial failure . . . to
perform [his] duties thereunder.’ ” The numerous defaults identified
included Feak’s “ ‘[n]on-existent, incomplete or inaccurate BOM [Bill of
Materials] and product specifications to provide technical and
production support, resulting in delays, incorrect orders placed to
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suppliers, reworks and added costs and expenses,’ ” his “ ‘[f]ailure to
qualify batteries,’ ” and his “ ‘[u]nprofessional . . . behavior, leading to
. . . unwillingness of any of the team members to work with Mr. Feak
and generating a non-productive and hostile work environment.’ ”
Meanwhile, Skinclinical secured an opportunity for SCT to sell
the Reverse Device on QVC. The initial two runs on QVC in the spring
of 2016 were successful, with the device selling out both times. QVC
made plans to feature the item in the fall of 2016 and placed an order
for more than 27,000 units, while emphasizing that it had strict
delivery expectations for the product.
The opportunity with QVC was hindered by appellants’
disruptive acts, however. In March 2016, Carmi was notified that Feak
was attempting to disrupt the manufacturing process and delaying the
production of the Reverse Device. Further, in April 2016, Feak and
Yang demanded that SCT “ ‘disband,’ ” a demand that SCT refused.
Feak and Yang threatened to harm SCT by contacting QVC, as well as
federal agencies, with false information that would impact SCT’s ability
to sell the device. Moreover, because of Feak’s refusal to give SCT the
documentation relating to the Reverse Device’s intellectual property,
SCT could not obtain regulatory approval to sell the device through
QVC in Europe.
Later, in July 2016, Feak traveled to Thailand and forced his way
into a meeting with a company that supplied an essential plastic
component of the Reverse Device to Qual-Pro, the manufacturer. Feak
demanded that the company remove the mold with the plastic
component from the factory premises and stop producing the
component. The Reverse Device could not be manufactured without the
component, and with production of the component stopped, production
of the device stalled. PSAE eventually relented and allowed some
production to continue, but authorized production of only 20,000 units,
fewer than the 27,000 ordered by QVC. Due to the disruptions caused
by Feak and Yang, including their refusal to transfer ownership of the
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Reverse Device and intellectual property from PSAE to SCT, SCT could
not meet QVC’s purchase orders.
Months after this legal action commenced in April 2017, Feak
started a company in Singapore, Azure Medical Technologies (Azure).
Without informing SCT, Feak used Azure to develop and market a
version of the Reverse Device called the “Orion,” which (according to
Feak’s testimony) was essentially a Reverse Device with a different
finish. Around the same time, Yang created a California corporation,
AMT Global (AMT), that began to sell the Orion. Feak testified that
Azure sold $100,000 to $130,000 of Orion devices and that AMT had
net sales from the product of $65,000 to $265,000.
In light of its findings, the trial court found that PSAE failed to
prove any of its claims. In essence, the court found that PSAE’s lawsuit
was based on the notion that respondents conspired to “steal” PSAE’s
“invention away from it,” but that the evidence favored the opposite
conclusion. Any allegations that PSAE was harmed due to defendants’
conduct were belied by the refusal of PSAE, Feak, and Yang to comply
with the obligations to contribute the Reverse Device and associated
intellectual property to SCT.
As to the cross-complaint, the trial court found that respondents
proved the majority of their causes of action. The court explained the
root cause of SCT’s failure as follows: “[W]hen the Joint Venture here
got started and the Operating and Consulting Agreements were being
negotiated by Yang for PSAE and Feak, Feak was ‘going along for the
ride’—because his wife Yang was pushing the idea, but . . . Feak never
intended to follow through with his promise to contribute the Device to
SCT.” The court continued that Yang later “join[ed] in ‘Feak’s reckless
ride,’ ” and, in refusing to transfer the Reverse Device and intellectual
property, appellants “refused to provide the documentation SCT
requested to aid in the manufacture and licensing of the Reverse
Device.” As a result, “Since SCT could not manufacture the Reverse
Device without the [intellectual property], its sales dropped to $0.”
7
Based on its findings of liability, the trial court awarded
monetary damages on the cross-complaint. Skinclinical was awarded a
total of $2,045,000, consisting of: $1.52 million “it loaned to SCT or had
to cover when SCT defaulted on the Gemini loan”; $120,000 for monies
paid to Feak under the Consulting Agreement; $10,000 for amounts
paid in royalties to PSAE; and $395,000 in disgorgement for improper
sales of the device by Azure and AMT. Thibiant was awarded a total of
$150,000 for the amount “it invested in SCT.” Additionally, True North
was awarded $800,000 for “its repayment of the Gemini loan on SCT’s
behalf.”
