CourtListener 10592046•People v. Woosley CA3
Texte intégral
Filed 5/23/25 P. v. Woosley CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
----
THE PEOPLE, C099036
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 23FE001712)
v.
AARON MICHAEL WOOSLEY,
Defendant and Appellant.
After a jury found defendant Aaron Michael Woosley guilty of numerous offenses,
the trial court sentenced him to an aggregate term of 15 years four months in state prison.
On appeal, Woosley contends the court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence
under Penal Code1 section 1538.5 and that his sentence for possession of ammunition
should have been stayed under section 654. Neither contention has merit. We affirm.
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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BACKGROUND
On February 2, 2023, police stopped Woosley in his car near his residence. An
officer searched the car and found “baggies” of various narcotics, drug paraphernalia, and
a lockbox containing a loaded .45-caliber Beretta handgun. Officers also searched
Woosley’s residence and found an AR-15-style rifle with a loaded magazine of .223-
caliber rounds, a .22-caliber long rifle loaded with .22-caliber rounds, two boxes of .45-
caliber ammunition in one safe, three boxes of .45-caliber ammunition in a different safe,
and a bag containing magazines, live ammunition, and gun tools.
The People charged Woosley with possession of methamphetamine for sale
(Health & Saf. Code, § 11378), possession of fentanyl for sale (id., § 11351), possession
of heroin for sale (ibid.), possession of a .223-caliber AR-15 rifle as a felon (Pen. Code,
§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)), possession of a .22-caliber rifle as a felon (ibid.), possession of a
.45-caliber Beretta handgun as a felon (ibid.), and possession of ammunition as a felon
(Pen. Code, § 30305, subd. (a)(1)). As to the possession of methamphetamine, the People
alleged the methamphetamine’s weight exceeded one kilogram. (Health & Saf. Code,
§ 11370.4, subd. (b)(1).) The People further alleged several aggravating circumstances
and a prior strike conviction.
At the preliminary hearing on February 23, 2023, Woosley entered pleas of not
guilty, denied all allegations, and requested a jury trial “within time.” The trial court
stated: “Not guilty pleas and denials are entered. That triggers your right to have a jury
trial within 60 days. That would be April 24th is the 60th day.” The trial readiness
conference occurred on March 29, 2023.
On April 19, 2023, Woosley filed a motion to quash the search warrant and
suppress evidence pursuant to section 1538.5. At the hearing that same day, the trial
court told the parties: “I think we all agree that it makes more sense to do the pretrial
conference today and then pick our jury Monday morning with the anticipation that we
would start up with openings and evidence on Monday afternoon as soon as the jury is
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picked.” (Italics added.) The court then reviewed the procedures for voir dire, took a
jury trial waiver from Woosley as to the prior strike and aggravating circumstances, and
considered the parties’ motions in limine.
As to the motion to suppress, the court noted that Woosley failed to bring the
motion before the issuing magistrate, under section 1538.5, subdivision (b), and also
failed to bring the motion at the preliminary hearing, under section 1538.5, subdivision
(f). The court explained that Woosley could bring the motion at a special hearing under
section 1538.5, subdivision (i), but under that provision, Woosley “has to give the People
at least ten days[’] notice unless the People are willing to waive time.” Given that the
People were not willing to waive notice, the court concluded the motion could not
procedurally be brought as nothing in section 1538.5 permitted the court to excuse the
notice requirement for good cause. The court then stated it would deny the motion
regardless because there was probable cause for the warrant. Defense counsel stated for
the record that he received the case after the preliminary hearing; that he had been in trial
since the trial readiness conference; and that Woosley had not been prepared to waive
time for trial.
At the end of the April 19 pretrial conference, the trial court asked the parties
when was the “last day” the trial could begin. The parties responded the last day was
Monday, April 24, 2023. The court said, “Okay. So we’ll be technically starting the last
day.” Defense counsel responded, “Yeah. As long as we’re picking a jury on Monday,
we’re fine.” The minute order for the April 19 hearing labeled the proceedings as
“Pretrial Conference and Jury Trial Day 1.” (Boldface & some capitalization omitted.)
On April 24, 2023, a jury was selected and sworn in. The jury found Woosley
guilty on all counts but did not reach a verdict as to the methamphetamine weight
allegation. At a bench trial, the trial court found most of the alleged aggravating
circumstances true and found that Woosley had suffered a prior strike conviction. The
court sentenced Woosley to an aggregate term of 15 years four months consisting of six
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years for methamphetamine possession (the upper term doubled due to the prior strike),
two years each for heroin possession and fentanyl possession (one-third of the middle
term, doubled), and one year four months each for the three firearm possession
convictions and the ammunition possession conviction (one-third of the middle term,
doubled). Woosley filed a timely notice of appeal in July 2023. His opening brief was
filed in August 2024, and this case became fully briefed on March 7, 2025.
DISCUSSION
Motion to Suppress
Woosley argues the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress under
section 1538.5.
As a threshold matter, the parties dispute which subdivision of section 1538.5
applied to Woosley’s motion to suppress. Woosley submits that, because trial had
already started when he made the motion, the motion was governed by section 1538.5,
subdivision (h). That provision states that “[i]f, prior to the trial of a felony or
misdemeanor, opportunity for this motion did not exist or the defendant was not aware of
the grounds for the motion, the defendant shall have the right to make this motion during
the course of trial.” (§ 1538.5, subd. (h), italics added.) In Woosley’s view, because this
provision applied, the trial court erred by failing to realize it had discretion to hear the
motion and by not concluding that defense counsel had established good cause for
making the motion during trial.