Additional Proceedings
The trial court entered judgment in favor of respondents in
February 2023. Appellants filed a timely notice of appeal. Following
the filing of appellants’ opening brief, no respondent’s brief was filed,
and respondents have not otherwise appeared in this appeal.
DISCUSSION
Appellants challenge the judgment in numerous respects. The
bulk of their challenges fail, largely due to substantial deficiencies in
their references to the appellate record and inadequate legal argument.
Appellants are successful on one point, however. The damages amount
awarded in the statement of decision is based on a double-counting of a
defaulted loan amount. We accordingly reduce the total amount
awarded to respondent Skinclinical by $700,000.
I. Deficient Briefing
We start by reciting some basic rules of appellate procedure. “[I]t
is a fundamental principle of appellate procedure that a trial court
judgment is ordinarily presumed to be correct and the burden is on an
appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the record presented to the
appellate court, that the trial court committed an error that justifies
reversal of the judgment.” (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594,
608–609.) An appellant’s obligations on appeal include a discussion of
all significant facts, not just those favorable to the appellant. (Perry v.
8
Kia Motors America, Inc. (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 1088, 1096.) Accurate
and complete citations to the record are also mandatory. (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C) [any reference to a matter in the record must
be supported by a citation to the place in the record where the matter
appears].)
Appellants’ opening brief1 fails to meet these requirements. The
brief’s lengthy statement of facts contains only several citations to the
record. The vast majority of matters referenced contains no citation at
all. We are thus left to guess as to whether (or where) support for
many of appellants’ assertions appear in the record. (See Mansell v.
Board of Administration (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 539, 545 [“We are not
required to search the record to ascertain whether it contains support
for [appellant’s] contentions”].)
Moreover, much of appellants’ narrative of facts is contrary to the
trial court’s own factual summary in the statement of decision.
Appellants’ primary challenges are to the trial court’s findings and the
evidence underlying them. To the extent the briefing focuses on only
the purported facts and evidence favorable to their side, appellants
“fail[] to demonstrate any error and waive[] the contention that the
evidence is insufficient to support the judgment.” (Rayii v. Gatica
(2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 1402, 1408.) “An appellant challenging the
sufficiency of the evidence to support the judgment must cite the
evidence in the record supporting the judgment and explain why such
evidence is insufficient as a matter of law. [Citations.] An appellant
who fails to cite and discuss the evidence supporting the judgment
cannot demonstrate that such evidence is insufficient.” (Ibid.)
1 No respondent’s brief was filed. “[W]e do not treat the failure to
file a respondent’s brief as a ‘default’ (i.e., an admission of error) but
independently examine the record and reverse only if prejudicial error
is found.” (Kennedy v. Eldridge (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1197, 1203.)
9
Finally, the opening brief is also deficient in its failure to
adequately address applicable legal authority. Again, many legal
assertions in the brief do not cite case law or any other legal grounds
for support. These assertions may likewise be treated as waived. (In re
Marriage of Falcone & Fyke (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 964, 1004.)
II. Claims Relating to Liability and Court Conduct
Despite the deficiencies of appellants’ briefing, we address their
arguments regarding the trial court’s findings of liability and a related
claim that the trial court committed misconduct.
Our review is largely dictated by the procedural history of the
case. “In general, in reviewing a judgment based upon a statement of
decision following a bench trial, ‘any conflict in the evidence or
reasonable inferences to be drawn from the facts will be resolved in
support of the determination of the trial court decision. [Citations.]’
[Citation.] In a substantial evidence challenge to a judgment, the
appellate court will ‘consider all of the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prevailing party, giving it the benefit of every
reasonable inference, and resolving conflicts in support of the
[findings]. [Citations.]’ [Citation.] We may not reweigh the evidence
and are bound by the trial court’s credibility determinations.
[Citations.] Moreover, findings of fact are liberally construed to
support the judgment.” (Estate of Young (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 62,
75–76.)
The issues raised by appellants are primarily subject to the
substantial evidence standard of review. “When a trial court’s factual
determination is attacked on the ground that there is no substantial
evidence to sustain it, the power of an appellate court begins and ends
with the determination as to whether, on the entire record, there is
substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which will
support the determination, and when two or more inferences can
reasonably be deduced from the facts, a reviewing court is without
power to substitute its deductions for those of the trial court. If such
10
substantial evidence be found, it is of no consequence that the trial court
believing other evidence, or drawing other reasonable inferences, might
have reached a contrary conclusion.” (Bowers v. Bernards (1984) 150
Cal.App.3d 870, 873–874 (Bowers).)