The People argue the relevant statute is section 1538.5, subdivision (i), which
provides that “the defendant shall have the right to renew or make the motion at a special
hearing relating to the validity of the search or seizure which shall be heard prior to trial
and at least 10 court days after notice to the people, unless the people are willing to waive
a portion of this time.” (Italics added.) In the People’s view, the trial court correctly
applied this provision to conclude that Woosley’s motion was untimely because trial was
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set to begin in fewer than 10 court days and there would thus be inadequate notice to the
People.
The People have the better argument. Woosley points to no authority interpreting
when a trial begins for the purposes of section 1538.5. But under any plain meaning
understanding of the statute, it is evident that trial had not yet started when he brought the
motion to suppress on April 19. A jury had not been selected or sworn in, no opening
arguments had been made, and no witnesses had testified. Moreover, the trial court and
the parties (including defense counsel) openly discussed that the trial would begin five
days later, on the following Monday. Woosley’s sole argument for why trial had already
begun when the motion was brought is that the April 19 minute order labels the
proceedings as “Pretrial Conference and Jury Trial Day 1.” But this labeling does not
dictate the outcome here—especially given that every other indication (including
Woosley’s own contemporaneous understanding) was that the trial had yet to begin.
Accordingly, the motion to suppress was not made “during the course of trial” and
section 1538.5, subdivision (h) did not apply. As the trial court observed, Woosley could
still “make the motion at a special hearing . . . which shall be heard prior to trial” under
section 1538.5, subdivision (i). That hearing, however, had to occur “at least 10 court
days after notice to the people.” (§ 1538.5, subd. (i).) Given that trial was set to begin
(and had to begin) in fewer than 10 court days, Woosley’s motion did not provide the
necessary notice to the People for such a hearing and was thus untimely. (See Moreno v.
Superior Court (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d 932, 935 [explaining that § 1538.5, subd. (i)
“makes it clear that the prosecution is entitled to 10 days’ notice of the motion. The only
reasonable construction of the notice requirement is that a defendant must file his motion
at least 10 days before the date set for trial”].)
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Woosley insists the trial court should have still applied the exception in section
1538.5, subdivision (h) because “opportunity for th[e] motion did not exist” previously.
This argument is unavailing because, even assuming the exception could apply when the
motion was brought, Woosley failed to make the necessary showing.
People v. Frazier (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 807 is instructive on this point. There,
the defendant moved to exclude evidence on the first day of trial. (Id. at p. 829.) The
motion alleged that “ ‘the defense was previously unaware of the grounds for bringing
this motion, and no opportunity existed prior to trial to bring the motion, given present
counsel’s late entry into the case.’ ” (Ibid.) The trial court rejected the motion,
explaining: “ ‘I understand that the particular trial counsel may have come in late, but the
evidence itself appears to have been known to the Defense or should have been known.
The facts are not new.’ ” (Ibid.) The court affirmed the trial court’s ruling:
“Defendant’s counsel had been employed on the case for two months prior to trial. . . .
Because defendant presented no persuasive justification for the delay in bringing the
motion, the trial court’s denial was not error.” (Ibid.)
Here, defense counsel claimed he had been busy at trial since the trial readiness
conference on March 29. But nothing in the record establishes why he did not bring the
motion before then, given that counsel had represented Woosley since the preliminary
hearing. There also is no explanation why Woosley’s prior counsel did not bring the
motion at the preliminary hearing. Woosley maintains that his trial counsel “filed the . . .
motion as soon as possible,” but that conclusory assertion is unsupported. Accordingly,
even if section 1538.5, subdivision (h) could apply here, Woosley failed to adequately
establish that “opportunity for this motion did not exist” prior to trial.
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Section 654
Woosley next contends the trial court erred by not staying his sentence under
section 654 for possession of ammunition because he was also being sentenced for the
possession of various firearms. We disagree.
Section 654, subdivision (a) provides that “[a]n act or omission that is punishable
in different ways by different provisions of law may be punished under either of such
provisions, but in no case shall the act or omission be punished under more than one
provision.” To permit multiple punishments, “ ‘there must be evidence to support a
finding the defendant formed a separate intent and objective for each offense for which
he was sentenced.’ ” (People v. Coleman (1989) 48 Cal.3d 112, 162.) Where the trial
court does not stay a sentence pursuant to section 654 and offers no factual basis for its
decision, we presume the court found the defendant harbored a separate intent and
objective for each offense. (See People v. Jones (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1147.)
“We review the trial court’s determination in the light most favorable to the respondent
and presume the existence of every fact the trial court could reasonably deduce from the
evidence.” (Id. at p. 1143.) We must uphold the trial court’s finding if substantial
evidence supports it. (People v. Fuentes (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 670, 680.)
Woosley relies principally on People v. Lopez (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 132, 138-
139, which held that section 654 precludes punishment for both firearm possession and
ammunition possession offenses “[w]here . . . all of the ammunition is loaded into the
firearm.” Here, Woosley possessed ammunition separate from the loaded firearm. More
specifically, Woosley possessed five boxes of .45-caliber ammunition in two different
safes in his residence whereas the loaded .45-caliber handgun was found in Woosley’s
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vehicle. The trial court reasonably could have concluded the evidence demonstrated
Woosley’s intent to use the stored, unloaded ammunition at a later time for a separate
purpose. Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s implied
determination that section 654 did not apply.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
/s/
BOULWARE EURIE, Acting P. J.
We concur:
/s/
MESIWALA, J.
/s/
WISEMAN, J.
Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
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