Appellants’ first argument is that the trial court erred in finding
that the Operating Agreement and related contractual obligations
required PSAE to assign, or transfer ownership, of the Reverse Device
and related intellectual property to SCT. Appellants contend that the
trial court instead should have believed the testimony of Feak. Feak
stated that he defined the contractual term “contribute” as merely
“ ‘allowing access’ ” or “ ‘providing it.’ ”
The trial court was under no obligation to give effect to Feak’s
belief regarding the meaning of the word “contribute.” “When a
contract is reduced to writing, the intention of the parties is to be
ascertained from the writing alone, if possible.” (Civ. Code, § 1639.)
“The words of a contract are to be understood in their ordinary and
popular sense.” (Civ. Code, § 1644.) “When attempting to ascertain the
ordinary, usual meaning of a word, courts appropriately refer to the
dictionary definition of that word.” (Wasatch Property Management v.
Degrate (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1111, 1121–1122.) The trial court in this
case appropriately considered the dictionary definition of “contribute”
as “to give.” No further analysis was required.
Moreover, even if consideration of extrinsic evidence was
warranted to discern the meaning of “contribute,” the evidence at trial
supported a conclusion that Feak and Yang themselves effectively
agreed with the trial court’s definition. Discussions prior to formation
of the joint venture included the point that PSAE would contribute
ownership of the device to the new company, Feak and Yang both
testified that the Reverse Device was subject to the Operating
Agreement’s assignment requirement, and the Subscription
Agreement, which was signed by Yang, called for PSAE to contribute
ownership of the Reverse Device along with all intellectual property
11
and related rights in exchange for PSAE’s ownership interest in SCT.
Appellants thus fail to demonstrate that the trial court erred in finding
that PSAE was required to “give” the Reverse Device and related
intellectual property to SCT by assigning it, rather than merely
“allowing access” to it.2
Appellants next take issue with the trial court’s evidentiary
determination that Feak breached his Consulting Agreement.
Appellants fault the trial court for relying, in part, on a “notice of
default” issued to Feak detailing his asserted breaches. Appellants do
not provide an adequate explanation or summary of the relevant record
related to this issue, however, and therefore cannot demonstrate error.
In any event, Michael Vitek (who, according to the opening brief,
“testified for SCT at trial”) testified regarding a number of wrongful
acts committed by Feak—including that Feak refused to contribute
intellectual property and created disruptions at SCT—providing
substantial evidentiary support for the trial court’s determination.
Appellants also argue that the trial court erred in finding that
appellants’ actions (rather than respondents’) were the primary cause
of SCT’s problems. Again, among other evidence, Vitek testified as to
various ways in which appellants’ conduct harmed the business,
including through their lack of cooperation regarding the product
manufacturing. Considering this and related testimony, the trial
court’s finding is supported by substantial evidence, and it is
immaterial whether the trial court might have reached a differing
conclusion. (See Bowers, supra, 150 Cal.App.3d at p. 874.) Relatedly,
2 Appellants’ related contention that the Subscription Agreement
was invalid because Yang signed it “under duress” is unavailing
because, even if the trial court did not consider the Subscription
Agreement, there was an adequate basis to find that the obligation to
“contribute” was an obligation to “give.” In any event, appellants do not
show that the trial court could not properly consider the terms of the
Subscription Agreement in determining PSAE’s commitments.
12
appellants argue that the trial court should have found that
respondents breached fiduciary duties owed to PSAE. As this was an
issue where appellants bore the burden of proof at trial, appellants
must demonstrate on appeal that the evidence in their favor was
“ ‘ “ ‘(1) “uncontradicted and unimpeached” and (2) “of such a character
and weight as to leave no room for a judicial determination that it was
insufficient to support a finding.” ’ ” ’ ” (Garcia v. KND Development 52,
LLC (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 736, 744.) Appellants’ briefing is
insufficient to make this showing and, in any event, the record shows
that the evidence relating to claimed breach of fiduciary duties was (at
a minimum) not uncontradicted.
Appellants’ next contention is that the trial court committed
misconduct and exhibited bias against appellants by the manner in
which it characterized and weighed the evidence. It is well settled that
judicial conduct becomes impermissible bias only when it is “ ‘ “so
prejudicial that it denie[s] [a party] a fair, as opposed to a perfect,
trial.” ’ ” (Arave v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. (2018)
19 Cal.App.5th 525, 536–537.) Dissatisfaction with a trial court’s
rulings does not establish judicial bias. (People v. Guerra (2006) 37
Cal.4th 1067, 1112, overruled on another ground in People v. Rundle
(2008) 43 Cal.4th 76, 151.) At their essence, appellants’ complaints
about the trial court’s findings are based on little more than an
assertion that the court should have sided with appellants over
respondents. That is an insufficient basis for a claim of judicial
misconduct.
Finally, appellants argue that the statement of decision contains
“derogatory and insulting remarks about Feak and Yang.” When an
appearance of “ ‘judicial bias and unfairness colors the entire record,’ ”
reversal can be warranted. (Haluck v. Ricoh Electronics, Inc. (2007)
151 Cal.App.4th 994, 1008.) “ ‘The test is not whether plaintiff has
proved harm, but whether the court’s comments would cause a
reasonable person to doubt the impartiality of the judge or would cause
13
us to lack confidence in the fairness of the proceedings such as would
necessitate reversal.’ ” (Ibid.)
In this case, an appearance of bias and unfairness does not color
the entire record. Appellants complain about portions of the statement
of decision, including a description of Feak as “appear[ing] to fit the
caricature of the strong-willed, mad-scientist-inventor, who is not only
ALWAYS RIGHT about everything, but who’s [sic] CREATION is so
much an extension of himself, that to lose even partial control of it
would to him be like ‘cutting off his hand.’ ” The trial court also wrote
that “Feak’s personal characteristics simply did and do not ‘allow him’
to accept the commercial reality of having to ‘contribute’ his invention
to—to share his device—with the newly created Joint Venture SCT.
Feak’s entire conduct after entry into the Operating Agreement and
during this trial, reveals a consistent attitude: ‘I don’t care what I
signed! To heck with what my wife wants me to do, SCT can’t have my
Device! Its [sic] mine! And it’s mine ALONE!’ ” While this language is
excessively colorful and ultimately unhelpful, the statement of decision
runs 45 pages, and the court’s characterizations of Feak cover only a
small portion of the decision. Furthermore, although the court got
carried away with its descriptions of Feak, the conclusion that Feak
adamantly resisted contributing the device does find support in the
record. Appellants’ claim of judicial misconduct therefore fails.
III. Damages
Although the opening brief is deficient in numerous respects, it
does adequately identify one material error in the statement of decision
and subsequent judgment.
The statement of decision awarded a total of $2,045,000 in
damages to respondent Skinclinical. One-and-a-half million dollars of
this total was awarded to Skinclinical for amounts “it loaned to SCT or
14
had to cover when SCT defaulted on the Gemini loan.”3 Respondent
True North, meanwhile, was awarded $800,000 for “its repayment of
the Gemini loan on SCT’s behalf.”
Evidence at trial showed that two loans originated from Gemini,
and that these loan amounts totaled $1.5 million. The statement of
decision likewise referenced this $1.5 million total loan amount. There
was no evidence of any additional loans. The statement of decision,
however, awards a total of $2.3 million in damages accruing from
default on the Gemini loans—$1.5 million to Skinclinical and $800,000
to True North.
The statement of decision, therefore, double-counts the $800,000
that True North repaid on “the Gemini loan on SCT’s behalf,” in the
$1.5 million that Skinclinical “loaned to SCT or had to cover when SCT
defaulted on the Gemini loan.” There is no indication from the record
or from the statement of decision that total loans in an amount greater
than $1.5 million were made. Moreover, the record contains no
evidence that any interest (or other charges) additional to the principal
amount was owed or incurred. Because the record contains evidence of
only $1.5 million in total loan amounts outstanding, the trial court’s
award of $2.3 million for loan-related damages is erroneous.
According to the Statement of Decision, an $800,000 payment
was made by True North for “repayment of the Gemini loan on SCT’s
behalf.” That leaves $700,000 in total loan-related damages remaining.
The $1.5 million awarded to Skinclinical for loan-related damages must
therefore be reduced to $700,000. Accordingly, we modify the judgment
to reflect a total damages award to Skinclinical of $1,345,000, with the
rest of the judgment remaining the same.
3 The statement of decision refers to an amount of $1.52 million,
but the opening brief explains that $20,000 of this total represented
Skinclinical’s initial investment in SCT.
15
The remainder of appellants’ arguments fail. Appellants
complain about the statement of decision’s conclusion that $395,000 be
disgorged to account for Azure and AMT’s sales of the device.
Appellants acknowledge, however, that $395,000 in total sales was
within the range of the total sales amount testified to by Feak. Any
claim that this total was incorrect, or that the trial court made other
errors in assessing damages, is not supported by the evidence.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is modified by reducing total damages awarded to
respondent Skinclinical, LLC by $700,000, resulting in a total award of
$1,345,000 to Skinclinical, LLC. As modified, the judgment is affirmed.
The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
LUI, P. J.
We concur:
ASHMANN-GERST, J.
CHAVEZ, J.
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